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Abstract 
The late twentieth century saw a major wave of democratisation against the 
unjust military seizure of state power in many countries around the world. In 
Bangladesh, General Hussain Muhammad Ershad seized power in March 1982 
ousting the then democratic government through a military coup and continued up to 
December 1990 until he was forced, by a mass revolution, to relinquish power to the 
interim Caretaker Government of the country. The dominance of the military 
intrigue over the state and political elites has resulted in sharp inter-group conflict in 
the society that deflected the normal democratic values: liberty, impunity, equality 
and freedom. A military committed to a professional rather than a political role is 
critical to the success of democracy. The military dictatorship of General Ershad in 
Bangladesh, is therefore, regarded as the aggression by the state on her own people. 
The movement for restoration of democracy was thus the attempt to change the 
military dictatorship. The movement included sporadic protests, strikes, riots, 
rebellions, violence and more continuous activities of organised political parties and 
interest groups of the society. The mainstream opposition political parties and their 
alliances, along with different socio-cultural forces i. e. students, laborers, 
intellectuals and professionals of Bangladesh society organised the movement. The 
middle class took the lead while the involvement of the lower class of the society 
ensured huge participation. A number of protesters were killed; many others injured 
and jailed in the course of various repressive measures taken by the military 
administration. This gave birth to counter violence in the opposition democratic 
forces. This research, with both qualitative and quantitative approaches, investigates 
the social origins of the movement for democracy in Bangladesh that brought about 
a significant social change in the social structure for the development of capitalist 
democracy. This research confirms that the military dictatorship of General Ershad 
had negative consequences in every respect-spreading corruption, plundering the 
economy, damage to constitutional rule and political institutions, and a complete 
ruin of the electoral process of the country. Finally, the research substantiates the 
power and strength of the people in making the revolution, which is always 
invincible-the most worthy spirit needful for the success of democracy, and this 
was exactly what happened in the final stage of the movement for the restoration of 
democracy in Bangladesh in the overthrow of the military dictatorship of General 
Ershad. 
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Preface 
Democracy has an enormous appeal' and indeed `an ideal that billions of 
people in all parts of the globe revere and aspire to". The movement for democracy 
in nations around the world is thus a universal objective to the freedom of mankind. 
In the late twentieth century numerous states of Asia, Africa and Latin America saw 
a major wave of the consolidation of democratic transition-mostly by movements, 
revolutions and mass upsurges against the authoritarian military dictatorships. 
People of these regions had been struggling for long periods to restore human rights 
and liberty that led them to organise mass resistance against the military autocracy in 
order to establish democracy. Bangladesh was ruled by authoritarian military 
regimes for most of the time since her birth in 1971. The most unprecedented 
damage to both of its democracy and nation building was made by the military 
dictatorship of General Ershad that was toppled by a historic pro-democracy mass 
uprising in December 1990. It was transformed into a heroic civil revolution against 
the rule of the criminals of the barrack-monstrous enemies of democracy, which 
was marked as the victory of the democratic forces against the power greedy military 
of the country. 
The transition to democracy in Bangladesh resulted from a convergence of 
dynamic socio-political forces where mass electoral politics was damaged mostly by 
military dictatorship of General Ershad. This was only because the budding strength 
of military institution in the post independent years posed a threat to the political 
institutions of the country. In this milieu, a host of powerful variables-the 
diplomatic efforts of the international democratic order including super powers, the 
UNO and the Commonwealth, the community of transnational non-governmental 
organizations, and the immense indigenous pro-democracy movements-have 
speeded up the process of transition to democracy and shaping its trajectory 
peacefully. In this event, the democratic transition in Bangladesh was able to provide 
a complete new ideal-the Caretaker Government-an interim constitutional 
authority to supervise a free and fair elections. The negative consequence of this 
whole process was that the military gangsters were able to survive the punishment 
for their crimes that left the rooms to reversal of autocracy in future or at least, put at 
risk of the development of post-dictatorship democratic institutions in the country. 
For nearly a decade, the democratic forces of the country including political 
parties and many socio-cultural forces spilled their blood-sacrificed a number of 
lives in the streets against the autocratic and wild regime of the army demons under 
General Ershad. This movement included the non-violent sit-in, strike, hunger- 
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strike, human-chain, petition march, public gathering protest etc. -although these 
always turned to violent on the wake of police atrocities-and violent sporadic 
protests, riots, rebellions and more continuous activities of organised political parties 
and interest groups of the society. This research investigates the nature of the 
conflict under the military dictatorship of General Ershad-the various actions of the 
opposition forces and the social origins of the democracy movement that brought 
about a significant social change to the contemporary social structure of Bangladesh 
society. 
The research project required extensive field work. The field work was 
planned for six months to operate a social survey among the leaders of various 
socio-cultural and political forces who took the lead in the mass upsurge of 1990 
that overthrew the military dictator. The field work collected data from 10 years of 
national dailies and weeklies and archives, presentation of seminars and audio 
interviews of the key political leaders of the movement. The field work was started 
in October 2002 and finished in May, 2003. It was nearly 12 years after the fall of 
the military junta and for a third term a democratic civilian government under BNP- 
led alliance was in power. Unfortunately, the then government had to employ the 
Army to help with the control of the law and order situation of the country at that 
time. A number of leaders of different socio-cultural and political organisations were 
arrested and the rest were hiding, which disrupted the normal situation in the 
operation of the survey. The survey questionnaire included some significant 
questions on the military interventions of General Ershad. As a result, many leaders 
were found to be in fear to answer the questions regarding military rule, but they at 
last agreed to answer the questions when it was ensured that their names would not 
be disclosed. As a researcher, I always felt myself insecure while working under the 
intense observation of different intelligence agencies all the time of the field work 
period. I had to carry a conflict in me-fought between the threat to life and eternal 
courage in me for democracy. Although the spirit for democracy and an aspiration in 
me for the freedom of mankind has won at the end, however, has left a life long 
threat to my own survival, which I believe would never be able to defeat my honest 
wisdom for the survival of democracy in Bangladesh society. 
In carrying out this study I have made use of the works of other scholars, and 
in particular, the academic works of my teacher Professor Rangalal Sen-an eminent 
political sociologist of contemporary South Asia who was influenced with the 
philosophy of his teacher British sociologist Professor Tom Bottomore-has broadly 
influenced me with the articulation of thoughts in the secondary base of this 
research, especially his academic excellence to analyze the social structure of 
Bangladesh has helped me to explore the formation of social base of the movement 
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for restoration of Democracy. Most significantly, the empirical outlook of Dr Paul 
Bagguley-my supervisor at Leeds to analyze the actions of contemporary political 
movements has led my research to incorporate a dynamics of a rare combination of 
primary and empirical understanding with secondary sources. In this regard, I also 
owe my debts to late Professor Syed Ahmed Khan and Professor Ishrat Shamim- 
my methodology teachers at the Department of Sociology, University of Dhaka who 
gave me elementary training on the use of quantative methods in sociological 
research. However, this joint endeavours of qualitative and quantative approaches 
have followed the analysis of all the propositions of this research. 
In this thesis I shall endeavor to understand three propositions: how the 
military dictatorship of General Ershad destroyed the constitutional democracy of 
Bangladesh; how the movement of opposition democratic forces was able to restore 
democracy in the country; and how both of these events were related to the 
contemporary social structure of Bangladesh. In chapter one I provide a more 
detailed summery of the central arguments of the thesis that include the clarification 
of the concepts such as the `military dictatorship of General Ershad', `movement', 
and `restoration of democracy' and how this study relates political sociology. In 
chapter two I provide a detailed theoretical framework of this research which is able 
to consider most of the contemporary critics on social and political movements and 
their relation with Bangladesh movement and able to focus the central arguments of 
the propositions for empirical observation. This chapter is divided into two 
dimensions: micro theories and macro theories. Micro theories examine all types of 
means used in the movement, i. e. the actions of the movement: protest march, strike, 
seize, non-cooperation and violence and repressive measures used by the military 
dictator. On the other hand, macro theories relate the Bangladesh movement with 
world perspective. In chapter three I have detailed the methodology of this research. 
In chapter four I am keen to focus on the rise of military dictatorship in 
Bangladesh that has followed an empirical analysis of four dimensions of the Ershad 
regime: immediate views on the military intervention of General Ershad; causes of 
the military seizure of power; consequences of this military dictatorship and the 
repressive measures used by his military administration to surpass the opposition 
movement. All of these dimensions under a number of factors are able to resolve the 
central arguments of the proposition regarding the military seizure of power by 
General Ershad. In chapter five and six I argue that to understand the formation of 
the social base and the development of democratic forces for the movement for 
restoration of democracy. These describe all the socio-economic factors pertinent to 
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the movement: socio-economic issues, pattern of the transformation of the 
agriculture into the non-agricultural sectors and various dimensions of different 
socio-political forces of the country: political parties and alliance, different interest 
and pressure groups: student forces, professionals, intellectuals, trade unions, and 
non-participatory groups such as business community, NGOs, religious groups and 
eminent personalities and witnesses of the important actions. This focuses on what 
scale of change of all these are related to the birth of a new social formation, in 
which a more powerful democratic forces grew up and organised a successful 
movement against military dictatorship. 
. 
In Chapter seven and eight I have elaborated the detailed wave of the 
movements by dates and different pattern and their effectiveness of all actions 
organised by the opposition democratic forces. The chapter seven describes the 
movement actions of the opposition democratic forces in detail from the date of 
assumption of power by the military dictator until he was toppled in December 1990. 
What was happened during these nine years of the military autocracy-the events, 
actions and consequences, their progress, repressions and killings-are illustrated by 
dates and time. Many memories are included here from the evidences of audio 
interviews of the key leaders of the movement. The chapter eight focuses on the 
various types of actions organised in the movement with huge examples such as 
non-violent protest marches, petition marches, mass gatherings, demonstrations, sit- 
ins, hartals (strikes), hunger strikes, non-cooperation or civil disobedience, human 
chains, seizes, and elections. It also entails violent attacks, barricades, blockades, 
riots, rebellions, clashes, destroying public transports, guerrilla fights resulting in 
harassing bombing, firings, killings of the government forces and officials etc. A 
unique comparison between the four major actions-protest marches, hartal, public 
meeting and violence-by years in graphical presentation have been illustrated that 
collected by dates from major local dailies from 1982 to 1990 along with a views on 
the effectiveness of the actions by different movement forces membership have also 
resolved the arguments on the ability of opposition forces to organise a credible 
movement against the military dictatorship of General Ershad. 
The argument about the leaderships is a very crucial phenomenon in the 
analysis of any movement that I have tried to raise in chapter nine. This focuses on 
the different types and layers of the movement leaderships that consider the 
leadership of political parties, student bodies, intellectual and professional 
organisations and trade unions from the central, regional and periphery branches of 
the country under two dimensions of the command: vertical and horizontal 
leadership of the movement. An empirical analysis on the political leadership has 
been incorporated in this chapter along with an exclusive comparison between key 
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movement leaders: Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia on the basis of different 
leaderships' criteria. Chapter ten has resolved the arguments on some critical issues 
of the movement that developed huge debates and controversies mainly on the basis 
of empirical analysis. Among others, the debates on the participation and non- 
participation in the general elections of 1986, the failure of the formation of the 
united platform of the movement, the level of sacrifice of different movement forces 
and the role of the different diplomatic missions in the movement are worth 
mentioning in this regard. The concluding chapter gives a final answer to the 
problems of the project. This generates an overall discussion which helps us to 
understand how the military institution in Bangladesh was a barrier on the process of 
democratisation and how this problem would be resolved. In this connection, this 
tries to raise the future problems and prospects of the movement for democratisation 
in the country. 
Finally I conclude that the military of Bangladesh was found to be betray an 
interest in every respect in the process of democratisation under the authoritarian 
military dictatorship of General Ershad. The strength and power of the people in 
making a revolution proved enough to deracinate the last root of this kind of 
unconstitutional military dictatorship. For the continuation of the process of 
democratisation, a national reconciliation between all civilian political forces and 
civic quarters has been an incessant event of popular demand to uproot this military 
intrigue from the last edge of power politics. 
PART I 
BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1. Preamble 
This thesis generates significant new knowledge about the political process 
of Bangladesh' concerned with the movement for restoration of democracy from 
1982 to 1990 against the fascist military dictatorship of General Hussain 
Muhammad Ershad (here after Ershad). The Late twentieth century saw a major 
wave of transitions to democracy in many countries around the world. This process 
of democratisation was curbed in the 1970s to 1980s in those countries of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America where authoritarian regimes were established, in most 
cases, as a consequence of military seizure of state power. The people of these 
regions had been struggling for a long period of time to restore human rights and 
liberty, and endeavoured to organise movements against the military autocracy in 
order to establish democracy. Bangladesh was ruled by authoritarian military 
regimes for most of the time since it was born in December 1971. It was the first 
country in the world following the Second World War to have achieved her 
independence as a consequence of traumatic civil war against the ruling civil- 
military clique of Pakistan. Immediately after independence, parliamentary 
democracy was established by the supreme leader of the liberation war, the Father of 
the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman2, although a one-party socialist 
reform was introduced following the Fourth Constitutional Amendment later on in 
January 1975. The reign of Sheikh Mujib was toppled with the beginning of an 
unconstitutional practice of a change of power in the state apparatus of this newly 
born country. The fatal attack came first from an unexpected quarter, following a 
military coup in August 1975, in which Sheikh Mujib and almost all of his family 
members were assassinated by a group of young army officers, most of whom were 
repatriated from the Pakistan Army immediately after the liberation of the country. 
General Ziaur Rahman 3 assumed political power on the tail end of a clutch of coups 
in the country by the first week of November 1975. He had attempted to civilianise 
his military regime through the presidential election in 1978, in which he was made 
President, and in the JS election of 1979, his BNP was returned with the absolute 
majority with allegations of voting frauds. In the administration, despite the 
appearance of parliament and politicians, the central decision making process was 
still under the firm control of military officers with the clandestine support of civil 
bureaucracy. However, President Ziaur Rahman was murdered in May, 1981 by a 
rebel group of army officers during a visit in Chittagong, a divisional and port city 
of the south-western part of the country. The civilian Vice-President, Justice Abdus 
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Satter took over as acting President' and elected President following a presidential 
election in November 1981. 
After Zia's death the Army was far too divided and discredited to attempt to 
seize power from the civilian government, but no sooner had it sorted out its 
immediate quarrels than the Chief of the Army, General Ershad "demanded the 
creation of a `National Security Council' consisting of the three defence chiefs 
which would have powers of veto over the decisions of the cabinet" (Gowher Rizvi 
in Clapham and Philip ed. 1985: 223). In the struggle that ensuing the outcome was 
inevitable. General Ershad dismissed the President and cabinet and seized power 
announcing Martial Law on March 24,19825. The country's political development 
had returned to where it had started after the death of Sheikh Mujib in 1975. The 
authoritarian military dictatorship of General Ershad continued up to 6th December 
1990 when he, due to a mass revolution against his regime, was compelled to 
handover power to the Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, the chief of the Caretaker 
Government, according to the constitutional provision of the country. Through the 
general elections held on 27`h February, 1991 under the Caretaker Government6 
power was transferred to the elected representative of the Jatya Sangshad (JS) 
[National Parliament]. Finally, the civilian political supremacy was established over 
military in the country and created a passage to free and democratic society. 
1.2. The Movement for Democracy: Related Issues 
The words `movement for restoration of democracy' in this research have 
focused on the struggle of the people of Bangladesh society, as a popular notion, to 
end the repressions in socio-political life in the wake of an illegal and autocratic 
military fascism-the dictatorship of General Ershad as well as the meaningful 
introduction of representative government that is primarily administered under a free 
and fair application of adult franchise in which the democratic and political forces 
are able to participate without any apprehension. This aim towards the reinstatement 
of democratic rule is familiar in the contemporary trends of democratisation process 
around the world. With this objective, the nature of various local components and 
existing democratic institutions must be considered as how far these were damaged 
under the junta regime. In addition, the nature of integration and reconciliation of 
the democratic forces outside the metaphor of the dictatorship is considered as an 
inevitable factor, which is able to define the pattern of democratic transition. This 
issue needs to be addressed to spell out the justification of the movement articulating 
the central definitions-the sense of restoration of democracy, pattern of actions and 
involved democratic forces and their interactions with socio-economic changes-the 
concern of political sociology. 
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1.2.1. Why this Movement? 
The `Armed Forces'-gently accentuated in military literature now a days, 
which is, in fact, a militia institution under the republic, had participated in an 
illegal seizure of the state power'7 beyond the rules and regulations, and norms and 
values designed for it in the constitution. Later a one man dictatorship-a genuine 
military fascism that had a `divine repugnance for being crystallized into a State' 
leading to a `fascist State', which is, `more than a State, a dynamo' 8 -was 
established in all spheres of political process of the country. In this connection, the 
dictator was found to be very blunt that he had shared all of his actions with the top 
rank Generals vis-a-vis high officials of the civil administration. 9 For eight years, he 
`maintained a firm grip over the 115 million inhabitants' and `ascended to the 
presidency in controversial elections, in which major opposition parties refused to 
participate' as the `confidence of electoral process had been eroded by serious and 
repeated complaints of partiality in the administration of elections, violence at the 
polls, and the intimidating environment in which elections were held'. 10 The 
increasing dominance of the civil-military clique over political elites and the 
resulting sharp inter group political conflicts deflected the normal course of 
democratic values: liberty, equality and freedom in all spheres of the society. The 
military ruler used repressive measures to sustain his power with countless killings, 
injuries, arrests, harassment, etc in the wake of conflicts and riots during the actions 
of democratic forces. The violation of constitutional orders, the destruction of the 
political process, the establishment of one man rule and killing of hundreds of 
political workers for the interest of the continuation of his rule had made him an 
unprecedented despotic and fascist military dictator in the history of the country. 
Thus the removal of this dictatorial military rule of General Ershad by means of a 
vigorous movement was inevitable and earned support from all corners of 
Bangladesh society. 
1.2.2. What is meant by `Restoration' of Democracy? 
The vital argument may be raised with the word `restoration' in this research. 
Did democracy exist meaningfully in Bangladesh society at that moment so that it 
was lost by the introduction of military seizure of power that needed to be restored? 
The nation achieved both its independence and rule of democracy with the triumph 
of the liberation war in 1971 that ended colonial military rule of Pakistan. It is fact 
that a `child tree' of democracy in the post independent years, which was still in the 
watering stage and struggled for breath and broaching for stability and consistency, 
had been forced to death with the introduction of military rule in the country. But the 
term-movement for the restoration of democracy-seems to have some uncertainty 
regarding the application of its starting period, which ought to be resolved here. First, 
since the removal of the civilian AL regime in a military coup in 1975 that turned 
-5- 
the country into an undemocratic one-the absence of any attempt for trial of the 
involved military gangsters-moreover found stopping the trial by changing the 
constitution"-the popular sense is in favour of the term to be in effect since the 
killing of Bangabandhu in 1975. Second, considering contemporary third world 
political legacies12, the military regime of General Zia-all activities since the 
August coup 1975 that were absorbed in the constitution by the Fifth Amendment in 
1979 and legalised all of the `illegal military orders and misdeeds of the military 
administration' 13-which, however, restarted a continuation of constitutional rule in 
the country. The presidential election of 1981 in which Justice Satter was made 
President had followed the constitutional process and hence, the Government of the 
BNP under Justice Satter was constitutionally legal. Under the threat of evolving 
military fascism, the democracy lay in the constitution rather than in function. In the 
aggression of military fascism in the state power under the command of General 
Ershad, the democracy had lost its ongoing constitutional base that removed all hope 
for the development of democratic liberties and institutions in the society. In this 
sense, one may consider the term to be function since 1982-on and after the 
military takeover. However, this research has limited the notion of the term to be 
used for second argument-the period of democracy movement under military 
dictatorship of General Ershad. 
1.2.3. The Instrumental Forces of the Movement 
The movement for restoration of democracy was made possible by the 
peoples' aspirations leading to a mass revolution with continuous actions organised 
mainly by political parties and their allies, and different socio-cultural forces of 
Bangladesh Society. The forces of the movement made a determined attempt to 
change the military regime of General Ershad, which followed different types of 
actions and initiatives: individual resistance, actions of political forces, struggles for 
implementation of the demands of interest and pressure groups, instances of joint 
endeavours, and above all, unity of the opposition forces in the observance of all 
actions. In the hallmark of this process, the political parties and their allies of socio- 
cultural forces-interest (pressure) groups including the students, intellectuals, 
professionals and labourers were likely to plan and perform the joint actions and 
programmes irrespective of national and local interests. Hence, the research looks 
upon the frequencies, participations and effectiveness of different actions of the 
opposition democratic forces for the cause of democracy. 
The nature and characteristics of the opposition forces have been crucial in the 
analysis of the movement. The opposition to the military dictator were divided into 
three categories: political parties and alliances, interest (pressure) groups and non- 
participatory groups and supporters of the movement. First, the number of existed 
political parties in the country was nearly one hundred. " The major opposition 
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political parties included the Bangladesh Awami League (AL), Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP), National Socialist Party (JSD) 15, Communist Part`' of 
Bangladesh (CPB), Bangladesher Workers Party (BWP), Muslim League (ML) and 
Jamaat-I-Islami Bangladesh (JIB) etc. The research has followed five categories for 
all of these parties following their ideological stands: first, the AL, linked with a 
combination of semi-bourgeoisie and pro socialist ideology; second, the BNP known 
as rightwing pro capitalist and pro religious; third, leftist-I for pro-Moscow leftists 
(Marxist-Leninist) primarily the CPB; fourth, leftist-2 for pro-China radical leftists 
primarily the JSD and BWP, and the fifth, the JIB, the collaborator political forces 
with Pakistan Army during the liberation war of the country that stands for pro 
Moududi religious fundamentalism and other Islamic Parties (IPs) including 
different parts of the ML and Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ) etc.. These categories of 
political forces were also considered as two distinct groups: the AL, CPB, JSD and 
BWP are considered to be `pro-liberation forces"6 and the JIB and the ML as 'anti- 
liberation fundamentalist forces'. '? The BNP maintains a clever balance between the 
two with a slightly closer link to the latter. 
These political parties were united under two major alliances to employ their 
united efforts in the movement for democracy: the 15-Party alliance under the 
leadership of AL and its leader Sheikh Hasina and the 7-Party alliance under the 
leadership of BNP and its leader Begum Khaleda Zia. There was a small alliance of 
Islamic parties as IOJ other than the JIB. The development of `interest or pressure 
groups' 18 in the post-independent periods, especially those, who had a wider 
political role in the national level, did not have any typical difference. The interest or 
pressure groups that participated in the movement were divided into four categories: 
students, intellectuals, professionals and trade unions of the working class labourers. 
All of these groups had their home agenda and demands in their own interest that 
transferred as the icon of pressures groups while they used to join with the political 
forces for the national cause-the movement for restoration of democracy. The 
political forces also included their demands in the central charter of demands of the 
movement turning them into auxiliary forces of the movement as well as 
transforming them, in a suitable space of time and location, into pressure groups 
against military administration for the implementation of their own agenda. Among 
them the intellectuals and professionals including the teachers of colleges and 
universities, poets, authors, artists, doctors, engineers and government and non- 
government officials acted as an important part of `civil society"9, which was more 
effective in the formation of democratic norms and values in socio-cultural sphere of 
the society. This also resembles the notion of a `public sphere' used by German 
social scientist Habermas. 20 
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The students' forces in Bangladesh worked as the affiliated bodies of political 
parties. 2' The main student forces of the movement included BCL, JCD, JSD, BSU. 
BSF, BCM and BICS. In the beginning of the military regime, the CSAC ww as 
formed by 14 student bodies of the pro capitalist and pro leftist progressive groups 
under the leadership of the BCL22 and a few years later under the leadership of 
JCD23, the SAA was formed by 7 rightist student groups. In final stage of the 
movement in 1990, the APSU was formed by all rightist and leftist student groups 
consisting of 22 student bodies including the rival BCL and JCD that had the 
pioneering role in organising the mass uprising that ended the military dictatorship. 
The trade unions of workers and labourers included the associations of all of the 
fourth to lower grades working class employees of the industrial set ups, 
government and non-government and semi-government offices under their national 
organisation SKOP. The Non-Participatory Group (NPG) of the movement does 
mean those who had the cognisant supports for the movement but did not take part 
directly in the actions. These groups included high level religious personalities, 
NGOs officials, business magnets, individual witness of movement for long period 
and the Persona the Greta of the society-a salient component of the civil society, 
who were respected by almost all of the society. However, the research focuses on 
the process of the development of these groups as movement forces and investigates 
the pattern of the inter relationship between the memberships of different movement 
forces and their views on many factors and issues related to the movement, which 
make it possible to understand the nature and scale of how they interact within and 
between the groups in the process of democratisation. 
1.2.4. How does this study relate to Political Sociology? 
The movement for the restoration of democracy in any country is a veritable 
subject matter of political sociology which `is concerned with power in its social 
context'24. By power is meant here the ability of an organised social or political 
group to pursue a course of action to reach the desired goal. 
25 It is also concerned 
with power in its political context that these organised groups have a desire to 
compete for political position in any stage of the state mechanism, from central to 
periphery. This is only possible when they conquer the economic set backs around 
them and brings a favourable social sphere for the change in the ruling power 
structure. The economic change in its way fetches the changes in social classes 
providing with a new shape, status and power, which carry a social value in their 
aspiration in organising the movement. The question has automatically come across 
the different views if the necessary components are already developed in the 
movement forces parallel to their counter group so that they have the ability to 
overthrow the existing power elites. These components include mostly the economic 
transformation resulting in the development of intellectuals and civic quarters, 
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science and technology, infrastructure, and communications etc of the existing social 
structure. The relations of these socio-economic changes build up a necessary new 
class for the movement for restoration of democracy, and how and in what extent 
these components were able to reach the stage of maturity in accordance with the 
fall of the authoritarian military dictatorship, which is the concern of political 
sociology. In brief, it concerns how far the socio-economic changes in the post 
independent Bangladesh are related to the movement for restoration of democracy. 
In more categorical form, the process of democratisation involves the crisis of the 
development of industrial and entrepreneurial capitalist society and how far the 
Bangladesh society in 1990 was able to fulfil this condition. The British established 
agro-based industries until 1947, growth of mercantile capital during the colonial 
rule of Pakistan and development of farming and cottage industries along with 
service sectors up to 1990 in the post-independent periods and a considerable 
operation of the NGOs, especially in rural Bangladesh, were among other hubs of 
the economic developments that made this society suitable for the process of 
democratisation. The concerns of how and in what level these changes have initiated 
the formation of a suitable force for the success of the movement for the restoration 
of democracy-the key arguments of the study of political sociology. 
1.3. Plan of the Thesis 
In this thesis I am concerned with three propositions: i) the military 
dictatorship of General Ershad had enormous consequences on the society that 
destroyed the space for the practice of democracy in state power; ii) the successful 
movement with a range of actions of the opposition democratic forces was able to 
restore the democratic rule; and finally, iii) the movement for restoration of 
democracy was related to the changing social structure of Bangladesh society that is 
concerned with the central issue of political sociology. These arguments based on 
different subsequent factors are illustrated through chapter two to nine with the 
application of secondary sources information along with a complementary 
quantitative analysis, generated from the closed questionnaire interview of 206 
research samples from the different movement forces memberships of the four 
divisional cities of Bangladesh. The structure of the survey samples consists of 
political parties (46), students (25) intellectuals (30), professionals (30), trade unions 
(30) and non-participatory groups (45) (See chapter 3 for details methodology of this 
research). The survey with extensive statistical analysis tries to resolve the major 
arguments of the central propositions of the research. A comparison between the 
frequencies of four major actions: protest march, public meeting, hartal and use of 
violence have needed to understand the density and dimension of the actions used in 
the movement. There are also some audio interviews with the key leaderships of the 
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movement and military leader to answer some critical debates on different turning 
points of the movement. A detailed literature review has been conducted on the 
military intervention and the process of democratisation around the world in which 
the characteristics of military regime of General Ershad-causes and consequences 
and pattern has to be detailed; the development of a necessary democratic forces and 
their detailed actions through which a chronology of the movement events for the 
whole period of the military rule were based need to be analysed; the development 
of leadership which was also a very crucial element has to be examined; some 
conflicts of issues that happened beyond a general expectation have to be addressed; 
and finally, the social aspects-the situation of detailed socio-economic variables 
towards the construction of pro-movement social formation has required to be 
concentrated. 
At the micro level, the sociological analysis has set off an investigation 
between the relationships on the views of the memberships of different opposition 
democratic socio-political forces regarding the issues on military aggression into the 
state power and since then onward, how the formative political and social forces 
responded against them in the process of democratisation. Hence the main focus to 
investigate is how the interaction of these opposition forces made the movement 
successful against the military dictatorship, which is linked to all three propositions 
of the research. The social origins of the event have come across with the views of 
movement forces memberships that argue how Bangladesh had gradually changed 
inside the social structure in order to accept democratic values in her society. 
Accordingly, at this juncture, I am merely able to illustrate these principal arguments 
and findings of more general work, leaving the detailed discussion of where these 
relate to my own for the chapters below. 
Firstly, there have been a range of studies concerned with the political 
sociology related to the power struggle and political movement and participatory 
class relations of the society. These have usually focused on the evolution of socio- 
political background of the different locations and period around the world as Marx 
considered the transformation of social evolutions into political revolution 
(1847[1963]: 177) or the democracy movement by the incorporation of middle class 
participation (Tocqueville, 1861), which however later was considered under two 
broad categories such as `social movement' and `organised political formations' that 
were reflected in i) the democratic and labour movement in Europe, ii) women's 
suffrage movement and independence movement in colonial countries, and iii) the 
present day movements in autocratic states provide effective means for expressing 
grievances and seeking to bring about political changes (Bottomore, 1979: 41-58). 
Sen (1994: 64) has considered the above third category was more relevant to the 
Bangladesh perspective. However, the detail of these studies is examined in chapter 
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six where the development of democratic forces for the Bangladesh movement is 
illustrated. 
Secondly, there are numerous studies on the causes and consequences of the 
military aggression into the state power distracting the democratic rule. freedom and 
human rights in many countries around the world. The military dictatorship of 
General Ershad employed repressive measures to suppress the opposition movement. 
In connection of the studies on military rule, home and abroad, Mons Janowitz 
(1964), L Loyd (1971), E. Schmitter (1971), S. E Finer (1975), Decalo (1976), 
Thomas (1976), E. A. Nordinger (1977), Claphan and Philip ed. (1984), Emaj Uddin 
Ahmed (1988), Thomson (1993) and Modud Ahmed (1995) were notably found 
among many other important literatures that was used in this research in addition to 
the facts from local sources. In chapter four, I have examined details relevant to their 
arguments on the pattern, causes, consequences and repressions of the military 
dictatorship of General Ershad in accordance with the application of survey analysis. 
Thirdly, there is plenty of literature on the democratisation process under 
authoritarian regimes relating the different socio-political constituents in analytical 
precinct-either in peaceful or violent transition, third world legacy, exporting 
democracy reflecting the prescription of the leading nations, elite configuration, 
class relation, structure of actions and violence, leadership of democratisation etc 
which has occupied most of the space of the theoretical framework of this study in 
chapter two. The whole literary experiment has involved two distinct types of 
theories: micro and macro, to the discourse of related variables of transition to 
democracy that has of much relevance to Bangladesh case. In the macro perspective, 
I have employed more than ten dimensions to see the literatures involving the 
various components of democracy movement under authoritarian regimes: first, for 
military seizure of state power, a resourceful literature has been summed up, in 
which the observation of Moris Janowitz (1964), L Loyd (1971), E. Schmitter 
(1971), S. E Finer (1975), Decalo (1976), Thomas (1976), E. A. Nordinger (1977), 
Claphan and Philip ed. (1984), Emaj Uddin Ahmed (1988), Thomson (1993) and 
Modud Ahmed (1995) include the causes and consequences of the takeover and 
cleavages between political elites and militia forces, Huntington (1991) for exit 
privilege for the dictators in peaceful transition etc; second, the literature of Marx 
(1849,1963), Engels(1889 ), Draper (1978), Bottomore (1979,1993) and Rangalal 
Sen (1994) include the classical debates on movements, revolution and reform; 
third, the world view of historical three route to democratisation of Barrington 
Moore (1973); fourth, the involvement of colonial civic and political institutions and 
economic infrastructure in the democratisation process in the post-colonial period is 
concerned with the literature of Emersion (1960), Smith (1978), Killigray (1986), 
Weiner (1987) and Axel Hadenius (1994); fifth, the third wave democratisation of 
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Huntington (1991); sixth, the relation of capitalism and capitalist control of center 
forces on the peripheral societies in the process of democratisation has been detailed 
in the studies of Alavi and Shanin (1982), Chirot (1977), Moore (1973), Thomas and 
others (1979), Thomas (1988), Gilbert and Gugler (1989), Rueschemeyer et al (1992), 
Francis Fukuyama (1992) and Sen (1994); seventh, for relation of class 
configuration and necessary development of middle class for the fostering of 
democracy has been revealed in the studies of Seymour Martin Lipset (1963a), 
Bottomore (1993) and Kivisto (1998); eighth, the universalism in defining the 
modern democracy is illustrated in the observation of Lively (1975) Huntington 
(1991), Hadenius (1992), Holden (, 1988,1994), Beetham (1994) and Wilson (1996); 
ninth, the relation of industrialisation and urbanisation in the development of the 
democratic society is shown in the literature of Alan B. Mountjoy (1978), S. A. Khan 
(1991), Kamal Siddiqui (1990) and Gilbert and Gugler (1989); tenth, the legitimacy 
crisis resulted in political instability in a society has been found in the studies of 
Habermas (1976), Bottomore (1979,1984) and Rangalal Sen (1994), eleventh, the 
actions of the movement that related to a forceful transition to democracy has been 
detailed in the study of Neil Smelser (1962), David Aberle (1966), Blumer (1969), 
Roy Wallis (1984), Snow and Oliver (1995) and McAdam and Snow (1997) and 
finally the notion of symbolic constructivist paradigm of Jocelyn Linnekin(2004) for 
democratic transition has been incorporated. 
On the other hand, the micro theories have involved another set of dimensions 
of the home and domestic components in the resurrection process: first, the re- 
enactment and reinforcing of political parties and alliances-the fundamental 
domestic constituent of democratisation in any society, have been disclosed in the 
studies of Ashraf and Sharma (1983) and Duverger (1966); second, in the discussion 
of different interest (pressure) groups, the socio-cultural opposition to military 
regime has been divulged in the literature of Sen (1994) and Alam (1991) for trade 
union and professional groups, Karl Marx (1849), Lipset and Dobson (1972), Draper 
(1978), Eyerman and Jamison (1991) for intellectual groups, Engels (1889) and 
Huntington (1991) for students community, and Karl Mannheim(1928,1952) and 
Margaret Mead (1970) for the growth of structural resemblance of the generational 
groups and dissident youths in taking the socio cultural and political leadership; 
third, the literature of Frederick D Miller (1983,1999) has unveiled details of the 
measures: repression, co-optation, success and failures that were used by the 
military administration to suppress the opposition movement; fourth, to understand 
the pattern of the use of tools and aftermaths of the actions and violence, has been 
discussed by many contemporary authors such as Barnes et al. (1979) for the 
citizen's political repertoire' from the 1960s, DeNardo (1985) for logic and power 
of the numbers of the participants, Tilly (1986,2003) for the modern repertoire of 
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collective action and violence, Dalton (1988) for chronological layers of the actions. 
Tarrow (1994) for the sequences of intensified interactions between challengers and 
authorities, Dellaporta and Diani (1999) for the understanding of the influence of 
public opinion and the like. 
Fourthly, the detailed socio-economic variables related to the pro- 
democratisation social formation including the pattern of the growth of pro capitalist 
industrial and non-agricultural sectors, influence of social factors-situation in 
poverty, literacy, inequalities, communal stability, informal money lending. 
landlessness, components of backward close systems (caste) and the situation of the 
rise of the fundamentalism etc, and class structure of the participants of actions 
have been accounted to establish a social connection of the boosting up the 
movement for democracy on the basis of secondary information and statistical 
documentation, and side by side, a further statistical rationale has been applied in 
terms of the opinions of the movement forces membership to measure the level of 
their acceptance. For the use of statistics on these variables, extensive numerical 
resources have been considered from the Statistical year Book of Bangladesh (1981, 
1991) and Annual Report of the ADB (1999). The literature of Dickension (1987), 
Mountjoy (1979), Abraham Guiller (1966), Bromley and Gerry (1979), Gilbert and 
Gugler (1989) and Sirajul Islam (1990) etc have gone through the dimensions and 
characteristics of urban components favourable for the enhancement of violent or 
non violent path of democratisation movement. In the same way, as an inevitable 
outcome of the socio-economic and political crisis in the society, the relation of 
social classes and income inequalities to the development of challenging leadership, 
participants and supporters of democracy movement have been investigated in the 
studies of Habermas (1976), Bottomore (1979), Ranglal Sen (1994) and M Rahman 
(1988). 
Fifthly, the most significant part of this research is the chronological 
description and critical analyses of the movement events through out the whole 
period of the military dictatorship, which is detailed in chapter seven. This has 
included the frauds and repressions in the continuation of huge killings and injuries 
and arrests, warrant and lawsuits to suppress the opposition to grasp power for 
indefinite periods, a for ever dream and secret desire in the junta side, contrasting 
an invincible spirit and stubborn instinct in the movement forces for freedom, liberty 
and equity-an ever-desired self-shaped spontaneous struggle, has been developed 
as a result of counter production to the repression of the dictator in the incessant 
mode of oppositions' actions. This chapter illustrates the description and analysis of 
the actions events-detailed with time, date and location that happened in the nine 
years period of military dictatorship from the summary of the local and 
international-daily and weekly newspapers. 
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Sixth, there were numerous forms of actions-violent and non ' iolent, which 
were organised by the opposition democratic forces as the effective tools to strike at 
the root of the dictatorship that generated the process for the resurrection of 
democracy. Chapter eight is therefore designed to include the understanding to 
making clear of these various types of actions. In brief, the non-violent protest 
march, public or mass gatherings, petition march, signing petition, human chain, 
long march, ride, demonstration, election etc; semi-violent non-cooperation, civil 
disobedience, student strike, sit-in, gherao (siege), hartal (general strike), setting 
fire on effigies etc and finally, violent actions attacks, barricades, blockades, riots, 
damaging vehicles and transport, guerrilla fights resulting harassing, bombing, 
setting fires, killing of forces and government officials etc. The detail of these 
actions is illustrated with examples as well as a statistical analysis of how far these 
were effective in the operation to uproot the military dictatorship. Side by side, a 
statistical and graphical presentation has also been subsumed to explore the different 
dimensions of the frequencies for nine years collected by date on the four major 
actions: protest march, public meeting, hartal and use of violence so that the ups and 
downs of the movement would be clearly demarcated. 
Seventh, the leadership-central to periphery or vertical to horizontal-is the 
soul of any movement, which was also a vital issue in the analysis of the process of 
democratisation in Bangladesh as it was experienced, in popular verdict, an absence 
of single and supreme leadership, or in more suitable version, the presence of a 
dichotomous leadership of the two converse opposition currents in the opposition 
forces. The different types and characteristics of these leaderships and their conflicts, 
socio-economic background, success and failure, have been discussed in the chapter 
nine. A range of principal leaderships of the movement has been examined with 
survey statistics in terms of some criteria-personality, leadership, experience, stand 
on issues, popular decision and non-cooperation with regime-to explore the role 
differentiation of the key political leaders of the movement. 
Eighth, the issues of conflicts, debates and disunity of the opposition forces- 
mostly responsible for disrupting and misleading the movement-have to be 
considered for ample discussion, which is incorporated in the chapter ten. These 
debates delimited on many critical issues such as the link of political parties to 
bring the military in power, the role of civil-military bureaucracy, the failure of 
opposition in the formation of a united platform, the issue of participation or non- 
participation in the elections under military regime, the credibility of the formation 
of the caretaker government, formation of the APSU as a instinct force for the 
movement, failure of the Dhaka siege actions, the different sacrificing role of the 
individual movement forces and the latent role of the diplomatic missions, if any, in 
restoring a democratic government in the country. The underlying questions 
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regarding the conflict on these issues have been analysed mostly with the survey 
statistics and graphical presentation originated from the interviews of the movement 
forces memberships. 
In conclusion, the problems and prospects of the process of democratisation in 
Bangladesh as the outcome of the research findings-from secondary analysis and 
survey have been waged details in conjunction with some identical similarities and 
dissimilarities being found in contemporary research on democratisation process 
around the world. 
1.4. The Significance of the Study 
This research is a milestone in understanding the development of the political 
process in Bangladesh and in the third world countries as well as having 
implications for theories of democratisation, how democracy is restored and how it 
can be maintained elsewhere. It presents significant new knowledge to the current of 
the democratisation research all over the world. At home, the research outcome will 
benefit mostly the democracy as well as the people of Bangladesh society, who have 
been struggling to establish a democratic essence-freedom, security, impunity, 
civil rights and liberty since the liberation of the country in 1971. It will also 
generate an important discussion for politicians, civil society, academic, interest 
(pressure) groups, and gender bodies to understand the process of democratisation 
under the military dictatorship of General Ershad. It must be able to show the policy 
makers of the state how the role of the democratic, political and military institutions 
is distinctive in the rule of democracy. The research aims to disseminate wisdom 
mostly for political and state elites and the military services under the republic to 
understand their interaction in fostering democratic society, where it tends to be a 
beam of light reflecting the enlightened instances of democratic movements among 
the repressive nations around the world. 
1.5. Conclusion 
The departure of the military dictatorship of General Ershad in the face of 
peoples' revolution was the most important event in the history of political 
development in the post-independent Bangladesh. The consequences of the junta 
regime-damages and repressions, formation of the democratic forces, events of 
actions and violence, social perspectives, leadership patterns, unresolved critical 
issues and the like are the major concerns of this research. The struggle of the people 
for democracy-the sacred wisdom for liberty, equity and freedom of the human 
self, and its society-is an eternal phenomenon irrespective of nations to 
nationalisms and space to species, races and ethnicities around the world. In all 
considerations, the democracy is either innovated or renovated or conquered in 
nations as an indication to the beginning of more civilised humanity. The 
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understanding of this research is leading the issues of the movement for conquering 
democracy in Bangladesh related to the instinct of this definite socio-political 
venture in the current of democratisation process around the world. 
Notes 
The People's Republic of Bangladesh was born in 1971 by a traumatic civil war against Pakistan. It 
is a low-lying riverine country located in South Asia. The country contains the confluence of the 
Ganges (Padma), Brahmaputra (Jamuna), and Meghna Rivers and their tributaries which empty into 
the Bay of Bengal. Bangladesh is bordered by India to the east, north, and west and shares a short 
border with Myanmar (Burma) in the southeast. With a population of approximately 133 million, 
Bangladesh is the most densely populated agricultural country in the world. Since achieving 
independence in 1971, Bangladesh has made progress toward establishing a sustainable form of 
democratic government. The country has experienced military intervention, the assassination of key 
political leaders and an authoritarian style of political leadership, which marred its first 20 years of 
nationhood. In 1990, a quasi-military regime came to an end, a caretaker government was established, 
and in early 1991, national elections were held. Elected government has since transferred power for 
three times under a normal democratic process from one party to another. Bangladesh is a 
parliamentary democracy, with broad powers exercised by the Prime Minister. Many formal 
institutions of democracy exist (parliament, an active opposition, a free and vigorous print media, the 
judiciary, competitive elections, and free speech), however they often function with limited 
transparency, accountability, and openness to public input. Human rights are guaranteed by law, but 
not always in practice. 
2 Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was the supreme leader of Bangladesh Liberation war. His 
party AL won the absolute majority in the parliamentary election of 1970. The refusal to hand over 
the power to him by the then ruling military elite of Pakistan had led the Bangladesh, the eastern 
wing of Pakistan, to a liberation war in 1971. He declared the independence of Bangladesh on March 
26,1971 before he was arrested by Pakistan Army in Dhaka. After the independence, nation had 
recognised him constitutionally with the title "Father of the Nation". He was also conferred the title 
"Bangabandhu" ( friend of Bengal) after had released from the historic Agartala Conspiracy case, 
in a huge gathering of students in April, 1968 at the Paltan Maidan, Dhaka. See for this, Abdul 
Wadud Bhuiya (1982, p. 119). He was born on 17 March 1920 and has assasinated in 15 August 1975 
by a military coup followed by a first time military intervention in Bangladesh. 
3 Major Ziaur Rahman was one of the popular sector commanders of the Bangladesh Liberation war 
in 1971. He was promoted to Major General and honoured as BirBikrann along with many other 
officers-the second highest state recognition for his great contribution in the liberation of the 
country and at the same time, was placed as the Deputy Chief of Army Staff under the post- 
Independence AL regime. Following the consequences of the killing of Bangabandhu Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman in 1975 that removed the AL from power, he became the most popular officer in the 
Bangladesh Army. In November 03,1975 there was an unsuccessful coup attempt, which had made 
Ziaur Rahman the Army Chief and in 1976 he capture the state power leading Bangladesh under a 
full pledged military regime. In 1979, he tried to civilianise his military regime by a parliamentary 
election, in which his party BNP was declared winner with the two third majorities. Clearly this 
verdict of parliamentary election was imperative to legalise his military regime by Fifth Amendment 
of the constitution. He was also assassinated by another military coup in 3151 May 1981 following- 
after a short period of civilian government of Justice Satter-the military intervention of General 
Ershad in March 1982. 
4 Justice Abdus Satter, as the Vice President assumed the office of the President of Bangladesh under 
the provision of Article 55(1) of constitution till the new President was elected according to the 
provision of Article 48(1) of the constitution of the country. However, it would be worth mentioning 
here that Justice Abdus Satter was the most trusted person of President Zia in his government. He 
was serious lyill and was admitted in hospital at the time of Zia's death. According to most sources, 
he was unwilling to take the charge of acting President. But, General Ershad, the Army chief of Staff. 
was desperate to choose Justice Satter to position to avoid their participation in the immediate quarrel 
for power that could expose his connection with the killing of Zia. For details, see Moudud Ahmed, 
Democracy, and the Challenge of Development UPL, Dhaka, 1995, Chapter-6. 
See Rangalal Sen, The Political Elite of Bangladesh, UPL, Dhaka, 1986, p. 323. The Army Chief 
Lieutenant General H. M. Ershad explained the causes of his capturing power and announced over 
the Radio and Television that he came into power for launching "a crusade against rampant 
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corruption, which termed the number one enemy of the nation. And by promulgating martial-laww he 
saved the country from catastrophe. " 
6 The formation of Caretaker Government was the consequence of the long standing demand of 
opposition democratic forces that compelled the dictator to quit from power. The design and activities 
of the Caretaker Government was reflection of the political wisdom of all socio-democratic force-, of 
the country those who involve in the movement for restoration of democracy through out the nine 
years regime of the military dictator. The demand of holding the parliamentary election under non- 
partisan and neutral Caretaker Government was first included in the 5-point movement charter of the 
opposition forces including 15-party alliance and 7-party alliance in the early 1983. In the peak of 
the movement by which Gen. Ershad was removed, it was Sheikh Hasina, the eight-party alliance 
chief in a highly attended meeting in the "Panth Path" of Dhaka city on November 06, explicitly 
stated the constitutional provisions of the Caretaker Government. On November 19, the three main 
political alliance published the historic joint Declaration (see the leaflet of 21.11.90 issued by 8-party, 
7-party and 5-party alliance) in which the outlines of the removal of autocratic Ershad Government, 
holding of the Sovereign Parliamentary Elections under the interim government and the established 
of elected representative government in the country were clearly delineated. 
7 On 10 October 1984, the ex President Justice Sattar in a statement said, "the power was snatched 
away in the darkness of night when we all were discharging government responsibilities in a healthy 
political atmosphere after I was elected President of the country through an impartial election. " For 
details of his statement see The Bangladesh Observer, 11 October 1984 
8 Camillo Pellzzi, Problemi e realita del Fascisino (Florance: 1924), pp. 103,164. Quoted in Adrian 
Lyttelton, "Italy: The Second Wave" in The Journal of Contemporarvv History, Vol. 1. No. 1,1966, 
77 
The dictator in an interview with eminent journalist Abdul Gaffer Choudhury at the Hilton Hotel in 
London where he was asked if would have felt any threat to his life from the Army as happened for 
Sheikh Mujib and Zia. He frankly replied negative and explained the cause behind that he always 
used to consult every thing with the top-rank Generals, even if anybody of the Army would like to 
capture power for which he had been always ready to accept the proposal without any bloodshed and 
losing his son and wife. This fact was published in a national news paper Daily Acker Kagoj June 
1991. For more details, see also, Nasima Khatoon, Bangladesher Rajniti 1982-1990 (The Politics of 
Bangladesh 1982-1990), M. Phil. Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Dhaka, 
Dhaka, 1995, p. 46 
1° See the Bangladesh Parliamentary Elections February 27,1991, A Post Election Report by 
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) Washington, USA, p. 2 
t' The leader of the August Coup, Khondoker Mostaque Ahmed proclaimed a law to give legal 
protection of the coup maker military officers debarring any trial for the criminal charges for killing 
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and others in August Coup 1975. This law was popularly 
known as the Indemnity Ordinancel975. This was again included in the Fifth Amendment of the 
constitution that rectified all martial law orders of General Ziuar Rahman. 
12 The fate of democracy under the military and authoritarian regimes of the third world nations 
around the world became a taboo to hold fake elections, capture polls results in favour of the dictators, 
legalised their all repressions under the cover of unrepresentative parliament and in this way, 
continued in power until another military coup occurred or assassination or accident that ended the 
dictatorships in these countries. This legacy was also applicable to what happened in Bangladesh 
after the killing of the country's father of the nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
in 1975. 
13 See the report on "5`h Amendment Illegal: HC-Govt of Mostaque, Sayem and Zia 
Unconstitutional" The New Age, a English Daily in Bangladesh, 30th August 2005, p. 1. The report 
published the historic verdict of Honourable High Court bench of Justice ABM 
Khairul Huq and 
Justice ATM Fazle Kabir on 29`'' August 2005. In their verdict of a case of Moon cinema-legality 
of the government act on abandoned property, the Honourable High Court 
in their 22-point 
observation declared illegal the Fifth Amendment to the constitution made 
by martial law 
proclamation. According to the report, " Proclaiming martial law is unconstitutional and those who 
have proclaimed martial law so far are liable to sedition charges----the court observed that usurpation 
of the state power through martial law proclamations, particularly by Khondoker 
Moshtaque Ahmed, 
Justice Abu Sadaat Mohammad Sayem and Major General Ziaur Rahman was 
unconstitutional. Proclaiming martial law is unconstitutional and those who 
have proclaimed martial 
law so far are liable to sedition charges, the court said in its 22-point observation. 
'Taking over the 
powers of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh with effect from the morning of 
August 15,1975 by 
Khondoker Moshtaque Ahmed, the usurper, placing Bangladesh under Martial Law and his 
(Moshtaque) assumption of the office of the President of Bangladesh by Proclamation of August 20. 
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1975 were, in clear violation of the Constitution and as such illegal without lawful authority. and 
without jurisdiction, ' the court observed. 'Consequently, all his subsequent action, as the President of Bangladesh were illegitimate and void. ' The judgement also observed that '... b> taking over the 
office of the President of Bangladesh and such entering into the office on No%ember 6.1975 bý 
Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem and his assumption of the powers of Chiet Martial Laý% 
Administrator and appointment of Deputy Martial Law Administrator and the proclamation on 
November 8,1975 were all in violation of the Constitution, and consequently all such functions, 
actions as President or CMLA were illegal. 'The handing over of office of Martial Law authority to 
Maj Gen Ziaur Rahman, by Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem by third proclamation on November 29. 
1976, enabling Ziaur Rahman to exercise all powers of the CMLA, being beyond the ambit of the 
Constitution was illegal, without lawful authority and without jurisdiction and consequently all his 
subsequent functions and actions as CMLA were illegal. ' The court also referred to the takeover of 
the presidency by General Zia on April 21,1977, and observed that it was also 'beyond the ambit of 
the Constitution and as such illegal. ' About the referendum of 1977 on General Zia's presidency 
during the martial law, the court termed it was 'unknown to the Constitution'. The judges said 'the 
violation of the Constitution was a grave legal wrong and remains so for all time to come. It cannot 
be legitimised. "' 
14According to the statistics of the Bangladesh Election Commission Secretariat 2003-04, the number 
of political parties that attended the JS elections of the 1991 was 75. There were also some small 
political parties functioning which were not able to give candidates in the elections. 
15 The name of the party in Bengali is Jatvo Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), which in English is National 
Socialist Party. However, this party is popularly known as the JSD. 
16 Under the leadership of the AL, these parties fought in the war of liberation against the aggressor 
Pakistan Army in 1971. Among these, the AL was pioneer party that led the Bangladesh 
Government-in-Exile and led the liberation of the country. They were united in the movement for 
restoration of democracy against the military dictatorship of General Ershad under the banner of 15- 
party alliance. They are known as progressive bourgeoisie, secular and leftist political forces of the 
country. They were in favour of the government on the basis of original constitution of the country 
that started in 1972. 
t' The collaborator parties those who associated the aggressor Pakistan Army in the liberation war of 
country are known as anti-liberation forces. These parties included the ML, JIB, and Nejame Islami 
Bangladesh and the like. These parties were banned under post-independent AL regime. But the 
Political Parties (Amendment) Regulation, 1976 [MLR No. XXV of 1976 (August 4 1976)] of 
General Zia had revived these parties to function in the country in the post-1975 political 
development of the country. Since then, the development of these political forces in and outside the 
military regimes of General Zia and Ershad were known as anti-liberation forces. All military 
regimes and these anti-liberation forces in the post-independent years were patronized by each other 
in establishing their interest in national politics. 
18 An interest (pressure) group is an organisation whose purpose is to influence the distribution and 
use of political power in society. In definition, Interest groups differ sharply from political parties, 
whose primary goal is to place members in positions of political authority rather than to influence 
those already in power. In Bangladesh case, the interest or pressure groups always aligned with the 
opposition democratic forces in support of their own demands as well as for the broader national 
cause of the restoration of democracy. For details of the definition of the interest (pressure) groups, 
see Allan G. Johnson, The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology, a User's Guide to Sociological 
Language. Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996, pp. 144-145. 
19 According to Karl Marx, civil society is a fragmented capitalist world organised around 
'individualism' and materialistic competition of all against all. The modern state became necessary to 
regulate and contain the resulting conflict and misery. More recently, Antonio Gramsci has argued 
that the core of civil society is not only the individual and individualism, but also private 
organisations such as corporations. Gramsci also argued that the state and civil society overlap and 
merge with each other to such a degree that it is hard to tell where one leaves off and the other begins. 
For details of the concepts of the civil society of Marx and Gramsci, see Karl Marx, "Critiques of 
Hegel's philosophy of rights. " In Writings of the young Marx on philosophy and society, edited and 
translated by D Easton and K Guddat, New York: Doubleday 1967[1843] and C. Mouffe edited 
Gramsci and Mar: vist Theory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979. 
20 This resembles the position of German social scientist Habermas (1970). He argues that democracy 
must be seen first and foremost as a process that results when a certain kind of social interaction 
prevails. More specially, democracy should be seen as a particular way by which citizens make 
collective and rational decisions, "a way that (such decisions) can be made dependent on a consensus 
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arrived at through discussion free from domination" (Haberman 1970: 10). If democracy is about tree 
and open dialogue, where does such discussion take place and under what condition'? Where is the 
space in which democracy is nurtured? Habermas (1989a) in response tu these queries has referred to 
this space as the public sphere, a term that resembles another concept that is currently receiving 
considerable attention: `civil society' (Calhoun 1993, Kumar 1993). 
21 For this, see The PPR, 1976. MLR No. XXV of 1976, August 4.1976. 
22 The Bangladesh Chattra League (BCL) is the student wing of the AL, one of the two mainstream 
opposition parties of the country 
23 The Jatyotabadi Chattra Dal (JCD) is the student wing of the BNP-one of the two mainstream 
oposition parties 
2' Tom Bottomore, Political Sociology, New York, Harper and Row Publishers, 1979, p. 7. 
25 Rangalal Sen, "The Movement for Restoration of Democracy in Bangladesh 1982-90: A 
Theoretical Framework and Social Background" in S. R. Chakravarti. edited Society, Polity, and 
Economy of Bangladesh, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1994, p. 63. 
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Chapter Two 
The Movement for Restoration of Democracy in Bangladesh 
1982-1990: The Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Introduction 
The theoretical framework of this study is divided into two principal phases: 
macro theory and micro theory. I Macro theories are concerned with how the 
movement for restoration of democracy in Bangladesh is related to the classical 
theories of democratisation in the twentieth century all over the world. It also covers 
the literature relating the nature and characteristics of military dictatorship and the 
social origin of the movement for democracy. Micro theories of this study relate to 
the contents of conflict between the opposition democratic forces and the military 
dictatorship of General Ershad, which focuses on the formative roles of opposition 
political parties and alliances, interest groups: student, intellectual, professionals and 
trade unions and the like. They also include the forms of collective actions: non- 
violent and violent2, and the various repressive measures of military administration 
to decline the movement entailed harassing, false law suits, arrest, jailing, killing, 
co-optation, leaving partial success and strategies to oppositions' failure to weaken 
the opposition forces. The micro approach also incorporates with the different 
dimensions of the movements: urban-rural, class composition of the participants, 
leadership pattern, religious and ethnic factions, causes of disintegration and 
preconditions of unity of the opposition forces and above all, the pattern of success 
of the movement. 
2.2. Macro Theories of the Study 
2.2.1. The Cleavages between Political Elites and the Armed Forces 
The movement against this military dictatorship of General Ershad could be 
seen as an indivisible part of political sociology, which `is concerned with power in 
its social context' (Bottomore, 1993: 1). The power is defined here as the ability of 
an organised social or political group to pursue a course of action to reach the 
desired goal (Sen, 1994). The political elites of the country-the mainstream 
opposition political alliances and different socio-cultural interest groups i. e. 
students, labourers, intellectuals, and professionals of Bangladesh society who 
organised the movement to achieve this goal to establish the democracy in the 
country-fell into an ensuing struggle with the Armed Forces. 
In fact, `Bangladesh was born in a war so was its army'. 
3 In terms of sharing 
the state power, the cleavages between political elites and civil-military cliques 
dismantled the political process of the country. Consequently, the military as a 
unified and organised group won in the course of conflict and captured the state 
power. It was not very easy for political elites in Bangladesh to achieve the ability of 
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pursuing such kind of organised course of actions against the militar% of the country 
in the resurrection of democratic rule. Because: 
"The military maintains the state, and the state maintains the military.. - military coup is, 
prima facie, the capture of control over the state by its own employees: that is v% by it is so 
easy.......... and been inherently opposed to any measure which would threaten the state's 
control over the resources which it needs to maintain itself" (Clapham and Philip ed., 
1985: 4) 
Moreover, it was found that military seizure of state power was introduced, as 
was frequently argued, in consequence of the failure of a civilian government that 
was not functioning satisfactorily. In fact, the military seizure was welcomed by the 
desire of civil-military intrigues with the support of a faction of unrepresentative 
bourgeoisie politicians to establish control over the economy and state power. 
Because, `any attempt to institutionalise must, under the military dispensation, 
ensure the exclusion of `representative politicians' by creating a patronage network 
capable of shoring up support for the regime. ' (Clapham and Philip ed., 1985: 201). 
The historical development of the Bangladesh Army and civil bureaucracy 
might be quite relevant in this respect. The Army was highly politicised and badly 
divided since its formation with rival factions-pro liberation and anti-liberation- 
`most of their formative experience had been under the Ayub-Yahya martial law 
regimes'` of Pakistan. The pro-liberation faction were divided again into two group: 
first, the Mukti Bahinee5 who were born as new soldiers purely under the command 
of the Bangladesh Liberation Forces (BLF) and second, a part of former Bengali 
officers and soldiers who left the Pakistan Army and joined the liberation war of 
Bangladesh. After the liberation, the both-freedom fighters excluding Mukti 
Bahinee and anti-liberation repatriated factions-used this formative experience to 
capture the state power of Bangladesh. 6 In the factional power struggle of the Army, 
it was found that there developed a unity between the freedom fighters and 
repatriated factions on the basis of their former service experience under Pakistan 
Army against the Mukti Bahinee faction which led thousands of killings of the later 
after the August coup 1975. The second unsuccessful military coup in May, 1981 
that killed President Zia, was made by the freedom fighters faction of the army, 
which ultimately helped the repatriated faction under the leadership of General 
Ershad to assume the power. Hence, it is clearly argued that the event of military 
seizure of power in Bangladesh had been exported from the Pakistan Military who 
had been pioneering military rule for more or less whole period since the 
independence of their country in 1947. It is also argued that there had been 
developed some factional cleavages in the civilian government of the AL in the 
wake of introduction of a one party socialist system in the post independence period 
that attached the military with the power structure which has been considered as to 
develop a grim political crisis in the power elites and had weakened the legitimacy 
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of the government. This also made the way for military to seize the power a. 
Smelser has pointed out: 
"A recent history has demonstrated the political behaviour of the military poses a special 
problem for nations weak in legitimacy. Only the military have the internal organisation, 
the sense of group loyalty, the authority, and most important, the means to o%erturn the 
government quickly whenever they finds its acts repugnant. The strength of the norms 
governing civil-military relations are, therefore, of crucial importance in any consideration 
of the factors making for political stability" (1973: 408). 
In developing countries, three views may be found from the literature on 
military aggression in domestic politics: power of the military as organisation 
(Janovitz 1964), weak political institutions (Finer 1975) and corporate interest of the 
military service men (Nordinger 1975). 8 The military seizure of power in 
Bangladesh might have some relations-not so strong to the creation of reactionary 
rebellion-with all these views. Although the Bangladesh Army was divided into 
different factions since her liberation, every government in the post independent 
period had strengthened the Armed Forces in respect to their growth in number and 
equipment-a dragon military net-willingly or unwillingly-considering the India 
as a monolithic enemy. This has resulted in a large and organised Army under a 
unified command, which was found visible in the full support for the decade military 
regime of General Ershad. In many third world countries, national liberation 
movements which failed to create effective political parties were either taken over 
by military elites or else the governments which they formed were overthrown by 
the military coups (L Loyd 1971). 9 Bangladesh was born with the strong 
development of political party institutions as the liberation war directed completely 
under the command of the AL government in exile. It may, however, be related to 
some extent to the sufferings of splitting and instability of political parties in 
the1970s and early 1980s. Regarding the interest of the Army, it was believed that 
the Bangladesh Army had been in an uncertain position due to the creation of Jatyio 
Rakhi Bahini1° under Mujib's regime. In the following regime, Zia's collaboration 
with repatriated faction inside the armed forces led him to kill the thousands of 
freedom fighters in the name of Court Martial. tt These steps had been considered as 
the threat to the corporate interest of the Armed Forces, which in fact, in their word, 
led them to capture the state power. The civilianization of the military regime has 
been an important but a rare event in the politics of developing nations. The end of 
military regime in the third world nations was also equally of crucial importance. It 
was found rare that the military leaders were punished brutally by the pro 
democratic revolutionary masses of the society. Because, in foremost cases, military 
leaders almost invariably posited two conditions or `exit guarantees' for their 
withdrawal from power, which was seemed to have much relevance to Bangladesh: 
"First: there would be no prosecution, punishment or other retaliation against military 
officers for any acts they may have committed when they were in power. Second, the 
institutional roles and autonomy of the military establishment would be respected, 
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including its overall responsibility for national security, its leadership of the government 
ministries concerned with security, and often its control of arms industries and other 
economic enterprises traditionally under military aegis. The ability of the withdrawing 
military to secure agreement of civilian political leaders to these conditions depended on 
their relative power...... " (Huntington 1991: 116) 
It was believed that Gen. Ershad and his followers, high rank army officers, 
had arrived at secret understandings-'exit guarantees' with the mainstream 
opposition political leaders that they would not be subject any trial, sentence or other 
vengeances for any other acts they have committed when they were in power. It was 
found to be anticipated with the resignation of Ershad that he was simply placed 
under house arrest and transferred to a residential house in the city, which, however, 
was declared a sub-jail. The other top rank officers had not at all any problems with 
the change of power as much as expected by the masses of the movement, although 
some civilian associates of the dictator were sent to jail. The secret of the avoidance 
for not to be serious for the trial of corrupt and fascist associates of the dictator 
might be considered as the strategy of the movement leaders to diminish the risk of 
infuriating the militia forces as a whole, which could be a threat to smooth 
democratic transition of the country at that time. 
2.2.2. Bangladesh Democratisation Debates: Movement, Revolution and 
Reform 
This research uses two significant concepts of political sociology: `movement' 
as an independent variable and `democracy' as dependant one. Sociologically 
speaking, movement itself can not be an independent variable, as Sen (1994) argues, 
since it has its own social background and the appraisal of the mass movement for 
restoration of democracy in Bangladesh from 1982 to 1990 may be sociological only 
when it is related to the contemporary social structure of Bangladesh society. 
The movement for democracy in Bangladesh included various `political 
actions ranging from sporadic protests, riots or rebellions or coup d'etat to more 
continuous activities of the organised political parties, pressure groups, or politicised 
military officers.... but most of the phenomena can be subsumed under two broad 
categories such as social movement and organised political formation' (Bottomore 
1979: 41-58). This movement `is broadly defined as a collective endeavour to 
promote or resist change in the society' (Bottomore 1979: 41). This might also be 
seen as the outcome of insoluble conflicts between political elites overthrown by 
military intervention and civil-military bureaucracy. As Marx (1849) explained: 
"the development of insoluble contradictions within the society prepares the way 
for social crises, which burst out in political revolutions. " 12 and also "the outcome 
is a revolution involving the transference of political power to a new class; and these 
change in ruling class tends to entail a basic change in the social system (mode of 
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production). It is this kind of revolution which is most properly called a social 
revolution" (Draper 1978: 19). 
According to Marx's theory, it is `a political revolution with a social soul. '' 
In this perspective, the movement against the military dictatorship in Bangladesh 
might be considered as the direction of a societal revolution, regardless the period of 
when changes in the social system actually begin to take place. It had been done by 
establishing a new constellation of socio-political forces in Bangladesh in the very 
early of 1990s, with new historic potentialities. The movement for restoration of 
democracy in Bangladesh was the realisation of these potentialities. "Every real 
revolution" wrote Engels, "is a social one, in that it brings a new class to power and 
allows it to remodel society in its own image. " 14 Therefore, one could hardly be 
able to see the difference between the successful mass upsurge against the military 
dictatorship in Bangladesh from the social revolution in the sense of Marx and 
Engels. It could be seen more clearly in the latter arguments of Marx, in which he 
succinctly said: 
"Do not say that social movement excludes political movements. There is never a political 
movement which at the same time social. It is only in an order of things in which there are 
no more classes and class antagonisms that social evolutions will cease to be political 
revolutions" (Karl Marx, 1847,1963, : 177). 
The movement reached its climax due to the illegitimacy and repression of the 
militias under the Ershad regime. In this period, all classes inside the democratic 
political forces were centred on the middle class of the society and the demolition of 
class antagonism led the mass movement into an urban based political revolution in 
the Marxian sense. Marx distinguished, initially in his `Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right' (1843-44) between "a partial, merely political revolution 
which leaves the pillars of the building standing', and a social revolution; thereby 
changing the whole concept of revolution, as Max Adler later argued, from the 
merely political idea of the transformation of the state, into the social concept of an 
economic change in the bases of society" (Bottomore and Patric Goode eds. 
1978: 136-146 and Sen 1994: 5). The mass movement for restoration of democracy in 
Bangladesh from 1982 to 1990, as Sen (1994) argued, was never a social revolution 
and "it may be regarded at best as a partial political reform in a Marxian sense, but 
for Bangladesh which lacked in democracy for quite a long period of her history, the 
overthrow of an autocratic regime of Ershad through mass upsurge might smack of a 
kind of urban revolution which took place in the metropolitan cities of Bangladesh 
where the anti-Ershad movement reached its climax"(Sen, 1994: 5). In short, the 
dynamics of Bangladesh society in the 1980s reached at the stage of an accepted 
level of socio-economic change, at which a new trend in urban social structure was 
established and therefore was quite competent to build up a mass revolution. In this 
sense, it might be said that the movement for restoration of the democracy in 
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Bangladesh in the 1980s must be considered to be nearly a social revolution in 
accordance with a political mass movement. 
2.2.3. The Process of Democratisation: Globalisation and Bangladesh 
Barrington Moore Jr. (1973) endeavoured to discern three main historical 
routes of democracy: 
"... the bourgeois revolution, a route that England, France, United States entered at the 
succeeding points at time with profoundly different societies at the starting point. The 
Second path also is a capitalist one, but, in the absence of a strong revolutionary surge, it 
passed through reactionary political forms to culminate in fascism.... in Germany and 
Japan. The third is communist one. In Russia and China, revolution, having their main but 
no exclusive origins among the peasants, made possible the communist variant. Finally. in 
the middle of the 1960's, India ........ 
had experienced neither a bourgeois revolution, nor a 
conservative revolution from above, nor so far a communist one. " (Moore 1973: 413) 
There were various complex conditions that allowed the institutional legacy of 
post-colonial democracy to survive. Especially in the sub-continent, Indian leaders 
were to face cruel choices between effective democracy and the necessity of 
development and have been nourishing democracy from the very beginning of its 
independence. The INC which led the freedom movement had taken socialism in 
their party manifesto. Moreover, the CPI had also a strong support base among the 
working class people and within two and half decades since the independence, the 
CPI systematically won the provincial power of West Bengal. On the other hand, the 
Eastern part of Pakistan, normally known as East Bengal, now Bangladesh, under 
the same cultural and language heritage bordering with West Bengal of India, had 
been struggling for socio-economic equity against the new colonial Pakistan ruling 
elites. In this movement, the political parties of the then East Pakistan, especially the 
AL and Communist Party had chosen socialism in their party manifesto. The 
liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971 was mostly considered to be guided by the 
socialist spirit. More or less, all the political components of liberation war were 
highly influenced by socialist spirit of the 1960s around the world. The introduction 
of the one-party socialist government of Bangabandhu in Bangladesh in 1975 was 
the culmination of these spirits of, more or less, all the then political parties of newly 
born Bangladesh. So the total scenario of Bengal-East and West had seen the same 
consequences of socialism within twenty five years after the British had left the 
subcontinent. Bangladesh became a socialist state in 1975 and the socialism had 
been established in West Bengal in the beginning of 1970s under a moderate federal 
democracy brought up by India. The reasons for socialism to be established first in 
Bengal rather than other part of India might have originated from the changing 
industrialisation and economic policy' 5 of British rule in India in the end of nineteen 
century which increased the industrialisation in Bengal that developed a reservoir of 
working class added to agricultural peasants leading to the socialism in West Bengal 
and Bangladesh in the 1970s. Thus it might be relevant to suggest here that the rise 
- 25 - 
of socialism, the first stage of communism in West Bengal and Bangladesh could be 
seen as an example of Moore's thesis of the transformation of agrarian society in to 
communism. 
In Bangladesh anti-liberation forces under the umbrella of pro-capitalist 
ideology returned in the state apparatus after the killing of socialist Bangabandhu 
and the socialist path was abandoned and various socio-political and cultural 
organisations related to this doctrine were destroyed, absorbed or banned by the 
succeeding military dictatorships. In this connection, the dynamics inside the 
working class could be explicated in various ways. One section of this class took the 
opportunity of large scale privatisation and manufacture based industrialisation 
introduced by the military regime which made them the owners of small capital and 
gradually turned them into an urban middle class. The characteristics of this urban 
middle class were very ambiguous. As an owner of capital, they were marked as 
petty bourgeois, but they could not leave their socialist values, which ultimately led 
them into a rational secular and progressive spirit of thoughts. Another section of 
this class took the opportunity to join the ruling elites, which with the time, 
developed a segment of pressure group inside the military government in favour of 
change the regime to democracy. A large section of this class still remained as the 
workers and supporters of political parties, interest and pressure groups and other 
group formations. The support base of the AL was consisted of urban progressive 
middle and working class and peasants of rural society, which had been struggling 
for democracy under the period of both military regimes of Gen. Zia and Gen. 
Ershad. By contrast, the BNP was able to gather supports from all corners of 
bourgeois components of Bangladesh society. The support base of this party was 
mainly the urban higher middle class backed by anti liberation forces inside and 
outside the country on the one hand and a major religious support base in the grass 
root people on the other. The introduction of a free economy by Gen. Zia went 
mainly in favour of his party workers, and the privatisation and industrialisation 
programmes benefited his party leaders. They became financially established in the 
society, which in turn, has made them as dominating force in the urban middle class. 
Both of these two parties-the AL and the BNP and all of their wings and allies, 
were in the front position of the movement. Thus it might be argued that the path to 
the transition to democracy by industrial capitalism discerned by Barrington Moore 
could be moderately applicable to the prevailing status of urban middle class, who 
led a movement successfully against a military dictatorship to establish democracy 
in Bangladesh started in the beginning of 1980s and ended in the end of 1990 
Axel Hadenius (1994)) has described some institutional factors of the 
colonial background that made easy of the establishment of democracy in the 
post colonial societies. The conventional wisdom holds that a British heritage is 
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an advantage from a democratic viewpoint. According to Hadenius (in Beetham 
ed. 1994: 75) the main arguments run as follows: 
"Earlier and to a greater degree than other colonial powers (France, Portugal, Spain etc), Britain established organs of representation in its territories. However, limited in 
competence, these institutions made the native population (or at least the elite strata) familiar with the pluralistic form of government, and set a tradition of representation 
through free and fair elections which in several places be maintained after independence. 
Furthermore, the British have been hailed for developing a well functioning administrative 
system, particularly a judiciary, in the colonies. At the same time, the local population 
was-through the policy of so-called indirect rule-to a significant degree incorporated in 
the administrative process. Thus it has been claimed, the people of the former British 
colonies became socialized into an administrative culture, which has served to counter 
balance tendencies to arbitrary and despotic use of power. " 
The British regime in India in the mid-eighteenth century was started from 
Calcutta, which was considered as the then capital of Bengal. As a result, all British 
administrative activities had been centred in Bengal from the very beginning of their 
rule, and it might be quite related here, according to Hadenius, that the Bengal was 
the major beneficiary of the institutional and administrative development of British 
rule in India. After the ending of British rule in India in 1947, Bengal was divided 
in East and West parts. Including Calcutta, West Bengal was attached with India and 
the East Bengal, now Bangladesh, which was included with Pakistan, was 
geographically distant with nearly two thousand Kilometres from the main land of 
Pakistan and later, was born as an independent state in 1971. So it could be easily 
argued that Bangladesh was much influenced by the British heritage of political and 
administrative institutions in her society-as frequently considered for the 
instrumental and political base in forging the strong nationalist and independence 
movement of Bengali nation against the military autocracy of Pakistan-which had 
some importance in the process of democratisation in the 1980s. 
It could be suggested here that the major changes in the policies of 
international power centres made the favourable environment for democracy in other 
countries, which was functioning in favour of the movement for democracy in 
Bangladesh. Some changes had occurred all over the world during the period when 
the "third wave of democratisation" 16 started. Samuel P. Huntington has described 
briefly these changes as follow: 
"There were also the unprecedented global economic growth of 1960s, which raised living 
standards, increased education and greatly expanded the urban middle class....., the striking 
changes in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Churches council in 1963-1965....... 
including in the late 1960s the new attitude of the European Community towards 
expanding its membership, the major shifts in USA policies beginning in 1974 towards the 
promotion of human rights and democracy.... and Gorbachev's dramatic change in the late 
1980s in Soviet policy. Snowballing or demonstration effects......... stimulating and 
providing models for subsequent efforts at regime change in other countries. (Huntington, 
1991: 6) 
All these changes in the international economic and political order had greatly 
stirred the autocratic military rulers in the 1970s and 1980s around the world. The 
fall of autocratic Marcos in Philippines, the end of military regime in Pakistan and 
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South Korea or the winning of the election by the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) in Myanmar and the end of major military regimes in Africa and Latin 
America-even a motivation was found for change in some socialist regimes in the 
post cold war period, the blood-spilled oust of the dictatorship of Ceausescu in 
Rumania and the student movement for democracy at the Tiananmen squire in 
communist China might be considered as the consequences of this new path of 
international order. This had also compelled Bangladesh military rulers to abscond 
from the race for state power as well, and enabled the democratic forces of the 
country to forge a competent movement for democracy. In Bangladesh, however, 
these socio-political forces were found to be centred on the urban middle class who 
organised the movement to establish the democracy in the country. 
Huntington (1991: 113-114) has also categorised the regimes that moved to and 
toward democracy in the third wave: "they generally fell into three groups: one- 
party systems, military regimes and personal dictatorships". And also he has 
identified four distinct processes to change these regimes to democracy, such as 
"transformation, transplacement, replacement and intervention". According to his 
typologies, transformation occurred when the elites in power took the lead in 
bringing about democracy; replacement occurred when opposition groups took the 
lead in bringing about democracy and the authoritarian regime collapsed or was 
overthrown, and what might be termed transplacement, occurred when 
democratisation resulted largely from joint action by the government and opposition 
groups (Huntington, 1991). The Gen. Ershad's regime in Bangladesh, with no 
shadow of doubt, was defined first as a comprehensive military regime and finally 
developed into a regime of personal dictatorship. However, the change of state 
power by a mass upheaval towards the establishment of democracy in Bangladesh in 
1990 could be regarded, in most views, as a replacement of an autocratic military 
regime. Although at the final stage of the mass revolution, the military ruler left 
power reluctantly, in his words, to establish democracy peacefully, which could be 
seen, slightly as transplacement of an autocracy by an interim caretaker government 
articulated and supported by main stream opposition forces. Huntington (1991) has 
deliberately given the `different interaction of individuals and groups and their roles 
working in the democratisation process' ", which was also found to some extent in 
the democratic transition of the country. 
More recently, Jocelyn Linnekin (2004) has offered a symbolic constructivist 
paradigm for democratic transition which has challenged the prevailing notion- 
objectivist discourse (Muravchik, 1991)ßg-that democracy is a clearly defined 
entity with fixed and invariant essence and can be transferred across national 
boundaries retaining an unchanged identity. She applies empirical qualifications and 
caveats to the self-congratulatory assumptions of conservative thinkers and some 
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foreign policy architects in different national settings, where institutional 
implementations responds, in her words, `to particular contingencies of history. 
place, culture and political custom'(2004: 17). Her idea is the extension of the 
insights of symbolic and interpretive social science (e. g., Berger and Luck-mann 
1966, Geetz 1973). This has been attached with the views of the anthropologists and 
area specialists to `lived variations of democracy in specific locations' (Gutmann 
2002, Paley 2001,2002, Schaffer 1998, Wiarda 1997, Linnekin 2004). In this 
connection, her idea of an `ethnology of democracy'19 and `variable construction of 
democracy'20 is also unique-close to the sense of democracy in the socio-economic 
and cultural context of Bangladesh in the 1980s-in which she has tried to 
conceptualise the meaning and practice of democracy in the comparison between 
nations-nationality and ethnicity close to the views of Howard Wiarda 
(1986,1994,1997) that concerned with authoritarian rule, militarism, political 
instability and pervasive economic inequality. Her approach considers some keen 
affiliations for the perfect adaptation of democracy in particular setting such as 
`identity', `tradition' `culture' and even `the nation' as dynamic symbolic creations 
rather than primordial legacies (Anderson 1983, Handler and Linnekin 1984, 
Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, Linnekin 1983,1990,1997,2004). On the basis of all 
of these observations, she argues: 
...... democracy cannot be "exported" because...... democracy is an ideational product of 
the human mind: a symbolic model, a system of values and symbols, a field of malleable 
representations, as well as an associated institutional apparatus. Because democracy is 
always implemented in particular cultures and historical contexts, it varies ethnographically 
and may carry unique and (to an outsider) unpredictable meanings for members of a 
society........ The term `symbolic construction' conveys the premise that democracy is not a 
bounded object passively adopted by people in emerging nations but an idea that is 
creatively reinterpreted and reconstructed in particular sites. This perspective treats 
'democracy' as a relatively open field of possible meanings, which must be discovered--not 
assumed--in particular settings. Instead of adopting criteria predefined by outsiders, as a 
cultural anthropologist I seek to discover how ordinary citizens beyond the major industrial 
nations conceptualize democracy. " (2004: 6.7) 
The pattern of democratic transition in Bangladesh in the wake of mass 
revolution mostly followed this symbolic constructivist approach. In this historic 
movement, the opposition democratic forces had been demanding to the junta from 
the very beginning to transfer power to a non-partisan Caretaker Government, which 
was completely a local innovation and possibly a unique, well accepted, universal 
and exceptional constitutional system of election supervising interim government 
around the world. This constructed the collective spirits of the opposition forces 
based on the particular pattern of the local problems, which was required mainly to 
establish the trust on election process of the country that was completely destroyed 
by a shameless liar military dictatorship-all of his lies became true by the state 
owned media-similar to the fascist propaganda during the Second World war. 
Therefore, this system of interim government was inevitable as an important local 
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variant in the transition of democracy in Bangladesh according to Linnekin's 
approach. 
2.2.4. Capitalism and Democracy: a Bangladesh Perspective 
Bangladesh could be characterised as a peripheral capitalism in terms of her 
socio-economic and political structures of the post colonial period following the 
ideas of Alavi, where the elites' of the society were found to have western 
technology and rationality and as a result, became habituated with westernising 
styles of thought and actions in their daily life. 2' Eventually they took-over the 
leadership from `traditional elites' based mainly on landed upper class of 
Bangladesh society. According to Alavi, "the problem of identifying the ruling 
classes and class alignments in peripheral capitalist societies is more complex than 
in advanced capitalist societies" (Alavi and Shanin, 1982: 296). It is because of the 
fact, as Sen (1994) argues, the elements of primordial loyalties, such as kinship, 
regional, religious, linguistic and ethnic affiliations and even some vestiges of caste 
system constantly get involved in the process of class formation in the peripheral 
capitalist society and Bangladesh must not be excluded from these primordial 
loyalties which were found as some of the key features in the history of her social 
evolution. Besides these inherent factors, the external forces also distort the normal 
development of class structure in such societies, which was also seen as quite 
relevant with Bangladesh society in the 1980s. 
According to the Marxist notion of social structure, although there are two 
fundamental classes, a class divided society has also some 'auxiliary classes' such as 
petty producers and traders, professional classes and so on. Moreover, there may be 
found many different characteristics of a single class, for example, the educated 
salaried middle class in post- independent Bangladesh. The political role of this 
middle class in peripheral capitalist societies, is, however of very considerable 
importance and should not be dismissed so easily, by designating them an `auxiliary 
class'. They could play a vital role in the politics of the peripheral capitalist societies, 
as Alavi argues, "by virtue of their capacity to appropriate an alien language and 
culture and thereby they would maintain their social distance from the common 
people of these societies" (1982: 297-299). But Bangladesh does not fully fit in this 
naive schema of class structure since its growing urban educated salaried middle 
classes had not yet been able to alienate themselves from the rural backgrounds. It 
might safely be said in this regard that `the processes have already started in this 
direction'. 22 
Francis Fukuyama (1992) has contended that representative democracy and 
capitalism have emerged as the uncontested models for political and economic 
systems in the contemporary world. The emergence of this order of contemporary 
world system has passed several stages of development in the last few centuries in 
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which, "world capitalism has been characterised by colonialism, then by capitalist 
commercial domination and finally by monopoly capitalism" (Gilbert and Gugler, 
1989: 36). Capitalism as world system had turned into a global system of 
imperialism after the Second World War, where a highly monopolistic industrial 
structure created the basis for the emergence of oligopolistic transnational 
corporations, which now dominate its economy. As a result, there had been found lot 
of changes in controlling the political power as Thomas argued: 
".... political power was placed firmly in the hands of the economically dominant financial 
and industrial bourgeoisie. ...... Many people envisaged this period as the time when 
comparatively small group of countries emerged at the `centre' of the world capitalist 
system and became its main beneficiaries, while the other much larger group remained on 
the `periphery'. The rhythm of growth and development in the system as a whole are seen 
to be dictated by the course of accumulation at the `centre'. The periphery, by contrast, is 
wholly dependent on the system because its growth is largely a reflex of developments 
internationally" (Thomas 1988: 37-38). 
This new world economic order could be seen perfectly working in regard to 
Bangladesh as it was completely dependent on the foreign aid of the `centre' 
capitalist worlds in her post-independent period. The negative impact of advanced 
`core' countries on the political economy of the dependent, `peripheral' countries 
would diminish the chances of democracy. "Outside the core, democracy is rarity" 
(Chirot 1977: 22), which was grown as a popular thought in regard to the history of 
democratisation process of Bangladesh society. Thomas and others (1979) drew the 
conclusion from several empirical tests that "economic dependence was indeed 
associated with the political centralism" (Rueschemeyer et al, 1992: 18), as Moore 
(1973) argued that the decisive causes of their politics lie outside their own 
boundaries. For Bangladesh in the 1980s, being a third world underdeveloped 
country, the decisive factor of her political change were also seemed to have been 
determined by several international core countries like United States, Great Britain, 
European Union etc. 
2.2.5. Democracy and Social Class: a Bangladesh schema 
Democracy in Abraham Lincoln's words: "government of the people, by the 
people and for the people" (Wilson 1996: 12) and is also defined by Schumpeter in 
terms of "the will of the people" (source) and "the common good" 
(purpose)(Huntington, 1991: 6). But that has given us only the general feeling that the 
people should rule. It could be seen as an etymological route to definition, be called 
as the "definitional fallacy" (Holden, 1994: 6), because, "it is illogical to define 
democracy by induction from the practice of any one political unit or any one sub- 
set of political units" (Beetham ed. 1994: 6). In a more promising route he has 
referred "these to be `popular controls' and `political equality" (ed. 1994: 7). 
Hadenius has adopted a similar approach and `has arrived at a conception of 
"political democracy" which holds that public policy "is to be governed by the 
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freely expressed will of the people where by all individuals are to be treated as 
equals" (1992: 7-9). Lively (1975: 49-51) 'pinpoints the norms dictating inclusive 
citizenship and political equality', while Holden (1988: 6) `boils democracy down to 
popular sovereignty'. 
In fact, Bangladesh society in 1980s had tried to restore these representative 
characters of modem democracy demanding a free and fair election under a non- 
military neutral caretaker government, by which civil liberties and human rights 
would be ensured to all citizens and central decision making power would be shared 
by the minority group of the elected legislators. Seymour Martin Lipset began with 
the observation that greater economic affluence in a country has long been thought 
of as a condition favourable for democracy: "all the various aspects of economic 
development-industrialisation, urbanisation, wealth and education- are so closely 
interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of 
democracy"(1963: 41). It could be simply described as: "the greater economic 
affluence of a nation, the better prospects of democracy" (Kivisto, 1998: 73). 
Though Bangladesh, in her pre and post independence history, has been developing 
the agriculture in the economy as their main mode of production, a agro-based 
industrial development also took place side by side mainly started from the last time 
of British rule that later reared by Pakistani entrepreneurs before the independence 
of Bangladesh in 1971. By the end of 1970s, the introduction of a free economy 
policy resulted in privatisation, industrialisation and urbanisation through out the 
1980s, might have transformed the Bangladesh society moderately towards a trend 
of `a well to do economic activities'. This trend empowered the different necessary 
classes of the society for democracy movements in the subsequent decades, which 
might have a considerable importance to overturn the military dictatorship of Gen. 
Ershad. 
In the beginning of the Political Man (1963a) Lipset quoted approvingly from 
the passage in Aristotle's Politic, in which the Greek Philosopher made the case that 
the most stable form of democracy is achieved only when the middle class is 
sufficiently large to ensure that neither the wealthy elites at the top nor the poor at 
the bottom come to control political life. Instead of a class structure that can be 
visually depicted as a triangle with a large base: "the classes in a democracy can be 
portrayed as a diamond" (Lipset 1963a: 5). However, Lipset treated economic 
development resulting in sizeable, stable and consistent middle class as a necessary 
but not a sufficient content for democracy. A number of others factors are also 
crucially important, including an important role of cultural values, which could be 
cited as follows: 
"Democracy relies on a culture that promotes values emphasizing egalitarian ideals, 
tolerance, a recognition of political opposition and dissent a belief in freedom of speech 
and assembly and a respect for the rule of law and for fundamental human rights. 
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Democracy requires a high level of political leadership, vibrant political parties. an informed citizenry and effective political institutions. In short, given these many requisites. it appears that democracy is not easily achieved, and citizen must v%ork unceasingly too 
sustain the conditions that ensure its survival. " (Bottomore 1993,71-73) 
However, the development of an 'urban middle class' in Bangladesh in the 
1980s, included education salaried employees of different government and non-govt 
organisations i. e. professionals, small manufacturer or petty businessmen, 
intellectuals, students and youths, who took the leadership role in the intermediate 
level of different political parties and socio-cultural organisation had played a role of 
organiser of the movement. In fact, they were steering the whole movement 
activities making a connection between militant grass root participants and the top 
level leaders of movements. The opposition forces of the movement culminated 
from all sections of Bangladesh society was, however, in the stage of maturity in all 
respects at that time. In spite of suffering from several weaknesses inside the 
political institutions, political leaders with a great risk at their lives and playing a 
responsible role, had made the movement successful and the rich cultural heritage, 
liberal religious groups, professional bodies and intellectuals had made their roles 
effective towards the increase of consciousness of human rights, freedom and liberty 
among the people of Bangladesh society. 
2.2.6. The Relation of Democracy with Urbanisation and 
Industrialisation 
The trends of urbanisation and industrialisation in any country could be 
considered as the most important social indicators to analyze the democratisation 
process in the context of changing the order of society. There have been found 
various problems regarding the industrial development in the peripheral countries. 23 
In spite of these obstacles, and the economic arguments as to whether there should 
be priority in development for agriculture or industry, or a path of balanced growth, 
recognition that manufacturing has some place in the economic mix of each country, 
varying with its resources and stage of development, has led third world countries to 
encourage industrialisation. After the end of British rule in the sub-continent, 
Bangladesh was treated as a colony by Pakistan until its independence. Therefore, 
Bangladesh had lots of deficiencies as an industrialised society. The situation had 
some developments in the post-independent period. The growth of small 
manufactures, poultry farming, factories of different local market goods, operation 
of different multi-national companies etc were found to be established in this period, 
which might be considered to create an urbanised culture as a whole, which has been 
compared with the western culture that has been pioneering democracy in those 
societies. However, "urbanisation is an indication of modernisation, the sign of 
growth and economic progress. The whole world is moving towards a more urban 
existence and where as the process is more nearly completed in the small number of 
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rich industrialised countries, it is only in recent years that marked urbanisation has 
started to sweep over the less develop countries"(Mountjoy, ed. 1978: 102). As a 
less developed country, Bangladesh in 1970s and 1980s, was seem to move towards 
urbanisation. But it could not be able to ensure the urban utilities duly that would 
have been necessary for the growing urban population. The reasons behind this 
problem is simply compared as follows: 
"In the advanced countries alternative employment grew up during a period of change and 
increasing efficiency in agriculture...... Mass transport, allowing cheap long-distance 
migration permitted millions to bypass the new industrial towns and cities and to seek a 
new life overseas...... it was spread over a greater period of time and was not focused 
solely on the towns. The flood to the towns currently sweeping through the third world no 
longer bears any relationship to expanding urban economics and opportunities: under 
employment in village is being exchanged for unemployment in towns. The flood of people 
to the larger towns in the third world is now at a rate far in excess of the possible provision 
of jobs in those towns, and this rate of population accretion outpaces the provision of the 
utilities and services that are the hallmark of an urban community. (Mountjoy ed., 1978: 
110). 
There was found a significant change in the growth of the urban population in 
Bangladesh in the 1970s to 1980s in the post independent period. The other relevant 
characteristics of the population under the over urbanised cities and towns were also 
found to be developed in the same scale. The urban sex ratio (number of male per 
100 female) was 118.1 where the national figure was 106.1 which indicate that the 
sex ratio of urban population was higher than the national one The sex ratio of the 
urban population had come down to 118 in 1991 from 125 in 1981 and this might be 
due to better coverage of females and more male international migration in the 1991 
census. It was found in Zilla (district) wise urban population by age that 14.51% 
were under 10 years and 13.94% were under 15 years of age and 1.59% older 
population who were dependent on 84.44% working population, and was also found 
that the age 15-44 years percentage of males was perceptibly higher in the urban 
areas than in the rural areas. This fact might be attributed to age selective male 
migration to urban areas for better employment and education. The trend was found 
noticeable both in 1974,1981 and 1991.24 
These socio-demographic statistics of Bangladesh's urban population in the 
1980s could be seen as positive trend in favour of democracy movement in the 
country. However, the social structure of Bangladesh urban society was extended to 
the periphery people as much as possible by different steps taken in the reforms of 
local government. In 1984, military government had promulgated Local 
Government Ordinance 25 by which the whole country was divided into 64 districts 
and 464 Thanas (police station) were upgraded to Upazilla (sub-district) with 
completely new administrative, judiciary set-up which might be considered as one of 
most important steps that led Bangladesh to be a one kind of peculiar third world 
urbanised society. 26 This change in the local government structure might be seen in 
favour of democracy movement as it had been increasing the support-base of the 
- 34 - 
movement against the military rule. Urban infra structural environment is also 
favourable to several movement operations. Some socio-demographic factors have 
also been found important for industrial and urban societies which are also treated 
very useful for social movements: "the demographic observation reflects an 
economic reality: the surplus is increasingly produced in the urban sector... It is the 
urban economy that finances the state apparatus -the state is dependent on urban 
economy, there are limits to repression in the urban context. Manager, professionals, 
skilled workers and even semi-skilled workers in great numbers can not be replaced 
at short noticed (Gilbert and Gugler, 1989: 159-160). These have also come to the 
fact in the rise of movement in urban area as the whole administrative and economic 
activities of the government were urban-based. 
2.2.7. The Political Instability and the Discourse of Democracy 
The people of Bangladesh were living through a period of considerable 
political instability in the post-independent period in which there was a complex 
`crisis of legitimacy', the term used by Habermas (1976). He examines the 
manifestations of economic, political and ideological crises in late capitalist 
societies. The responsibility for dealing with the crisis is assumed by the state, and a 
crisis of the whole system could only develop if there were a political crisis and an 
ideological crisis in which the cultural system became incapable of providing the 
necessary motivations for the maintenance and the reproduction of existing society 
(Habermas 1976, Bottomore 1984 and Sen 1994). Although Bangladesh is not a late 
capitalist society, there was still a crisis of legitimacy. However, it was being a 
peripheral capitalistic society of the third world faced both political and ideological 
crisis during the rule of Ershad who left no stone unturned to overcome this crisis in 
order to achieve legitimacy acceptable to her people, which failed. The continuous 
mass movement from 1982 to 1990 by the opposing political and other socio- 
cultural forces mainly aimed at the end of the autocratic rule of Ershad so that the 
`legitimacy crises' could be resolved and democratic rule be returned. It should be 
noted here that the great political change i. e. the transition from autocracy to 
democracy which Bangladesh witnessed in 1990 was brought about by the principal 
political agents such as aggrieved social classes, elites of diverse kinds, generational, 
ethnic and cultural groups of the society. According to Bottomore, `any crisis of any 
country, whatever its form and character in the twentieth century, can not be fully 
comprehended unless it is seen in the global political context' (1979: 94). This is also 
true in the case of the restoration of democracy in Bangladesh which ceases the 
political crisis of Ershad regime following the violent mass uprising in 1990 since it 
took place in the favourable international situation of post cold era. 
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2.2.8. Movement Actions of the Democratic Forces 
According to H. Blumer, a "social movement' can be viewed as a collective 
enterprises to establish a new order of life" (McLauglin ed., 1969: 8). As a social 
movement develops, it takes on the character of a society. It acquires organisation 
and form, a body of customs and traditions, established leadership, an enduring 
division of labour, social rules and values-in short, a culture, a social organisation, 
and a new scheme of life (McLauglin ed. 1969). In fact, the movement for 
democracy had assumed the characteristics of Bangladesh society-the people of all 
corners including politicians, students, labourers, intellectuals, professionals, trade 
union workers, youths, etc were united for a single demand that the military dictator 
must resign from power and his militias must return to the barrack. However, the 
term `social movement' has also some conceptual definitions, which include: 
"(1) collective and joint action; (2) change-oriented goals; (3) some degree of 
organisation; (4) some degree of temporal continuity; and (5) some extra-institutional 
collective action, or at least a mixture of extra-institutional (protesting in the streets) and 
institutional(political lobbying) activity"(McAdam and Snow, 1997: xviii). 
All these elements together can define a social movements as "a collectivity 
acting with some degree of organisation and continuity outside of institutional 
channels for the purpose of promoting or resisting change in the group, society, or 
world order of which it is a part" (Snow and Oliverl995: 571, Benford 1992: 1880, 
Turner and Killian 1987: 223 and Wilson 1973: 9). In the Bangladesh case, the 
movement for the change of a military state into a free and democratic one had 
undoubtedly acquired all these conditions set above by McAdam and Snow. They 
have also described different types of movement found to be of popular acceptance 
in contemporary societies around the world. They have summarized the movements' 
typologies of many scholars, in which Smelser, Roy Wallis, Aberle were found to be 
of relevance here. 
Neil Smelser (1962) has divided social movements into two generic categories: 
norm-oriented and value oriented. 27 Roy Wallis (1984) has also provide a similar 
dichotomy based on the religious mind: world rejecting and world affirming 
movement28 The typologies provided by Neil Smelser and Roy Wallis might be 
familiar in with the movement for restoration of democracy in Bangladesh from 
1982 to 1990 by their `value-oriented' and 'world rejecting' movement category, 
which was aimed at a fundamental change of Bangladesh society from military 
autocracy into democracy. David Aberle (1966: 315-33) differentiated "social 
movements based both on the amount or degree of change and the locus or level of 
change: The cross classification of these two dimensions has presented four generic 
types of movements: alternative, redemptive, reformative and transformative 
movement29 The Bangladesh movement could be explained by the fourth category 
transformative movement dimension given by Aberle, which in fact, was 
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concentrating towards a major change in the central power structure associated with 
an establishment of democratic ideals in the society with a broader perspective. 
2.3. Micro Theories of the Study 
2.3.1. Political Parties and Alliances: the Political Opposition to Military 
Dictatorship 
The opposition to the military regime comprised a group of political and 
socio-cultural forces who were the inheritors to previous democratic regimes. For 
the political forces of the country, it was the first step in April 1983-under the 
permission of indoor politics by the junta-to re-establish relations between partisan 
political parties and organisations and the bases of different socio-economic interest 
groups and at the same time to organise the parties themselves. And the second 
challenge was to form a unified political opposition and finally, to withstand the 
dictatorship by opposing its policies and try to end the military regime. 
In this regard, it will not be out of place to take the oppositions' party 
structures into account. Ashraf and Sharma (1983) in their Political Sociology: A 
New Grammar of Politics, have categorised political parties in several ways, 30 which 
could be compared in regard to the Bangladesh society. These are (1) Party based on 
Ideology and power, (2) party as an organisational structure, (3) parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary group, (4) direct vs. indirect structure, (5) cadre vs. mass parties, 
(6) oligarchy or stratarchy, In Bangladesh, the political parties, mainly the AL and 
the BNP had been suffering cleavages between their different ideological stands31 
having an adverse effect in organising a united movement against the military 
regime that was reflected in a statement of NDI delegation in Bangladesh: the single 
largest obstacle to ensuring a democratic environment is the hostility between the 
two major parties that breeds politically motivated disharmony and violence. 32 The 
major parties might have the direct structure, but to win over the election or to 
organise the united movements, there were found some indirect structures in the 
form of `Dote' (alliance) and `Okya Parishad' (coalition) etc33 Although there is 
some debate over the Michel's thesis of oligarchical control of party decision 
making process, it could be seen as an imperative factor in Bangladesh. Sheikh 
Hasina and Begum Zia, the two chief leaders of both the AL and the BNP had the 
full control of the decision making inside their parties as well as in the movement 
against the military dictatorship. 
Political parties, pressure groups and interest groups may co-exist and function 
in a well co-ordinated manner under certain forms of alliances and alignments. This, 
in fact, happened in regard to the democracy movement of Bangladesh. In this 
connection, Duverger's statement is of some importance: 
".......... alliances between parties vary greatly, in form and degree. Some are ephemeral 
and unorganized, simply temporary coalitions which take place in order to benefit the 
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parties concerned in the elections in order to overthrow a government or to support one from time to time; others are lasting and strongly organised. Of all coalitions. the popular front is probably one which has had the greatest effect on public opinion" (Duverger. 1966: 
324-326,331). ` 
According to Duverger, there are three kinds of coalitions of party-based 
political elites, namely the electoral, the parliamentary and the governmental. All 
types may co-exist or occur in isolation. Here it can be conceived of another type of 
coalition which may be called `political alliances'34, the motive of which is to launch 
a movement against the existing ruling cliques. Even the electoral alliance often 
becomes a part of the `political alliance', when the situation demands. The formation 
of three main alliances which jointly fought against the dictatorship of General 
Ershad belonged to the category of political alliances. So far as the class affiliations 
of these alliances are concerned it may be said that the different middle class strata 
of Bangladesh society dominated their activities. 
2.3.2. Interest and Pressure Groups: the Socio-cultural opposition to 
military Dictatorship 
Beside political parties, various interest groups of Bangladesh society 
participated in the democracy movement, who were primarily in four categories: 
trade union workers (non-agri cultural labour force), professional, intellectuals and 
students. 
The workers -the labour force of Bangladesh society might be regarded as a 
proletariat in the classical sense, but these people have not yet given up propensity 
to acquire small business and property. 35 Their class consciousness therefore can not 
take a clear shape. The relationship between the factory owners and workers was 
apparently non-antagonistic. But sometimes it became hostile. The transport 
labourers were apt in ensuring their daily income by striking a balance between the 
owners and management. 36 The employers-labourers relationship in the tea gardens, 
weaving sectors and other establishments also did not have always the character of 
class conflicts. But these labour forces were well organised under trade unions and 
linked with different political parties, mainly leftwing parties, of the country. They 
had their own demands to the dictator and therefore were seemed to be a crucial 
associative group in activating the all actions of the movement. The white-collared 
workers who were called employees generally belonged to low income group. They 
maintained a necessary managerial link between workers and professionals. 
Although they were employed in different government and semi-government offices, 
organisations, institutions, trading and commercial houses etc., they often were 
engaged in small business. In protection of their group interests, they, in most cases, 
liked to forge unity with the workers. They had a tendency towards attaining the 
status of professionals. These employees of Bangladesh constituted a well-organised 
social force that had the ability to bargain for their demands. "The professionals of 
LEEDS UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
-38- 
Bangladesh form that portion of the population who are relatively well established in 
socio-economic life. Most of them come from the middle class and lower middle 
classes. They are engaged in the sector of science, technology and knowledge, 
production and distribution, literature and administration etc. as well as the owners 
and possessors of land, capital, talent and technological know-how"(Sen, 1994: 14). 
Despite the fact that they have different styles of life from these workers and 
employees, the professionals can not live in isolation from the former. They were 
regarded as a considerable movement force against the military regime as: "no 
political, economic, social or cultural development can be attained without their 
united endeavours" (S. Alam 1991: 1-2). The professionals of Bangladesh society 
includes doctors, engineers, lawyers, bureaucrats, agriculturist, businessmen and the 
like those who have the expertise in their respective fields. 
The intellectual interest group was believed to articulate the movement for 
democracy in Bangladesh. No one is born an intellectual. They are `formed in the 
process of social interaction'37 through the carrying out of intellectual activities in 
particular social contexts: "they may point to certain occupations (like writers or 
professors) or to certain occupational groups (like professionals or white collar 
workers), or to certain socio-psychological categories (like scholars or 
'thinkers') 
.... 
" (Draper 1978: 481). For Lipset and Dobson (1972) as for many other 
American sociologists, intellectuals are attributed a special function in modern 
societies as "producers of cultures". Marxist-inspired analysts have conceptualised 
intellectuals as shaped by the "relation of production" (Eyerman and 
Jamison 1991: 96). The class they represent has been identified by Marx himself, 
when he argued: 
"According to their education and their individual position they may be as far apart as 
heaven from earth. What makes them representatives of the petty-bourgeoisie is the fact that 
in their minds they do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not get beyond in life, 
that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and solutions to which 
material interest and social position drive the latter practically. This is, in general, the 
relationship between the political and literary representatives of a class and the class they 
represent" (Marx: 18`h Brum. in ME: SW 1: 424) 
The intellectuals of Bangladesh society consisted of the teachers of different 
universities and colleges, poets, authors, novelists, columnists, dramatists, 
sculpturists, painting artists, television performers, journalists, cultural workers, 
head of religious institutions etc. They created consciousness among the people 
against the military regime by their courageous participation in thoughts and actions, 
which in fact, had awakened the students, youth, and political workers etc. to 
participate in the movement. The teacher associations of different universities, 
colleges and secondary schools, National Poetry Council, Combined Cultural forces, 
Press Club, Journalists Unions and Women Bodies etc. came forward with their all 
abilities in organising the support base of the movement. They were the political and 
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literary representative of a class of petty-bourgeois in the Marxian sense determined 
and guided by the relations of production creating new thoughts for the passage to 
democracy and might also be treated as "producers of culture" according to 
American sociologists as they were the precursors to establish democratic culture in 
the country. They opposed many military ordinances promulgated in different times 
as these were against the values of a free and democratic society. 
It has been found in every society all over the world that "students are the 
universal opposition; they oppose whatever regime exists in their society" 
(Huntington 1991: 144). The students of different universities, colleges and other 
academic institutions in Bangladesh society have an insurgent revolutionary role 
from the very beginning of Gen. Ershad had assumed the power. Their role in the 
movement might be treated as a catalyst in creating the unity of opposition forces. 
Engels (1889) had some critical observations about the young forces including 
students regarding their participation in revolutionary movements: 
" The greater part of the young men of all classes, below the capitalist class, was to be 
found, for a time at least, in the ranks of the insurgent armies, but this rather indiscriminate 
aggregate of the young men very soon thinned as soon as the aspect of affairs took a 
somewhat serious turn. The students particularly, those "representatives of the intellect, " 
as they liked to call themselves, were the first to quit their standards, unless they were 
retained by the bestowal of officer's rank, for which they, of course, had very seldom any 
qualification"(E: Revol. & C. R. Ger., in ME: SW 1: 379). 
The students of Bangladesh society, mainly of a rural background representing 
the lower middle class of petty-bourgeoisie, poor farmers or peasants might be 
incorporated moderately as `the insurgent armies' with the proletariat class of non- 
agricultural working forces and could be seen as recurring militant participants in 
the movement. Engels termed further the role of students treating them as the 
`intellectual proletariat'38 that ultimately is true in the Bangladesh case where they 
had awakened and united the manual lower class workers in the frontier of the 
democracy movements. The events of killing, torturing, batons charge, and arrest 
under military regime made victims largely from students, labourers, and workers of 
the lower and lower middle class of Bangladesh society. However, the students' 
forces were integrated under the APSU39 played the central role in unseating the 
military junta. 
Karl Mannheim (1928) has argued that a generation has `a certain structural 
resemblance' to class position 40 : "the fact of the belonging to the same class, and 
that belonging to the same generation or age group, have this in common, that both 
endow the individuals sharing in them with a common location in the social and 
historical process, and thereby limit them to specific range of potential experience, 
predisposing them for a certain characteristics mode of thought and experience, and 
a characteristic type of historically relevant action" (Mannheim, 1952: 276-322). 
Moreover, he has argued that the younger generation is generally used to vigorously 
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assert its claim to cultural and political leadership. In this context, Margaret %I. ead 
(1970) has developed the concept of a `dissident young' to pioneers who are 
exploring a new time rather than a new country. The movement for democracy from 
1982 to 1990 along with the Language Movement of 1952, the Student Movement 
of 1962, the Six-Point movement of 1966 and the Mass Upsurge of 1969 in the 
Pakistan period have been marked by the huge participation of this dissident groups 
of Bangladesh society. 
2.3.3. The Repressive Measures Used by the Military Administration 
Frederick D. Miller (1983) has identified four separate broad features that lead 
to the decline the movement: repression, co-optation, success and failures. Firstly, 
repression occurs when agents of social control use force to prevent movement 
organisations from functioning or prevent people from joining movement 
organisation. Miller argued: "Repressive actions may defined as legitimate by the 
state, for example, when it passes laws banning political parties or suspending civil 
liberties in emergencies, but they are never legitimate from the perspective of the 
movement"(Freeman and Johnson ed., 1999: 05). In Bangladesh, the military ruler 
has defined all of his repressive measures for the so-called sake of the nations 
interest, which took many killings, jailing, harassment, criminal charges, spying to 
disrupt the opposition and frequent `latthi peta41 on the processions of students, 
political parties etc. The `imprisonment' of political leaders and `house arrest' of the 
key movement leaders including Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia; curfew imposed 
dawn to dusk and political activities banned for indefinite periods, mass arrest of the 
activists were found, among other, the most usual repressive measures used by the 
military administration. 42 The intelligence branch of the military ruler, mainly 
consisting of army officers designed the repression blue print, which was to be 
followed by the other `white dressed'43 intelligence officials of the regular forces. 
Secondly, it is usually seen that "co-optation strategies are brought into play when 
individual movement leaders are offered rewards that advance them as individuals 
while ignoring the collective goals of the movement" (Freeman and Johnson 
ed., 1999: 305). In the case of Bangladesh, it was frequently found that many leaders 
of opposition political forces were caught and co-opted by the military rulers by 
rewarding them with a high ranking port-folio in the Ministry or in diplomatic 
missions, which in fact, demolished the movements sometimes. In this process, the 
junta also floated a political party-JP, which consisted of opportunist leaders 
expelled by or co-opted from opposition political forces-an empty effort to give a 
civilian cover to his military dictatorship. 
Thirdly, success : "while every movement should seek and be able to enjoy 
success or victory, .... 
in obtaining concessions from the dominant system, movement 
organisation often have relinquish some portion of their claim to represent an 
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independent radical opposition"(Miller, 1999: 306). The movement in Bangladesh 
also was in trouble in 1986, when one major faction of the opposition, the AL and 
its alliance had participated in the election under martial law. This partial success 
left the military dictator in power and the AL ceased to the demand of resignation of 
Gen. Ershad. Fourthly, failure in the movement in any society is not welcomed at 
any case, but not uncommon in several histories of the democracy movement around 
the world, especially in the third world perspectives, where authoritarian military 
regime prolonged in power. Miller (1983) has pointed to the failure at the 
organisational level as two major forms: factionalism and encapsulation that 
prevailed in opposition political forces, which also led Bangladesh movement a 
failure for several times. 44 
2.3.4. The Movement Actions and Violence 
The movement actions against the military regime in Bangladesh were 
influenced by different contemporary national movement strategies and tactics 
around the world from the 1960s to the 1980s. First, it was found that a new set of 
political activities has been added to the citizen's political repertoire' from the 1960s 
(Barnes et al 1979). The research has showed a significant pattern of political 
participation to protect the democratic rights of the citizen, described as follows: 
"According to the research just cited, a long list of new and unconventional forms of 
political participation including signing petitions, lawful demonstration, boycotts, 
withholding of rent and tax, occupations, sit-ins, blocking traffic and wildcat strikes, have 
been added to the more traditional ones such as following politics in news papers, 
discussing politics with others, working for political parties or their candidates, attending 
political meetings, contacting public officials or persuading friends and acquaintances to 
vote in particular ways. " (Barnes et al, 1979: 524) 
Second, the marches, boycotts, occupations and other forms of action have 
been found very effective for the campaigns of the movements and could be all part 
of a modern repertoire of collective action and the "whole set of means [a group] 
has for making claims of different types on different individuals"(Tilly 1986: 2). In 
Bangladesh, the opposition democratic forces organised many actions that easily 
incorporated with the typologies of Barnes and Tilly. The protest march of the 
plethora of thousands of students in different University campuses in Bangladesh 
was found every day routine protest against junta regime. Hartal45, petition march, 
Gerao, blocking traffic were mostly used actions against the regime. Another 
effective action against the regime, "Dhaka Seize" in which the supporters of the 
opposition political forces were called to march towards the capital from the 
countryside resulting a number of casualties. 46 Besides these, non-violent actions 
like the sit-in, human chain, hunger strike, wearing black badge, long march used to 
reach the movement to masses. The participation of intellectuals, professionals and 
civil society were mainly limited to signing petitions, lawful demonstrations, human 
chains, making statement in media, protesting several regimes' ordinances and the 
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like. The chronological layers of these actions and participation in the movement 
could be seen as nicely presented by Dalton: 
"The various unconventional forms of participation are ordered along a single continuum 
from least to the most extreme. This continuum is marked by several thresholds. The first 
threshold indicates the transition from conventional to unconventional politics. Signing 
petitions and participating in the lawful demonstrations are.... accepted democratic norms. 
The second threshold represents the shift to direct action techniques, such as boycotts. A 
third level of political activities involves illegal but non-violent acts. Unofficial strikes or a 
peaceful occupation of a building typify this step. Finally, a fourth threshold includes 
violent activities such as personal injuries or physical damage" (Dalton, 1988: 65). 
The actions of the movement could also be diagnosed by these four thresholds: 
liberal programs including giving statements in the newspapers, signing petitions, 
sit-in, hunger strike to the gradual change towards extreme and direct actions 
including boycotting the military rulers in their state activities everywhere, illegal 
non-violent actions including hartal (strike), occupying government education and 
home offices, and finally violent activities including burning effigies, setting fire to 
vehicles, militant attacks, bombing and gunfire on police forces and harassment of 
government officers. 47 The Bangladesh democracy movement might be significantly 
characterised by a chronology of movement actions with cycles of protests. Though 
varying in dimension and duration, protest cycles have had a number of common 
characteristics in recent history: they coincide with "a phase of heightened conflict 
and contention across the social system that includes: a rapid diffusion of collective 
action from more mobilised to less mobilised sectors; a quickened pace of 
innovation in the forms of contention; new or transformed collective action frames; 
a combination of organised and unorganised participation; and sequences of 
intensified interactions between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, 
repression and sometimes revolution"(Tarrow 1994: 153). In Bangladesh, the 
student movements of 1983, movements against Upazilla system of 1985, JS 
election of 1986, and Dhaka Seize of 1987 etc. could be marked as the decline of the 
cycle of protests due to confusion and disunification of opposition forces, which 
ultimately collapsed for the time being. However, as the cycle of protest extends, the 
reaction of the authorities produces simultaneous processes of radicalisation and 
institutionalisation. The resignation of General Ershad and the end of military 
regime was the single demand by the opposition democratic forces at the peak stage 
of the movement in 1990-the year marked to diffuse and broaden the insurgencies 
of the movement in all sectors of Bangladesh society. The mass upheaval took place 
from central urban to rural periphery towns within very short period of time and 
actions were chronologically happened, by which it was shaped as one kind of urban 
mass revolution as described above by Tarrow, where government offices were 
attacked, minister's residential area occupied and burned, associates of military 
junta were mass beaten, arrested, jailed and convicted. 
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The logic of numbers, to which James DeNardo referred in Power in Nuinbers 
(1985), underlies numerous forms of protest. Since `there always seems to be power 
in numbers' (1985: 35), a movement's destiny depends to a great extent on the 
number of its supporters. As DeNardo notes, the "size of the dissidents' ... give the 
regime an indication of how much support the dissidents enjoy" (1985: 36) and also 
the logic underlying such actions is totally coherent with the principles of 
representative democracy: "an attempt is made to influence public opinion, the main 
repository of political power" (della Porta and Diani, 1999: 175). In Bangladesh, the 
strength of the opposition political forces was found undoubtedly enough strong as 
all the political parties, student organisations, professional and intellectual 
association were absolutely against the military regime. When the students unity like 
CSAC and SAA 48 brought out the protest march from the University campus 
towards the main streets of Dhaka city chanting anti-Martial Law slogans, it seemed 
to be a wave of thousands of students welcomed by clapping from the mass of 
people, the number of which, of course, frightened the military administration. 
When the pro-AL 8-party alliance or pro-BNP 7-party alliance called the public 
meeting in the Bangabandhu Avenue, or Manik Mia Avenue or Press club, Naya 
Bazar etc, 49 lakhs (hundreds of thousand) of supporters, workers and mass people 
joined these meetings, where crucial political programs were announced by 
opposition political forces. 
The use of violence in the movement could be considered an important means 
of protest against the regime. Charles Tilly (2003) has identified six types of 
violence in politics: violent rituals, coordinated destruction, opportunism, brawls, 
individual aggression, and scattered attacks. 50 In the Bangladesh movement, more or 
less, all these types of violence were used both by the opposition political parties 
and their military counter part. The military leader used several violent measures to 
wipe out the protests, gatherings, blockade, strikes including organised baton 
charges, kadane gas, shooting out on the protests marches, which produced counter 
violence mostly scattered attacks. 
2.3.5. Conclusion 
Theories in this research have covered a range of macro and micro issues. The 
macro issues try to investigate the differences and similarities of the Bangladesh 
movement globally comparing with the democratisation process in many nations 
around the world. The nature of conflict between political elites and military 
servicemen, patterns of democratic transition, relations of industrialisation, 
urbanisation and capitalism, necessary class configurations for democracy and the 
like have been examined in the macro perspective. Similarly, the micro theories 
have concentrated mainly on the characteristics of movements-the strength and 
weakness of political institutions, especially the political parties, development of 
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interest and pressure groups-students, intellectuals, professionals and trade unions 
of labour and working class, demographic issues, social structure, structure of the 
actions-violent and non-violent and the like, which has laid down the scholarly 
base of this research. On the whole, the wide range of literature reviewed and 
examinations of theories has resolved most of the central arguments of the 
movement for democracy in Bangladesh against the military dictatorship of General 
Ershad, which is able to find out the differences and targets of the enquiry, and this 
has provided the strength to continue on the empirical investigation of the issues in a 
micro perspective. 
Notes 
' To understand the difference as well as relationship between micro and macro perspective of 
sociological theories and issues, see Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan S Turner ed. The 
Penguine Dictionary of Sociology. 4`h ediion, London: Penguine Books, 2000, pp. 204,224. See also, 
Nicos P. Mouzelis, Back tp Sociological Theories: The Construction of Social Orders. London: 
Macmillan, 1994, p. 78. 
2 The non-violent actions included the protests march, petition march, mass gathering, demonstrations, 
sit-in, harta (strikes), hunger strikes, non- co-operation or civil disobedience, human chain, seize, 
elections etc., one the one hand, the violent actions included attacks, barricade, block, riot, rebellion, 
clash, destroying public transport, guerrilla fights resulting harassing, bombing, setting fire, killing 
government forces and officials etc. 
See Moudud Ahmed, Democracy and the Challenge of Development: A Study of Politics and 
Military Interventions in Bangladesh, UPL, Dhaka, 1995. 
4 The experiences they had gathered from a `so much politicised Pakistan Army' led them, later on , to exercise political power in Bangladesh when they were placed in the Bangladesh Armed forces. 
These repatriated faction of Army could be treated as the core of conflict in every events of military 
coup in the post-independent Bangladesh. 
5 Mukti Bahini (Bangladesh Liberation Army) was formed in 1971 under the auspices of the 
Bangladesh Government- in-exile in the border of Bangladesh-India to free the country from 
occupied Pakistan Army by war. It was mainly consisted of militants students, peasants and youths of 
Bangladesh society. Indian Government trained up this force in some border provinces of India like 
West Bengal, Tripura and Assam. They were fighting side by side with Bangladesh Army, the 
force consisted by mainly the Bengal regiment officers and solders of Pakistan Army left the side to 
join the freedom war of their motherland. The Mukti-Bahini forces were incorporated in Bangladesh 
Army after the independence of the Country. 
6Bangladesh Army launched its formal beginning with a major part of former East Bengal Regiment 
(EBR) of Pakistan Army and East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), who left the Pakistan side to join in the 
liberation war in 1971. After the war, the Army was formed from some thirty thousand men who had 
deserted the members of Bangladesh army in the war together with Mukti Bahini freedom fighters. 
Another group of 28000 Bengali soldiers repatriated from Pakistan and was included in the Armed 
Forces. This might be seen as the start of conflict inside the army institution. Because "most of their 
formative experience had been under the Ayub-Yahya martial law regimes, and had reflected the 
armed forces' contempt for politicians and a rabid anti-Indian feelings ; many, even before their 
repatriation , thought in terms of a military solution to 
Bangladesh's problems"(Gowher 
Rizvi, 1985: 224). 
7A number of Civil Service officers who returned from Pakistan after the liberation was incorporated 
in the civilian administration. They were the principal civilian associates of the military to be in 
power. In Bangladesh, it is evident that the first military coup in August, 1975 took place with the 
help of repatriated factions of the army collaborating with the same faction of civil bureaucracy 
8 The three strands for military seizure of power includes: the first is related to the nature of 
organisation which provides the armed forces with discipline and cohesion, hierarchy and centralised 
command and unity both at the decision making level and execution. These organisational features 
enable the army to take over political power promptly with a view to saving the nation from the 
"misdeeds" of the corrupt and "inept" politicians (Moris Janowitz, 1964) The second strand refers 
to the weakness of political system such as the fragile political institutions and chronic instability, 
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lack of consensual leadership and legitimacy, power vacuum and low level of political culture. These 
weaknesses may provide the justification for intervention (S. E. Finer, 1975). The third one is 
associated with the corporate interests of the armed forces. Any threat to their corporate interests may 
propel them to move and capture political power with a lightening speed (E. A. Nordinger, 1977). 
See also Moris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of the New Nations, Chicago: 
Philippe, 1964. 
10 Jatiyo Rakhi Bahini (National Security Force) was created in 1974 which was considered as a 
private force of the then government to be a step of establishment of socialism in the state. It was 
found that this force were well trained and well equipped then the regular force of Bangladesh Army. 
They were mostly comprised of freedom fighter persons of Bangladesh Liberation Army, formed in 
1971. 
11 Court Martial normally works to take disciplinary action against army personnel if found them in 
any anti-army activities. In fact, it was believed that a number of court martial were arranged only to 
destroy the counter group of Gen. Zia especially the Mukti Bahinee faction inside the army, and those 
who were hanged or killed in firing squad were mainly from freedom fighters group of the Armed 
Forces. A soldier who escaped such a court martial described later that every morning he used to see 
the flow of the bloods to the brink of the drains of the central jail while he was prisoner of so called 
mutiny in the Army. 
12 Karl Marx, bef. Cologne Jury, MEW 6: 245, quoted in Hal Draper, Karl Marx's Theory of Social 
Revolution Vol. 1! , The Politics of 
Social Classes, London and New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1978, p. 19 
13 KMTR 1, ch. 8: 123, quoted in Hal Draper, op. cit, p. 19 
14 Engels: On Soc. Rel. Russ., in ME: SW 2: 390, quoted in Hal Draper, op. cit, pp. 219-221 
15 The change of British industrial policy in India in the nineteenth century could be seen in their 
creating different amendment and new laws regarding trade and commerce to their colonies. H. De. B 
Gibbins(1895) in his `The Industrial History of England" has given an excellent features , in which 
British industry was guided by manual labour in manufacturers and mining in sixteenth century, 
coal-mines in seventeenth century and iron trade and pottery in eighteenth century before the 
renaissance of industry with the innovation of stream use. Machinery began to displace unaided 
manual labour. Industry, too, was not organised upon a huge capitalistic basis, though of course 
capitalist existed; but it would be more correct to say, that hitherto industry had been chiefly carried 
on by numbers of smaller capitalists who were also manual worker, even when they employed other 
workman under them. Bank of England (1694) and East India Company (1693) were established to 
regulate and find out new area of their trade and commerce.. However, the great inventions were all 
made in a comparative short space of time, and the previous slow growth of industry developed 
quickly in to a feverish burst of manufacturing production that completely revolutionised the face of 
Industrial England. The revolution in manufacturer and factories with steam machineries reached the 
pick in the end of eighteenth century. In the second half of this century, the seven years war resulted 
from the treaty of Perish(1763) was began between England and France and other European countries 
led the British policy to increase their trade with colonies. The out break of the Great Continental 
war (1763-1815) and abolition of slavery ( see the British House of Commons Papers,... "Bill for 
abolition of slavery through out British colonies, for promoting Industry of Manumitted slaves, and 
compensating owners, 1833(492) IV. 183" and " Bill for the extending to the Governors and 
officers of East India Company the powers given by an Act 5 Geo. 4 to his Majesty's governors and 
officers for the More Effectual suppression of the importation of slaves in to India... ") could be seen 
as important factors that enhanced England for trade with India. In the mean time, the great 
achievement of England was the step taken for the beginning of free trade in 1820: " For in that year 
the London Merchants formulated their famous petition praying that every restrictive regulation of 
trade, not imposed on account of the revenue, together with all duties of a protective character, might 
be at once repealed"(Gibbins, p. 212) and demands were also raised for the same from different 
business corners, a committee was appointed in Parliament to investigate the wishes of the petitioners 
and it brought in a reports thoroughly in agreement with free trade principles of the Merchants. The 
first measures of commercial reform was proposed in the following year, and one by one the 
restrictions upon the trade were removed. The most important of the new measures was the gradual 
alternation of the old navigation laws, finally culminating in their total repeal in 1849 (see, British 
House of Commons Papers.. "Bills to amend or regulate Trade with British Possessions Abroad 
1830-1831, (26) 11.377" and "Bills to amend laws for encouragement of British Shipping and 
Navigation 1847-48 (652). IV. 495 , 1849 (33). 
IV. 331). Meanwhile since the war of American 
Independence, the England had been building up a great colonial empire, and she had the sense of 
not to attempt again to levy tax upon her unwilling offspring. India was taken over from East India in 
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1858. (Gibbins, p. 215). Revolution in the means of transit i. e. railway( 1830), steamship to New York 
(1838), telegraph company (1840), and shorten the distance to the east by opening. the Suez Canal 
(1869) etc encouraged the British Merchants to find out the possibility of trade ýe ith their colonies in 
Asia. English manufacturers and capitalists have consistently supported that policy \'. hich seemed 
likely to open up these new markets to their goods. For long time , it was 
found that they occupied 
themselves very wisely in obtaining cheap raw materials by passing enactments actuated by free trade 
principles and removing protective restrictions. Cheap raw material having thus been gained and 
machinery having now been developed to such an extent as to increase production quite 
incalculably, England sends her textile and other products all over the world. She seems to find it 
necessary discover fresh markets every generation or so, in order that her vast output of commodities 
may be sold. Meanwhile, English manufacturers were complaining of foreign competition in 
plaintive tones which merely means that where as they thought some years ago that they had a 
complete monopoly in supplying the requirements of the world, they are now perceiving that they 
have not a monopoly at all, but only a good start, while other nations are already catching them up in 
the modern race of wealth. Rail communication was started in 1850 in India between Madraz and 
Arcot (see House of Commons Papers, "Bills for Considerations an the applicability of Canals and 
Rail Roads to India; 1831-32" in Appx. 10.735 II , 
X. Part II. 671). The rail network was established 
all over India by the end of nineteenth century, which could also been found to create opportunity of 
a large market of the goods of English Manufacturers. Keeping pace with time, when colonial 
people were becoming habituated with the English goods, the English merchants found it more 
profitable to establish industrial activities there in India by the end of nineteenth century , which 
led 
India, specially Bengal with heavy jute and textile, salt industries, at that time. And several factory 
acts were amended and created to promote all these industrial development( see British House of 
Commons Papers, Bill for extension of factory and workshop acts, 1864(55) 11.81; 1867 (62) 111.1; 
1871(194), 11.49; 1891(2) IV. 151; 1896 (216) 111.51. In this connection see also the laws for India, 
which might be regarded as important document in favour of changing attitudes of British Industrial 
Policy in India, for example, " Factory Acts Amendment: Act to amend the Indian Factories Acts 
1881, being Act, No. XI, of the governor-general in Council; 1890-91 (194) LIX. 181 Regulations 
issued in the several provinces of India, and by the Government of India, under the Indian Factory 
Act, 1891; 1893-94 (151) LXV. 607; Indian Factory Act; 1896[ in C. 80671 XIX. 404; Bill to amend 
the Indian Railways Act, 1894; 1906 (186) II. 665; Factory Labour Commission 1908: Reports of the 
Indian Factory Labour Commission; Vol. I Reports and Appendices; 1908[ Cd. 42921 LXXIV. 545- 
Vol. II. Evidence; 1909 [Cd. 4519] LXIII. 541; Reports on the working of Indian Factory Act, 1881, 
made to the Government of India, in reply to inquiries recently directed by the Secretary of the State 
for India; 1889(124) LVIII. 463. -Correspondence in continuation of the Reports; 1889 (162) LVIII. 
591. Statistical Abstract; from 1889 to 1899 CXII to CXVIII ) 
") Samual P. Huntington ( 1991) in his The Third Wave', categorised the establishment of 
democracy all over the world into three distinct ways. First wave (1828-1926): the countries those 
successfully established democracy from the beginning of nineteenth century to early twentieth 
like UK, USA, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, Iceland, Ireland etc. Second wave(1943- 
1962) of democracy has included the countries those entered into the process of democratization 
with the beginning of second world war. Allied occupation promoted inauguration of democratic 
institutions in West Germany, Italy, Austria, Japan, Korea and also some countries in Europe and 
Latin America in the late 1940s and 1950s. He has also presented a reverse wave for both of these 
two where authoritarian non-democratic environment were returned to some of these countries. His 
analysis of third wave (1974--) has incorporated some countries of Asia, Europe and Latin America , 
most of which were ruled by Army Administration. These countries were likely to be Portugal, 
Greece, Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay, Honduras, Philippines, Taiwan, and Pakistan etc. However, 
third wave has also included some countries in which there had been a massive change due to fall of 
socialist antagonism. ( p. 6) However, according to Huntington thesis, as Bangladesh was ruled by 
military regime for long period of time and had restored the democracy by mass upheaval which 
finally reached at the climax of revolution of the vast multitude against the military autocracy. Thus 
Bangladesh might be worth reckoning of third wave democratisation in the late twentieth century. 
17 According to his view, "three crucial interactions in democratisation processes were those between 
government and opposition, between reformers and stand-patters in the governing coalition, and 
between moderates and extremists in the opposition. In all transitions these three central interactions 
played some role. The relative importance and the conflictual or co-operative character of these 
interactions, however, varied with the overall nature of the transition process" (Huntington 
1991: 123). In Bangladesh, the interactions between government and opposition forces was foremost 
conflictual in all times of the military regime, although at the end of the regime, there might 
be a 
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possibility of division inside the government, the military and civil bureaucracy, who might be 
treated as reformers for returning to democracy and stand-patters in favour of autocracy to be 
continue. In the opposition democratic forces, there were mainly two streams: the AL-led 15-Party 
alliance and BNP-led 7-Party alliance. In the early age of the movements, both of these two 
opposition groups could be treated as extremists as they were austere in their movements for the 
resignation of Gen. Ershad. But regarding the participation of the parliamentary election of 1986, 
AL-led 8-Party alliance could be treated as moderate opposition with participation in the elections on 
the one hand, and boycotting the election, BNP led 7-Party alliance might be treated widely as 
extremists on the other, regarding the cessation of military regime. In considering the operations and 
actions of the movement, the student community of Bangladesh society had foremost an important 
and non-co-operation role, followed by militant labourer reservoirs of industrial areas to end the 
military autocracy. On the contrary, divisions inside the ruling elites are also much crucial in this 
regard: "The emergence of liberalizers and democratisers within an authoritarian system creates a 
first-order force for political change. It also, however, can have a second-order effect. In military 
regimes in particular, it divides the ruling group, further politicise the military, and hence leads more 
officers to believe that `the military as government' must be ended in order to preserve `the military 
as institution" (Huntington, 1991: 129). In Bangladesh, it was found some divisions inside the Armed 
Forces, as a whole, in the end of 1980s. They were seemed to be in positive attitudes towards the 
establishment of democracy in the country. The secret of this change was believed that the conflicting 
factions, the upper rank repatriated army officers were largely decreased due to regular end of service 
or forced retirement by Gen. Ershad to secure him from further coup attempt. The newly recruited 
lower rank officers, those were sent abroad as international peace keeping forces, were more 
interested in their professionalism rather than to be part of an autocracy. This liberal polarisation 
inside the Armed Forces of Bangladesh led them to exit from the military rule in order to establish a 
disciplined military institution. 
18 Jocelynn Linnekin, "Why `Exporting Democracy' Is a Contradiction in Terms" ,a paper 
presented in a conference on Exporting Democracy organised by Harry Frank Guggenheim 
Foundation, USA, at Ascona, Switzerland, 22-24 April, 2004. pp. 3-6. By "Objectivist discourse, " 
she means a way of talking about democracy as if it were a thing-clearly bounded entity defined by 
a particular set of characteristics. In her words, Joshua Muravchik (1991) epitomizes this approach 
when he states that democracy has an "essence" that is present in both presidential and 
parliamentary systems (p. 5). More fundamental than specific institutional arrangements, 
democracy's essence lies in "those profound and humane ideals on which America was founded" 
(p. 10). Positing an enduring core of characteristics is the hallmark of objectivism, which can be 
identified with the natural science approach and an overarching philosophical position known as 
positivism. This paradigm sees democracy as a type within taxonomy of political systems. Like a 
bird species, democracy is uniquely identifiable according to certain specific criteria. The 
unabashedly objectivist Muravchik avers that democracy will inevitably triumph because it is 
"indeed natural" as a system of governance: "democracy has proved itself natural in that it answers 
something innate in human nature: a longing to be treated with dignity... "(p. l) 
i`' lbid, pp. 9-14 
20 leid, pp. 14-16, In the aim of variable construction for democracy in nations around the world, in 
her empirical observations in Dominican Republic Venezuela, Peru, --"one striking finding of the 
democracy project thus far is that, in every national case, the poor conflate democracy with what we 
might aptly identify as "human rights. " Working class and poor respondents look to 'democracy' to 
guarantee a list of practical necessities that virtually replicates the United Nations Declaration of 
Universal Human Rights. 'Freedom of expression' is most often identified as democracy's primary 
characteristic, but other rights and liberties rank below such basic needs as access to education, health 
care, vivienda 'housing, ' alimentaciön 'food, ' servicios bäsicos 'basic services'--in other words, the 
fundamentals of survival with a modicum of dignity. The simple but comprehensive expression vivir 
biers 'to live well' eloquently sums up what poor Latin Americans want from democracy. Respeto 
'respect' is also frequently cited as something that people expect to gain from a democratic system. 
The ordinary Latin American citizen living in poverty is well aware of the rights and civil liberties 
that every human being should enjoy and considers them entitlements. " 
21 See also Rangalal Sen, "The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in Bangladesh 1982- 
1990: A Theoretical Framework and Social Background", presented in a seminar on Society, Polity 
and Economy of Bangladesh held on March 7-8 1994, organised under the auspices of the centre for 
South, Central, South-East and South-West Pacific Studies of the School of International Studies, 
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Dellhi-100067, India, p. 10 
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22 /bid., p. 11. Alavi appositely has depicted the social situations prevailing in 1980s in a country like 
Bangladesh as a peripheral capitalist society. He writes: "we find a tendency for this class (i. e. 
educated salaried middle class) perpetually to fracture on the basis of ethnic, regional, linguistic, or 
sectarian loyalties, which on the surface may appear to contradict the traditions of the liberal secular 
"western" ideologies that they have imbibed. In fact, they inherit more than one cultural domain. 
Their life style remains "Westernized", especially as expressed in material objects that fetishize 
western culture" (1982:. 299). 
23 See Dickenson in Alan B. Mountjoy ed. The Third World Problems and PerspectiI 'es, 6`h edition, 
London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1978, p. 94. He wrote: "Colonial policies served to inhibit 
industrialisation and though political independence has afforded opportunities for development, 
progress has been comparatively slow in the face of various obstacles. The resource endowment in 
general is not an inhibiting factor, given the sustenance that third world raw materials give to first 
world industries. Nevertheless, individual countries lack particular resources, and resource 
exploitation is often impeded by infra-structural deficiencies. More important are shortage of 
educated and skilled labour, and of physical and financial capital. The former may be obtained by 
education and training programmes and the latter sought from savings, export earnings and foreign 
investment and aid. " 
24 The Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh, 1991 
25 The Military Regime of General Ershad Proclaimed `Local Government Ordinance, 1985'. This 
ordinance was protested by all major opposition parties of the country. 
26 This has created some opportunities of employment and education, judgement in the sphere of 
village-level peasants, workers and very lower class strata of Bangladesh, although it might be 
considered that this step also created lot of political anarchism in the rural towns of Bangladesh 
society In fact, the hidden plan of the dictator was to establish military administration in all of these 
upgraded sub-district towns to establish control over the whole political environment of the country. 
27 Norm oriented movements are concerned with producing more limited but specific changes within 
a social system, particularly with respect to rules of access to and operation within the various 
institutional arenas of society. For example, anti-child labour movements, anti-drug movements etc. 
Value-oriented movements, on the other hand, are said to be concerned with more fundamental 
change, and thus seek to alter basic values and the institutional bedrock on which they rest. The most 
important examples would be revolutionary movements, such as those that under girded the French, 
American and Russian revolutions, or broad based struggles such as the civil rights or women's 
movements (McAdam and Snow, 1997). 
28The world rejecting movements, like Smelser's value oriented movement, condemn the prevailing 
social order as a whole, both its underlying values and institutional arrangements. The world 
affirming movements is just similar to the Smelser's norm oriented movement (McAdam and Snow, 
1997). 
29 According David Aberle (1966: 315-33), first, alternative movements seeks partial change in 
individuals including alcohol, sexual practices, abuse interpersonal relationship etc.; Second, 
redemptive movements seek the total change in individuals required personal transformation leading 
to religious movements. Third, reformative movements seek limited change in the social system in 
which they are embedded and there is no blanket rejection of the present order of things, but an 
attempt instead to rectify or neutralize specific perceived wrongs or threats. For examples, movement 
for the protection of environment and finally, transformative movement seek total change in the 
broader social structure and its associated ideational bedrock but these are commonly referred to as 
revolutionary. "' 
30 Ashraf and Sharma (1983) has described six types party organisations: First, Ideology and power in 
which, "a party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for 
political power" (Schumpeter, 1950: 283) and a political group that contests at elections and is 
capable of placing through elections (free or non-free) candidates for public office ( Sartori, 1976: 63). 
Second, party as an organisational structure, in which a party is... "a collection of communities, a 
union of small groups dispersed through out of the country (branches, caucuses, local associations 
etc. ) and linked by co-ordinating institutions" (Duverger, 1966: 15-17). Third, parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary group in which, central decision making power is controlled mainly by electoral 
group of the party (Duverger, 1966). Fourth, direct vs. indirect structure, in which "its members sign 
a membership form, pay a monthly subscription and attend local branch meetings more or less 
regularly" (Duverger, 1966: 5-16). Fifth, cadre vs. mass parties, in which the control of the 
machinery of the party rests large in the hands of an elite influential persons of high repute, experts 
and financiers in the cadre parties and the mass party, on the other hand, is designed to involved the 
rank-and-file members in the decision making process of the party (Duverger, 1966). Sixth. 
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oligarchy or stratarchy, in which all political parties-- indeed all organisation and even the most 
democratic ones are oligarchical in the sense that they are controlled by a minority of leaders and 
decision making power lay centred in the top echelon of the leadership( Michels, 1915). 31 Opposite ideologies: In fact, the basic ideological stands of these two parties have been raising 
many debates in the political arena of post-independent Bangladesh. The Awami League under the 
leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman preserved its ideology in the pre-independence Bangladesh as 
Bengali Nationalism, secularism, democracy and mix-economy policy. In post-independent periods, 
the AL has changed its mix economy policy and included " socialism" as the non-capitalist path of 
development. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in 1975, AL was thrown out of power by 
military intervention; it was found again some ideological sufferings inside the party and was divided 
in 1983 in to two factions. Main stream of the party under the leading of Sheikh Hasina had again 
included the mix economy policy instead of the socialist economy. In more recent times, the AL has 
left its policy of mix- economy policy replacing the pure market economy of capitalist development. 
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was formed in the wake of Sheikh Mujib's assassination in 
1975. The founder of the party General Zia patronised by pro-Islamic and pro-capitalist path of 
development. Hence, the BNP had changed the two important pillar of the constitution: secularism 
and socialism. On the first actions in this regard of Zia government was the insertion of Bismillah-ir- 
Rahman-ar Rahim (In the name of Allah, the beneficent the merciful) at the beginning of the 
constitution. Article8 (1) of the constitution, which declared secularism as one of the fundamental 
principles of the state policy was amended and in the place of secularism, absolute trust and faith in 
the Almighty Allah was inserted. Article 12 which contained the mechanism for implementation of 
the principles of secularism was totally omitted. Moreover a new clause was added to article 25 
declaring the intentions of the state for establishing preserving and strengthening fraternal ties with 
the Muslim states on the basis of Islamic solidarity. He changed the socialism replacing social justice 
and Bengali Nationalism in to Bangladeshi Nationalism. This conflict of ideological stands between 
two parties led the differences to form a united movement against the autocratic military regime of 
General Ershad. 
32 See the Statement of the National Democratic Institute(NDI)/Carter Center Pre-election 
Delegation to Bangladesh's 2001 Parliamentary Elections, Dhaka, August 4,2001, p. 1 
33 There were found several `Dotes' (alliances) and `Okya Prishad' (coalitions) of like minded 
political, cultural, professional and intellectual organisations during the anti- martial law movements 
in Bangladesh. The AL leading 15-Party alliance were mainly consisted by pro-leftist political parties; 
the BNP leading 7-Party alliance were mainly consisted of pro-Islamic political parties; the dissident 
part of leftist group after 1986 parliamentary elections were named as radical 5-Party alliance; 
Sammilitta Sangskritic Jote (Combined Cultural Alliance), University Teachers Federation etc. and 
there were also found some coalition for united participation in the election. 
34 Political alliance' in Bangladesh might be defined as the unity of like minded political parties or 
forces to form united movements against military regime. For example, 15-Party alliance could be 
treated as pro-leftists and mix-economy ideologies, 7- Party as pro-Islamic and rightist ideologies, 
and 5-Party as radical leftists in the movements. See Ranglal Sen, op. cit. p. 7 
35 See Rangalal Sen, op. cit. p. 13 
36 In Bangladesh, in every industrial set up, the owner and management are completely different term. 
The owner of the organisation employs another person as he responsible for the over all management 
of the organisation, which, however, has been used by the western scholar as a similar meaning i. e. 
there is no basic difference between owner and management. 
37 Ron Eyerman & Andrew Jamison, 1991, p. 95 
38 As Hal Draper (1978) quoted "only a year before his death, Engels sent a massage of cordial 
greetings to the First International Congress of Socialist Students held in Geneva. Its content is quite 
striking in terms of what it implies about the role he envisioned for the intellectual labourers in the 
productive process who are here called the "intellectual proletariat": May your efforts to awaken 
consciousness among the students succeed, so that out of their ranks will come the intellectual 
proletariat, who are called on to play an important role in the coming revolution, at the side of and in 
the midst of their brothers, the manual workers. "(E: To Internal. Cong. Soc. Stud. MEW 22: 415). 
See, Hal Draper, Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, Volume II The Politics of Social Classes, New 
York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1978. 
19 All Parties Student Unity(APSU) was formed on October 10,1990 to protest against the killing 
of five persons including some students by police firing during the observances of the programme of 
'Secretariat Seize' organised by the main stream opposition democratic forces. It should be pointed 
out here that it was the students who joined this opposition forces' programme in large numbers who 
forcibly took away from the hands of the police a dead body of a fellow student named Nazir Hussain 
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Jehad of Ullapara College, Sirajgonj and held a morning rally on the foot of " APAR. AJEYA 
BANGLA" (a sculpture symbolizing invincible Bangla in the Liberation war of 1971) in the 
premises of the Arts Building of the University of Dhaka, which was attended by national leaders. It 
was Sheikh Hasina, the chief of 8-Party alliance, who conducted the oath to the students who stood 
besides the dead body of Jehad that the APSU will not go back home until the quit of Gen. Ershad. 40 Rangalal Sen, op. cit, p. 4 
41 The police forces of the military janta government always took the rapid action against any 
processions, protest march, demonstration, strike and demolish the any attempt of such programmes 
null and void by vigorous 'lathi-peta' (baton charge) on the movement participants. It is found a 
normal course of repressive measures against the movements, and even the national level leaders 
were found injured during these events. 
42 Many of the students, labourers, youths, political leaders and members of professional groups were 
shot dead and thousands of others injured by the armed police during the movement period, among 
which, the events of 1983,1985,1987, and 1990 were most notable in the analysis of extreme 
measures taken by the military regime of General Ershad. The victims of the movements who were 
killed, injured, arrested and suited trial belonged mainly to the nationalist and leftist political forces 
of Bangladesh society. Salim, Delwar, Kanchan, Dipali Shaha, Moijuddin, Titas, Raofun Basunia, 
Nur Hossain, Fattah, Babul, Zehad, Comrade Tajul, Dr. Milon and many others killed in the 
movements were mainly nationalist and leftist orientation of Bangladesh society. The repression of 
the military dictator had created twofold effects of opposite dimensions: unified the divergent 
opposition political parties including rightists and leftists and other democratic forces on the one hand 
and weakened the movement for time being on the other. 
43 In fact, during the movement period, all the leaders of the different political parties, student 
organisation etc. were always in fear of Detective Branch (D. B) police man who were wearied 
white-coloured uniform carrying heavy arms and ammunitions. These forces were empowered to pick 
up anybody in anytime without showing any cause. In this way many workers of political party were 
arrested, imprisoned and even were killed whose dead body could not be terraced. This was planned , 
guided and taken in action by the army intelligence branch of the military government 
44 The opposition political parties suffered various factional conflicts under military regime. The 
inter-party conflict between the AL and the BNP was a very important factor that was used shrewdly 
by the dictator, which dismantled the unified movement against the regime. It also was found intra- 
party conflict inside the major political parties that led splitting both the AL and BNP several times 
under military regime. The leaders and activists of the movement were encapsulated and had to hide 
in the underground to save arrest and jail when repressive measures reached the peak. 
45 The country wide hartal was called for half day, full day, 48 hours, 54 hours, 72 hours and even for 
96 hours to paralyse military administration and during this action hundreds of political workers were 
arrested, injured, and killed by police atrocities. 
46 See The Daily Bangladesh Observer, November 11,1987. 
47 During the clash between protesters and I police lots of police forces were found injured and even 
were killed. In the pick of several movement occasion, when BDR and military forces were involved 
tackling the situation, army personnel was killed by the revolted mass participants. For example, see 
the events of the actions programme of the students in the Dhaka University Campus 
48 In fact, there were found two alliances of all the student organisations in the anti-autocracy 
movement in Bangladesh. The Chatra Sangrain Parishad ( Student Action Committee) was 
consisted of nationalists(Bengali), socialists, pro-leftists and radicalist students organisation , backed by Pro-AL 15-party alliance and Sangrand Chatra Jote ( Student Alliance for Actions) was 
consisted of nationalists (Bangladeshi), fundamentalists, religious students organisations, backed by 
Pro-BNP 7-party alliance. 
49 These were main large places where the most public meeting were held. When political parties and 
alliances called for observing new programmes against the regime, it was declared by large public 
meeting showing the strength of their support for movements. Hundreds of thousands participants 
were found attending these gathering. 
so See Charles Tilly (2003), The Politics of Collective Violence, London, Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 14-15 
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
3.1. Introduction 
This research project has chosen both qualitative and quantitative methods to 
collect data from primary and secondary sources in order to investigate the social 
and political issues of the movement for restoration of democracy in Bangladesh 
against the military regime of General Ershad. It includes both documentary and 
historical evidence, as well as social survey, content analysis and case study 
methods. These methods include different techniques of data collection consistent 
with empirical investigation. The data used in the analyses of the issues are mainly 
from secondary sources and supported by both quantitative and qualitative primary 
evidence. However, the methodology of this research has followed some objectives 
to organise the chapters of the thesis: first, describing the facts; second, giving 
qualitative and quantitative reasoning; third, making comparison of the opinions 
from different groups regarding different factors or issues and finally, to reach a 
conclusion about factors or issues under the principal hypotheses or propositions. 
3.2. Qualitative and Quantitative Methods 
For secondary sources of data, the qualitative approach has used various 
techniques of data collection. First, a good number of literatures have been 
reviewed to examine many theories of the democratisation process and actions of 
movement all over the world, especially in those countries, where authoritarian 
military regimes and the process of democratisation were observed. Details of this 
literature review have been included in chapter two. Second, four major types of 
sources have been used for documentary and historical data: i. archival data, ii. 
personal documents (including autobiographies) iii. private documents (diaries, 
confessions, personal interview etc. ) iv. public documents (mass media, literature 
etc. ) Third, this research has also examined many numerical reports on socio- 
political, demographic and administrative changes in Bangladesh in the post- 
independent period. Fourth, it has considered the papers on different conferences, 
workshops and seminars. Fifth, national and international journals have been used to 
include the latest debates. Together with the electronic resources, sixth, it has 
scanned the major national dailies and weeklies of Bangladesh to detail the 
chronology of the movement events. Seventh, this project includes some 
international weeklies such as Far Eastern Economic Review, Time, and Newsweek 
and the like focusing on the global views of the movement. Eighth, in quantitative 
methods, this research used a social survey for the primary sources of data on the 
movement. Finally, this has also used case study method in making audio interviews 
with the key leaderships of the movement. 
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3.3. Focussing the Primary data 
For primary data, this research has used three techniques of data collection. 
First, a quantitative questionnaire (see appendix-I) has been constructed for the 
interview of 206 leaders (see appendix-4) of the democracy movement. This has 
been used to analyse many issues of the military regime and democracy movement. 
Second, a checklist (see appendix-2) has been used to count the actions by dates, 
drawing on the newspaper archives-the major dailies of Bangladesh from 1982 
to1990-the nine years tenure of the military regime of General Ershad. This data 
are used to examine the quantities and the dimensions of the four major movement 
actions: hartal (strike), protest march, public gathering and violence. Using the 
statistical tools, these applications have found the trends and patterns of these 
actions that happened during Bangladesh democracy movement. Third, a qualitative 
open questionnaire (see appendix-3) has been used for the audio interview of major 
six case figures i. e., the military dictator-General Ershad, and the opposition key 
leaders: Sheikh Hasina (AL), Begum Khaleda Zia (BNP), Hasanul Haque Inu (JSD), 
Rashed Khan Menon (WPB), Mujahidul Islam Salim of the CPB and an interview 
with country's prominent sociologist, Professor Rangalal Sen. These interviews 
have helped to explain the different arguments and critical issues of the movement. 
3.4. Sampling for the Social Survey 
As my research concerns an event of the recent past in Bangladesh society, a 
social survey method is used to accumulate quantitative information from a number 
of veteran leaders of different political parties and interest or pressure groups, which 
were directly involved in organising and leading the movement. The samples used 
in the survey have been drawn from the three distinct categories of the population: 
leaders of political parties (PP), leaders of interest and pressure groups (IG & PG) 
and leading non-participatory groups and individuals (NPG) of Bangladesh society 
during the movement for restoration of democracy against the military dictatorship 
of General Ershad. Ultimately, the interest groups and pressure groups participated 
in the movement under four separate entities: students (S), intellectuals (I), 
professionals (P) and labourers and workers of trade unions (TU). Hence, it is 
considered useful to demonstrate the whole sample frame to be distributed for six 
movement forces memberships: PP, S, I, P, TU and NPG. These six categories of 
the sample have been considered purposively according to their weights and roles in 
the movement. Although the sampling frame is purposive, the samples from each 
category have been chosen randomly as the high ranked leaders-according to the 
positions in the organisation in all respects. For this, list for all six categories in 
different divisional cities- as their names were published in the news papers in 
1990 as leaders and organisers of the movement and as renowned personalities in 
their respective fields. Then the samples were chosen randomly by taking highest 
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ranked leaders in all respects and to some extent, there was also lottery to choose 
correct sample randomly from the similar quality leaders of different organisations. 
Although all four divisional cities have been covered, the capital city of Dhaka-the 
nerve centre of the movement has been given priority. In question to their 
representative value, it may be argued that all of the samples have been taken from 
the leaders and organisers of the movement having executive and important 
positions of their organisations, who were renowned personalities in the society. In 
general, the sampling design has covered the key leaders of the political parties, 
students, intellectuals, professionals and trade unions, and the leaders of non- 
participatory groups. In broader perspective, this has incorporated the central 
personalities of Bangladesh society, which includes political leaders, students, 
teachers, doctors, engineers, lawyers, artists and performers, poets and authors, 
journalists and agriculturists, bureaucrats, business magnets, NGO leaders, religious 
figures and non-partisan personalities. In this connection, it would be worth giving 
some introduction to all of these categories of samples. The samples from the 
leaders of the political parties have been categorised into five types according to the 
divergent currents of political forces in the movement: AL, BNP, Leftist-1(L-l, pro- 
Moscow group), Leftist-2(L-2, pro-china radical) and JIB & IPs. The samples have 
been chosen from the central and divisional level leaderships of these opposition 
political currents. The opposition students' organisations of the country were united 
under their single platform-APSU (All Parties' Students Union) in the final stage 
of the movement in 1990, which had a pioneer role in ousting the military dictator. 
Hence, the samples from the leaders of the students have been chosen from the 
APSU leaderships in four divisional cities. Although the intellectuals have always 
their individual identity, most of them were also more or less organised under the 
CCA (Combined Cultural Alliance) and therefore, the priority has been given to 
choose the samples of the intellectuals attached to this organisation. The samples of 
the professional groups have been included the leaders of different professional 
bodies of society, for example, teachers, journalists, doctors, engineers, lawyers, 
agriculturists and the like. The samples from the TU category have been chosen 
from the proletarian section of the society-the trade union leaders of the lower and 
lower middle class workers and labourers of the semi-government, government and 
industrial settings who were organised under the SKOP. The NPGs were consist of 
the religious leaders-priests, NGOs leaders, business magnets, very important 
personality (VIP) of the society along with some persons of specific places who 
were witness to almost all events of the movement. In this way the sample frame 
has tried to cover all significant groups to gather their views for this research. 
Keeping these entire categories intact, first, I have targeted for 50 cases from 
five currents of political parties with equally 10 for each of them in four divisional 
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cities of Bangladesh along with additional 10 in the capital city of Dhaka in which I 
have been able to reach 46 cases in total in this category. In second category, I have 
targeted 25 APSU leaders with 5 for each city along with additional 5 for capital city 
of Dhaka in which all of my target have been filled up. In category three to five. I 
have targeted 90 cases for the leaders of intellectuals, professionals and trade unions 
(30 for each) with 5 (for each of them) in each city along with 10 additional (for 
each of them) for the capital city of Dhaka in which all of my target have been 
completed although 1 for each of I and P groups has been shorted in Khulna city, 
which has been covered by taking 1 extra for each of these two groups from the 
capital. In the last and sixth NPG category, I have targeted 50 samples from the five 
subgroups with 10 from each divisional city along with additional 10 from the 
capital city of Dhaka in which I have been able to reach 45 in total. It should be 
mentioned here that 1 additional VIP sample has been included, as this respondent 
has been from BICS (Bangladesh Islami Chattra Shibir), which was outside of the 
APSU. This, altogether gives 206 cases in six categories, has been surveyed with a 
closed questionnaire to complete the empirical investigation on different issues 
related to the movement for restoration of democracy against the military 
dictatorship of General Ershad. One important point is that although the leaders of 
political parties are the main actors of the movement, they had always some 
controversial roles in the movement. Therefore, non-political groups are given 
priority in the sample frame with a view to achieving an impartial judgement in the 
critical issues of the movement. (For sample distribution, see the table below) 
TahlP" ThP rlictrihittinn of the 4amn1ec of the Survey 
Sample Categories Dhaka Chittagong Rajshahi Khulna Total 
Cate o -I: PP 
AL 04 02 01 02 09 
BNP 04 01 02 02 09 
Leftist-1 (L-1) 05 01 02 01 09 
Leftist-2 (L-2) 05 00 02 02 09 
JIB & IPs 04 02 02 02 10 
Total-1 22 06 09 09 46 
Cate orv-2-5: IG & PG 
Students (S) APSU 10 5 5 5 25 
Intellectuals (I) 16 5 5 4 30 
Professionals (P) 16 5 5 4 30 
Trade Union (TU) 15 5 5 5 30 
Total-2 57 20 20 18 115 
Cate ory-6: NPG 
Religious groups 03 02 02 02 09 
NGOs 04 02 01 02 09 
Business Groups 04 00 01 01 06 
Important Witness 04 02 02 02 10 
VIP 05 02 02 02 11 
Total-3 20 08 08 09 45 
Grand Total 99 34 37 36 206 
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3.5. The Analysis of the Data 
The analysis and presentation of data which follow statistical applications in 
this research are primarily social survey and the measurement of the frequency for 
four major actions. The analysis of data for both of these two has followed the 
application of SPSS programme. However, the analysis of the survey data follows 
several stages: first, a SPSS data file is prepared for the whole questionnaire 
following the coding instruction [for coding instruction-value level, see the 
questionnaire in appendix-2] and the entry of the data for 206 samples has been 
completed. At this stage, a general description of the all issues under the each of 22 
broader questions under questionnaire has been made, which included different 
dimensions, depths, comparison and substantial description and interpretation of the 
issues (factors)-in fact, a general and clear shape of the arguments on the issues 
under a broader question has been focused. 
For this, I have followed the `analyze' tool under the SPSS data editor as: 
`analyze'> `tables'> `tables of frequencies' (layout: variable labels in `down the 
side' and statistical labels in `across the top' and statistics: display of percentage). 
In the second stage, the data is recoded according to the recoding instruction [for 
recoding instruction see the same questionnaire in appendix-2] to change the factors 
or variables into the dichotomous values [SPSS data editor>transform>recode> into 
same variable..... ]. In this process, I have considered those broader issues or 
questions which have more than three codes (value labels) to bring them into three 
value labels. Then I have ignored or deleted the value of the response like `don't 
know, ' `refused to say' and `no answer' etc from the three value labels which 
therefore changes into dichotomous value labels for all factors under each broader 
question. The principal task of this stage is to construct a relationship between the 
six groups of the samples: the six movement forces' memberships' respondents 
according to the sampling design (the column head of the table included these six 
groups' respondents as: PP, S, I, P, TU and NPG along with a `total' view in the 
beginning; for this see the construction of the tables of the survey statistics on each 
broader issue in the thesis). The differentiation in their views on each factor under a 
broader question to find out is crucial. To format a data table in this regard, I have 
followed the `Analyze' tool under SPSS data editor as: `analyze'> `tables'> `custom 
tables' [putting `types of movement forces', as located in the question 1.9a, in the 
column and all variables/factors/issues under a broader question in the row and then 
have followed the subsequent instructions required for the characteristics of the table 
formation]. On the basis of the data in these tables, I have made a statistical 
reasoning in the analysis of survey data in comparing the views and positions of six 
groups of the movement forces' memberships regarding the many issues of the 
military dictatorship and the opposition movement for the restoration of democracy. 
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For more clear understanding, I have displayed these statistics in the graphical 
presentation using the `Microsoft Excel' programme [Create New file, transfer table 
statistics into the excel using `copy & paste' and also typed wherever required. 
Graphs are created by selecting fields-rows and columns, then chart wizard, chart 
type, chart sub-type and series are applied, names and chart options are also 
assigned to create the graphs. Every navigation step has been forwarded by next 
command buttons. Further improvements according to standard requirements were 
represented using format axis options such as pattern, scale, font, number and 
alignment]. 
The analysis of the frequencies of four major actions: protest march, public 
meeting, hartal (general strike) and use of violence have also followed two stages 
process. First, a SPSS data file is prepared for the whole `checklist chart' that used 
for the collection of frequencies of these actions following the coding instruction 
[for coding instruction-value labels, see the `checklist' in the appendix-4]. Here, 
one thing should be mentioned that separate checklist chart is used for collection of 
the frequencies on each of the four actions. This does mean that four separate 
checklist charts are used for the collection of the number of events for four actions. 
Under SPSS programme, a combined data file is prepared for all frequencies 
collected for the four actions and the entry of all frequencies for four actions by 
dates has been completed. Second, for the construction of the table of frequencies 
for actions by date, I have gone through the `Analyze' tool of SPSS data editor: 
analyze>descri ptive statistics>cross tabs (taking dates/year in row and `four actions' 
in column). In this way, a table for the comparison of frequencies of four actions by 
years have been found. This data later has been transferred simply to the Excel 
programme that has led a graphical presentation of the whole analysis. In the same 
way, for the construction of the table for the actions organised by different 
movement forces-PP, S, I, P and TU categories, the `Analyze' tool under the SPSS 
data editor has been taken as: Analyze>tables>custom table (taking `year' in row 
and `five movement forces' in column). For graphical presentation, this table 
statistics simply is transferred to the Excel programme. Although, frequencies have 
been collected on many issues: number of actions, organising forces, places, 
approximate number of participations and the like, due to time and space constraints 
only a comparison of the frequencies of four actions by years and movement 
forces-PP, S, I, P and TU have been included in this research. 
3.6. Amassing the Data 
The findings of the quantitative analyses of the social survey have been 
synthesised in most chapters of this thesis in accordance with the arguments 
constructed from the qualitative information of secondary sources from literatures, 
documents, reports, archives, seminars, and personal audio interviews with key 
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leaders of the movement as described in the step two and three of this methodology 
description. And, the analysis and comparison of the four actions by years has been 
included in chapter eight of the thesis. 
one limitation of this research may include the failure to interview one of key 
leaders of the movement, Begum Khaldea Zia-the present Prime Minister of the 
country. However, some of her interviews published in the Weekly Bichittra-a 
local weekly during the movement period have been consulted to cover this failure 
of the researcher. The interview with other five key leaders was able to touch some 
key issues, but was not reached as expected as there were time constraints for them 
as they are very busy politicians of the country. The long interview with the military 
dictator was not satisfactory, as he was always found to `singing his own praises' 
avoiding answering of the key issues of the opposition movement. 
3.7. Conclusion 
The methodology of this research was planned to gather the best possible 
information on the movement for restoration of democracy against the military 
dictatorship of General Ershad. It covers from the general description of the facts by 
qualitative method to the use of statistical arguments by quantitative analysis of the 
survey data. Amassing the data gathered from both of the methods-qualitative and 
quantitative has determined the fate of all arguments set under the propositions of 
this research. The graphical presentation of the different views of the survey 
respondents has added an extra dimension understanding the answers of the issues. 
A combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to the sociological analysis of 
political events is found very useful in this research. 
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Chapter Four 
The Military Seizure of State Power 1982-1990: The Base of 
Democracy Movement in Bangladesh 
4.1. Introduction 
The military seizure of state power in many countries around the world 
originated in the manoeuvring of `the men on horse back'' or `the men- in- 
uniform'2 or `the men in power with guns on their back'3 against the political elites 
of the society. Many scholars and academicians in literary debates, admire them as 
elites of the society as soon as they are crowned in politics by their seizure of state 
power. But the painful truth for them is that the military in politics are generally 
considered as criminals and miscreants in the eyes of the law of a democratic society. 
The military institution in any country has its role clearly defined in the constitution, 
which is mainly to defend the country in the wake of external aggression. Hence, the 
civic and lawful views are that a military takeover in any society is a complete 
violation of the rules and regulations, norms and values provided for them in the 
constitution. However, as part of the punishment for the unlawful capture of state 
power, the authoritarian military rulers in many countries were toppled and sent to 
trial eventually by the democratic masses of these societies. It is also worthwhile to 
mention here that the social impact of a military intervention is very traumatic. The 
soldiers, in a distinct uniform, are given weapons and normally they are to stay in 
the security of the barrack or cantonment, except at the time of war. But when they 
move around the masses-from the more civilized zone of urban area to the naive of 
rural periphery-they sow the seeds of fear in the innocent civilians. The repressive 
measures they use and the bulk of arms and ammunitions, and their peculiar 
appearances that terrorise and militarise the whole public, destroy the honest 
thoughts and mild instinct of the civic quarters of a possible democratic society. 
It was not a new phenomenon for General Ershad, as he sought to replace his 
predecessor General Ziur Rahman, who had captured the power following the 
military coup in 1975 that ended the life and reign of President Bangbandhu Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of the country. Afterwards, the military 
leaders, in many cases, were seen to take the side favourable to the international 
political order as a tool to seize the state power. In fact, there was no political or 
civilian ally of international capitalism in the post independent Bangladesh that 
could be a perfect alternative to the socialist government of a least developed 
country like Bangladesh. Evidently, the Armed Forces had been considered to be a 
political representative of this kind of international bourgeoisie. The capture of state 
power by General Zia was a part of ongoing cold war of the international capitalist 
bloc against its socialist counterpart all over the world and when he failed to serve 
the interest of the bloc, he was just removed and General Ershad was set up to 
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continue the process until either there was a indispensable political ally to be 
developed or the chapter of the cold war had collapsed. The latter view was more 
appropriate towards the end of the military dictatorship of General Ershad along 
with the rise of popular aspiration for democracy in Bangladesh society. The 
amnesty for these criminal Generals-arranged by local and international agents of 
the bourgeoisie-destroyed the chances of launching the fundamental objectives of 
democracy. The instances of their survival in the regular society threw the peaceful 
transition into the legacies of the repressions-the military autocracy made on 
general masses-in every pace of institutionalizing democracy. The rises of this 
kind of military dictator, causes behind their power, the repressive tools of their rule 
and the consequences of their regime-the damage in the every sphere of socio- 
economic and political life they made-is the central focus of this chapter. 
4.2. General Ershad: The Birth of a `Dragon's4 Tyranny' in 
Bangladesh 
Lt. Col. HM Ershad returned home to Bangladesh as a repatriated officer from 
Pakistan in 1974, along with thousands of army personnel who had not participated 
in the liberation war of 1971 and was in service under the Pakistan Army during the 
whole period of the war. Immediately after the return, his political attitude towards 
the new government was not satisfactory and the Select Committee of the Army 
almost decided to give him retirement. However, one of his maternal uncles named 
Riaz Uddin Ahmed Bhola Mia of Rangpur was an eminent AL leader who 
convinced Bangabandhu to take him into the Army. In effect, the AL government 
gave him promotion to Colonel and sent him for training to India. 5 In the post 1975 
coup, Colonel Ershad returned home from training and was able to convince General 
Zia to give him a double promotion to Major General. After an unsuccessful coup in 
1977, General Zia employed his full strength to reorganise the Army in his favour. 
This brought a great opportunity for General Ershad to be crowned as Army Chief, 
in which he cleverly caused conflict between Zia and his very close associate, a war 
veteran officer Maj. General Monzur. Monzur was also in conflict with another 
freedom fighter officer Maj. Gen. Mir Swakat Ali, Commander of the 9 Infantry 
Division and later adjoined with the 55 Infantry Division. Although both of them 
were war veterans and popular in the army, Mir Swakat began to distrust Monzur 
when he was integrated into the 46 Infantry Division with the Army Headquarter in 
Dhaka, which he led as the Commander and also was enjoying the position of the 
Chief of General Staff. Ershad took advantage of this conflict by way of his position 
being Chief of the Army. In the event, he was able to convince Zia that Monzur and 
Swakat could have led the coup against him, if they both had continued as 
commanding officers of the two infantries. He suggested transferring them outside 
Dhaka. Zia trusted the Army Chief in this regard and asked his ally Maj. Gen. Nurul 
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Islam Shishu, who also confirmed the opinion of General Ershad. As a result, Zia 
transferred Monzur to Chittagong as Commanding officer of 24 Infantry Division 
and Mir Swakat as P. S. O in the secretariat of the C. N. C6. In fact, General Monzur 
became closer to Zia for the ability he demonstrated in organising the Army in post 
1975 politics. He was expecting to be the Chief of the Army and that, he believed, 
was snatched by General Ershad. Even he unveiled his deep concern over this 
decision and complained to Zia that the new Army Chief was of bad character-a 
vicious and corrupt person. 7 In this way, Ershad used the conflict between the war 
veterans and repatriated factions in the Army and became the Chief of the Defence 
Forces. Thereafter, it was a complete mockery for the heroes of the liberation war 
that Ershad, a repatriated officer, became the Chief Patron of the Central Freedom 
Fighters' Command Councils as the Army Chief. 
In this time, the ruling BNP was in massive internal chaos in different parts of 
the country. In Chittagong, the internal disorder of the party became worse and Zia 
was due to come to this port city on 29th May 1981 to resolve the crises of his party. 
However, General Ershad, in an unscheduled visit, went to Chittagong on 26`h May, 
just four days before the visit of Zia. He went straight from the airport to the office 
of Monzur, the General who disliked Ershad most and was in a closed meeting with 
him until 1: 30 pm.. Immediately after this he left for Dhaka, although the Office of 
the C. N. C confirmed that the Army Chief was due to visit the Military Academy of 
Chittagong. However, President Zia waited at the airport for half an hour for Ershad, 
who was also scheduled to accompany him. Ershad informed Zia over the telephone 
of his inability to attend. However, since Zia was flying to Chittagong, it was 
reported that Ershad had established contact with General Monzur by telephone and 
misguided him with the information that the President disliked his presence at the 
Airport, which offended Monzur that led him into strong resentment. However, 
President Zia was killed in a military coup under the leadership of General 
Monzur-widely believed to have been designed by Ershad-in Chittagong in the 
dawn of 30th May 1981. Immediately after this blood-spattered event in Chittagong 
Circuit House, General Ershad was in a closed meeting with Generals in the Dhaka 
barracks that reported him to be proposing the proclamation of Martial Law in 
favour of General Monzur. But the Air Force Chief Sadruddin and some army 
officers did not agree with the decision of Ershad. 10 Subsequently, the popularity of 
Zia among the junior officers and general soldiers restrained Ershad from acting. In 
the afternoon, he issued the ultimatum to the coup officers to surrender. General 
Monzur was killed in army custody within a couple of hours of his arrest. Although 
he was appealing to journalists to come to listen to him, in his words, the truth of the 
coup; but was not allowed to meet any reporter before his handover to the army, 
when he was first captured by Hathazari Police station, a hilly Thana of 
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Chittagong. ' However, 12 other freedom fighter officers were hanged later 
following a Court Martial in connection with this coup. 
Moreover, Ershad shrewdly used the killing of General Zia in his favour. He 
took many steps to convince the general public that he was loyal to General Zia and 
believed in civilian rule of the country. In this connection, his shedding of tears 
beside the dead body of Zia and the allocation of a palatial building in the barracks 
to the widow of the late President are observed by millions on TV. He supported the 
temporary President Justice Abdus Satter and insisted that the Army was not 
interested in taking power. However, what he smartly did was to increase the 
salaries and to create many other opportunities for the members of the Armed Forces 
with the civilian President, which in turn increased his popularity in the army. '2Due 
to being linked with this coup, almost all the freedom fighter officers and war 
veterans in the Army were either killed or sacked or given forced retirement. 13 
Subsequently, he achieved his full control over the whole Defence Forces within a 
couple of months-after being completely prepared, a leader of the gang in uniform 
was in the hunt for a proper chance to seize the state power. 
4.3. The Rise of a Military Dictator and the Consolidation of One 
Man Rule 
General Ershad had been planning for a military seizure of power since he was 
sworn in as the Chief of the Army. In January 1981, Ershad in an article published in 
the Bangladesh Army Journal, stipulated his demand that the Armed Forces as a 
national institution should have a role in the development process of the nation. 14 
His design, however, took shape after the killing of President Zia. In an interview 
with Peter Neiswald in August 1981, Ershad clearly reasserted his demand that `the 
army (of Bangladesh) should be directly associated with the governance of the 
country, which might fulfil the ambitions of the army and might not lead to further 
coups'. 15 After a week, Ershad made a similar comment to the correspondent of the 
New York Times and stated that the military in Bangladesh should be accorded a 
constitutional role to ensure the protection of political system of the country. '6 A 
guard of the state was threatening to seize the state! These unlawful arguments in 
favour of army participation in national politics produced huge discontent and 
controversy among civilian political elites, and some leaders from the ruling BNP 
and the opposition AL made their strong apprehension over the issue. 
'? 155 lawyers 
of the BSCBA in a statement in the national dailies questioned the legality of the 
statements in the media by the Army Chief without the support of the civilian 
President. However, Ershad had been informed by DGFI, just five weeks before the 
Presidential election in November 1981 that the opposition AL candidate was 
running ahead of Justice Satter of the BNP. In this situation, he and the top level 
Generals did not want to take the risk and proposed to Justice Satter to handover 
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power to the Army. This proposal was directly rejected by Satter flaming vv ith rage 
and he threatened them that he would leave the Bangobhaban (Presidential Palace), 
if they were to force him again in this regard. '8 But General Ershad and military 
leaders did not stop here. 19 
No sooner was Justice Abdus Satter crowned as President, the Generals started 
to undermine the civilian rule. Although they were not satisfied with Zia in the last 
days of his regime, they felt him to be `their man' who safeguarded them in the state. 
But they could not continue their trust in the same way in Justice Satter. 20 
Consequently, General Ershad came forward very bluntly with the proposal for the 
political role of the Army after the election. The whole political arena became 
concerned over this issue and the opinion of the President was strictly in favour of 
the continuation of a democratic rule in the country. The unhappiness and worries 
over the issue reached the climax in November 1981, when the President had to 
explain his position in this regard. He made this comment: "the army has role to 
protect the sovereignty of the country and I do not think any other role is 
possible. " 21 By contrast, General Ershad was found unshaken and pursued his 
recent proposal clarifying in the news media that insisted again a claim of the 
constitutional safeguard to political role of Bangladesh military. 22 In this critical 
juncture, President Satter felt unsafe to continue his office without the support of the 
Army and tried to achieve a consensus over the issue. Ershad also continued his 
pressure on President to form a high profile presidential committee that would 
examine the constitutional feasibility of the political role of the Army. As a result of 
discussions with top-level Generals on 1 January 1982, the President formed a 10- 
member National Security Council of which he was the Chairman while the Vice- 
President, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Industries Minister, the 
Home Minister, the Chief of Army Staff, the Chief of Naval Staff and the Chief of 
Air Staff were members. 23 But the Chiefs of the three forces i. e. the Army, the Navy 
and the Air Forces, met the President in following day and refused to join the new 
council, where the proportion of civilian members were higher. It was considered an 
audacious revolt by the Generals against the civilian supremacy in the politics of 
that time. 24 
It was found that General Ershad was attacking everybody and continued his 
unrestrained deliveries to the press like a political leader in favour of constitutional 
role of the Army hoaxing at the rules and regulation of the Armed Forces. A month 
later, it became clear that General Ershad was preparing for a military takeover. In 
this critical situation, President Satter took an epoch-making decision for the sake of 
democracy in the country. He sacked General Ershad as the Chief of Army on 23 
March 1982, which was not implemented. 25 On 23 March 1982 at 8: 30 pm in the 
Army Headquarters' conference room, the top-level military officers including 
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General Rahman, General Nuruddin, Brigadier Mahmudul Hassan (D. M. O). 
Brigadier Amsha Amin and a smaller number of Battalions and Brigade 
Commanders from Dhaka and elsewhere were present in an emergency meeting. 
Ershad first gave an emotional speech about his contribution to the army and 
informed the officers about the latest development of his dismissal by the 
President. 26 Subsequently, under the leadership of General Ershad they formally 
decided in this meeting for a military intervention in the country within the next 
couple of hours. Then in the early hours of 24 March 1982, four months after the 
swearing in of a civilian President, General Ershad proclaimed Martial Law. 27 With 
this step, the armed employees of the state seized its government and suspended the 
constitution and arrested the supremacy of the civilian politics in the cantonment 
that killed the passage to democracy of a newborn country. The military as a 
national institution lost all its credibility; their images falling into the aggression of 
the illegal exercise of power became contemptuous of their own service rules and 
turned them into a corrupt and most hated interest group in Bangladesh society. The 
tanks and artillery were positioned in the streets of the cities. The crackdown and 
massacres against the people who were arrested, beaten and killed and emptied the 
streets-as if it they were the attacks of `wild demons' on a quiet and calm civilized 
society. The fight between the `men with guns on their shoulders' and `men without 
those' led only to the odious killings of the innocent latter. If the military felt that 
there had been any irregularities in civilian politics, they could have chosen to 
contest the election leaving their uniform and gun behind. That was the only 
acceptable way to change the power in a peaceful non-antagonistic society. However, 
the military intervention by General Ershad was not accepted by the people and 
never did win the acceptance of any corner of Bangladesh society. Although Justice 
Sattar was brought to the TV station in the evening of 25 March 1982 and made a 
welcome speech for the military men in power, it was clear later that he had not left 
power willingly to the Army. The military compelled him-putting guns to his 
back-to resign. Since General Ershad became the Chief of the Army, his open 
statements to press in the wake of the assassination of President Zia, killing of 
General Monzur and Presidential election of Justice Satter, anticipated him with an 
ambitious character to capture the power. However, many home scholars also 
considered that it was seen as a trend for the part of the military to seize the power in 
the wake of August coup of 1975-the beginning of undermining the civilian regime 
in Bangladesh political history. 
The survey statistics in table 4.3.1 show the supports for democratic norms and 
values as well as a strong reservation of the people about the illegal military 
aggression that deflected the constitutional order of the country. In the survey, 
89.3% respondents think that the people of Bangladesh were not expecting the 
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military intervention by General Ershad at that time. In addition, 64.1 % supports the 
view that the intervention was in the interests of the Armed Forces as a whole, 
contrasting with 32% disagreeing with this view. However, 91.3% feels that General 
Ershad captured the state power to fulfil his own personal ambition. In contrast, 
69.9% deny the charge against Justice Satter that he left the power willingly to the 
military dictator. A sense of balance in the survey is found when a close middle 
trend of 48.5% favours the anomalous political drift after the killing of 
Bangahandhu in 1975 coup contrasting 38.3% disfavours while 13.1 °ö refuses to 
provide their opinion. 
General views on the Military regime of G. Ershad 
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Graph 4.3.1 General views on the military regime of Gen. Ershad in terms of the 
relationships of six movement forces membership. 
The data in table 4.3.1 and graph 4.3.1 show the relationship between six 
movement forces memberships and their observations about the general impression 
on the military intervention of General Ershad. Overall, the expectation of the 
people for military aggression was least likely views with only 7.3% on the whole in 
which P for 0% and S for 3% only are found very distinctive. In contrast, `the 
personal ambitions of General Ershad to seize the state power' was seen as the most 
likely observation, in which 90%-93.5% is supported by PP, S, I and NPG except 
TU for 86.7%. Intellectual and professional groups stand out with many agreeing 
with 63.3% and 60% respectively and PP, TU and the NPG memberships express 
moderate support with 43.5%, 53.3% and 50% respectively to accept the Ershad 
regime as a continuation of the post 1975 coup trend, whilst the S membership 
supports this distinctively with only 23.3% at the lowest. Generally speaking, the 
survey statistics show that the I and P memberships were distinctive in this way and 
launch a same line of opinions. However, the PP and S memberships (84.8% and 
83.3% respectively) are also distinctive in disagreeing that the then President Justice 
Satter left power willingly to the Armed Forces. This survey outcome has revealed 
Seen as post F rsonal ambition 
1975 trend of Ershad 
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the fact that the general sentiment of the then Bangladesh society in the beginning of 
1982 did not expect the military aggression in the state power. 
However, many causes may be found military takeover in modern literature, 
although the patronage of the international capitalist order against the rise of 
socialism in the state power was seen, among many others, as the most important 
cause for Bangladesh case. 28 
4.4. The Consequences of Military Aggression 
The military aggression of General Ershad in Bangladesh was marked by the 
huge repressions on her people. This was the episode in the history of the mankind 
that darkened the political history of the Bengali people in South Asia. The military 
terrorists broke their own professional codes and outlawed the constitution-almost 
killed the social, political and democratic instincts of the society. In consequence, 
the effects of this aggression on socio-economic and political life of Bangladesh 
were evident in many ways. First, the military aggression destroyed the institution 
of the military itself being disloyal and betraying their own professional rules and 
regulations, and norms and values of a conventional army outlined in the 
constitution. 29 Political grievances brought them out of their institutional arena when 
the military entered into politics. Politics also reached the military institution that 
followed-on from the corruption in their professional actions. The army became 
highly politicized when General Ershad tried to give the `men-with-guns-on-their 
backs' a constitutional right for a share of political power, which was quite absurd 
and denied by the elite of all non-military civil quarters of Bangladesh society. 
Second, the military autocracy discarded the constitutional provision for a 
change of state power, which threw the peaceful political process into uncertainty 
and disrupted the continuation of a civilian rule in politics. Since the constitution of 
Bangladesh outlined, in particular, how its government, cabinet and parliament 
would be formed, the aggression of General Ershad in power was therefore a 
constitutional collapse of the rules for the officials of the state. 30 
Third, the actions of General Ershad damaged mostly the social soul of the 
political institutions of the country. The military intrigues under his rule sowed the 
seeds of corruption in politics, which affected the whole political culture: parliament, 
political parties, the election process and the practice of democracy. The military 
leaders purchased some political leaders as their civilian associates, mostly known 
as political touts, who were corrupted and jailed by the military themselves, floated 
a political party-the JP in support of the military administration. 31 Under the 
shadow of the umbrella of the JP, the junta elected these political touts and corrupt 
people to JS through the electoral malpractices, in which few voters went to the 
polling centres. The institution of the election process was completely damaged. 
32 
The corrupt election practices produced bogus representatives for a rubber stump 
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parliament in support of the military dictator. Bangladesh faced these kinds of fraud 
by the state in her political and social life under the dictatorship of General Ershad. 
Fourth, the military in power expanded ubiquitously in all spheres of the 
society: the state, government, administration, politics and socio-economic activities. 
The militarization of the bureaucracy destroyed the moral freedom and democratic 
values of civil administration. He started with the 5-member Brigrediar Enam 
Commission33 which was set up to reorganise the posts of the civil administration. 
In fact, this commission designed the suitable positions for military personnel in the 
civil administration. Retired military officers were employed as the chiefs of the 
important government offices including corporations, banks, insurance companies, 
airlines, hospitals, secretariat, foreign and home services, nationalised industries and 
national transport etc. They enjoyed both the retirement facilities of the Army and 
the facilities of the civil administration. A report of the Establishment Secretariat 
showed that the chief positions of 90 main civilian administrations were occupied by 
retired military personnel. 34 In the President secretariat, the military attache, 
assistant secretary, PSO to supreme commander and chief coordinator, four ADC to 
President, were all military personnel. Furthermore, the transport officer, senior 
comptroller, comptroller, Asst. comptroller, transport superintend, women medical 
officer (Presidential Palace), and C. O. and PGR-cantonment (the guard regiment of 
President) were all military personnel. In addition, in the President secretariat, 
Tajgaon, the joint secretary (cabinet division), DG, Natural resources and social 
development sub section, the chairman, joint and additional directors of the 
coordination and control of the National security division, all of them were from the 
military. 35 In the Defence Ministry, two joint secretaries were Brigadiers and two 
DS were Majors and the engineering advisor was a Lieutenant Colonel. The Director 
of Defence Science Institute was a Group Captain36. In 1987, all types of civilian 
control over the Ministry of Defence were impounded by the enactment of the first 
and third articles and other rules of the `Rules of Business, 197537. 
Earlier in the military takeover, the military dictator relocated six important 
divisions of the secretariat under the Presidential Secretariat, which was extended 
further by the inclusion of Supreme Command Head Quarters Division. In the later 
stages of the take over, he relocated the EC Secretariat and JS Secretariat under his 
Office. In this way, the military leader established a military control over the civil 
activities in all important divisions of the civilian administration and centralized all 
of the power in his Office of the President vis-ä-vis Martial Law Administrator. This 
was considered to be an unforeseen event in Bangladesh in running the government, 
which broke the moral spine of the civilian administration. In the Home Ministry, 
the DS was a Major, and 23 in the rank of Lieutenant to Major were employed in the 
higher positions, in which 14 were appointed as the DIG, police-nine graduates 
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and six under graduates. Moreover, they were given two years seniority that made 
the civilian police officers junior to the new appointees. 38 These changes of police 
administration created much dissatisfaction from the top to bottom of the police 
force and the then IGP, Police exposed his grievances over the situation that led him 
to be sacked from his service in an unprecedented way. 39 The other divisions in the 
Home Ministry like the Anser and the VDP, Jail and the BDR etc, the highest key 
positions were held by military personnel. 4° In the wake of the mass revolution of 
December 1990, a secret circular was distributed through out the capital from Police 
forces that exposed the massive dissatisfaction within this institution. " 
In the MOFA, in addition to the military attache in the Bangladesh High 
Commissions in foreign countries, the dictator filled up the senior civilian positions 
of the High Commissioner, Secretaries and other portfolios with military personnel. 
In this period, 30 retired army personnel were appointed to this Ministry and they 
were given the most important appointments in the European and other rich 
countries. According to a report, Ershad himself and his three allies including R. S. 
Doha, Humayun Rahid Choudhury and Anisul Islam Mahmood, appointed many 
extra professional persons illegally that damaged the diplomatic activities abroad 
and ruined the structure, skills and image of this ministry. 42 In this period, there 
were 11 retired Generals and 2 retired Brigadiers in the posts of High Commissioner; 
protocol chief was a Brigadier and 14 other high officials were Majors. The BBC 
commented on the situation that the officers in the Foreign Affairs Service cadre 
were declining in number in their own Ministry as a result of continuous 
appointment from the other cadres. 43 The normal features of this Ministry during 
1982-1990 was exposed in a report, which argued that appointments and transfer to 
this ministry depended on the blessings of Ershad himself. His word was the law in 
this regard. Once this ministry was marked as a mini cantonment. The professional 
diplomats became frustrated and General Ershad had done it deliberately to keep one 
or a group under strict watch over another. 44 As a result of the militarization of the 
Defence, Home and Foreign Affairs Ministries from 1982 to 1990, there were severe 
effects on the rule of law in the country: state and government became dictatorial: 
broke down the rule of law; the process of autonomy was inactivated; differentiation 
and specialisation of the application of power occurred; the process of accountability 
in the government and administration was dented; the military and civilian conflict 
and bad blood reached a pinnacle that smashed the whole administration. 45 An 
additional secretary, who went into voluntary retirement many years before the end 
of his normal period of service reported his experiences to the same author when 
asked about the causes of his leaving the service: `the one man show of military 
dictator can no longer be tolerated; military leaders destroyed the environment of the 
service that led him to quit the job. 
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A bureaucrat of another ministry claimed: this one man (Ershad) damaged 
everything! From the purchase of file covers to the medical treatment of an office 
bearer- all were interfered by him. '46 The man who protested so much against the 
militarization of the civil administration was Mr Mohi Uddin Khan Alamgir, the 
Secretary General of the BCS Administration Association. He was made OSD by 
the military leaders for a long period of time. 4' The protest against the militarization 
of the civil administration reached its zenith in 1988, when Ershad announced that 
10% of the jobs of civil administration would be preserved for the retired military 
personnel. 48 In this time, a remark of Dr Alamgir in a meeting organised by the 
Citizen Committee created a reaction among the military leaders in which he argued 
that the civil servants of the Government were the servicemen of the Republic, not 
of an individual. 49 The Action Committee for Civil Rule demanded that all uniform 
men must be withdrawn from all civil offices including even from Bangladesh 
Police. 50 
Fifth, the military dictator destroyed the electoral institutions as the means of 
transferring power to the representatives of the people. The EC turned into an 
untrustworthy body of the junta and its activities became as a circus and a shambles, 
in which the people did never participate. The elections from the local government 
to national level held under this period were marked by an empty participation of 
voters, riots, killings and injuries, gunfights, seizure of polling centres, illegal 
ballots, theft of ballot boxes and false voting statistics by local and national level 
election officers. All these irregularities happened under the supervision of military 
and police officers in charge of maintaining law and order during the elections. The 
leading main opposition parties of the country never participated under the military 
rule, adding an exception of the general election in May 1986. So it was always a 
voter less farce in the name of an elections' Sixth, corruption, smuggling and the 
black economy intensified under the military administration of General Ershad. 
Some high ranking officers of the civil-military bureaucracy and ruling political 
leaders of the JP in collusion with each other were involved in these malpractices. A 
research report published during the regime showed how the officials of the civil 
bureaucracy were involved in corruption. The research surveyed 68 richest men of 
Dhaka city. Their annual incomes were ranging from Taka 5 millions to 50 millions. 
All of them except 4 informed the researcher that they maintained a `monetary link' 
with high officials of the government to receive extra facilities in their business. 52 
Seventh, since the military coup, the high ranking secretaries of the 
bureaucracy and became partners of military in plundering the billions of taka of 
assets from the people during the whole period of the regime. The `G-10'53, a group 
of high ranking 10 personnel from civil-military bureaucracy controlled the whole 
administration. They acted as middlemen and broker class between the military junta 
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and the business magnets. An honest and popular institution of the Civil Service 
hence changed over night into a slave to circumstance. Moreover, the dictator 
established his networks everywhere in the intelligence branch, secretariat, cabinet, 
and government media and even to the post offices of the country, which was 
compared to the `Spoil System' of USA. 54 The direct relation of a general bureaucrat 
with the dictator and first lady made him powerful even over the secretary. Some 
secretaries were so powerful that they did not even care the Premier and Vice- 
President of the military cabinet. 55 The popularly known weakness of the dictator 
and military leaders for women destroyed moral spine of his administration. As a 
result, the chain of command of the civil service was ruined and broken down. Over 
the years, General Ershad along with his bureaucracy destroyed the social structure 
of Bangladesh society. 56 The civic quarter of the society believe, Bangladesh might 
never overcome this damage to society for some next decades. 
Eight, the overall economic deterioration led the country into the development 
of underdevelopment, where the condition of the general populace declined by 
means of the converse growth of affluent sections in the society. The intense 
political disorder in the urban, suburban and semi-urban towns and rural-urban 
peripheries had ruled out the huge possibility of international, national and local 
initiatives for non-agri cultural small and middle patch industrial activities. An 
agriculture as the main source of development was not functioning any more. The 
new class of rural medium range landlords cum political touts became the supporters 
of the military regime to protect their assets who were elected chairmen and 
members of the UP by force under the auspices of military administration. They 
transferred their capital from land to the non agricultural businesses in the towns, 
especially in the service sectors, mostly not as investors but as customers. The 
repressive measures both in monetary and administrative levels forced the 
opposition mid level business out of the production. The foreign aid and grants were 
disbursed in the name of development projects among the high profile Generals, 
ruling political groups and civil servants, which, as was believed, benefited this 
section personally more than their proper use in real development. In addition, the 
condition of the sharecropper marginal and mid-level farmers became worse due to 
the increasing cost of cultivation. Also, the costs of their livelihoods became 
unbearable from the earnings of agriculture that forced them to migrate to the city 
and towns as lower income class. The military leaders sometimes seemed to have 
been proud for some infra-structural development ignoring the flood of foodless, 
cloth less and shelter less uprooted landless people to the high ways to cities and 
towns that intensified the poverty of the society. The target of GDP growth (in 
average 7%) was never fulfilled and comparatively, decreased to less than 3% in this 
period 1982-90 than that of 1972-81(more than 6%) and net income per capita 
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increased only by 35 taka (less than one dollar). 57 In agriculture, the average rate of 
annual growth decreased to less than 2% compared to the target of 6c7c on average. ' 
In the industrial sector, many jute and textile mills were lost due to the policies of 
military government. The absence of foreign investment due to extreme political 
disorder, the drop off ability of local consumers to pay resulted in a demand crisis. 
Strikes and labourers unrest in the industrial sector meant that only less than 3% 
annual GDP growth on average in 1982-1990, more than four times lower in 
comparison with post independent period of 1972-1981 (13.9%). 59 
Ninth, the expenditure for the military in this period was increased many ways. 
Although, the annual budget always showed the military expenditure a little lower 
than other sectors, it was, in fact, full of lies. In addition to military budget 
allocations, the military took the expenditure for their education, health and some 
other developmental works for communications, city facilities etc, from the central 
budget allocations of these sectors. As they moved through the whole country, set up 
many military administrative units and patrolled and controlled civilian life, a major 
part of the budget allocation for domestic security was spent on them in addition to 
the military budget. Even, many military officers who were given additional 
positions in the civil administration were also paid their salaries from public funds 
rather than the military. This made the total expenditure for military many times 
greater than other sectors like education, health and development works, which was 
believed to be, at least, not less than 50% of the total annual budget expenditure of 
the country. 
Tenth, it was no doubt that General Ershad left no stone unturned to establish 
the military interest in politics and business. In one sense, he established the retired 
officers and soldiers as the mainstream of the business sector, which was mainly 
supervised and controlled by the Sena Kallyaan Sangstha (The Army Welfare 
Association) while the retired army personnel were established in politics mainly 
through his JP. Eleventh, the policy of the decentralisation of power of the dictator 
attracted much attention under which a new layer of local government unit was 
established by Upazilla system, which spread and rooted political touts in the 
periphery of the country, where it was easier to deal with the military administration 
to create support base for the regime. 60 Twelfth, the junta was dependent on outside 
international power by debts and aids to secure its longevity, which derailed the 
social and political independence of the country. 
Primarily, most of these consequences of the military dictatorship are 
supported by the survey6' focussing the variations in views of six movement forces 
membership respondents. Table 4.5.1 and graph 4.5.1 shows the relationship 
between six groups of respondents and their stance regarding these consequences. 
Overall, the survey statistics initiates unanimous consensus over the gruesome 
-7? - 
sufferings of the people caused by Ershad regime in every sector of Bangladesh. By 
and large, the damage to the electoral process is seen as the most negative 
consequence as supported by almost all groups by 96.6%-100% respondents except 
the NPG with slightly lower supports of 87.5%, in which a distinctive similarity is 
found between S, I and P with 100%, followed by `destroyed the CPG' which gains 
supports from all groups by 93%-100% along with P as distinctive (100% supports). 
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Graph 4.4.1: The Consequences of military regime of Gen. Ershad in terms of the 
relationships of six movement forces membership 
However, `damage of Pl' earns the supports from all groups by 90%-100'% in 
which S is distinctive giving 100% supports. Although, the UZ system is accepted 
by all groups by 60%-87% respondents`', the PP and TU memberships (39.1 % and 
36.7% respectively) are found distinctive in disagreeing the initiative. Generally 
speaking, the survey unveils the all movement forces especially the student, 
intellectual and professional groups to be very blunt in expressing their views over 
the consequences of military rule. This survey result reflects the fact that there is no 
major difference in the views of the six movement forces memberships about the 
military dictatorship of General Ershad that laid an enduring effect on the way to 
building the intuitions for the democratic society. 
4.5. The Repressive Measures of the Military Administration 
The military dictator was keen to adopt many repressive measures to subdue 
the opposition movement that led the society into a permanent war situation. There 
were unlimited abuses of prisoners and indescribable tortures that took many lives. 
In a word, Bangladesh under the military rule of General Ershad was a kingdom of 
`terrorists in uniform'. However, the repressive measures of the dictator could be 
evaluated in many ways. First, the normal course of repressive measures against the 
CPG PI Arme black money electlon & poverty of law llpäla system dependerY. yon 
process EPF 
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actions of opposition democratic forces included lathi (baton) charges. use of tear 
gas, rubber bullets and a hose of hot stream and dirty sewer water on the anti- 
autocracy processions, marches and demonstrations to disperse the participants. The 
use of direct shooting on these actions was also a normal event during the clash 
between the furious movement and junta forces. In addition, the forces were 
deployed with a barricade of an iron fence in the public thoroughfare in the way of 
the destination of the protest marches and rallies that were already cordoned by not 
police and intelligence forces. The thousands of opposition participants, from the 
capital to periphery of Bangladesh society were harassed by false lawsuits following 
the warrants of arrest, which created enormous problems in social life. 63 
Second, the secondary level measures on associative individuals, groups and 
organisations were marked by colossal repression by the dictator. The substantial 
harassment of the individual serviceman of the civil administration reached an 
intolerable level. The union leaders and influential officers of the various civil 
service administrations were forced either to join the side of the dictator or lose their 
jobs, or be transferred to a remote location for their alleged connection with the 
opposition movement. In some events, some of them were sent to jail in false law 
suits. It was even alleged that the crucial leaders of the civil administration were 
arrested in the wake of military aggression and were threatened with the army 
torture cell along with political prisoners, if they would show any negligence to 
work together with military leaders. Under the special military act, the military 
leaders imposed restrictions on the all national and regional printing medias: dailies 
and weeklies and took the control of national TV and Radio, which debarred to 
publish or print anything without the prior scrutiny by responsible military division 
until the end of the military dictatorship. The intellectuals, professionals and 
business magnates were cautioned first by the secret service men about the 
dissatisfaction of the regime and eventually picked up by the intelligence forces. If 
he or she posed a considerable threat to the autocracy, a demoralisation process from 
mental to physical torture began. The eminent intellectuals and professionals of civil 
society realised this painful measures of the regime. In this way, the dictator stopped 
the intellectual development and freedom of thoughts in the society. In some cases, 
the military leaders offered alluring positions such as ministership, ambassadorship, 
directors and chairmen of corporations and bank etc to the potential opposition 
leaders to co-opt them in the military administration. 
Third, a crackdown of the forces and a brutal massacre used to derail the mass 
upsurge by heavy lathi (baton) and tear gas charges and opening fire on rallies 
resulted in a number of casualties. This was marked by pools of blood, broken 
glasses and discarded shoes spreading across the city streets. Charred body parts of 
the participants of the opposition democratic forces spread across the meeting places 
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and even birds killed by gun fire lay scattered across the rallies' area. The huge cries 
of thousands of wounded with affected families filled up the hospitals of the cities. 
Thousands of opposition participants became limbless by losing their hands or legs 
or many other parts of the body that led them to be permanently unable to work. 
Along with this direct massacre, the dictator operated the mass arrest of the 
movement participants; banned political activities; placed the top-level leaders under 
house arrest; declared curfew dawn to dusk to stop peoples' movements outside; 
closed down the all higher level academic institutions including universities, 
colleges and to some extent, also the secondary schools of the country. Issuing 
warrants by filing false law suits against participants in the opposition forces from 
the capital to periphery was a normal practice to suppress the mass uprising that 
happened many times in the decade long duration of the dictatorship. 
Fourth, abuse of political prisoners that suppressed their universal human 
rights included the extreme mistreatments and humiliations through extensive 
psychological and physical coercive interrogations under military tutelage in their 
clandestine operation. According to the testimony of some detainees' experiences, 
the top level leaders to the workers of the opposition democratic forces, told 
nightmarish tales of the tortures beyond imagination during their days in the military 
torture centre. The relatives of the victims could not even find out where these 
detainees were held for a long time or if they were still alive. The cases interviewed 
were reluctant to disclose their sufferings and avoided details of the events that had 
happened. However, they agreed to describe some techniques of tortures that were: 
yelling, hands and legs chained up for all time, tied up blind folded or head covered 
for all the time, standing for 12-48 hours in a stress position, using individual 
phobias, attacking and insulting the ego of the leaders, complete isolation, sitting in 
electrified chair, put into hanging position on a boiling oil tank with legs tied up on 
moving copikal, compelled to stand on boxes in blind fold with electrified wires 
attached in hands, stripped and kicked with random beatings on bones, hot eggs 
pushed into the anus, pulling out the nails of legs and hands in the name of 
interrogation, removal of all privileges and items of comfort, removal of clothing 
and being left naked for long periods, compelled to drink their own urine, torture on 
the genital organs that tied up with heavy stone or brick, connecting electric wires 
for shock to the genitals causing the infertility and loss of manhood, sleep 
deprivation, exposure to extremes of cold and heat that used the flow of hot stream 
on head and nose and disrobed standing in the tank of cold water for long hours and 
the like. 
Fifth, surveillance of intelligence agencies, in fact, made the whole country 
into a prison. Freedom of movement, liberty of speech and the equality of implying 
rights were seized by the network of intelligence agencies-SB, DSB, and NS! 
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under the supreme command of the DGFI. -the military intelligence. The 
involvement of the intelligence agencies in civil dress \v as ranging from military 
itself, secretariat, opposition political forces, and educational institutions to the post 
office of the rural Bangladesh. They were engaged in all operations and could arrest 
the target, and in some cases, were involved with the assassination of selected 
leaders and workers of the opposition. In a word, they were the architects of running 
the military administration. 64 
Sixth, since the early hours of the martial law, as its part of heinous repressive 
measures, the military junta started to arrest of the mainline opposition political 
leaders, and veteran students and trade union workers, who were considered a 
possible threat to the regime. 65 The most barbaric acts they carried out on the 
innocent non-political civic masses in the name of Islam that swelled anger and 
terrorism up from the bottom of the society were to compel the boys and youths to 
shorten the hair and smeared tar over the `uncovered parts of the body of the 
women' who were brought up within a very rich Bengali culture along with Muslim 
norms and values, although there was nothing indecent or anti-religious in their 
dress. 66 These kind of activities produced serious encounters with the progressive 
women forces of the country. 
In general, in the survey statistics in table 4.5.1 all these repressive measures 
were found more or less effective to establish control of the opposition rebellion, 67 
along with a wide range of variations in the views of six groups of the respondents. 
The same table and graph 4.5.1 presents the relationships between the six movement 
forces memberships and their views about the effectiveness of these repressive 
measures. Broadly speaking, the measures used in the normal course were likely to 
be more effective than the measures on associative groups and individuals. The 
repressive measures under normal course category like baton charges, use of tear 
gases and firing of rubber bullet on the marches and rallies are found as highest 
effective measures, which are supported by 70% around respondents. 
In the second stage, more than 60% respondents think that the measures like 
`blocking the marches', `police cordoning of the rallies' and `false law suits' under 
normal course, `restrictions on the media', `harassment in job' under individuals and 
group course, and `ban on political activities' and `house arrest of key opposition 
leaders' under peak movement course are considered as more effective measures to 
tackle the opposition movement. In the third stage, 50%-60% have considered the 
rest measures under both of second and third categories to be effective in the same 
uses for opposing the movement for democracy. 
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Graph 4.5.1: The effectiveness of the repressive measures used by the military 
administration in terms of the views between six movement forces memberships 
In the relationship of the views of movement forces' membership, baton 
charge, use of tear gas have earned more than 70%> supports as effective measures 
from the PP, S and NPG while restrictions on the news media finds the same 
supports from TU in addition to the above three memberships. The students (more 
than 70%) have been found distinctive to consider majority of these measures to he 
cttcctive including baton charge, use of tear gas and firing, police cordoning of the 
procession, restrictions on news media, harassment in service, ban on political 
activities, targeted shooting resulting killings and injuries and house arrest of key 
leaders in the peak of the movement and nearly 70% for `closing down the 
universities and colleges' and `issuing the warrant of arrest'. The TU membership is 
also found distinctive to consider the false law suits as most effective with 80% 
supports. Generally speaking, the NPG followed by the student forces' memberships 
are distinctive in finding all repressive measures as effective as they have rendered 
their higher supports while the professionals are also distinctive to turn down their 
support to lower proportion for all count of the measures. The relationship shows a 
strong coherence between all movement forces regarding their difference and 
supports for the use of normal course and peak time measures as the means of 
suppressing the opposition movement in which the normal course category has been 
found more effective than all other measures. The statistics in the same table shows 
that there is no major difference in the views of these six groups of respondents 
regarding the effectiveness of the repressive measures used by the regime to 
suppress the opposition movement and were more or less effective and these tools of 
the repression increased the sufferings of the people of Bangladesh society 
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4.6. Conclusion 
A number of scholars-strongly believed to be under the auspices of the super 
powers-were keen to provide an academic cover for the military intervention in 
nations around the world from the very beginning of cold war epoch as an agent of 
modernisation-a development model for the developing countries. In their 
endeavour, they suppressed the nationalist-democratic or nationalist-socialist 
movements of the time. In what range of measures-either lawful or moral spirit, it 
would be useful to consider an 'inexperienced 968 military-a soldier to be a model to 
rule the mankind, human being, nation or his country who is primarily given training 
to fight the war-to kill human being, just similar to him-to attack on the human 
and nature vicinity-the range of all instincts of the existence of human civilisation. 
It was true in some cases that the military became popular and came out as a strong 
part of the state apparatus in the post-second world war, which is sometimes argued 
for the right of their invasion in power. It was practised where there was war-there 
the military was to be stronger in the government administration. The rise of the 
cold war made this variable more important to the super powers-a competition 
around the world was fabricated to capture the support of the governments in their 
favour. Immediately after the second world war, many countries those who fought 
side by side with their big allies were found to have strong nationalist movements 
for their independence-that was due to turn to either democratic or socialist form 
of government, which would not be favourable to anyone of the superpowers. This, 
in fact, made the military a variable-a part of conspiracy network to keep their 
`man of choice' in power, which ultimately made a `disciplined war institution' into 
a `disciplined group of robbers' prone to state power. 
Some have also argued about the power of corporate interest of the military- 
purely to be seen as the power of their guns. In capturing the whole state 
mechanism-the media, administration, educational institutions and everything, 
their robbery was always found straight and blunt-guns pointed to people of the 
civilised society in voicing the spurious words- for `national interest! ' they take the 
power-basically a deception of looting the wealth of the state. No sooner had this 
barbaric event happened had it been supported by the concerned international 
power(s) that was responsible to kill millions of human being in the last century 
around the world in the movement for the restoration of peoples' rule-the 
democracy. As a part of this trend, General Ershad-a military tyranny amid the 
prowlers of the barracks-the looters of the military institution in Bangladesh 
brought to hostage of the liberty, freedom, security, impunity and equalities-the 
universal values of democracy-for nearly a decade. The movement for the 
restoration of democracy, therefore, was inevitable to return these values of 
democracy to the people of Bangladesh society. 
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reasons. First, the opposition AL policy was not in favour of the Army. Second, the older Satter, who 
even did not have a strong political base in his BNP, could be easier to deal with their plans to 
safeguard the future political position of the Army. 
20 See the interview of General Ershad with Peter Neiswald, The Holiday, 18 October 1981 
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21 The Bangladesh Observer, 15 November 1981: See also, Dr Sen, "Bangla Army Chief Insists on 
Role in Government, " The Hindustan Times, 22 November 1981: See also, Emaj Uddin Ahmad. Ibid. 
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The Bangladesh Observer, 29 November 1981, The Holiday, 6 December, 1981. The political 
elites of the society considered it as the dared insolence beyond his limit when he uttered: "Inshallah 
(God willing), there will be no coups, but what you must do is to find constitutional solutions so that 
coups and killings do not take place a year later or tan years later or ever again.... Our military is an 
efficient, well disciplined, and most honest body of truly dedicated and organised national force. 
Potentials of such excellent force... can be effectively utilized for productive and nation-building 
purposes in addition to its role of national defence. " 
3 The Bangladesh Observer, 2 January 1982 
24 In this situation, the number of the members of the council was reduced to six, where the three 
chiefs of the defence forces were included. However, the function of the Council was to advise and 
assist the Government in all matters related to national security as a whole. The leader of the AL 
parliamentary party argued in the JS that the new Council seemed to act as Supra Government that 
was evading JS. 
25 President sacked General Ershad as Army Chief on 23`d March 1982 and appointed Major General 
Shamsuzzaman as the new Chief with effect from 24 March 1982 and asked Information Minister 
Shamsul Huda Choudhury to broadcast the news on the National TV. But Shamsul Huda Choudhury 
betrayed the President and informed Ershad about this development. 
26 In Bengali, see for details, Major Rofiqul Islam, op. cit, p. 61 
27 
The Bangladesh Observer 25 March 1982, See also "Martial Law Proclamation Order", 
Registered No. DA-1, Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary Published by Authority, Wednesday 24 
March 1982. The following is the text of the proclamation of Martial Law: 
Whereas a situation has arisen in the country in which the economic life has come to a position of 
collapse, the civil Administration has become unable to effectively function wanton corruption at all 
levels has become permissible part of life causing unbearable sufferings to the people, Law and Order 
situation has deteriorated to an alarming state, seriously threatening peace, tranquility, stability and 
life with dignity and bickering for power among the members of the ruling party ignoring the duty to 
the state jeopardizing national security and sovereignty, 
And 
Whereas the people of the country have been plunged into a state of extreme frustration despair and 
uncertainty. 
And 
Whereas in the greater national interest and also in the interest of national security it has become 
necessary to place our heard-earned country under Martial Law and responsibility has fallen for the 
same upon the Armed Forces of the country as a part of their obligation towards the people and the 
country. Now therefore, I Lieutenant General Hussain Muhammad Ershad with the help and mercy of 
Almighty Allah and blessing of our great patriotic people do here by take over the assume all and full 
powers of the Government of peoples Republic with immediate effect from Wednesday, 24th March, 
1982 as Chief Martial Law Administrator of the People's Republic Of Bangladesh and do hereby 
declare that the whole of Bangladesh shall be under Martial Law with immediate effect. Along with 
assumption of powers of Chief Martial Law Administrator I do hereby assume the full command and 
control of all the Armed Forces of Bangladesh. 
In exercise of all powers enabling me in this behalf I Lieutenant General Hussain Muhammad Ershad 
do hereby further declare that: 
A. I have assumed and entered upon the office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator with 
effect from Wednesday 24th March 1982. 
B. I may nominate any person as president of the country at any time and who shall enter upon 
office of the President after taking oath before the Chief Justice of Bangladesh or any judge 
of the Supreme Court designated by me. I may rescind or cancel such from a time to time 
and nominate any other as the president of Bangladesh. The President so nominated by me 
shall be the head of the state and act on and incorporate with my advise as CMLA and 
perform such functions as assigned to him by me. 
I may make from time to time Martial Law Regulations orders and instructions among 
others providing for setting up of Special Military Courts, Tribunals and summary Military 
courts for the trial and punishment of any office under Martial Law regulations or orders or 
contravention thereof and of offence under any other law. 
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(2). Prescribing penalties for offence under such regulations or order or for contravention 
thereof and special penalties for offences under any other law. 
(3). Empowering any court or tribunal to try and punish and offence under such regulation 
or order or the contravention thereof. 
(4). Barring the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal from trying and offence specified in 
such Martial Law regulations and orders 
and 
(5). On any other subject or in respect of any other matter including any subject or matter 
specified in or regulated by or provided in any other law. 
I may rescind the declaration of Martial Law made by this proclamation at any time either in 
respect of whole of Bangladesh or any part thereof under Martial Law by a fresh declaration. 
E. This proclamation and Martial Law regulations and orders and other orders and 
instructions made by me in pursuance thereof shall have the effect notwithstanding anything 
contained in any law for the time being in force. 
X. The Constitution of Peoples Republic of Bangladesh shall stand suspended with immediate 
effect 
G. All Acts, Ordinances, President's orders and other orders, proclamations, rules, regulations, 
by-laws, notifications and other legal instruments in force on the morning of Wednesday 
24March, 1982 shall continue to remain unforced until repealed, revoked or amendment. 
The Judge of the Supreme Court including the Chief Justice, Attorney General, Chief 
election Commissioner, Election commissioners, Chairman and the members of the Public 
Service Commission, the Controller and Auditor General and others in the service of the 
Peoples Republic of Bangladesh will continue to function. All proceedings, arising out of 
and in connection with Writ Petitions under article 102 of the suspended constitution shall 
abate. 
H. No court, including the Supreme Court or tribunal or authority shall have any power to call 
in question in any manner whatsoever or declare legal or void this proclamation or any 
Martial Law regulations or order or the order made by me in pursuance thereof or any 
declaration made by or under this proclamation to have been made or anything done or any 
action taken by or under this proclamation to have been done or taken or anything done or 
any action taken by or under any Martial Law regulation or order or other order made me in 
pursuance of this proclamation. 
J. Subject to the provisions aforesaid all courts including Supreme court in existence 
immediately before this proclamation shall continue to function but subject to the provisions 
o Martial Law regulation orders or other orders made by me. 
K. The Martial Law regulations and orders and other orders and instructions shall be made by 
the Chief Martial Law Administrator. 
There shall be a council of ministers, to aid and advice the Chief Martial Law Administrator 
in the exercise of his functions. The advisors shall be appointed by the CMLA and they shall 
hold the office during his pleasure. An advisor may resign his office under his band 
addressed to the CMLA. The Chief Martial Law Administrator shall be the Chief Executive 
and head of the Government. 
M. The persons holding office as president, Vice-President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime 
Minister, Ministers of state, Deputy Ministers, Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Chief Whip and 
Whips immediately before this proclamation shall be deemed to have been ceased to hold 
the office with immediate effect. The council of the ministers the and parliament which 
existed before this proclamation shall be deemed to have been ceased to hold office with 
immediate effect. The council of ministers and the parliament which existed before this 
proclamation shall stand dissolved with immediate effect. 
N. The Chief Martial Law Administrator may appoint Deputy Chief Martial Law 
Administrator, Zonal Chief Martial Law Administrator, Sub-zonal Chief Martial Law 
Administrator, District Chief Martial Law Administrator for effective enforcement of 
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Martial Law. However The Chief Martial Law Administrator may delegate his power of 
appointing of sub-zonal and district martial law administrator to the zonal martial law 
administrators. They shall exercise such power and perform such function which may be 
assingned to them by me from time to time. 
I do hereby appoint: - A. P. No. -3 Rear Admiral Mahbub Ali Khan, Chief of Naval Staff and 
B. BD14295 Air Vice Martial Sultan Mahmud BU, Chief of Air Staff as Deputy Chief 
Martial Law Administrator. 
I do hereby divide whole of Bangladesh into five Martial Law Zones in the following 
manner: - Zone `A' Civil District of: Dacca, Dacca Metropolitan City, Mymenshingh, 
Tangail and Jamalpur. 
`B': Bogra, Rangpur, Dinajpur, Rajshahi and Pabna. 
`C': Chittagong, Chittagong Hill Tracts and Bandarban. 
`D': Comilla, Noakhali and Sylhet. 
`E': Jessore, Khulna, Kustia, Barishal, Patuakhali and Faridpur. 
And appoint zonal Martial Law Administrator as follows: 
Zone `A': BA-121 Major General Mohammed Abdur Rahman General Officer 
Commanding, 9 Infantry Division. 
Zone `B': BA-119 Major General Mohammad Abdur Rahman, General Officer 
Commanding, 11 Infantry Division. 
Zone `C': BA-112 Major General Abdul Mannaf, General Officer RYT Division, 
Commanding, 24M SFA. 
Zone `D': BA-132 Major General Muhammad Abdus Samad, General Officer 
Commanding, 33 Infantry Division. 
Zone `E': BA-183 Brigadier K. M. Abdul Wahed, Officiating Commander, 55 Infantry 
Division. 
They shall hold the office during the pleasure of chief Martial law administrator and shall be 
responsible for the effective enforcement of Martial Laws and maintenances of law and order in their 
respective area. I hereby delegate to them the authority to appective areas I hereby delegate Martial 
Law Administrator within their respective zones 
This proclamation Martial Law regulations orders and other orders instructions made by me during 
their continuance shall be the supreme law of the country and if any other law is inconsistent with 
them that other law shall to the extent of inconsistency be void. 
I may by order be notified in the official Gazette amend this proclamation. Lieutenant General 
Commander in Chief Bangladesh Armed Forces and Chief Martial Law Administrator (Hussain 
Muhammed Ershad). 
28 There are numerous causes for the military takeover in nations around the world. First, a threat to 
the 'corporate interest' (Emajuddin 1988) of military service men 'concerned with the position and 
resource standing' (Thomson 1973), 'lack of adequate budgetary allocation (Nordlinger 1977) or 
'civilian interferences in their internal autonomy' (Stephen 1977, Vatiokitis 1961) and 'creation of a 
functional rival' (Bebler 1973, Rizvi 1976) by a civilian regime. Some considered this corporate 
interest as 'inextricably bound with their self-image as the selfless and dedicated guardian of the 
nations' interest' (Nordlinger 1970). All of these views were seen as quite irrelevant in the 
Bangladesh case, as General Zia increased the income and strength of the army, which was increased 
further by the civilian regime of Justice Satter. However, a factor like personal interests of the 
military service men, for example, 'desire for promotion, political ambition and fear of dismissal' 
(Decalo, 1976) might have some connection. It was clear that only the political ambition-an act of 
treason and sedition-of General Ershad and top rank officers led to the coup in Bangladesh in 1982. 
Second, the internal rivalry and factional cleavages were also responsible for the military to be in 
power. There were several factional rivalries in the post-independent Bangladesh military: (i) war 
veteran freedom fighters vs. repatriated non participants of war, (ii) BDR (former EPR) vs. regular 
forces (former EBR), (iii) ideological cleavages, i. e. conservatives vs. liberals vs. radical groups, (iv) 
ºneinbers of Mujib Bahinee vs. members of regular forces of Bangladesh Liberation Army (v) pro- 
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Indian support group vs. anti-Indian attitudes in the defence forces' members, (vi) officers vs. 
soldiers conflict, (vii) supporters of military professionalism i's. inclination to military in politics. 
Third, the international political order in the 1960s to 70s was in favour of military aggression in the 
state power in order to destroy the rise of socialism in Bangladesh In this dimension, the socialist 
Bangabandhu government was toppled by military aggression in August 1975. The takeover of 
General Zia was just a more suitable follow up in this regard while General Ershad continued the 
same process. Fourth, the institutional set up of political culture and the level of their practice was 
also a precondition for the stability of the civilian administration that was lacked in Bangladesh in the 
post independent years. Fifth, the nature of agrarian economy of Bangladesh was consistent with the 
rise of an authoritarian regime. Sixth, corruption of the civilian BNP regime; Seventh, sharp conflicts 
in the opposition civilian politics-intra-party and inter parties' conflict; Eighth, indemnity act to 
protect the military coup makers. In general, most of these causes for military seizure of state power 
in the post-independent Bangladesh is found relevant in the survey, although there is range of 
difference of views in six membership groups of respondents. The survey statistics in table 3.3.1, 
shows that 76.7% respondents (in which 38.8% supports strongly) present the highest single cause 
behind the military rule in Bangladesh as `the international political order', in particular, the US - 
British led western capitalist allies were in favour of military seize to wipe out the chances of the rise 
of socialism in the state power. This factor together with several other domestic issues is seen as 
explaining the aggression of military on the people. In domestic issues, the sharp conflict and 
divisions among the civilian political forces (68.9%, in which 23.8% supports strongly); corruption, 
inefficiency and autocracy of the civilian political leaders (68.9%, in which 25.7% carries strong 
views); absence of stable political institution and culture (64.1 (7r, including 27.2% strong views), 
conflict inside the armed forces between freedom fighter factions and repatriated factions (54.9% 
including 26.2%, strongly supports while 8.7% declined to answer) and ideological conflict inside 
Army between liberal and radical faction(55.8% including 23.8% strong views, while 10.2(h declined 
to answer) are some most important causes of the military seizure of power according to the survey. 
By contrast, a significant part of the respondents also refute the conflict inside the Armed Forces that 
led the military interventions (36.4% for conflict between freedom fighters and repatriated factions, 
and 34% for the ideological conflicts). Although a major part (47.1%) of the respondents does not 
concur any threat to corporate interest of the military to be responsible for military seize, such as the 
creating of the JRB under AL regime (supported by 41.3%) and large scale killing of freedom 
fighters' soldiers and officers under Zia regime (supported by 42.2%) while it was important to note 
that 11.7% and 10.7% respectively declined to express their views in this regard. But it surely 
produces the arguments that the presence of this kind of dissatisfaction in the Armed Forces might 
had some influence to the military seize of the people of Bangladesh. The views of these different 
movement forces' membership do not differ widely. Overall `literacy, poverty and inequality' is least 
likely to be seen as a cause with 18.9% in general, in which PP, S, I and TU support for 20%-27%, 
and P and NPG for 15%-17%. In contrast, the IPO desire to destroy the rise of socialism in 
Bangladesh was seen as the most likely reason behind the military seizure of power with 76.7% on 
the whole, in which S and I are found distinctive to be most likely group with 80% supporting this 
view. I and P movement forces stand out with many agreeing that the `JRB threat to the CIOAF' 
(76.7% and 53.3% respectively), `the killing of WVO threat to the CIOAF' (86.7% and 50%) and 
'the conflict between WVO and RO' (76.7% and 73.3%) are important causes, whilst most of the 
supporters of other movement forces did not. Generally speaking, the results show that the supporters 
of I and P memberships are distinctive in this way. PP supporters are also distinctive in disagreeing 
(54.3%) that 'liberal-radical conflict in the Army' caused the military aggression. The relationship 
between the respondents of six forces' memberships have accepted a close majority of the causes of 
the military aggression in the state power including `IPO against the rise of socialism', `absence of 
political culture', `literacy, poverty and inequality in the society', `divisions in the civilian forces' 
and `corruption and inefficiency of the civilian regime' without significance although the later is 
found close to have very lower significance (. 08). This reflects the fact that there is no major 
difference in the views of the six groups of respondents regarding above causes of the military 
intervention. However, the relationship between the memberships regarding the rest of the causes 
including `CIOAF threatened by JRB', `CIOAF harmed by killing WVO', `conflict between liberal 
and radical faction inside the Army' and `conflict between WVO and RO' are accepted with high 
significance (. 000), and however, the later is found close to . 001 significance 
level. This test result 
reproduces the fact that all of these causes, although they might have different level of acceptance to 
the different group of memberships, had also influenced the military seizure of the state of 
Bangladesh 
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29 Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs. The Constitution of the Peoples' Republic of 
Bangladesh Dhaka 1973. 
30 Ibid 
31 Although General Ershad assured the nation during the aggression that he would not stay in politics. 
he encountered all his opposition politically and formed the Jatiya Party (JP) in January 1986. The 
party stalwarts were mainly from the former BNP cabinet, most of who were charged with several 
corruptions allegations under Martial Law Courts and were in jail in the beginning of military take 
over. However, in July 1984, his party started as Jano Dal (People's Party) and a National Front was 
established in support of junta that consisted of the JD, BNP (Shah), ML (Siddiquee), UPP and BDP, 
which had no real base of support in Bangladesh society. This National Front became the JP in 
January 1986. Mr Moudud Ahmed and many others, who were mainly known as politicians 
participating all government. They are always known as the member of ruling party. However, in a 
rally on 12 January 1986 at the premise of the BM mosque, Ershad announced his formal 
involvement in this party. 
32 The British introduced election system is very popular in rural Bangladesh society and the villagers 
consider the election as the reflection of all political activities by which they elects their leader. This 
also reflects the attitude of civil society in democratic practice. The military state damaged this very 
accepted institution of Bangladesh society. The election under Ershad regime was a farce and became 
a laughing stock. The maximum cases of election scenario of Bangladesh society under military 
regime of General Ershad, from Presidential and Parliamentary election to lower stage local 
government Union Parishad election, were painful and full of cheatings with the people. What 
happened in this regard is that the military and police of authority guarded the polling centres and 
some of their terrorists political supporters carrying illegal arms and bombs came to seal up the 
ballots in favour of their planned candidate. The military back election commission declared an 
arranged statistics of electoral participation usually more than 5017r, which in practice; however, was 
not more than 1 (I . 33 See the documents, Government of Bangladesh, Tables of Organisation and Equipment: Ministries, 
Constitutional Bodies, and Commissions etc. Dhaka, 1982 
34 See the annual report of Establishment Ministry of the Government of Bangladesh, 1990 
35 Hassanuzzaman, Bangladesh: Rastra and Sarkerer Shamarikikaran, ( Bangladesh: the 
Militarization of the State and Government), UPL, Dhaka, 1991, p. 101 
36 Ibid , p. 102 37 See the Weekly Ekota, the spokes news paper of the Communist Party of Bangladesh, 15 August, 
1989 
38 Hassanuzzaman, Shainarik Rajnitir Chalchitra: Bangladesh Pariprekhit ( The Background of 
Military Politics: Bangladesh Perspective), Ahmad Publishing House, Dhaka, 1993, pp. 23-29 
39 It was heard that the Chief Martial Law Administrator called on the IG, Police in his Office. The 
military leader grumbled on the Police Chief and came out from his seat and himself put off the 
badge of IG, Police and shouted with `you are dismissed'. In a moment the military dictator signed 
the removal of the Chief the Police Forces. 
40The DG of the Anser and the VDP was a Major General and the rest eight positions were filled up 
by Brigadier, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major and Captain of the Army. The DG of the Fire 
Service was a Brigadier and two positions were held by two Majors and the chief of the Jail Division 
was a Colonel. See Hassanuzzaman, Ibid, pp. 34-37. 
41 Translated from the Secret Circular No-l, This circular was distributed among the people of Dhaka 
capital on 3 December 1990. In regard to the militarization of the police forces, the secret circular 
said that many corrupt military personnel were employed illegally in the superior positions of the 
Police during the last eight years and 23 SPs of the department at that time were from military 
personnel. Besides, the general police officers had to depend on the blessings of the military leaders 
to be appointed in many other positions in their department, and according to this circular this very 
important part of civil administration had lost its independent role and credibility. 
42 Translated from the Article, " Pararastro Mantralalayer Anek Ajana Kahini" (Many Un kwon 
Stories of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) published in the Bengali Daily Sangbad, 3 January, 1991 
43 See The Weekly Ekota, 8 May, 1987 
44 See The Week! ' Purvavus, Dhaka, year 16, No. 3,25 December, 1990 
a` Translated from Hassanuzzaman, op. cit, p. 69 
46 Ibid, p. 118 
07 Muntasir Mamun and Joyanta Kumer Roy, in Bengali, Bangladeshe Civil Samaj Protisthar 
Sangrani, ( The Struggle to Establish Civil Society in Bangladesh), Abashar Prokashana Sangstha, 
Dhaka, 1995. p. 143 
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48 See the Weekly Ekota, 5 October, 1988. Many BCS cadre service associations including 
administration, police, foreign affairs, doctors, engineers and agriculturists etc protested against this 
announcement by the military authority. They made it clear to the dictator that this type of decision 
would destroy the structure and integrity of different service cadres and would lead to severe 
discontent among the regular service men of the administration. 49He added that cadre services must be given the opportunity to work independently and promotion 
be given indifferently. He clearly mentioned that none from the outside should be employed in the 
30 cadres of the BCS and the age of the service must be restricted to 57, which were welcomed by 
the civil society of Bangladesh. For more details, see Mohammad Khusbu, in Bengali, Bangladesher 
Chatra Andoloner ltihaash (Ershader Shamaykal) (The History of Student Movement in Bangladesh 
(the Ershad Period), Student Ways, Dhaka, 1991, p. 119 
50 The Action Committee for Civil Rule, in Bengali, Sharazantrer Biruddhe Oikvva bad/ia Haoun 
(Unite Against Conspiracy), a leaflet distributed in Dhaka city on 27 October, 1990 51 General Ershad held one referendum, two parliamentary elections and one presidential election to 
achieve national and international acceptance for his military government. Besides, there were also 
held some local government elections including several Union Parisbad, municipalities and Upazilla 
elections under the military regime. The referendum of March 1985 asked the people to vote 'yes or 
no' for General Ershad as President, which was boycotted by the all opposition alliances and parties 
of the country. The EC of the junta made a false claim of 94.1417c voting `yes' for the dictator, 
although all national and foreign media found that not more than 4%-5% voters were present in the 
polling centres (Golam Hossain ed. 1992: 108) The Times representative reported that Bangladesh 
learned yesterday (22 March 1985) how to tolerate the lies and it was false to recognise the autocratic 
military dictator as a democrat (The Times, London, 23 March 1985). A frustrated officer from a 
polling centre in the capital Dhaka, informed the Times election observer that less than 16 voters 
came to this centre and they had to come as they were government employees (The Times, London, 
23 March 1985). It was interesting to note a remark of the ex-premier of the military cabinet, Ataur 
Rahman Khan in this regard. He wrote that he inspected 10/12 polling centres in his constituency, the 
Dhanirai area near the capital and he saw the same situation of few voters. After his inspection when 
he was tired and taking a rest, some of his supporters came to him and informed him that they had 
cast thousands of votes. He became outraged and asked how it had been possible. They told him that 
it was very easy: there was no one as opposition or competitor; so they filled up the ballot boxes 
(Ataur Rahman Khan 1984: 146). He also wrote that Britain's resident Bengali community informed 
him that the press in London also published the report of a 499>-5"/r turnout of voters in the poll (Khan, 
146). In the third parliamentary election on 7 May 1986, the election fights were between the JP, the 
party of the dictator and the opposition AL, the members of AL alliance including CPB, NAP 
(Mujaffar), BAKSAL, WPB, JSD (Rob), JSD (Shajahan Siraj); BML, JIB and some other Islamic 
and minority parties, a total of 27 opposition parties, while other main opposition BNP alliance 
boycotted the election. From the very beginning, the military leader did not care of the election rules 
and regulations as his military allies Major General Mohobbatjan Choudhury and Major General 
Shamsul Haque were on the list of candidates for the JP. Both of them were members of the military 
cabinet of the CMLA and both were in active service in the Army. It should be mentioned here that a 
person in active service of the government was not allowed to be member of any political party and 
was not allowed to participate as a candidate in the election according to the rules and regulations of 
the EC (The Weekly Ekota, 21 March, 1986). On 6 May 1986, the pre election reports of Eric Silver 
and John Elliot, the reporters from the Guardian (London) and Financial Times (London) 
respectively told that all the arrangements for the ballot rigging was completed to make the victory of 
the ruling JP candidates (The Weekly Bichittra, 14 May 1986). However, it was reported that the 
ruling JP had practised massive rigging in this election to ensure their victory. In most cases, the 
voters found that their votes had been cast earlier before they reached the polling centre; the polling 
was completed by 11 am in the morning and they did not need to go to polling centres (Ruhul Amin, 
1993: 173). There were people's commission to observe this election. The commission invited two 
members of the British Parliament and one reporter from the BBC as observers of the election. In a 
joint statement published in the local dailies, they told that their observance of the poll might vary, 
but their decision was clear that armed hooligans destroyed the election process in the afternoon in 
favour of the ruling JP and that they were mainly responsible for the rigging in the poll. They 
commented that the election, which could be or might have been a historical event for Bangladesh to 
return to democracy, was turned in to a tragedy by the ruling JP. According to their report, (1) there 
were no parliamentary seats won by the JP without massive terror activities and ballot rigging; (2) In 
the history of elections in Bangladesh, the army had never been seen in the polling centres, which 
was found in this election; (3) Since the afternoon of Thursday, the way in which the changes of 
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election results were announced by the government controlled radio and TV and a sudden halt to the 
announcements of the results after 6 pm, created a massive speculation that there was a 
administrative coup against the EC (The Ekota, 9 May 1986). The full results of the election was 
announced on 9 May 1986, in which it was shown that the ruling JP got an absolute majority with 
153 seats following the AL to 76. The opposition AL rejected the results in a press conference 
accusing the dictatorship of a media coup that robbed the real verdict of the people and presented 
enormous fraud in the poll while the ruling JP secretary general brought the same accusation against 
the AL in a press conference in the same day. So, it was clear that both of the parties, the AL and the 
JP recognised the reality of massive malpractice in the election (The Times, London, 8 Max' 1986). 
Regarding the irregularities of this election, the ex-premier of the military cabinet wrote that one of 
the government high officials informed him about a record of the election. It was about the seat of a 
Minister in the military cabinet. As part of his election duties, the officer went around 8/10 polling 
centres and he found no presence of voters. The presiding and polling officers sat in silence and there 
were no people voting. At about 11 am, he found a UP chairman with some of his supporters coming 
along the road to the centre and they informed him that they had sealed up 80% ballots in favour of 
JP Minister. What a surprise it was! And it might be a real record of massive fraud in the poll (Khan, 
1984: 171-74). The third presidential election on 15 October 1986 was basically a voter less election 
as all opposition parties boycotted the poll. Although the military dictator set a range of dummy 
candidates against himself, there was no participation of people in this election. Moreover, on the 
Election Day, all opposition parties called a dawn to dusk hartal, in order that, the high ways to 
streets, bazaars and shops, and transports through out the country were empty. It was found that less 
than 1% of voters cast their votes in this election. In his book, a local journalist described his 
experiences of the massive frauds in the polls. He wrote that one of his friends, who was a teacher at 
a famous private college in Dhaka, was appointed presiding officer of a polling centre in the capital 
city. His friend found that just 1 vote was cast until 11 am. He and other polling officers were 
nodding off to sleep. Suddenly, an army convoy stopped in front of the centre from which a middle 
rank officer and some solders came out and rushed into the centre; asked the presiding officer how 
many votes had been cast till then. In response, he informed the army officer that one vote had been 
cast. The officer became exasperated and ordered him to cast 60% votes, in which 96(7( must be cast 
for Langol (plough), the election symbol of Ershad. It was surprising that the army officer being 
present scrambled the presiding and polling officers to seal up the ballot boxes as ordered (Ruhul 
Amin, 1993: 196-97). On 16 October 1986, in a press conference, the dictator vowed that he was able 
to hold the election although all oppositions threatened to stop it. In response to the legality of the 
election raised by the foreign reporters, the dictator replied without hesitation that he was elected 
President arguing that even if it was true that the turn out of votes was 3, in which the majority of 
them had been cast in favour of him (The Guardian, London, 17 October 1986). The fourth 
parliamentary election on 3`d March 1988 was again a voter less malpractice of the dictator. In 1987, 
as the mass movement reached its peak, the dictator was forced to set aside the parliament and 
arranged a further election according to the provision of the constitution, which was boycotted by all 
opposition forces in the country including the three alliances and the IPs accusing that the military 
leader was playing a trick on polls. The Election Day was observed by a 36 hour hartal called by 
three major opposition alliances and the other IPs. The opposition forces brought out mass 
processions, rallies and demonstrations through out the country, but nothing restrained the dictator. 
18 candidates of the ruling JP were elected without any opposition, an unprecedented event in the 
history of Bangladesh. All the international press condemned this and exposed the fact that 40.8 
millions voters expressed their hatred towards the election held on 3 March 1988 by a massive 
boycott of the polls (The Guardian, London, 17 October 1986). In this way, the military dictator 
destroyed the election as a national institution during the period of his unconstitutional reign. The 
same thing was practiced in all local government elections: UP, municipalities and Upazilla. 
Immediately after the capture of power, General Ershad took the initiative to establish his control 
over all the local government units. The UP elections in December 1983 and 1988 and the 
municipality elections in January 1984 were marked by many killings and injuries resulting from 
terror activities, vote rigging and frauds in the direct backing of the military administration, in which 
the Junta elected the members of his choice. The same election drama was played in the Upazilla 
elections on 16 and 20 May 1985 and 1990 resulting many deaths and injuries. It should be worth 
mentioning here that all these local government elections were boycotted by all of the opposition 
political and democratic forces of the country. At this stage, the terrorist activities and rnastanism 
(musclemen) became an additional part of the polls. This terrorist activity was used not only as an 
instrument of political rivalry, but also as the means of total exclusion of the general mass from 
participation in political activities (Hossain Zillur Rahman, Bangladesh Unnvan Sainikkha, 1397, 
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part-8). The overall scenario of these local elections was published in a national daily as: (1) there 
were massive terrorist activities in these elections including gunfights, bomb blasts and stabbing the 
rivals etc.; (2) there was massive rigging and fraud in the polls in which the ruling groups filled up ballot boxes in their favour without the participation of real voters; (3) The direct and indirect 
participation of 'musclemen groups' backed by the military administration influenced the elections: 
(4) The police and all levels of the election authority including presiding and polling officers 
participated in this illegal process: sometimes voluntarily and sometimes by force; (5) There also 
took place many fatal events in the polls like murders, injuries and kidnapping of rival groups and 
threatening the voters to cast the votes in one's favour or not to come to polling centre; (6) In some 
cases, the presiding officers ran away in fear of their own security (The Daily Ajker Kagoj, 24 
February 1991). The people of Bangladesh became fed up with the massive election fraud of military 
autocracy. At this stage, a slogan became very popular from the top to grass roots: "Amar Vote Ami 
Debo, Jake Khushi Take Debo" (I will cast my vote whomever I like) (The Daily Ajker Kagoj, 3 
February, 1993). After the removal of military junta in 1990, immediately after the vote in the fifth 
parliamentary election on 27 February, 1991, the opposition AL chief Sheikh Hasina expressed her 
happiness that she had cast her vote after a decade, when she had voted last in the presidential 
election of 1981. For this, she accused the junta regime and said that she could not go to polling 
centre during this period due to the massive terror attacks on the polls by JP musclemen (The Daily 
Ajker Kagoj, 3 February, 1993). 
52 Matiur Rahman and Syed Azizul Haque, in Bengali, ' Dhanik Ghustthir Lootpater Kahinee' (The 
Stories of Plunder of the Rich Class), Shoochana, Dhaka, 1987 cited from a research report on third 
world urban sociology: 'The Richest People of Dhaka City" by Kamal Siddiquee, Syeda Rowshan 
Kadir, Sitara Alamgir, and Saidul Haque, which was published later in the form of book as The 
Social Formation in Dhaka City, UPL Dhaka 1990. 
53 Hassanuzzaman, in Bengali, Bangladesh: Rashtra and Sarkerer Samarikikaran, (Bangladesh: The 
Militarization of State and Government), Dhaka, p. 122 
54 A famous journalist and columnist, Najim Uddin Mostan, in an article in Bengali, "Proboor Sange 
Bidaye: Bangladeshe Spoil Systemer Provarttak Ershad" (Good Bye with the Master: Ershad, the 
Instigator of Spoil System in Bangladesh). The Weekly Khabarer Kagoj, Dhaka. 20 December, 1990, 
p. 21. He used the government and semi-government officials in this way so that many of them, those 
who were the chiefs of the important industrial and monetary institutions, became as 'a slave to 
master'. 
55 Mahmud Shafique, in a report published in a Bengali weekly, "Middlemen Amlatantrer Bister" 
(The Spread of Middlemen bureaucracy), The Weekly Bichittra, Dhaka, 21 August, * 
56 This included the suppression of the opposition democratic movement following many killings, 
injuries, arrests and unlawful lawsuits against political and socio-cultural activists; played the 
election drama and circus of media coup and frauds in polls; plundered billions of taka from hundreds 
of sources and removed these moneys to foreign countries; created a bigger wealthy class over night; 
expended millions of taka to personal aggrandisement; organised rallies with hired people; and 
forced the youth and students of the society to ruin, first, by closing down the academic institutions 
for years and second, spreading terrorism by supplying illegal fire arms to them. 
57 The Daily Sangbad, in an article in Bengali, "Ershad Sarkerer Shath Bachar, " (The Seven Years 
Rule of Ershad Government), Dhaka, 25 March 1989 
58 /bid, 
59 The Weekly Bichittra, 16 year, No. 29, Dhaka, 8 December, 1987 
60 The UZ chairman would hold office for a five year term and they were given the status of a deputy 
secretary of government. Furthermore, they were given wide powers and responsibilities at the UZ 
level. Bertocci points out, "dependent on government funds for their activities, these local level 
officials will, on the one hand, be inclined toward regime loyalty, while, on the other, their 
considerable resources will endow them with significant patronage potential for consolidating their 
own power bases and, by extension, that of the ruling regime. " See Syed Serajul Islam, Bangladesh: 
State and Economic Strategy, Dhaka: UPL, 1988, p. 176. See also, Peter J. Bertocci, "Bangladesh in 
1985: Resolute against the Storms, " Asian Survey Vol. 26, No. 2 (February, 1986), p. 230. 
61 The Table 3.5.1 presents a general views about the consequences of the military dictatorship of 
General Ershad on the socio-economic and political life of Bangladesh society. Overall, 96.1% of the 
survey respondents (in which 81.1% supports very closely) have brought it delight that the dictator 
had shattered the constitutional process of the change of government in the country while the extent 
of negative influence on political institutions is supported by 95.1% (in which 60.7% supports very 
closely) who believe that the military rule has damaged the political institutions and political culture 
of the society patronizing a loyal group in every sphere of socio-political life. The dictator destroyed 
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the political party, election procedures, parliament, democratic tolerances and all other components 
of democracy. However, 96.6% of respondents (in which 67% supports very closely) believe that the 
military rule ruined completely the electoral process of the country. In this connection, the survey 
reflects that the military rule has the drawbacks on its own institutional professionalism that is 
supported by 89.3% (in which 49.5% supports very closely) who believe that the dictator has 
politicised the Armed Forces, and destroyed the Army as a professional institution. The absence of 
elected legislature under a military oligarchy lessened the form of accountability in economic 
activities. A vicious circle consisting of the retired or sacked military service men linked to the civil 
and military bureaucracy and their loyal political allies controlled the central activities of the 
economy, which stimulated corruptions in the ingredient of administration and patronized the black 
economy. This is unveiled by 85.9% respondents (in which 59.2% supports very closely) who think 
that the regime has spread and rooted corruptions and black economy, smugglings, etc through out 
country suffocating the drained political atmosphere. The dictatorship of General Ershad was also 
marked by acute poverty and underdevelopment steering for foreign aid that led to political 
dependence on the centre countries of the new international political order, which has come across 
the views of 86.8% respondents ( in which 43.7%h supports very closely), who make the regime 
responsible for acute poverty and underdevelopment in the country while 85.4% (in which 40.3% 
supports very closely) considers that it had made the country dependent on international political 
forces-as treated in another sense that the dictator was sustained in power with the support of 
international political forces. The domestic law and order and human rights situation were ever worse 
under the reign of Ershad. The survey reveals the issue with support of 94.1% (in which 51% 
supports very closely) respondents, who consider that the regime destroyed the rule of law in the 
country. Many people were killed and injured in the anti-Upazilla movement during 1984-85, 
however, 72.3% respondents (including 35% very closely) supports this local government reforms of 
the military administration. 
62 The survey has been conducted in 2003, which is nearly two decades later of the event (anti- 
Upazilla system) happened under the military regime of General Ershad. However, this local 
government reform established a new layer of local power exercised directly by elected 
representatives at thana (local government layer based on police station) level between District 
council and Union Parisbad, the lowest unit of local government. At that time, political analyst as 
well as countries leading opposition parties explained this step of the dictator as a successful measure 
to build his support in the grass root of the country. 
63 The absence of the earning members stopped the income of many families, which destroyed the 
domestic economy; broke down the family ties; undermined the traditional family values and created 
an over all social disaster in the community. 
64Especially, they had sources and informers in all opposition political parties, student organisations, 
trade union, professional and intellectual bodies in the higher ranks, from which they could easily 
collect information in advance about the programmes and actions of the movement forces. 
65 The Bangladesh Observer 25 March 1982, See also "Martial Law Proclamation Order", 
Registered No. DA-1, Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary Published by Authority, Wednesday 24 
March 1982. The martial law orders and regulations forced to shut down all educational institutions 
for indefinite period and imposed censorship on the press. All kind of political activities were strictly 
prohibited for the following year under the measures announced by the military authority. 
66 The general Muslim women of Bangladesh society, in accordance with their culture and heritage 
and ethnic origin, use to wear Sari and blouse. The blouse is used to cover their top (a part that starts 
below the head and ends before the belly) and the Sari is used to cover the whole body that starts 
mainly over the blouse part down to the leg. Sometimes it also covers up to the head leaving the face 
open. In this pattern of dressing, sometimes the parts lower the ribs or the part of belly side or necks 
or heads are used to leave open .... the 
barbaric soldiers smeared tar to black out over these parts that 
sometimes went beyond the limit of civilised norms and, values. In fact, with these heinous activities, 
they wanted to capture the supports from fundamentalist preach or Imams of the Muslims 
communities. These activities of the soldiers under military rule in Bangladesh were the serious 
misconducts and violations of human rights that are most fundamental to preserve by any means. 
"'There are two distinct views in the survey. One group of respondents believe that the repressive 
measures were effective to denounce the opposition movement for the time being, and this group 
expressed their opinion according to the planned theme of the questions. By contrast, with radical 
wisdom, another group of respondents believe that the repressive measures were non-effective or a 
little effective as these were counter productive generating more violent actions in the movement. 
These measures might have been considered with different level of effectiveness to suppress the 
opposition movement. Considering these differences above, for the use of normal course of 
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repressive techniques, the survey shows that using tear gas and rubber bullet (70.9% v. ith 24.9% for 
most effective opinion) lathi charge (69.9% with 24.3% for most effective opinion) were ettecti%e to 
wreck the procession, marches or demonstration of the opposition forces. Ho"ever, 29.1% and 
28.2% respectively feel these as non-effective carrying the sense of exploring the counter movement. 
Among other measures, barricade (block) to stop procession or march by deploying forces (63.6%). 
police cordon or guard on procession (61.2%) and false law suits against the movement leaders and 
organisers (63.9% with 22.3% for most effective opinion) were considered as effective to keep the 
opposition actions under control. By contrast, 35%,, 36.4(-7( and 34.1% respectively believe that these 
measures were no longer effective to abstain the participants from their actions. In the second stage, 
among the repressive measures against associative groups and individuals, restrictions imposed on 
news media (68.4%, with 17.1% most effective opinion), individual harassment in service i. e. sacking. 
transfer, demotion etc (63.6% with 12.7% most effective opinion), individual life threat (55.8% with 
7.2 most effective opinion) and co-optation of movement leaders (52.4% with 8.8% most effective 
opinion) have been considered as effective measures used by the military administration. However, 
supporting the `counter productive' sense, 29.6%. 35%, 42% and 39.3% respectively prop up these 
measures as `no effective' on the movement for democracy. In the third stage, amid the measures 
used in the pinnacle of the mass movement, mass arrest of the movement participants (59.2% with 
24.9% most effective opinion), ban on political activities (60.2(7c with 22.7% most effective opinion), 
use of heavy baton-tear gas and firing on marches and gatherings (63.1% with 21%I most effective 
opinion), house arrest of key leaders (60.2(/(, with 20.4% most effective opinion), declare curfew for 
indefinite period (58.5(-/c with 18.8% most effective opinion), closing down the educational 
institutions (56.9% with 24.9% most effective opinion) and issuing warrant against the leaders and 
organisers of the actions with false law suits (60% with 21(/( most effective opinion) have been 
considered as effective to tackle the opposition movement when it reached the peak. By contrast, 
considering the `counter productive' sense, 37.4%, 36.9%, 33%, 36.4%. 36.171,38.7%h and 34.6% 
respondents respectively believe that these hard line measures were no longer effective to derail the 
mass upheaval rather than increasing casualties. 
68 The audio interview of the military dictator with researcher during his fieldwork in Bangladesh in 
March 2003. In his interview, General Ershad told `since three months earlier of the takeover I have 
deliberated several times that we are not experienced people. We do not know how to run a country, 
but the things were going such way and that led us to takeover. " 
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PART II 
THE SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE MOVEMENT 
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Chapter Five 
The Formation of the Social Base of the Movement for Democracy 
5.1. Introduction 
The movement for the restoration of democracy against the military regime of 
General Ershad originated in a social base that was formed in the wake of social 
change in the post independent Bangladesh society. In fact, the analysis of the 
trends of social change of the last several hundred years' social history of 
Bangladesh easily gives a glance of the aspiration for freedom, equality and liberty 
of the people, which has evolved in the process of the ethnic and social formation 
of the Bengali nation. ' In brief, the history of social change of this nation functions 
from the pre-Mughal period where the cities and towns were developed gradually 
in the bank of the water ways of canals, rivers and seas on the basis of commerce 
and business. 2 The development of a systematic institutional framework in the 
socio-economic life of the Bengal was the main contribution of the Muslim and 
Mughal period (1200-1759), which was mainly run through these port cities in the 
process of revenue collection3, central management of the irrigation system4, 
building the gigantic structure for administrative and military purposes 5, 
development of road communications 6, the trend of individual accumulation of 
capital through the development of interest bearing users capital along with its twin 
merchant capital in fourteenth and fifteenth century Bengal', the development of 
commerce and monetary systems, the development of the education, cultures and 
economic activities with the combination of local and more enriched Mughal 
heritage. 9 
The elementary form of the modern capitalist economy based on business and 
commerce was present in Bengal from the end of seventeenth century before the 
establishment of British rule in India. 10 The social changes under the British period 
(1759-1947) were mainly two fold. First, the more systematic and institutional 
development in the social life under the initiatives of land reforms-the formal 
development of private property", further expansion of irrigation 12, the huge 
communications network by rail, road, water and telegraph 13, making an `associate 
class' of the British ruling elites-might be considered as the formal creation of a 
middle class-by building huge institutions in the combination of local and 
western education, finance and culture 14 , 
development of the institutional 
framework of the administration and judiciary15 and getting the touch of industrial 
development 16 that flourished by the industrial revolution (1750-1880) in the 
British main land. Although, these contributions happened, according to most 
evidence and argument of the academicians, for the interest of British rule itself, 
however, these brought a significant change in socio-economic life and in the 
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development of post colonial social formation of the South Asian nations including 
present day Bangladesh. 
Second, these contributions to social life gradually rooted and changed into 
the political aspiration of the people and caused the birth of nationalist and freedom 
movements-violent and non-violent, revolutionary and non-revolutionary 
peaceful forms-for the liberty, equality and freedom of these nations that led a 
peaceful solution in the independences of the India and Pakistan in 1947. This 
second development of this kind of political movement was advanced under the 
neo-colonial Pakistan period (1947-1971) in the form of the struggle for social and 
economic liberty of the Bengali nation that developed from the `policies of 
disparities' 17 by the central civil-military intrigues of Pakistan for their then 
Eastern wing-Bangladesh. This period was marked by huge protests, riots, 
rebellions, killings and movements for social and political emancipation, which 
ended with the traumatic and blood-spattered civil war that resulted in the brutal 
genocide of three millions lives and the atrocities of the rape of two hundred and 
fifty thousands Bengali women of East Bengal by the barbaric Pakistan Army. The 
social formation of this Bengali civil war originated in the development of an 
educated Muslim middle class that was mainly centred on the British established 
Dhaka University in 1921 and many colleges in the region. ' 8 There also developed 
a bourgeoisie based on kolkata-majority non-Muslim and some Muslims but non- 
Bengali or a lower proportion of Bengali origin-since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, which slowly increased first by Muslim majority based on 
Pakistan after the British left India in 1947. Under Pakistan, the proportion of 
Muslim bourgeoisie slowly increased among those who were in touch with the 
ruling ML and military government of Pakistan and their allies of ML elites in East 
Bengal. Although a middle class came into power under the provincial government 
of the UF in East Bengal from the progressive Bengali origin for some time (1954- 
56), they were kicked out from power before their transformation into a 
bourgeoisie. However, the proportion of this Bengali Muslin bourgeoisie increased 
in the wake of the India-Pakistan war in 1965 when a majority of the non-Muslim 
bourgeoisie of East Bengal left for India and replaced mostly by a local Muslim 
peti-bourgeoisie. In the end of 1960s, this new bourgeoisie seemed to have been 
defeated in the competition with non-Bengali Muslim bourgeoisie patronised by 
the central civil-military government of Pakistan in all sectors of economy, which 
led them to support the Bengali nationalist movement for the independence of East 
Bengal. 19 So it is clear that Bangladesh was born in and with the history of fertile 
and breeding field of civil unrest, protests and movements in her social and 
political formation, which must be considered in the analysis of the social 
formation for the movement for restoration of democracy against the military 
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dictatorship of General Ershad. The social history also unveiled the truth of this 
nation that they were ruled by the repressive and coercive military oligarchy under 
all periods of the Mughal, British and Pakistani reign so as to the development of 
political movements in the region. 
In the post Pakistan colonial period the pro socialist objective of 
Bangabandhu government until 1975 aimed at the development of the society from 
the base. 20 The problem with this attempt in the social formation was that the kind 
of working class and proletariat army was needful for this kind of speedy social 
change was not shaped fully with the liberation war of Bangladesh and even in any 
stage of the development of post independence ruling class. The inevitable 
consequences were that these socialist steps of Bangabandhu divided his own party 
leaders who were born and brought up in the well rich upper middle class of the 
society. These divisions in the ruling class led to the downfall of the socialist 
Bangabandhu regime by military coup in August 1975 in the interest of vested 
ruling faction as well as national and international bourgeoisie forces in the 
background. However, the social change returned to its old track towards the 
reestablishment of bourgeoisie order under the new post-Mujib military 
administrations of General Zia and General Ershad. 
This social change initiated a transformation of class configuration and 
economic independence as well as social disparities that developed differences, 
conflicts and an objective for self emancipation of the people in their social 
milieu. 21 For Bangladesh society, this involves first the changes in how its landed 
class and capital shifted to the non-agricultural class, and the commercialisation of 
this capital restructured the relation of productions and the `social choice of 
individuals for social well-being'. 22 In both new set ups-urban non-agricultural 
sectors and rural land, `social capital'23 changed as well, which was a considerable 
element in the change of social structure of the 1980s. The network of the flow of 
this non-agricultural social capital included the urban centred development- 
business and employment generation, denationalised agro-based industrial sectors, 
private investments including local, national, international and joint venture, 
factories and firming-based on small capital, development of export-oriented 
garments sector, new local initiatives from government through banks and financial 
organisations for the development of small industries, housing, super markets; 
development of service sectors including banks, insurances and hospitals, foreign 
exchange from repatriated Bengali communities especially those were working in 
the oil rich middle east countries, illegal capital from smuggling and bribe in the 
internal economy, NGO operations in the grass root communities. A significant 
mobility of social capital has been functioning between the agricultural 
communities-big land owners, medium and marginal farmers, leasers, share- 
-- 94 -- 
croppers on the basis of landed production due to the `land reforms' 24 in the post 
independent period. This social change was spontaneous being disrupted by the 
post-independent military regimes on the way of its flight to full swing economic 
boom. 
An effective democracy movement always originated in a developed 
industrial society in the sense of academicians of the west, which include a kind of 
social conflict that initiates a competition over the capital flow as well as develops 
a freedom in thoughts and actions for the well being of a stable society. Bangladesh 
as a less developed agrarian society, therefore, needs to examine how an alternative 
way of capital flow was ensured in the absence of industrial capital in western 
sense that gave birth of a critical and completely different social relation for the 
democracy movement. The question is that to what extent this social change had an 
effect on the success of the movement for democracy. Bangladesh in the 1980s was 
an over populated country, but led the entire developing world in the terms of 
income generated (GDP) per square kilometre of land area. 25 The scale of 
necessary social change for the development of active movement for any change in 
the society does not require bringing the whole masses to the spotlight. A standard 
part of this population needs to be covered by a minimum limit of major indicators 
of the development for the success of the movement. According to the history of 
many freedom movements and democratisation processes around the world, the 
socio-economic development, literacy and class configuration of these nations were 
important in allowing such events of change in their societies. 26 The growth of 
these indicators for building a suitable social formation for the success of the 
movement for democracy was visible in the 1980s Bangladesh society. The 
situation of this changing mode of economic life, socio-economic status and related 
demographic factors, social differentiation and class participation are empirically 
examined by the survey that is also able to demonstrate the state of social 
formation for the movement for democracy against the military dictatorship of 
General Ershad. 
5.2. Bangladesh Society in the 1980s 
Understanding the movement for restoration of democracy requires an analysis 
of the Bangladesh society in the 1980s in terms of its socio-economic development 
and class composition of the movement forces that were opposed to the military 
dictatorship. It is also evident to relate here that, many authors have stressed the 
close cultural linkages between market capitalism and democracy. 27 
In order to understand the socio-economic development of Bangladesh under 
the period of the movement for democracy, the structure of its population, income 
and employment-the essential elements of any social change have to be analysed. 
The total population of Bangladesh was about 114 million (1990 population census 
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report) of which 52.6% grown adults (15-64 yrs. ), 44.3(7, children (0-14 yrs. ) and 
3.1 % adolescents. 28 There are 17.3 million teenagers; 48 per cent of the total 
population of the country are female which figures at 53.75 million. The number of 
tribal people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and elsewhere in the country are 1.3 
million. In 1990,29.4% GDP came from agriculture which was 41.2% in 1980. The 
GDP from industry, trade and commerce and service sectors were 70.6% in which 
industry, trade and commerce was 20.9% and 49.7% from service sectors. In the 
industrial sectors, 12.7% came from manufacturing and the rest came from trade and 
commerce. 29 The industrial labour force employed in the mills and factories, 
transport industry, tea gardens, weaving and other industrial units along with 
agricultural labour force numbers of about 30 millions. Agricultural labour forms the 
largest group of this category i. e. about 20 million. These 30 million people 
constitute the working class in Bangladesh. The nature of their work mainly 
involves physical labour. The number of white collared employees in the 
government, semi-government, autonomous and non-government institution, 
agencies and offices, shops, trading houses, commercial organisations and factories 
stands at 5.6 million. Their work is clerical and semi-clerical in nature. The number 
of professionals comes about 9 million. 30 About 18 million adults are unemployed. 
Their number was fast increasing both among literate and illiterate sections of adult 
population. The age of the majority of this group ranges from 18 to 25 years. These 
people do get occasional and temporary jobs. But these do not bring them enough 
money for their livelihood. That makes them by and large dependent on the earnings 
of the other members of the family (S. A. Khan, 1991). In fact, the growing 
unemployment problem of the youths posed a serious threat to the socio-political 
life of Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh being a predominantly agrarian country of peripheral capitalism its 
general social structure was gradually becoming more marked by income inequality, 
especially in its rural sector (Sen, 1994). On the economy, the impact of capitalism, 
foreign dependency and poverty-all existed together. 31 The distribution of income 
was largely influenced by structural factors. On the other hand, economic growth, 
even fuelled by resource growth, technical and structural changes can not occur 
evenly in all economic activities and social strata. Consequently wealth and power 
were concentrated in a few hands. Rural society in Bangladesh was highly 
differentiated and its population displays a complex structure of big landowners and 
tenants; big merchants and salesman; rich moneylenders and poor peasants, artisans 
and landless labourers etc. This structural pattern forms the basic and fundamental 
layer of intra-social class disparity in earning and welfare. The most important factor 
causing high inequality in income distribution was the uneven distribution of land 
ownership and related assets. Agriculture was the main source of income and 
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possession of agricultural lands was the prerequisite for possession of economic as 
well as socio-political power which, in turn, helped to enter into development efforts 
and decision making process. The influential elites by virtue of their economic and 
political power got free access to rural resources nexus and derive benefits from all 
development processes while the poorer sections scarcely get any access to them and 
thus they were deprived of the benefits accrued from the development efforts of the 
country. This state of affairs which has been prevailing in Bangladesh was 
confirmed by a survey conducted in 1984 during the rule of Ershad. 32 Thus the rural 
power structure, commercialization of rural society, and agrarian social relations 
were primarily responsible for the process of polarization which was deepening the 
inequality in the rural society of Bangladesh during the autocratic regime of Ershad. 
The proper functioning of the market economy-maintaining the law and order, 
ensuring property rights, keeping the high ways and ports operational in the face of 
indiscriminate political programmes, which raises basic concern of the human rights 
and security, had been posing slow steps in the beginning of 1980s and started to 
function after the JS election of 1986 and withdrawal of Martial Law-still in the 
face of socio-economic setbacks. 33 
5.3. Urbanisation and Industrialisation 
The trends of urbanisation and industrialisation in any country could be 
considered as the most important social indicators to analyze the democratisation 
process in the context of changing the order of society. Many problems have been 
found regarding the industrial development in the peripheral countries. 34 In spite of 
these problems, and the economic arguments as to whether there should be priority 
in development for agriculture or industry, or a path of balanced growth, recognition 
that manufacturing has some place in the economic mix of each country, varying 
with its resources and stage of development, has led third world countries to 
encourage industrialisation. After the end of British rule in the sub-continent, 
Bangladesh was treated as a colony by Pakistan until her independence, which left 
many deficiencies for this country. The various initiatives were taken for rapid 
economic development in the first three years-the period before the introduction of 
the one party socialist system in January 1975-of the Banghabandhu regime 
towards the development of capitalism under the state auspices, however, the free 
economy policy of Zia regime had changed the situation towards an urban base for 
industrialisation in the 1980s-small manufactures, poultry farming, factories of 
different local market goods, operation of different multi-national and joint venture 
companies etc were found to be established in this period 
35 
, which might 
be 
considered to create an urbanised culture as a whole. This urbanised culture, 
comparatively, was close to that stage of western culture in which they had been 
pioneering democracy in their societies. As the urbanisation is an indication of 
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modernisation-the sign of growth and economic progress, the v%hole world is 
moving towards a more urban existence and where as the process is more nearly 
completed in the small number of rich industrialised countries, it is only in recent 
years that marked urbanisation has started to sweep over the less developed 
countries. 36 As a less developed country, Bangladesh in the 1970s and 1980s was 
seen to move towards urbanisation, although she could not be able to ensure the 
`urban opportunities necessary for the growing urban population'. 37 
The wide gap in living conditions separating the labouring masses from local 
elites, foreign advisors and tourists is less taken for granted. The time and again 
potentially powerful sectors of the labour force are induced to behave as vested 
interest groups, concerned to pressure and improve their privileges rather than to 
express solidarity with the great numbers of less privileged workers. 38 This kind of 
significant change had been found in the growth of `urban' 39 population in 
Bangladesh in the 1980s during the democracy movements. It was found that the 
proportion of urban population of Bangladesh had increased relatively quickly 
during 1961-1974(137.6%), 1974-81(115.8%) and 1981-91(65.89%). The area 
expansion was the principal reason for population growth in urban area. According 
to 1991 census total area occupied by urban areas are 9576.90 sq. -km. In 1981 this 
figure was 5230.15 sq. km., which shows, inter-censual urban areas' increase by 
83.11% in 1981-91.40 The literacy rate for Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi 
were 54.8%(male: 61.1% and female: 46.6%), 52.6%(male: 65.1% and female: 34.9%), 
53.9%(male: 60.4% and female: 46.1%) and 44.8%(male: 50.9% and 37.9%) 
respectively41, which was also in suitable level for movement for democracy. 
Since the democratic movement against the dictatorship of General Ershad, 
was mainly confined to the metropolitan cities of Bangladesh, the analysis of urban 
social structure becomes imperative. The social structure of the capital city of 
Dhaka-the nerve-centre of the movement had a significant development in two 
decades in the post-independent period that was confirmed in an empirical study 42 in 
which the researcher pointed out a significant social change related to the movement 
for democracy. On the other hand, the poor people belonging to the both formal and 
informal sectors in the city of Dhaka make the floating population who mainly come 
from the lower middle class. 43 They participated in all actions of the movement in 
significant numbers. In the same trend, it is also noteworthy that, between the census 
years of 1980 and 1990, it was the semi-urban areas rather than the urban municipal 
area that experienced the highest growth of population. 44-where a process at work 
in the development of `compact townships, habitation centres or rural growth 
centres'45 in which the rural settlements grew in conglomerations around these rural 
towns that promoted various non-firm activities-catered to urban like and income 
elastic consumer demand. According to some recent studies, these are the kind of 
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activities that have shown more dynamism within the rural non-firm sectors in terms 
of production growth associated with improved technologies and higher labour 
producti vity. 46 
These socio-demographic statistics of the Bangladesh urban population in the 
1980s unveiled a suitable social formation trend in favour of a democracy movement 
in the country. Moreover, this urban society was further extended to the rural people 
as much as possible by different steps taken by the local government reforms. Under 
the `Local Government Ordinance 198447 the whole country was divided into 64 
districts and 464 upgraded Upazilla (sub-district) with completely a new 
administrative and judiciary set-up which might be considered as one of most 
important steps that led Bangladesh to be a one kind of peculiar third world 
urbanised society that developed some opportunities of employment, education and 
judiciary in the sphere of village-level peasants, workers and very lower class strata 
of the society. Although it might be considered that this step also created much 
political disorder in these rural towns. In fact, starting from the grassroots, the secret 
plan of the junta was to establish military administration in all of these upgraded 
sub-district towns to set control over the whole political environment of the country. 
These rural towns, however, slowly changed into the new fronts for movement of 
the opposition forces as `the urban infra structural environment is always favourable 
to several movement operations'. 48 The `socio-demographic characteristics' 49 of 
these urban population were strategically considered useful for the development of 
social movements against the military dictatorship. 
5.4. Empirical Observations on Socio-economic Indicators 
The socio-economic instability in any society is regarded as the fertile land of 
political instability: movement, protest, strikes and violence. The data in table 5.4.1 
reveals the perceptions of this situation of socio-economic structure of Bangladesh 
during the period of General Ershad. The statistics reflected the views of the most 
unpleasant features of the socio-economic life, which might have an overall 
influence on the democracy movement. In general, the survey supports the presence 
of extreme backward situation in the development of poverty level, illiteracy, 
population growth, unemployment, social differentiation, corruption, landlessness, 
dependency on foreign aid and debts, and the absence of efficient leadership in 
civilian politics. 50 Table 5.4.1 and graph 5.4.1 presents the statistics on the 
relationship between the six movement forces memberships and their views on these 
indicators, which is pertinent with the social context of the democracy movement. 
Broadly speaking, the survey results show a presence of social change in the 1980s. 
Overall, `the absence of communal harmony' is least likely to be seen, which might 
have an effect on the movement or on military regime except a distinctive support 
by intellectual membership (63.3%). In contrast, the dependency of foreign aid was 
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the highest agreed factor, in which I and P are found distinctive for their absolute 
support with 96.7%. This fact is further unveiled while the 'presence of the acute 
poverty' is supported by the all movement forces membership in which, again the 
side of I and P (96.7% and 93.3% respectively) are very distinctive. 
They also stand out with many agreeing that the illiteracy (100% and 93.3%), 
high population growth (80% and 93.3%), unemployment of the educated youth 
(93.3% and 100%), corruption in all sectors(100% and 93.3%), increase of 
landlessness (83.3% and 80%) and rise of fundamentalism (83.3% and 73.3%) were 
very important factors that influenced both the rise of the dictatorship and movement 
for restoration of democracy, whilst the memberships of PP, S and TU groups, in 
comparison, are found to be less identical in the survey. Generally speaking, the 
results reveal the fact that the respondents of I and P memberships are very 
distinctive in this way. The membership of S, however, also is distinctive in 
agreeing less all these factors, as most of them believe these could hardly influence 
either the rise of military dictator or the movement for restoration of democracy. 
5.5. Empirical Views on the Evolution of the Mode of Economic Life 
The modes of economic life in the post independent Bangladesh are 
considered in five distinct dimensions: first, the Bangladesh economy was led 
mostly by agriculture in 1970s and industries in operation were mainly agro-based; 
second, the mode of economic life was still agriculture, however, found increases of 
small batch industrial activities in the early 1980s; third, agriculture was still leading, 
but a huge non-agri cultural activities was found increased mostly in urban areas in 
the mid-1980s; fourth, higher increase of industrial activities in early 1990s along 
with agriculture as main mode of economic activities; fifth, NGO as an additional 
mode of economic life mostly in rural society that influenced the agricultural and 
non-agricultural economic activities. Primarily, the presence of all of these modes of 
economic life is supported by the survey statistics in table 5.5.151 focussing the 
variations in views of the six groups of the respondents. In the relationship between 
their views (see also graph 5.5.1) overall, a mandatory verdict from all forces' 
memberships along with the distinctive positions of S and I (100% each) is found 
for `agriculture and agro based industries to be the main mode of economy in the 
1970s'. These agro-based industri es-although in a smaller quantity in the 
beginning-established a route of transforming the landlord and land labourers into 
urban based non-agricultural enterprises as private investors and non-landed 
labourers. 
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in terms of the relationships of six movement forces memberships 
This also slowly initiated the transfer of capital from land to commercial 
activities, which by years was transformed into industrial capital that invested in 
farming, textiles and services sectors etc in the major urban areas. The statistics 
supports exactly this trend of change in the mode of economy in the 1980s in the 
views of all forces' memberships in which PP, S and I are found distinctive to 
provide more than 90% who supports the development of `urban based farming and 
small industries in the 1980s'. This was further accelerated by the increase of a 
sizeable service sector, i. e. bank, insurance, housing, transport etc in the mid-1980s, 
which is supported by almost all memberships with distinctive response from P 
(96.7%) followed by I and TU (93.3% each). In the early 1990s, the country was 
about to a take off for the development of an industrial and entrepreneur boost, 
mostly joint venture initiatives by national and international private investors or 
between government and private entrepreneur from local, national and international 
auspices while the traditional agricultural production, in the new shape, mostly 
became in the control of farmers, sharecroppers rather than owner of the land. Most 
of the owners of land had shifted to the urban area at this stage. This fact is revealed 
by 82.5% memberships and widely supported by I and S (86.7% each). The role of 
the NGOs in transforming the rural economy in a positive way making the poorer 
people self sufficient by the micro financing at the base is also accepted by the most 
of the memberships. Although, the level of acceptance is lower in comparison to 
other modes of economy, their initiative receives more than 60% supports from 
NPG, I and P memberships. By contrast, the S and TU memberships (53.3% and 
50% respectively) are also found slightly distinctive in opposing the role of them in 
the same cause. 
The statistics reveals that the mode of economic change shifted to a kind of 
locally accepted trend of capitalist development, which, although was far behind the 
western pattern, was enough to bring the changes in the class structure that was 
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apposite for the launch of a distinctive pattern of third world democracy. This 
change in the economic life has reshaped the character of the middle class and gave 
birth to an urban based new middle class, who organised and led the movement. 
This also sharpened the difference between privileged classes in the power structure 
and the newly transformed classes-all stages of the lower to the middle class. This 
new pattern of the conflict in class structure-the desire of middle class to extend 
their present capital, where they felt the privileged class a hindrance-have speeded 
up the movement against the dictatorship of General Ershad. The middle class 
characteristics of intellectuals and professionals, mostly urban base, became close 
while the root of students was rural middle class-ideally more close to trade union 
workers and labourers of the lower and lower middle class, but in practice, had a 
tendency to have an upward vision to be accommodated into the middle class or 
upper middle class due to their additional educational qualifications. In this way, the 
class relation of various intellectuals, professionals, students and trade union groups 
were coordinated and class conflict and class interest of these groups had been 
resolved eventually by accommodating their characteristic demands in the central 
agenda of the movement. 
The statistics in table 5.5.1 show that the relationship of the respondents of the 
six movement forces has supported the small scale agro based industrial presence in 
the post independent periods while the development of the urban farming and small 
industries through out the 1980s, development of the service sectors in the mid- 
1980s, the extension of joint venture industries in the early in the early 1990s and 
the micro financing of the NGOs towards the self sufficiency of rural people are also 
supported. In general, although the agriculture was main mode of economy, the non- 
agricultural sector with all variables of macro and micro economy was boosting 
towards a locally fitted level of entrepreneurial development that had reshaped a 
necessary characteristic of the class relation suitable for the movement for 
restoration of democracy. 
5.6. Socio-economic Differentiation in the 1980s Bangladesh 
The level of social differentiation in Bangladesh society was significantly 
higher under military regime of General Ershad in the 1980s. A highly differentiated 
society is normally considered ripe for civil unrest. Any kind of deprivation of an 
individual or groups could lead to a social and political disorder in the society. A 
large-scale difference, division and disparity could even be transformed into a 
movement that changes the existing social and political order. This was what 
happened in Bangladesh in the 1980s under the military dictatorship of General 
Ershad. The social differentiations during this period were found mainly by level of 
income, religion, caste system, gender, age group and urban-rural life styles, most of 
which are primarily supported by the survey statistics in table 5.6.1. This shows that 
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94.2% respondents (with 40.8% strongly agree) agree that Bangladesh society ww as 
highly differentiated by income groups demarcated by social classes and their 
conflicts. It is thought that a more affluent class-civil-military bureaucracy and 
their civilian allies-expanded at a fast pace under the military dictatorship. They 
controlled the state machinery and earned huge illegal incomes by looting the wealth 
of the state. This small affluent class was exploiting the middle class and deprived 
the poverty prone large lower class of the society. The higher their exploitation, the 
bigger the unrest and protest against military dictator in different forms that brought 
more consolidation of the middle and lower class in the movement. Although 57.3% 
(with 18% strongly disagreeing) feel that there was no religious differentiation, it 
was significant that 42.7% support the existence of religious unrest in an absolute 
Muslim majority state (where a major minority are the Hindus), which envisages an 
incessant rise of fundamentalism in Bangladesh society in the interest of military 
dictatorship. Although 61.2 %( with 11.2% strongly disagree) of the respondents 
consider that there was no presence of closed caste system inside the major religious 
community, it was significant that 35.4% agree that there was the existence of 
differentiation by caste system in the society. It is worth mentioning that the Muslim 
community in Bangladesh is segregated by different caste components i. e. Sheikh, 
Syed, Talukder, Choudhury, etc., which has an effect on any attempt to group 
formation and social and political leadership. In the same manner, the closed caste 
system controls the social and political life of the Hindu community. The gender 
exploitation is a very important issue to consider the socio-political context of third 
world societies. In this connection, 69.4% (with 40.8% strongly agree) supports the 
existence of gender differentiation under military regime. This does mean that men 
dominate over women in every respect of socio-economic and political life. In the 
socio-economic perspective, female are mainly engaged in non-profited household 
activities, which is treated economically as a non-working force. Although the 
leadership of the major political parties-the AL and BNP, are female, the 
participation of women in national politics was still insignificant. By contrast, 
29.6% does not believe in any existence of gender exploitation in the society rather 
the existence of lack of consciousness due to the illiteracy and religious values 
among them. This is reflected in the movement as several women's bodies came out 
and forged unity with the mainline democratic forces. They believed that the 
religious fanaticism initiated by the dictator was halting the advancement of the 
women in society. 
The age group differentiation of the population is another major socio- 
economic setback leading to higher dependency ratio that has caused an enormous 
socio-economic crisis which is found to be an important factor behind social unrest. 
This is supported by 64.6% respondents (with 15.5% strongly agree). This unlocks 
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the view that a large youth age group of the population was suffering with the 
pressure to increase their income, while the rate of unemployment under military 
regime was very high-a crucial factor behind the socio-economic havoc in the 
society. The developments in the post independent Bangladesh is merely seen in the 
urban areas. The expansion of the city area, modem communication network, high- 
rise structures and expanding the administrative and academic opportunities for 
citizens were however the most conspicuous developments in the major cities of 
Bangladesh. It was evident for illegal military regimes that they initiated more 
opportunities and utilities in towns rather than rural areas-as the cities and towns 
were the centres of movement. This, however, had transformed the citizens into 
more cognisant forces of the movement against military dictators. This is unveiled in 
the survey with the supports of 81.6% respondents (with 45.6% strongly agree) 
finding the military dictatorship to have created differentiations by giving the 
priority of urban area than that of rural area in its development policies. This was the 
attempt of the military leaders to show the eye-catching development-high rise and 
lucrative infrastructure-to the donors and foreign aid agencies as they need the 
money for their survival, and to some extent, it was in the interest of fashionable 
lifestyle of the new parasitic class of civil-military bureaucracy and their civilian 
collaborators. In fact, the eye-catching possessions of the ruling class led to an eye- 
catching differentiation and distance between them and the middle and lower class 
factions of the society that developed the reunification and consolidation of the 
later-a strong unity between them in these cities and in vein, these cities and towns 
came apart as the centre of actions-burst out in a mass upsurge that eventually 
compelled the dictator to stepped down. 
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Table 5.6.1 and the graph 5.6.1 show the relationship between six movement 
forces memberships and their views on the level of existence of socio-economic 
disparities in Bangladesh society under the period of Ershad regime. The views of 
these different memberships on the existence of socio-economic differentiations do 
not differ widely. Overall, the `differentiation by caste system' was the least likely 
factor in which S are the lowest 16.7% and I are the highest 53.3% are found 
distinctive followed by the `religious differentiation', under which the position of S 
and I does not change (23.3% and 66.7% respectively). Both of these factors behind 
the social differentiation are found to have lower influence on the movement. In 
contrast, the `differentiation by income groups' was accepted as the most likely 
socio-economic factor by all memberships under which P and TU are sharp to 
consider this issue with entire 100% whilst the views of other forces (86%-97%) are 
not far from them to be seen as a principal cause of the movement. The views of I 
and P stand out with the supports of almost all respondents that the `difference in 
providing the urban-rural utilities' (93.3% and 100% respectively) was another 
important factor, which limited the movement in the urban areas, whilst the S 
considers this factor comparatively as the lowest 63.3% along with an up to mark 
views from other forces membership. Generally speaking, the results show that the 
respondents of I and S memberships are always inversely distinctive in expressing 
their views. However, the views of the NPG are close to overall statistics, which has 
identified them as a stable and distinctive group. The statistics has however, 
established the fact that the existence of differentiation by income group, gender, 
age-group and use of utilities in the cities and towns are found to determine the rise 
of the movement. 
The statistics shows that the relationships of the six movement forces' 
memberships have supported the social differentiation by income groups, caste 
system, gender and age group than that of the differentiation by religion and urban- 
rural utilities. These influenced the country's political system as well as the 
movement for democracy against the military dictator. The statistics also supports 
their views that the social differentiation by `religion' and `closed caste system' has 
lower influence on the movement. 
5.7. The Movement Constituents: Class, Gender, Religion, Age, 
Area and Interest /Pressure Groups 
The various socio-demographic constituents were inclined directly and 
indirectly with the movement for the restoration of democracy. The level of their 
involvement in the movement was different. These constituents include the conflicts 
in social classes, gender groups, religious groups, youth age groups, interest and 
pressure groups and political forces. The survey statistics provide primarily a clear 
account of their presence in the movement. 
52 The statistics in Table 5.7.1 and graph 
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5.7.1 also present the relationships between six movement forces' memberships and 
their stances on how far the movement involved the different constituents of the 
society. The social conflicts generated from these constituents have mainly 
considered about the possibility of the rise of class struggle, gender discrimination 
and religious conflict under military regime. 
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Overall, none of the first three factors was found involved in a major 
proportion in the movement. However, the class conflict is found to have some 
supports in which the views of I and P (56.7% and 40%) are distinctive. The 
statistics of these groups reveals the fact that the connection of the lower range of 
class conflict was present, mostly in latent form, however, is more manifested in TU 
groups, which was able to determine the magnitude of the movement. In comparison, 
the presence of religious conflict (12.1 %) and gender conflict (11.7) are seen as 
least likely variables that might have no influence on the movement. The views of S 
and TU are more distinctive (90% and 93.3% respectively) in disagreeing the 
presence of any type of religious conflict. Their views on the presence of gender 
conflict remain unchanged along with professionals (86.7%) as the highest 
disagreeing group. The participant constituents-age, area, interest or pressure 
groups and political parties-are seen as more identical in the survey. Here the age 
is focused with youth, the area with urban-rural or center-periphery; interest or 
pressure groups include the students, intellectuals, professionals and trade unions 
and political parties with the opposition democratic forces. However, the statistics 
on the relationship between almost all movement forces membership supports (95%- 
98%) that these constituents were the main participants of the movement. However, 
the TU is found distinctive in agreeing all of these four constituents lending their 
QPP  J Q1 QP  TU Q'. PG 
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supports for 100% whilst the students are found distinctive in agreeing all of the last 
three constituents (100%) followed by the NPG and professionals for middle two 
constituents in the same range of their supports. The statistics for all memberships 
has highlighted in the views about highest participation of the youth, urban base of 
actions, involvement of interest and pressure groups and leading role of political 
parties in the movement. 
5.8. The Class Structure of the Movement Participants 
The formation of suitable participant classes plays an important role in any 
change in the society. In a pre-industrial society like Bangladesh in the 1980s, the 
participation of different classes in the movement has reflected the realism of the 
class structure in capitalist transition of a third world agrarian society. In the 
Bangladesh case, the classes have been categorised into six different dimensions on 
the basis of their incomes marked by their occupations and livelihood: higher, upper 
middle, middle, lower middle, lower and the distress class at the lowest stage of the 
society. 53 The survey statistics in Table 5.8.1 reveals this, 91.7% respondents feel 
that there was very little participation of higher class in which 29.1% denies this 
class to have any kind of participation in the movement. The role of the upper 
middle class in the movement is discernible. The survey shows a perception of 
substantial participation of this class by 58.8% (with 50.5% fairly participated) in 
the movement. This class was either in the second and third level leadership of 
different political and socio-cultural organisations or were used in most cases as of 
financier and their intellectual and professional capabilities in the movement. 
The middle class is always crucial in any large-scale social change of a 
society. In the Bangladesh case, an urban petty-bourgeoisie middle class developed 
through out the 1980s, which played a decisive role in organising the movement. 
This class was in the intermediate and leading positions of different political and 
socio-cultural organisation, interest groups and pressure groups and led 
comparatively the lower units and branches of district level processions in all actions 
of the movement. This class maintained a link with upper middle class and higher 
class, and had a close and intimate connection with lower classes as they were 
brought up from these base classes. They had also relatives in the administration of 
the military regime. All types of smaller and middle range processions or gatherings 
in the urban to rural periphery were led by this middle class and had been able to 
organise mammoth mass rallies through out the whole period of the movement. In 
the end, there was significant participation of urban middle class in the actions 
organised by the opposition democratic forces, which was ultimately able to throw 
out the military dictator. The survey reveals the massive participation of urban 
middle class with 90.8% support (with 58.3% greatly) for their significant role in the 
movement. The lower middle class could be treated as a directive force behind the 
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middle class. For example, a middle rank class-I employee in any type of 
administration and business organisation is regarded as a representative of middle 
class and other clerical or semi-clerical employees under him are the members of 
lower middle class who are responsible to manage the whole office. In the opposite 
way, this class is also organised under the middle class leadership-the striking 
force of the movement. The survey strongly recognises the huge participation of this 
lower middle class by 91.2% of respondents supporting their role (in which 65% 
supports as greatly participated) in the movement. The lower class ensured the huge 
participation of the movement. They joined the gatherings and the actions of the 
movement. They were involved in all the clashes with police resulting in many 
killings and injuries. Although they were not in a leadership role, they were, in fact, 
the main fighting force at operation that made successful of all actions of the 
movement, which is supported by 76.7% respondents (with 43.2% great 
participation) while the involvement of the distressed class participants is supported 
by 58.7% (with 18.4% great participation). 
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The statistics in Table 5.8.1 and graph 5.8.1 presents the relationship of six 
movement forces memberships on the trends of participation of different classes in 
the movement for democracy. Overall, the participation of lower middle class and 
middle class are seen as most likely to have `fairly participated' categories followed 
by lower class. The participation of distress class and upper middle class are 
moderate as fair participant classes while the participation of higher class is 
contrasted far and wide as the lowest group. In the relationships of memberships, 
the participation of lower middle class achieves more than 90% supports from PP, I, 
TU and N PG movement memberships along with distinctive l 00°, o supports from I. 
Higher class U. muddle class Niddle class L. rriddle class Low er class Distressed 
class 
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In the same way, the middle class has earned the same supports from I, TU and NPG 
memberships with distinctive 100% supports from TU. Generally, speaking the 
participation of lower middle class and middle class are widely accepted by all 
forces' memberships. It is found distinctive that I render more weight to the 
participation of all classes ranging from middle class to distress class (93.3%, 100%. 
90% and 80% respectively as fairly participated class) in comparison to other forces' 
membership. The students' membership is also distinctive in disagreeing the 
participation of higher class and distress class (0% and 36.7% respectively as fairly 
participation). The relationship reveals the important role and highest participation 
of the middle to lower class in the movement along with a moderate involvement of 
the upper middle class. The overall statistics express the insignificant participation 
of the higher class in the movement. 
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5.9. Conclusion 
The social structure of the post independence Bangladesh society was mainly 
pro movement, which reached a more suitable shape in the anti-Ershad movement in 
the 1980s. This social formation was pertinent in the process of democratisation 
through a necessary class configuration-the transfer of landed capital to the non- 
agricultural, commercial and industrial sectors, which initiated an urban base new 
petty-bourgeoisie class. This class was developed on the base of existing 
denationalised sectors and process of privatisation especially in the development of 
service sector-local, national, international and joint venture organisations-trade 
and business, foreign exchange from the export of manpower, development of small 
industries on the local raw materials, farming, housing, pharmaceuticals, textiles and 
above all the growth of illegal capital-smuggling and bribe. This process of change 
in the social structure was spontaneous. Moreover, the invention of using the small 
credit by an enormous NGO movement for the development of marginal and poorer 
section of rural Bangladesh, which started to work in the end of 1970s, was regarded 
as a revolution in the trend of social change. This contributed to take the huge rural 
masses in the line of urban-rural edge in the development of pro democratic socio- 
economic formation. Although the size of the change in all socio-economic 
indicators-literacy level, scale of poverty, growth of the GDP, per capita income, 
dependency ratio, changes in the class formation towards the growth of middle class, 
rate of unemployment, development of industrial, commercial and service sectors, 
trade and business etc were not in the stage of statistically sufficient level, in a western 
sense, for the development of democratic norms and values in consideration to the 
whole population, the overall frequencies of these changes in all indicators were 
enough for the growth of the movement, especially in the urban agglomeration of 
Bangladesh society in the 1980s. Full democracy may require maintaining an overall 
socio-economic change of the society while the elimination of an autocratic military 
dictatorship does not require reaching such limit. 54 The main factor was to consider 
that there was a presence of necessary limit to the social change in the social structure 
to depose the dictatorship. In fact, all cities and towns including the capital city of 
Dhaka reached such capacity in the change of these indicators in quantity rather than 
overall percentage, which were adequate for the development of the movement to 
overthrow of the military dictatorship. There were two diverging and competitive 
trends of social change in this regard. First, in an average 30% to 50% population of 
the urban areas-more than five hundred cities and towns had reached the limit of the 
development indicators necessary for the movement. The major part of this population 
was completely new middle and lower middle class who were competing with the 
ruling higher and upper middle class in all sectors. As there was limited opportunity 
for their own development under ruling military interest, and a very small part of their 
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civilian allies, these classes took the side of the opposition political forces and trade 
unions in all sectors. In a very short period, they became a potential force for the 
security of their own business and employments. In opposition, the vast population of 
the urban and urban-rural edge under the limit of development indicators grew as 
proletarian elements in the form of providing the participants of the movement. In all 
considerations, the higher the competition between the higher, middle and lower 
middle classes of the ruling and opposition forces, the more growth of the urban 
proletarians-lower and distressed class, which grew more larger size in the wake of 
rural-urban migration for landlessness and limitation of work in the rural area, and 
evolved a necessary structural change of the society that ignited an urban revolution 
and a huge mass uprising ousting the military dictatorship of General Ershad. 
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patronised by the military government. 
3a Dickenson in Alan B Mountjoy ed. The Third World Problem and Perspectives, 6`" edition, London: 
Macmillan Educational Ltd., 1987, p. 94. Dickenson wrote: "Colonial policies served to inhibit 
industrialisation and though political independence has afforded opportunities for development, 
progress has been comparatively slow in the face of various obstacles. The resource endowment in 
general is not an inhibiting factor, given the sustenance that third world raw materials give to first world 
industries. Nevertheless, individual countries lack particular resources, and resource exploitation is 
often impeded by infra-structural deficiencies. More important are shortage of educated and skilled 
labour, and of physical and financial capital. The former may be obtained by education and training 
p5rogrammes and the latter sought from savings, export earnings and foreign investment and aid" 
For details of industrial and non-agricultural growth in the 1980s Bangladesh and the relative changes 
in the subsequent years, see The Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, Report of 
the Asian Development Bank, 1999. See also, Mozammel Haque and Jim Love, "Bangladesh 
Industrialisation since Independence. " Chapter 1 in Strategies for Industrialisation: The Case of 
Bangladesh, edited by Mozammel Haque and Jim Love, Dhaka: UPL, pp. 1-23 
36 Dickenson in Alan B. Mountjoy, ed. p. 102 
37 See Ibid, p. 110. Dickenson categorically has described the reasons behind this problem in nice 
manner, which is also pertinent to Bangladesh: "In the advanced countries alternative employment 
grew up during a period of change and increasing efficiency in agriculture. Urban mortality levels 
remained higher than those of the countryside and help to dump down the gap between growing 
numbers of worker and work available. Mass transport, allowing cheap long-distance migration 
permitted millions to bypass the new industrial towns and cities and to seek a new life overseas. Thus 
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although a vast movement from the land took place, it was spread over a greater period of time and was 
not focused solely on the towns. The flood to the towns currently sweeping through the third world no 
longer bears any relationship to expanding urban economics and opportunities: under employment in 
village is being exchanged for unemployment in towns. The flood of people to the larger towns in the 
third world is now at a rate far in excess of the possible provision of jobs in those towns, and this rate of 
population accretion outpaces the provision of the utilities and services that are the hallmark of an 
urban community. There are also political overtones. It is in the town that much of the political life of 
the third world is to be found: meetings, newspapers, a speaker can bring new ideas and stir opinions. A 
discontent urban proletariat can become a far more effective force for change than ten times its number 
of dissatisfied farmers; it is more easily swayed by demagogues and provides an uncertain but volatile 
element in the urban community. More serious, to the detriment of long time national development 
plans, pressures may be exerted to channel more and more development capital to the short term end of 
alleviating urban distress. Increasingly political decisions in the social and economic fields may be 
affected by discontented urban masses. " 
38 Ray Bromley and Chris Gerry, Casual Work and Poverty in Third World Cities, Chichester : Wiley, 
1979, p. 19 
39 In the 1991 census of Bangladesh, the definition of urban areas are adopted as follows: a) All places 
with City Corporation, Municipality or Town Committee and Cantonment area, Thana Headquarters, 
Industrial areas or development centres and notified towns having distinctly urban characteristics such 
as railway, tourists, administrative, educational and big market centres. b) All other places which satisfy 
the following criteria i) Majority of male working population engaged in non-agricultural pursuits ii)An 
identifiable central place where amenities like roads, electricity, community centres, water supply, 
sanitation, sewerage system etc. exist and iii) which are densely populated. Apart from these, the 
outgrowth of cities and towns have also been treated as urban or an urban agglomeration. An urban 
agglomeration forms a town and its adjoining urban outgrowths or two or more physically contiguous 
towns together with contiguous well-recognised outgrowths, if any of such towns. In Bangladesh the 
urban areas have been classified in to five categories according to their functions and sizes: i) Megacity 
ii) Statistical Metropolitan Areas (SMA) iii) Municipality iv) Thana Headquarters v) Other Urban Area. 
Dhaka, a divisional city and the capital of Bangladesh, is only the Mega city, the other three divisional 
cities Chittagong, Rajshahi, and Khulna are categorised as Statistical Metropolitan Area (SMA), 
Municipality means areas designated as such under municipality ordinance which is a statutory town. 
464 Thana Headquarters and other urban areas are non-municipal towns, usually are places of 
commercial, industrial, educational and tourists importance. These urban areas consists of some smaller 
units such as Ward (in corporation and municipal areas only), Mauza ( in other urban areas only) and 
Mahalla (in corporation and municipal areas only). 
40 The Zilla (District) wise urban area expansion indicates the highest urban area expansion in Gazipur 
Zilla with 823.7% followed by Nawabgonj and Rajshahi Zilla with 291.61% and 287.30% respectively. 
The Division wise urban area expansion has shown that decadal area expansion has taken place in 
Rajshahi (121.91%) followed by Dhaka division with (115.34(/c). All the Zillas of four divisions also 
showed similar urban area expansion was highest 30 in addition new urban areas came under urban 
frame in consequence of which number of urban centres rose to 522 in 1991 from 492 in 1981. It 
appeared that urban dwelling households of Dhaka Zilla have the highest involvement in secondary and 
tertiary activities like non-agricultural labour, handloom, business, construction, transport employee 
and others with 20784,3849,209860,24540,80567,288,237 and 154145 households respectively. 
Chittagong zilla ranked second highest in this activities like agricultural labour (9807), business(70747), 
employee (115836) and other(62461) For the primary activities like cultivator/share-croper Dhaka Zilla 
ranked highest while Jamalpur zilla ranked second highest with 33512.. Chittagong Zilla ranked highest 
for livestock/forest/fisheries with 6751 households while Dhaka ranked second highest with 5627 
households. The above figures indicated that the involvement of urban dwelling households of Dhaka 
Zilla in non-agricultural pursuits, which supported Dhaka at the most urbanised Zilla and Chittagong as 
the second urbanised Zilla of the country. The urban sex ratio (number of male per 100 female) was 
118.1 where national figure was 106.1 which indicate that the sex ratio of urban population was higher 
than the national one The sex ratio of urban population had come down to 118 in 1991 from 125 in 
1981 and this might be due to better coverage of females and more male international migration in 1991 
census. It was found in Zilla wise urban population by age that 14.51% were under 10 years and 
13.94% were under 15 years of age and 1.59% older population who were dependent on 84.44% 
working population, and was also found that the age 15-44 years percentage of males was perceptibly 
higher in the urban areas than in the rural areas. This fact might be attributed to age selective male 
migration to urban areas for better employment and education. The trend was found noticeable both in 
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1974,1981 and 1991. For details changes in the expansion of urban area and trends of the change of different characteristics of urban population, see The Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh I99/. 41 The Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh, 1991 42 Sirajul Islam, a review article of Social Formation in Dhaka City: a Study in Third lt'orld Urban 
Sociology, edited by Kamal Siddiqui et al, Dhaka, UPL, 1990, See also, The Bangladesh Observer, 
July 20,1990, p. 9 . The main feature of this study included: the land of Dhaka city was highly unevenly distributed. Only 30 per cent people control 80 per cent land of the city; and the process of 
differentiation were increasing fast. In the name of `housing society' the affluent families were getting 
exemption of the ceiling of city land ownership and grabbing the city land by sheer might of money. 
The city land was mostly used in residential purpose which covers 88 per cent. Demographically the 
Dhaka city showed another major deviation. Unlike other major cities, Dhaka was highly youthful. 
Among its inhabitants 41 per cent are below forty and only 29 per cent are above fifty. The average size 
of the city family was 6.7 as against 5.5 in village. This fact might suggest that Bangladesh was an 
over-urbanised society which is one of the characteristics of the peripheral capitalist countries. About 
37 per cent do not have any property in the city. Education is positively related to property ownership. 
The higher the education the greater is the chance of having property. About 55 per cent live in their 
own houses and 44 per cent in rented accommodation. About 66 per cent of the people are first 
generation residents and the second generation residents made only 17 per cent and third generation 
only 8 per cent. About 85 per cent inhabitants have a rural linkage and 51 per cent people visit their 
village home regularly. Only 21 per cent of household heads were more or less associated with political 
and other organisations. Asked about the best possible economic system that may be adopted in the 
country in the above study, 45 per cent of the households supported an Islamic system, 24 per cent 
supported a socialist system followed by mix economy 16 per cent and capitalist economy 7 per cent. In 
1947, all the top rich families of Dhaka were local Hindus and expatriate Marwaries. In the middle of 
1980s, among the 68 multi-millionaire families none is Hindu. At present all the Dhaka tycoons are 
Muslims and most of them became rich after 1971. The secrets of their success were brokerage in big 
state purchases and projects involving aeroplane, transport, communication equipment, ships, bridges 
and roads, agricultural machinery, oil drilling and deals and so on. Becoming rich through industrial or 
other productive activities was rare. The early fortune was made by `theft', embezzlement, forcible 
occupation, etc involving government funds and stores, abandoned property, smuggling, narcotic trade, 
defaulting bank loans, commission agency, bribes and so on. The rich people mostly introduce 
themselves as industrialists; for it is prestigious to call oneself industrialist but actually most of them 
were found to businessmen and traders. They are in fact comprador bourgeoisie patronised by the state 
machinery. 
43 Most of them are squatters and tenants in squattering settlements. Richshaw-pullers constituted the 
single largest occupational group of about a million which means that about one sixth of the city 
population were directly or indirectly dependent on the rickshaw industry. For details, S Alam Khan, 
Social Classes in Bangladesh, MNO Publications Pvt. Ltd., Dhaka, 1991, pp-3-4 
as Wahiduddin Mahmud, "GDP Per Square Kilometre in Bangladesh: Implication for Sustainable 
Development" in W. Mahmud, ed. Popular Economics-Unpleasant Essays, Dhaka: UPL, 2002, 
pp. 21-22 
For details of the concepts of compact townships, habitation centres, or rural growth centres, see 
Rasid Salim, "Compact Townships as a Strategy for Economic Development, " University of Illinois, 
Urbana-Champaign, memeo. July 2000 
46 See Wahiduddin Mahmud, "Informal Sector in Bangladesh: A Micro Economic Perspective, " Dhaka: 
ILO, memeo. February, 2001. 
47 The Military Regime of General Ershad Proclaimed `Local Government Reform Ordinance, 1984' by 
which it divided the whole country in 64 districts and 464 Upgraded Upazilla (sub districts). There were 
found rigorous movements later in these new towns in the country side organised by different political 
forces. In this movement, Salim and Delwar, two Student League workers were killed brutally, when 
police car went by force on the students' procession in the city. There were participating in a protest 
march against government decision to holding Upazilla elections in the country, which was boycotted 
by the main stream opposition parties. 
48 Abraham Guiller (1966), the intellectual mentor of urban guerrillas in Uruguay, quoted in Wilson, 
John. Introduction to Social Movements, New York: Basic Books, 1973, p. 238. He wrote, ": 
"strategically, in the case of a popular revolution in a country in which the highest percentage of the 
population is urban, the centre of operations of the revolutionary war should be in the city. Operation 
should consist of scattered surprise attacks by quick and mobile units superior in arms and numbers at 
designated points, but avoiding barricades in order not to attract the enemy's attention at one place. The 
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units will then attack with the greater part of their strength the enemy's least fortified or \\eakest links 
in the city.... The revolution's potentials is where the population is. " 49 Gilbert Alan and Gugler Josef, Cities, Poverty and Development: Urbanisation in The Third World, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 159-160. They wrote, "the demographic observation 
reflects an economic reality: the surplus is increasingly produced in the urban sector... It is the urban 
economy that finances the state apparatus -the state is dependent on urban economy, there are limits to 
repression in the urban context. Manager, professionals, skilled workers and even semi-skilled workers 
in great numbers can not be replaced at short noticed. To imprison them for any length of time, to push 
them into exile, or to kill them entails severe economic losses. This means not only a reduction in the 
resources available to the state, but also deterioration in living conditions for the population at large that 
is likely to foster discontent. " 
50 The survey statistics in table 4.4.1 shows that 77.2% respondents (with 47.6% completely agree) and 
78.6% (with 46.6% completely agree) consider the presence of acute poverty and high illiteracy 
respectively in the 1970s-80s Bangladesh, which, as a whole, supports primarily a characteristic 
towards the rise of authoritarian dictatorship in a society. In addition, 64.1% (with 34.51-/(' completely 
agree) recognise the absence of efficient leadership in civilian politics, which also ultimately favour the 
rise of authoritarian regime in society. Population growth, unemployment and uncontrolled corruption 
in all government and non-government sectors and sharp inequality in socio-economic life are seen as 
the most significant issues in the survey. 75.7% (with 33% completely agree) feels that population 
growth was major problem and 74.7% (with 39.3% completely agree) supports the views that 
corruption was one of the most important national setback while 78.2% (with 38.8% completely agree) 
has identified the most significant socio-economic problem as unemployment of the educated youth. In 
adding together, 65.1% (with 30.6% completely agree) finds the increasing trend of social 
differentiation in the society. These observations expose the trends of socio-economic and political 
unrest of society, which bred the movement against the military regime. This has demonstrated further 
when 66%I respondents (with 39.5%r completely agree) characterise the regime of General Ershad as an 
authoritarian dictatorship. The change in rural society was also significant. The survey shows that 65% 
(32% completely agree) respondents support the increasing trend of landlessness while 53.4% (and 
28.2% not replied) identify the problem of the increasing considerable economic miseries of the 
peasants, farmers and landless households due to informal money lending-presence of interest bearing 
capital-in rural Bangladesh. These features portray a tendency of rural-urban migration for the people 
of small earning, which raised the pressure on the city life and expanded the urbanisation without 
proper utilities. This was also an important factor to be considered for the socio-economic and political 
unrest in the main cities of Bangladesh. Moreover, 56.3% respondents support the rise of religious 
fundamentalism, which could be related with the increasing threat to the existing communal harmony 
(which is already agreed by 43.2%)-one of the fundamental components of democracy. This was only 
because of the dictator had no acceptance in the democratic and progressive forces so as to hunt for a 
support base in the religious fanaticism patronising the fundamentalist forces in the power structure. All 
of his socio-economic programmes were aimed at the factional religious groups to increase the support 
base for the military regime. Another significant feature is the dependence on the foreign aid and debts 
of military dictatorship in running the economy of the country. According to the observation of 81.6% 
respondents (with 45.6% completely agree), the country under the military dictatorship was completely 
dependent on the foreign aid and debts, which reveals that the regime sustained its power with the 
support of outside forces conceiving the fact that the domestic economic growth was not satisfactory. 
These findings disclose the fact that the level of socio-economic development of the country was far 
lower under the military regime. 
`' The survey statistics in table 4.5.1 shows a precise trend of evolution of the mode of economic life of 
Bangladesh in her post-independent years, which might have link with the democracy movement 
against the military regime of General Ershad. The survey (95.6%) agrees the fact that the mode of 
production in the economy was mainly agricultural in the 1970s. Although some agro based industries 
established under the British period was still continued under the nationalisation system. However, 
87.9% considers an evolution of the economy in the later stage that a number of smaller industries 
based on a modest capital had increased in the beginning of 1980s, even though the main mode of 
economy was led by agriculture. The denationalisation process under the post-1975 regimes encouraged 
the private enterprises that initiated a landed upper class to be transformed into an urban middle class. 
This stage was found to be strengthening the non-agricultural initiatives in the urban areas through out 
the 1980s under international and local auspices. As 91.3% respondents believes that the export 
oriented small-scale industries were increased proportionately in this decade-in return boosting 
imports. This reveals a further boost in the size of middle class in the urban areas. Sizable service 
oriented industries also grew up in this period. These came across in the expansion of urbanisation in 
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Bangladesh. Moreover, 82.5% believes that these evolutions of the economy in the direction ot 
entrepreneurships were exaggerated in the 1980s to the 1990s, which added a considerable return in the 
GDP. These non-agricultural industrial initiatives were the source of a change in the class and class 
conflict in the social structure of Bangladesh society. This change generates a kind of middle class who 
although took advantage of the western life style, but still bear the norms and values of an agro based 
society. They want be a bourgeoisie over the nights, but do not have sufficient means to do so. They 
consider the new civil-military quarters and their patronised political agents as opponents in their ways 
to do so in this regard. This antagonist middle class, in some views, took the lead at the intermediate 
level of different socio-cultural and political organisations of Bangladesh society under the movement 
for restoration of democracy. In the same trend, 56.8% respondents have agreed that the contribution of 
NGOs evolved mainly in the rural society of Bangladesh. They identified these NGOs in the building 
up of political consciousness along with the economic self-sufficiency in the rural masses of the society, 
which also created an anti-autocracy support base among the rural people. The evolution of the 
Bangladesh economy through out the 1970s and 1980s towards the urban based non-agricultural, 
service and small-scale industrial initiatives might be seen as one of the main factors behind the 
sustainable development of the democratic forces against the military regime. 
52 The data in table 4.7.1 present the perception of various constituents of the movement for democracy. 
The class and class conflict was seen as a cause, but was not seen as a major factor in the movement. 
Only 36.9% (with 12.1% highly accepted) respondents believe that the Bangladesh democracy 
movements involved the rise of class conflict in her society while 57.3% (with 11.2% highly rejected) 
rejects the same cause in this regard. 85% respondents (with 24.3% highly rejected) also reject any 
kind of participation on the basis of religious conflict in the movement while 77.7 % (with 10.7% 
highly rejected) does not agree with the participation of any gender groups that evolved from any kind 
of gender discrimination. It is important that 95.6% respondents (with 63.6% highly accepted) 
recognises the high participation of the youth age group in the movement, which is related to the unrest 
in the student community of society. This is linked with the youth problems i. e. unemployment, 
problems of higher education at the university level, etc., which were not met under military regime. 
The highest response of 98.1% (with 57.3% highly accepted) consider the involvement of huge urban 
participation in the movement, which is related to the different kinds of urban problems that increased 
immensely under the military regime leading to the development of an indispensable movement force 
in the cities and towns of the country. The military regime could not also able to take into consideration 
the demands of different interest groups i. e. students, professionals, intellectuals and trade unions of the 
society. The student unrest in the higher education institutions, lower wages of the govt and non-govt 
working class employees in the industrial and non-agricultural enterprises in the urban area, demands of 
professionals and the limitations of freedom to express the views of the intellectuals, demands of the 
press freedom etc steered the movement against military autocracy. This is unveiled in the survey by 
98% respondents (with 62.6% highly accepted) that the movement involved the high participation of 
different interest groups of the society. However, the main problem was political. The rise of civil- 
military intrigues in the power structure deflected the normal course of the political institutions in the 
country, which developed a conflict with the political forces of the country. The military junta floated a 
new political party-JP and practised power with a non-elected cabinet and army advisory council and 
their collaborators from centre to grass roots, which created an uneven relationship with the existing 
political forces in all sphere of the society. The survey discloses this with the supports of 97.1% 
respondents (with 63.6% highly accepted) that the movement was organised and led by the political 
forces-the elementary battle forces for democracy of the country. 
53 Under the socio-economic context in the 1980s, the higher class included landlord, industrialists and 
high position bureaucrats whom monthly income was supposed to be Taka 25000+; middle upper class 
included big businessmen, university professors and that range of bureaucrats whom monthly income 
was supposed to be Taka 15000-25000; middle class included middle rank college teacher, government 
employees, businessmen whom monthly income was supposed to be Taka 10000-15000; lower middle 
class included small businessmen, school teachers, third and forth class government employees whom 
monthly income was supposed to be Taka 5000-10000; lower class included small shop businessmen, 
owner of small land, labourers of the industries whom monthly income was supposed to be Taka 3000- 
5000; and the distress class at the lowest stage of the society included landless, day labourers, 
rickshaw pullers, porters etc whom monthly income was supposed to be under Taka 3000. 
s' For example, Dhaka city had nearly 8 million populations in the end of 1980s. The whole population 
did not require fulfilling the all indicators of the development for the necessary structural change for the 
movement. The movement was taken off when all indicators of the development covered only 40% to 
50% of the population. 
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Chapter Six 
The Development of the Democratic Forces for the Movement 
6.1. Introduction 
Since the military aggression took place in 1982 the socio political forces of 
the country were alienated by many factors engineered mainly by inter party 
collisions and intra party factionalism. The ideological alignment: socialism vs. 
capitalism; intra party leadership discrepancies; inconsistency between power elites: 
politician vs. civil-military bureaucracy; underdeveloped political institutions: 
revolutionary party rather than parliamentary party; geopolitical and super power 
variables; suffering related to the indecision regarding religious impetus in society 
and non-existence of popular administration were some of the major factors that 
delayed the process of the development of opposition forces in Bangladesh to 
initiate a movement for democracy in the early days of the aggression of General 
Ershad. At the same time, political power both in the opposition and the ruling 
group was mainly held by the landed upper class'; the industrial class was still 
waiting for its slow take-off after denationalisation at the end of 1970s. The socio- 
economic status and financial circumstances of civil-military servicemen was far 
better than a group of new-born political elites of society in the post independent 
period, which however, might be related to the success of the military in the power 
race. At the moment of aggression, the political forces of both the ruling BNP and 
the main opposition AL were fragmented over many of their internal issues; leftist 
forces were dispersed by ruling repressions and the potential student forces of the 
country was crippled with many divisions. Moreover, a clandestine support of the 
collaborating and defeating forces of the national liberation war for military power 
elite in the cover of safeguarding the Islamic values was an open secret. The process, 
however, took time to change this stage of political circumstances in the next couple 
of years and to develop a democratic force in Bangladesh society. 
The forces for the movement for democracy that developed in the later years 
mainly consisted of political forces and many other interest and pressure groups of 
the society. The interest and pressure groups, who played splendid roles, among 
other, were the students, labourers, professionals and intellectuals. Some other 
interest groups like business associations, NGOs and religious groups were also 
involved indirectly in the movement. It would be worth mentioning here the pattern 
and issues of conflicts in political parties and interest and pressure groups of that 
time and the process of how these conflicts transformed these socio political forces 
into unified democratic forces in the long run in organising a successful movement 
against the military dictatorship of General Ershad. 
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6.2. The Development of the Democratic Political Forces 
The political forces of the country were segregated into many rival groups 
during the installation of military seizure of power in 1982. The AL was the main 
stream opposition to the ruling BNP before the takeover by General Ershad. A '10- 
party opposition alliance'2 under the leadership of AL was already in the movement 
for democracy against the ruling BNP-founded under the military administration of 
General Zia. As Zia was from the Army, the party had always a blessing of the 
Army until General Ershad was in the scene of power. 3 However, a significant group 
of power elites including cabinet members and high officials of the BNP had joined 
with the new military dictator; some of them were jailed4, and many of them were 
hiding to avoid the arrests and abuses. On the other hand, the main opposition AL 
(Hasina) had been facing an intra party leadership brawl. 5 As a result of the 
deepening of their intra party conflict, the 10-party alliance under AL, in a real sense, 
failed to build any active movement against the new military junta. The other 
opposition political parties including leftist JSD, WPB, NAP and Somajbadi Dal, 
and the rightist and religious base-JIB, ML and other IPs were also found to have 
splitting tendencies until the General election of 1986. In this period, the AL and the 
BNP were able to stay with their independent current in politics as well as lead the 
15-party and 7-party alliances respectively. In question of the participation in the JS 
election of 1986, a faction of 5 parties under the decision for non-participation in the 
election left the 15-party alliance, which formed later an independent 5-party 
alliance known as radical leftist in Bangladesh politics. An 8-party pro election 
alliance under the leadership of the AL participated in the election. However, the 
leftist parties could be divided into two major currents: first: leftist-1 parties who 
were pro-Moscow group and stayed with main opposition AL in all time of the 
movement including CPB, NAP, Somajbadi Dal and Ekota party and the like. 
Second, the leftist-2 parties who were known as pro-china revolutionary group, a 
majority of them were with AL led 15-party alliance until the election of 1986 and 
later formed 5-party alliance. The same category-leftist-2 parties like UPP and 
RCP was aligned with the BNP under 7-party alliance. The deep organisational and 
leadership crisis of the country's two biggest political parties brought the military 
ruler space to form his new party-JP and evolved its own line of political thinking. 
However, the detailed discussion of the developments in the opposition political 
parties is related to the understanding of the development of the democratic political 
forces for the movement for restoration of democracy. 
6.2.1. The Developments in the AL in the 1980s 
In the August of 1983, the main opposition AL (Hasina)6 faced the major 
splitting into two separate parties as AL (Hasina) and AL (Razzak) as a result of the 
ideological scuffle between the two factions under Sheikh Hasina and Abdur Razzak. 
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Sheikh Hasina had the emotional acceptance as the daughter of Bangabandlzu to the 
millions of grass root workers and supporters of the party while Mr Abdur Razzak 
had the organising capacity following a large cadre force with him. The root of the 
split started from the conflict of the two factions of the BCL-BCL (Jalal-Jahangir) 
and BCL (Fazlu-Chunnu). 7 Since January 1983, statements and counter statements 
in the press by the two factions of AL (Hasina) and BCL reached the worst and 
sharpened the divisions in July 1983. On 17 April 1983, on the occasion of `Mujib 
Nagar Dibash'8, although it was found the both faction leaders Sheikh Hasina and 
Abdur Razzak was together in the party programme in Meherpur, there was no sign 
of reunification between them in later days. On 17 July 1983 in a Eid reunion 
gathering in Chittagong, three Presidium Members including Mohiuddin Ahmed, 
Abdul Momin Talukder and Abdul Malek Ukil, and ALGS Abdur Razzak accused a 
vested group of destroying the unity of the party, which were encountered by Tofael 
Ahmed, ALOS and asked these leaders to leave, who had broken with the decision 
of the party. In the same day, two factions in Chittagong and Khulna released 
statements against each other accusing them of breaking the party. It was just in the 
final stage of a cold war between two factions, and on 18 July 1983, an emergency 
meeting of the Presidiums in the chair of Sheikh Hasina, called an extended council 
of the party on 31 July and a meeting of the ALWC on 1 August 1983. On 19 July 
1983, Syed Ahmad, Office Secretary of the party protested the statement of Mr 
Tofael Ahmed, which charged with many allegations. In this critical juncture, on 20 
July 1983 the Presidium of the party sat again and condemned the speech of Malek- 
Razzak in Chittagong and also decided to send this observation to the forthcoming 
meeting of the ALWC for final decision. 9 The whole process at this stage sparked 
attacks and counter attacks between the two factions all over the country, especially 
in Dhaka city. 10 The ALWC meeting in the chair of President Sheikh Hasina on ist 
August 1983 decided to expel six leaders of the Razzak faction including GS Abdur 
Razzak on charge of breaking the disciplines of the party. This decision was 
approved by the presence of 35 members out of 52 of the ALWC, which was 
encountered by rebel leader Abdur Razzak shortly. " In this connection, forced 
retired Presidium Member Abdul Malek Ukil made the accusation that the designer 
of this meeting came from abroad to split the party of Bangabandhu and his design 
was successful. But he did not expose the name of the person. '2 The rebel faction 
under the leadership of Abdur Razzak decided later in November 1983 to form a 
new party in the original line of socialist spirit on which cause Bangabandhu died, 
named Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BKSAL). Since then, the AL 
under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina grew stronger and became the leading 
opposition political party in the democracy movement against the military 
dictatorship of General Ershad. 
- 124- 
The AL held its National Council on 1-3 January 1986 for the first time since 
the introduction of the Martial Law in 1982. Sheikh Hasina was re-elected to the 
post of the President unopposed and Begum Sajeda Choudhury became GS. It was 
widely believed that the council failed to resolve the leadership issue-particularly 
the position of the GS-setting instead for a compromise. A baseless counter faction 
committee of the party was also published in news papers in the following day., 3 In 
the late 1988, the AL was embroiled in an internal conflict-between Sheikh Hasina 
and its senior leaders including Dr Kama] Hussain-regarding the decision of senior 
leaders for the resignation of the party MPs from the JS while Sheikh Hasina was 
detained in early December 1987. In the event, the JS was dissolved and elections 
were called in March 1988, which Sheikh Hasina considered a major setback for the 
interest of the party. 
6.2.2. The Formation of the 15-Party Alliance 
On 14`h January 1983, `some comments of General Ershad'14 in a meeting of 
madrasha teachers under Mudasserine in Dhaka presided by Mowlana Mannan15, 
State Minister for religion, created a bitter reaction in opposition political parties. In 
an attempt to protest against these comments by major opposition allied forces and 
in the ensuing developments, the 15-party alliance was established. At first, four 
veteran leaders of the opposition including ASM Abdur Rab of the JSD, Haider 
Akbar Khan Rano and Rashed Khan Menon of the WPB and Siddiqur Rahman of 
Samajbadi Dal initiated to protest these comments of the military junta. They 
considered including all major opposition parties to protest against the junta together, 
which followed an all-party meeting soon. '6 In the residence of Mowlana 
Tarkabughis in Dhaka, an all-party meeting was held under his chair in the evening 
of 16`h January 1983. '7 The first statement against the military junta was released by 
the 15 opposition democratic and progressive parties from this meeting. In fact, this 
statement was signed by 14 parties, which was extended later into 15 parties by the 
joining of the AL (Farid Ghazi). However, on 16`h January 1983, when these parties 
met for a joint statement, there were no plan for the building an alliance among them. 
Only there was a choice at that time if it was possible to observe together the 
forthcoming `Language Martyr Day' on 21st February. In the mean time, as it was 
beyond their expectation and imagination, there was a bloody carnage on the wake 
of student movement on 14`h February 1983 in protest of the new Education Policy 
of the junta in the Dhaka University campus and suburbs, which took many lives 
and casualties. The leaders of these 15 parties sat in a meeting for action 
programmes in the residence of the AL leader Dr Kamal Hussain on 15`h February 
1983, which followed an arrest of all of them. '8 They were all sent blind folded to 
the torture cell in the cantonment. 19 On is` March 1983, the majority of these leaders 
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including Sheikh Hasina were released. Since then these parties tried meeting 
together on every issue against the military junta. 
In April, 1983 there was an initiative to extend the earlier 10-party alliance 
into a `15-party alliance'20, which was completed by the end of the month on the 
basis of an `11-point demand', although the left-linked 11 parties-based on 
peasants, labourers and workers-were still in dissatisfaction and doubt about the 
leading role of AL (Hasina) in the alliance. However, these 11-points included the 
demands of withdrawal of the martial law and the reintroduction of the 
parliamentary system of government. In the mean time, the JSD-one of the main 
members of the alliance-faced intra-party conflict over the issue of Sheikh Mujib. 
The JSD chief Major (Rtd) Jalil stated that he had no longer any reservation to see 
Sheikh Mujib as the father of the nation as recognised in the constitution of the 
country, which sparked opposition in his party. 21 On 9 April 1983 at Hotel Eden, 
Dhaka in the observance of the `Demand Day', the disintegration of the alliance was 
exposed when Siddiqur Rahman of Samajbadi Dal objected to the `Joy Bangla22' 
slogan delivered by AL chief Sheikh Hasina as she finished her speech. However, it 
was accepted later by all members of the alliance that they could use their own party 
slogans in their respective deliveries. On 13 April 1983 in a meeting of the alliance 
presided by Khalequzzaman Bhuiya, Convenor of the BSD formed a mass tour 
programme all over the country under 10 teams of the alliance leaders to build up 
consciousness among the people against the new military dictator. The alliance on 
18 June 1983 in a meeting at Hotel Eden demanded the date of JS elections first than 
any other elections. If not, the alliance was agreed to organise movement against the 
dictator. The alliance was in a critical stage in July 1983 when a break away faction 
of the JSD and AL (Mizan) joined the dialogue with the military dictator evading the 
alliance decision. But in November 1983, the dissident of AL and the newly formed 
BKSAL under the leadership of Abdur Razzak joined the 15-party alliance, which 
replaced the AL (Mizan) that joined later with the political front of the dictator in 
1984. However, until the JS election of 1986, the number of member parties of the 
15-party alliance were sometimes decreased and sometimes increased, but continued 
with a stable number of 15 parties in the long run. 23 
6.2.3. The Breakdown of 15-Party Alliance: the Formation of the 8-Party 
and 5-Party Alliances 
The issue of participation in the election of 1986 split the 15-party alliance. At 
the midnight, 21" March 1986 in a meeting of the alliance, those who favoured the 
participation in the election including AL, CPB, NAP, BKSAL, Sammya Badi Dal, 
WPB (Nazrul), JSD (Siraj) and GAL formed the 8-party alliance. The another 
faction of alliance those who disfavoured the participation in the election including 
WPB (Basher-Menon), JSD (Inu), BSD (Mahbub), BSD (Khalequzzaman) and 
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Samaj Badi Dal formed a new left linked 5-Party alliance. The election, however. 
divided the JSD in which JSD (Siraj) joined with 8-party alliance and JSD (Inu) 
joined with 5-Party alliance. In the later couple of years until the end of the military 
regime, the number and party members of the 5-party alliance were stable, but, the 
8-party alliance was not. In the issue of seats sharing in the election, the BKSAL left 
the alliance and boycotted the election. In the same issue, the JSD (Siraj) also left 
the alliance and participated in the election individually. After the election, the UCL 
and Sammya Badi Dal also left the alliance for some time. However, in the later 
stages, the BKSAL and Sammya Badi Dal returned to the alliance and as a result the 
8-party alliance returned in the same format until the end of military dictatorship in 
1990. 
6.2.4. The BNP and the Formation of 7-Party Alliance 
In the beginning of April, 1983 the BNP (Satter) divided into two factions as 
BNP (Ruda) under the leadership of Shamsul Huda Choudhury and BNP (Satter) 
under ousted President Justice Abdus Satter. 24 The JCD-student wing of the BNP 
could not also survive the split as 23 executive members joined with newly formed 
pro-dictator student organisation `Nutan Bangla Chattra Somaj'. However, on 12 
April 1983, a meeting of BNP (Satter) Executive Committee was chaired by Justice 
Abdus Satter, in which Vice President Shah Azizur Rahman withdrew his 
resignation and a decision was made to observe an organising tour all over the 
country from 15-20 April, 1983. Another faction of the BNP (Huda)-as trying to 
earn their strength as wel125 -subsequently joined the newly formed pro-junta Jano 
Dal (Peoples Party). On 25th May 1983, the BNP (Satter) formed a national unity 
with the Jatya League of Mr Ataur Rahman Khan. In the same day, Begum Zia, 
Senior Vice-President of the BNP (Satter), urged the workers to elect the new leader 
of the party. 26 On 12 August 1983, BNP (Satter) started the discussion with six other 
parties to form an alliance, which was completed as the `7-party alliance'27 by the 
end of August 1983. On 6`h September 1983, the BNP and pro-BNP political forces 
reached an action based unity with 15-party alliance on the basis of 5-point demands, 
and at the same time, the formation of 7-Party alliance was announced. 28 
On 24 `h September 1983, the extended meeting of the BNP (Satter) was held 
under the chair of Begum Khaleda Zia due to the illness of Chairman Justice Satter. 
The party hailed the leadership of Begum Zia, when she first on 30 September 1983 
attended the public rally of 7-party alliance in front of the city BNP office in Dhaka. 
On 28 November 1983, the junta administration put Begum Zia under house arrest, 
and forced her to attend the dialogue with the dictator. 29 However, Mr Satter 
resigned as Chairman on 13 January 1984 and was replaced by Begum Zia who was 
elected to the position unopposed in May 1984. The 7-Party alliance faced 
difficulties in the mid-January 1984 when some member parties and leaders joined 
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the dialogue with the junta. The Jatya League of Ataur Rahman Khan, NAP of 
Nurur Rahman, and KSP of the Syed Azizul Haque Nanna Mia of 7-party alliance 
joined the dialogue, who also formed earlier an `11-party National United Front"' 
on 28 November 1983. On the other hand, a break away faction of DL (Moazzem) 
under the leadership of Abdur Rouf Chowdhury joined the 7-Party alliance. The 
BNP (Dudu-Nilu) a dissident of BNP (Huda) divided again on 5`h July 1984 into two 
factions and one of them under Khalequzzaman Khan Dudu joined later with pro- 
dictator Jana Dal. In the beginning of 1985, the main stream BNP under the 
leadership of Begum Zia survived an intense intra-party conflict from the ex-Muslim 
League faction under the leadership of Shah Azizur Rahman. 31 In June 1985, Shah 
Aziz faction formed a dissident BNP (Shah) and included them with the formation 
of the `National Front'32 in support of the military dictator. In the end of 1986, the 
party was facing the deep internal organisational crisis evident in the surprising 
resignation of the Dhaka City President Abul Hasnat-the former Mayor of the 
capital. 33 In late July 1988, six prominent leaders including Secretary General K. M. 
Obayedur Rahman were expelled from the party. 34 Mr Obaidur Rahman was 
suspected of planning to form a breakaway faction of the BNP aligned with the 
dictator to contest the JS elections rumoured for next March 1989. However, these 
severe divisions in the opposition political parties were not able to put any effective 
change in their central command of leaderships of the movement. 35 
6.2.5. The Leftist-1 and Leftist-2 Political Forces 
The pro-Moscow leftist-1 parties mainly the CPB and NAP (M) were aligned 
with the progressive and pro-liberation forces without major intra-party collisions 
during the whole movement. On the other hand, the majority parties of the leftist-2 
category faced bitter splits, which sometimes affected the unity in the movement for 
democracy. The factions prone JSD-the main component of this group became 
topsy-turvy in 1983.36 On 5`'' November 1983, the BSD-another component of the 
leftist-2 forces divided again37 into two parties: BSD (Khalequzzaman) and BSD 
(Mahbub) after the expulsions of two prominent leaders Mahmudur Rahman Manna 
and Kamrunnher Beby for their alleged immoral relationships. This largely affected 
the anti-Ershad student movement as their student wing was running the DUCSU38-- 
the `second parliament of the country'. However, the internal frictions of the JSD 
came to light in the beginning of February 1984 when the party split into two 
factions: JSD (Rob) and JSD (Siraj). 39 A smaller faction under Major (Rtd) Jalil 
later formed a new party as `Bangladesh Jatyatabadi Oikya Andolon'. The three 
smaller leftist components of 15-party alliance including NAP (Haroon), NAP 
(Muzaffar) and Ekota Party started the process of unity into a single party on 5`h July 
1984. In the mid-1985, `9 leftist parties'40 excluding pro-Moscow CPB under 15 
alliance tried to form a `greater communist unity' which did not come to light. On 
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18 July 1985, the WPB faced a major split in question to participate in the JS 
election under junta administration. This brought into a new dissident WPB under 
the leadership of Menon and Rano. 41 
6.2.6. The Pro-Islamic Parties 
The pro-Islamic forces at the beginning of 1980s included mainly the anti- 
independence `fundamentalist forces'42 of the country. In fact, major parties of these 
religious forces prefer Islam mostly for use to secure power than that of for practice 
in life and maintained a pro-Pakistani link in Bangladesh politics. 43 These pro- 
Islamic forces included mainly the ML, JIB, BKA, DL, and IDL etc. However, these 
forces, although in opposition, were considered as the associative inlets in the rise of 
anti-liberation forces in the post-independent Bangladesh. In the beginning of the 
Martial Law, they were trying to cope with the new military leader. Some of them 
supported the new junta in the name of dialogue. 44 In April 1983, the 11-party NUF 
was formed under the auspices of Khondoker Mostak Ahmed and later was extended 
into the 14-party Front. The JIB was trying to reinstate in politics at this stage. 45 In 
the mid-July 1983, two initiatives of round table discussion under the auspices of 
Moulana Hafezzi Hoozur of the BKA and the NUF for unity in the opposition forces 
were failed. 46 The ML was present in this time of politics with five factions: ML 
(Siddiquee), ML (Sabur), ML (T. Ali), ML (Huda) and Nikhil Bangladesh Muslim 
League (Faiz Box). 47 In March 1984,18 leaders of ML (Siddiquee) joined the newly 
formed pro-dictator National Front. On 14 March 1984, Hafezzi Hoozoor of the 
BKA called the government to cancel the Upzilla election and to form a national 
government under the leadership of Chief Justice of the country. On 30`h March 
1984, the Jatya League chief Ataur Rahman Khan took the oath as Prime Minister of 
the junta cabinet, who just two days ago on 28`h March 1984 branded the dictator as 
the `killer of democracy'. 48 Many leaders and parties of pro-Islamic ideology based 
on 11-party Front joined the dialogue with the military junta and as a result, the 
49 Front' became divided. 
In December 1984, the baseless smaller right wing Islamic components tried to 
reorganise under a Front that consisted of 17 parties 50 under the leadership of 
Khondoker Mostaque Ahmad, which formally opened on 10`h December 1984. The 
manifesto of the Front supported the revival of the post-1975 politics and seemed to 
oppose the ongoing anti junta movement of 22-parties. Also this Front in accordance 
with the BKA of Mowlana Hafezzi Hozoor united to contest the forthcoming 
elections in the view of the formation of a national government that would declare 
Bangladesh as an Islamic Republic. The ML (T. Ali) split again on 11 February 
1985 with a new faction under Shamsul Huda and Jamir Ali as President and 
Secretary General respectively, while the ML (Siddiquee became into three factions 
in 1985.51 The majority of these pro-Islamic parties joined with the junta until 1990 
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and those who were in the opposition had a very insignificant role against the 
military junta. 
6.2.7. The Liaison Committee and the Unity of the Opposition Forces 
Since the ban on politics was withdrawn in April 1983, the opposition political 
parties and alliances tried to form a liaison among them so that the united movement 
against the military junta could get momentum. In this stage, all member parties of 
the 15-party alliance tried to include the BNP in the movement as well as for the 
formation of a single platform of all opposition parties. 52 But the BNP itself became 
the main obstacle in the way of greater unity at this stage. They proposed that the 
movement could be built from two different platforms on the basis of joint action 
schedule. 53 Later, the political liaison committee of the BNP (Satter) took the 
initiative to discuss with the AL and the 15-party alliance to settle the issues related 
to the formation of indifferent schedule of actions which came to light on 7-8 
August 1983. However, the stand of the BNP was found contradictory from the 
difference of the statement of their two leaders and it was found later that the BNP 
was not in favour of unity with `only 15-Party alliance'. 54 It was very difficult to 
form any type of unity between AL and BNP as both of the parties had many 
differences in regard to their ideology, political roles in the near past and between 
their present aims and objectives. 55 However, at one stage of discussion of the last 
one and half months, Ferdous Ahmad Koreishi, Mohammad Forhad, Haider Akbar 
Khan Rano and Rahed Khan Menon prepared a draft of joint action programmes for 
both alliances. On 6 September 1983, at the resident of Siddiqur Rahman, a leader of 
Samajbadi Dal of the 15-party alliance, the inception of the unity between 15-party 
and 7-party alliances was approved on the basis of `5-points Demand' 
56, under 
which they agreed to observe all actions together from their own platform in the 
struggle for restoration of democracy. Both of the alliances decided to observe a 
`Demand Day' all over the country on 30 September 1983. Both parties-AL and 
BNP were able to eschew the debate of constitutional form of government in this 
crucial stage. 
The state of unity of the opposition alliances became delicate for the time 
being when the junta tried to shade under the shelter of a new political party in the 
end of 1983.57 In this process, the junta cleverly communicated with 299 leaders of 
around 50 parties in the name of `political dialogue' on 7`h January-7`h February 
1984, in which only 1/2 parties and some leaders of the 15-party and 7-party 
alliances joined. 58 Many of these parties that responded to the invitation of the junta 
had no longer any base or full committee or any office in the country and even the 
names of some parties were never known. However, 30 parties including the main 
stream AL and BNP boycotted this dialogue of the junta'59 and this created some 
instability in both of the mainstream opposition alliances for the time being. The 15- 
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party alliance was in a critical phase in relation to participation in the Upazilla 
election and the JSD-the strong alliance member became divided in February 1984 
when a strong faction of the party lobbied for participation in this election. Although, 
the military junta invited again the main opposition forces to the dialogue, the 15- 
party and 7-party alliances were committed to boycott the junta as they observed 
`Demand Day' on 6`h February 1984 and `Protest Day' on 14`h February 1984. 
However, the action based unity between the 15-party and 7-party alliance was 
working through out the 1984-1985 on the basis of the 5-point demand, although the 
basic difference between these two leading parties could never be resolved. The role 
of the JSD in the alliance was very critical. It was found that the JSD was not happy 
with the leadership of main stream parties of the opposition including AL and BNP, 
which was seen in an interview of the JSD chief Major (Rtd) M. A Jalil in January 
1984-that criticised both Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia. 60 This was promptly 
countered by the two leaders in their interviews in the following months. 61 Therefore 
it was clear that the command of the opposition forces under Sheikh Hasina and 
Begum Khaleda Zia was still at stake and could not win over the member parties of 
their alliances. 
Historically Bangladesh had some experience of `crucial political dialogues' 
that resolved the cri sis. 62 Hence, 15-Party and 7-party alliances took the strategy to 
participate in the dialogue-in the sake of imprisoned and hiding away party 
workers, in the hope if then normal course in daily life returned-when the dictator 
threatened to impose stiff Martial Law regulations. 63 On 26 March 1984 although 
they informed their consent for dialogue, they changed their position on 27 March 
1984, not to attend. On 3 April 1984, the 15-party alliance wrote to the dictator to 
reschedule the date and set some preconditions to create a peaceful environment, 
which included mainly the release of political prisoners and 5-points demand of the 
opposition forces. 64 However, the dictator was successful in creating divisions in 
the opposition line in the name of dialogue as both alliances presented their separate 
fresh demands-the 15-party for 10-point and 7-party for 33-points. 65 At this stage, 
although the 5-points demand was still working as the means of unity in actions and 
programmes between the two alliances, the dissimilarity of demands in the dialogue 
with the junta-especially in the question of constitutional revival and the closer 
relationship of the BNP with JIB became the content of mistrust, doubt and cold war 
between them. The leaders of the 15-party alliance never recognised the JIB as a 
democratic force in the ongoing movement, although the BNP was completely silent 
in this regard, which reacted among the youth of the country. 66 However, the 
dialogue of the junta became a drama and false initiative and clever handling of 
opposition forces no sooner than General Ershad had formally recognised the 
National Front-transformed into Jano Dal as his party around the middle of May 
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1984.67 The opposition alliances became divided and could not announce united 
actions due to the differences since their unification in demands in September 1983. 
The Liaison Committee of the 15-party and 7-party alliances sat together again 
on 9 June 1984 and evaluated the dialogue and exposure of the dictator in the 
connection of Jano Dal. Both of the alliances condemned the decision of the junta to 
participate in `politics with uniform'. 68 However, they agreed to maintain their 
united actions against the junta and called the public meeting on 5`h August 1984: 
the 15-party alliance at the south premise of BM mosque and the 7-party alliance at 
the holy shrine of Hazrat Gulap Shah (R) at Gulistan Square that followed an united 
action of a half day hartal on 27`h August 1984 to realise their 5-point demand. On 
14 September 1984, the two main opposition leaderships, Sheikh Hasina and Begum 
Zia, for the first time, addressed a meeting of the SCBA from a single platform, 
which sparked a new hope in the opposition forces, although the two leaders sat 
separately by the side of the Bar President Shamsul Huda Choudhury and did not 
exchange any word between them. 69 However, there arose some dissatisfaction in 
the opposition alliance when BNP chairperson Begum Zia, in an interview with the 
BOA, favoured the Presidential form of Government in the country, which was 
strongly criticised by the leaders of 15-party alliance as well as faced some 
opposition from her own 7-party alliance members, although Ahmad Nazir, a middle 
rank leader of the party informed later that it was their own stand of the BNP. The 
state of difference at this stage between the AL and the BNP were far and wide. 70 
In November 1984, the political ambience of the country glimpsed a 
possibility of a peaceful solution of the current crisis. The leaders of the 15-party 
and 7-party alliance projected their shadow cabinet or a possibility of national 
government that would replace the junta administration and the news media put 
forward the framework of a caretaker government under the leadership of Justice 
Kamal Uddin Hossain following a discussion among civic quarters. 7' Side by side, 
there was found a possibility of division in both of the major alliances as the 
Samniva Badi Dal and both factions of the BSD under 15-party alliance and UPP, 
DL (Rouf), NAP (Bashani) and RCP under 7-party alliance were about to leave the 
alliance politics as they thought that they were not considered properly by the bigger 
parties of the alliances. Some of them could have joined with the dictator, although 
finally the dissatisfactions among these smaller components were mitigated. The 
unity of the 22-party alliance was again threatened by a statement of BNP youth 
front Jubo Dal President Abul Kashem and Secretary Saifur Rahman on 16 
November 1984, later denied on 20 November 1984, which recklessly criticised the 
role of AL in the liberation war and raged severe dissatisfaction in the AL workers 
following an encounter statement by the AL Youth Secretary Mohammad Nasim on 
17 November1984. At this stage of crisis, in a public meeting at Mirpur on 23 
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November 1984, the AL chief Sheikh Hasina, assured that the unity of people built 
through the movement could not be broken down and the united movement would 
continue at any cost. She compared the cooptation of opposition leaders in the junta 
cabinet with the fall of stars from the unaffected sky that could not do any harm to 
opposition mass movement against the military dictator. This assurance of the AL 
President however removed possible obliteration of 22-party unity at this time and 
the Liaison Committee of both of the alliances sat again to formulate the action 
programmes of the movement. 
In the beginning of 1985, in relation to participation in the JS elections dated 
on 6`h April 1985-the date postponed later, the two alliances and their member 
parties faced intense cold war. Although the many leaders of leading AL were silent, 
two components of 15-party alliance, the Samajbadi Dal and the Mazdur Party 
denied participation in the election under military dictator. However, the BNP was 
keen to boycott as many of its leaders were in jail while the UPP and the GP, two 
major components of their 7-party alliance favoured participating in the election to 
end Martial Law. In fact, the delicate issues like the election always disrupted the 
unity of the opposition. The announcement without preparation and cancellation of 
the date of election were just white wash to avoid the international pressure that 
became a usual and clever practice of the dictator to prolong his power. However, 
the AL President Sheikh Hasina authorised the senior leaders of his party to take a 
decision on forthcoming elections in the three day extended meeting of party held on 
7-8 &10 February 1985, which reiterated its determination to resist any farcical 
election drama that was designed to legalise the illegal power. On 11 February 1985 
at IEB, BNP Chairperson was denied participation in the election as she denounced 
the step as `high drama on our national political stage'. 72 Both of the major alliances 
along with the JIB and some other smaller components in the opposition were in a 
firm stance to resist any attempt of the election that led again to a stiffer phase of 
Martial Law in the country. 73 The military dictator formally entered into politics 
with the formation of the Jatya Party (JP), the political party no. 116, under his 
direct auspices on ls` January 1986.74 However, some factions of the BNP (Shah), 
ML (Siddiquee) and the GP disagreed with their involvement in the formation of the 
JP. 75 On 26`h January 1986, in a representative's council of his party at DDSA 
auditorium, Shah Azuzur Rahman, who was not given any position in the newly 
formed JP supported the 5-point demands of the mainstream opposition alliances. In 
the end of January 1986, a statement of the JIB leader Abbas Ali Khan published in 
the Pakistan Dawn on 15 January sparked a country wide protest by pro-liberation 
forces both in ruling and opposition parties, in which he mentioned that `the people 
of Bangladesh was then repented to be isolated from Pakistan. '76 
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The opposition 22-parties under two major alliances announced a unity 
Council on 14`h February 1986 at the BM mosque south premise, where they wanted 
to reach a single demand-`the resignation of the military dictator from power'. At 
the same time, there was also an expectation from the workers as well as pressure 
from the smaller segments of both alliances that the two key leaders Sheikh Hasina 
and Begum Zia would address the council from the same platform, which never 
came to light. In this milieu, there were also found two separate initiatives to form a 
greater alliance of all opposition forces, which were failed. 77 
At mid night of 21S` February 1986, `a clash between the rival youth and 
student factions of the AL and the BNP at the Central Shaid Minar'78, for the first 
time, caused problems in the course of united actions between the main stream 
opposition alliances. Although, the neutral political analyst believed that this 
incident was designed and implemented by the DGFI to dislodge the unity of 
opposition forces. At this stage, on 2°d March 1986, the dictator announced the date 
of JS elections under a revived article of the suspended constitution, which again 
brought both of the opposition alliances together. 79 In this stage of the political 
situation, on 17`h March 1986, the leaders of the mainstream opposition alliance sat 
together, for the first time in their history of three and half years' anti-autocracy 
movement, to reach a decision regarding the participation in the election. Comrade 
Mohammad Forhad, GS of the CPB made a proposal for united participation of all 
opposition forces, so that a ballot revolution could oust the military dictator, which 
was knocked out by the BNP leaders along with 5 radical leftist parties under 15- 
party alliance. The AL was found soft and silent. However, at mid-night, the alliance 
leaders together announced to the media that the opposition 15-party and 7-party 
alliance agreed to participate in the election if the 5-points demand was to be 
fulfilled. This announcement was ultimately a signal for the boycott of the 
election. 80 In this situation, the 15-Party alliances did not want to allow the dictator 
to have a walk-over and decided to contest elections as part of the movement in the 
late hours of the night 21 March 1986-a deadline set by military administration. 
The AL with a faction of its 15-party alliance-newly renamed as the 8-Party 
alliance and the JIB announced on 23 March 1986 their intention to participate in the 
elections. This decision was subsequently criticised by Begum Zia of the BNP and 5 
other leftist components of the 15-party alliance. The unity between the two major 
opposition alliances was thus broken on this issue. After the general election of 1986, 
although the AL boycotted the Presidential poll in October 1986, this period led to 
many events of the opposition movement on the basis of parliamentary debates. But 
the street agitation of the 8-party alliance-in the failure to realize their demands in 
the JS-brought them again closer to the street movement forces of the 7-party and 
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5-party alliances, which culminated in their united action of 'Dhaka Seize' in 
November 1987 leading to the dissolution of the JS in December 1987. 
6.3. Interest Groups and Pressure Groups 
6.3.1. The Student Organisations and Alliances 
The students and youth of the universities and colleges of Bangladesh society 
were the principal components and pioneer forces to build the movement against the 
military dictatorship of General Ershad. The opposition student forces were mainly 
divided into two distinct currents: Kendryo Chattra Sangram Parishad (Central 
Students Actions Committee-CSAC) and Sangrami Chattra Jote (Student Alliance 
for Actions-SAA). The CSAC was formed with 14 leftist and liberal right wing 
student organisations at first on 21S` November 1982 as the pioneer and advanced 
force of the student movement, 8' and announced historic `10-points demands'82 of 
the students in a huge gathering on 26`h March 1983 at the APARAJEYA BANGLA 
in the Dhaka university. Later, the SAA was formed in the wake of the movement 
consisting of purely right wing components of the student forces. 
The CSAC protested the education policy of Dr Mazid Khan that announced 
in September 1982. The CSAC leaders organised the countrywide tour and signature 
campaign in November against the education policy of the junta, which was able to 
collect more than two hundred thousand signatures of students all over the country. 
After the countrywide tour, they organised a huge protest on 11 January 1983 in 
Dhaka University campus during their planned `Secretariat Siege' action. At this 
stage, an initiative of the dialogue between student leaders and the junta was 
failed. 83 Through out the movement against the military dictatorship, the CSAC was 
a principal spokesman of the students of the Bangladesh. It was the fact that the 
CSAC dominated the major part of the student forces before the JS election of 1986 
on the wake of which a major part of the 15-party alliance along with their student 
wings joined. As a result, the CSAC was broken down; however, the different parts 
of the CSAC had tried to forge unity again, and at the end, were able to restore their 
unity from the middle of 1987 in the face of their united struggle against the 
fundamentalist BICS all over the country. In 1988, two thirds of the country 
including the capital city of Dhaka went under the devastation of the flood and the 
massive relief distribution by the student organisations took them closer, and this 
unity had been recuperated further in 1989 in their protest again against BICS which 
culminated in their victory in the DUCSU election in February 1989 against the 
SAA. The unity among them was broken down again on 22 October 1989 in the 
wake of conflict between VP and GS of the DUCSU. A new break away faction 
consisting of `9 pro-leftist student organisations' 
84 quit the CSAC under the 
leadership of DUCSU GS Mushtaque Hossain. 
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At this point of the unexpected division of the CSAC-from center to 
periphery-in all higher educational institutions through out country, their rival, the 
JCD led SAA, grew stronger among the students of the society, and in 1990, they 
won more than two-thirds of the university and college unions of the country along 
with the key seats of the DUCSU that had an enduring glimpse in the movement all 
through the history of political development of the country. In the first half of 1990, 
the major two opposition student wings-BCL and JCD were found to fight against 
the BICS in parallel, which again brought them closer. In this suitable political 
atmosphere, they took the first chance to protest the military dictator while the all 
mainline opposition political forces called a day long sit-in action round the 
Government Secretariat on 10 October 1990 resulting 6 killings and hundreds of 
injury. The student forces participated in the said sit-in snatched the dead body of a 
fellow student to the campus. The dead body lay down at the premises of the 
Aparajeyo Bangla (invincible Bangladesh) in the Dhaka University campus. In a 
moment, the leaders of all student organisations came to the Aparajeyo Bangla and 
stood side by side along with thousands of student supporters that filled up all of the 
walkways of campus. This unity was caught by an event of a spontaneous emotional 
outburst, not by the pre designed decision of their own, from which the student 
leaders could not slip back and had to sit for the formal declaration of the APSU in 
an evening meeting at the DUCSU office in the Dhaka University campus on 10`h 
October 1990. Since then the APSU was the sources of more inspiration than that of 
the opposition political parties to all corners of the society up to the removal of the 
junta on 6 `h December in 1990. 
6.3.2. The Intellectual Forces 
The movement of the intellectuals against the military regime of General 
Ershad was found in their participation in all actions with opposition political forces 
of the country. Although they are too differentiated to be regarded as a single class, 
there is, however, one unifying sociological bond between all groups of intellectuals 
namely education, which binds them together in a striking way. 85 The teachers of 
different universities and colleges, poets, authors, novelist, columnists, dramatists, 
sculpturists, painting artists, television performers, journalists, cultural workers and 
head of religious institutions etc were defined as the intellectual communities of 
Bangladesh. They were the `persons possessing knowledge or in a narrower sense 
those whose Judgement based on reflection and knowledge, derives less directly and 
exclusively from sensory perception than in the case of non intellectuals'. 86 They 
were a distinct group in the society `whose special task it is to provide an 
interpretation of the world for that society. 87 Like most other categories of the 
educated groups, intellectuals in Bangladesh were overwhelmingly public or semi- 
public sector employees. They were mainly university professors, or employed by 
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some research institute. In addition some full-time bureaucrats were also noted as 
part-time intellectuals. For the rest, the journalists employed by private dailies or 
weeklies, party intellectuals and a very few individuals who support their intellectual 
activity on private means. 88 They were mainly involved in the movement under a 
kind of their own interest group associations, for example, teachers associations of 
different universities, colleges and schools, poetry council, Combined Cultural 
Alliance, Press Club, Union of Journalists and women bodies in the form of local 
and national control. Although they had some professional demands while they were 
exposed under group formation, their main agenda was to free the country from the 
military dictatorship, which was purely for the wellbeing of whole society and 
therefore was regarded as an event of intelligentsia. The famous individuals of these 
groups sometimes became a symbol of the movement for their outstanding 
expression in the form of writing of poems, novels, drama or column against the 
military dictatorship. Any attempts by these kinds of intellectuals were able to move 
the citizens and that was also exactly what happened in Bangladesh. However, the 
intellectual community of the country were exposed under the non party Combined 
Cultural Alliances (CCA) which united more than 200 socio-cultural organisations 
of the country. The eminent singers, poets, authors, actors and actress and artists of 
all corners of the non-party civic quarters were united under this alliance, which 
directed a non-political cultural movement that was able to attract a huge general 
mass to the mainstream opposition political movement. 
6.3.3. Professional Forces in Bangladesh Democracy Movement 
The professionals in 1980s Bangladesh were defined as the skilled manpower 
in their specialised area of the educated middle class of the society. Although they 
struggled primarily to establish their own professional standing in terms of 
economic rights like other middle stage interest groups of the society, they moved 
quickly into the movement with the cause of national issues in their professional 
circle. From the experiences of their movements, they reached an ultimate 
conclusion that the absence of a democratic and accountable government in the state 
system had laid down the main barrier to solve their own professional problems and 
related issues in national sphere. 
The lawyers, for their professional position, felt first that the damage to the 
constitution and suspension of the fundamental rights of the people in the interest of 
the military junta had endangered the rule of law in the country. 
89 In the October 
1982, the lawyers of the Supreme Court started demonstrations, processions and 
strikes in protest of the steps of the dictator taken regarding judiciary and a number 
of eminent lawyers leaders were arrested in these events. 
90 On 19 November 1983 
lawyers presented '6-point demands' 
91 for establishing the free and fair judicial 
system. In favour of their demands, the lawyers observed the historical non-stop 17 
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days strikes and boycott of the courts all over country from 20`h January to 5`n 
February 1985. On 9 April 1985, the convener of the CCBA Shamsul Haq 
Chowdhury was arrested and all the lawyers of Dhaka metropolitan area boycotted 
the courts and brought out huge demonstrations. On that very day the dictator was 
compelled to free him. On 10 November 1987 in the program of Dhaka siege by the 
opposition forces, lawyers participated and took the historical step to close the 
Supreme Court and other courts all over the country. Hundreds of lawyers all over 
the country were arrested in this event. The SCBA, DCBA, NLA and their units all 
over the country spontaneously participated in these movements. In the frustration 
stage of the political movement in 1988, the success of the SCBA in `the verdict of 
High Court against the junta regarding the Eighth Amendment of the constitution'`'' 
had revealed a new hope for non-communal democratic forces of the country. The 
CCBA first formulated the provision for a `Neutral Care Taker Government' to 
conduct a fair election, when the political parties of the country did not agree to 
participate in the election under the administration of the military junta. 
The engineers, agriculturalists and medical doctors (PROKRICHI 93) first 
organised a movement to protect their rights and status after the publication of the 
report on national salary scales of the Rashid Commission in 1978, `' ` which led to 
the formation of the Senior Service Pool in 1979, Cadre Service in September 1980 
and the BCS Coordination Committee excluding the BCS (administration) cadre in 
November 1981.95 In 1984, the activities of the PROKRICHI revived and a `9- 
point demand' was formulated. In the end of 1984 to January 1985, they tried to 
build up a countrywide movement to protect their professional status, which, in the 
end of December 1985, led all professional cadres in the administration into extreme 
actions like strikes, hunger strikes and demonstrations. In this period, all 
professional cadres under BCS Coordination Committee raised their `17-points 
demand. ' 96 However, this turned into a painful history in the movement of the 
professionals as the military junta took hard-line policy including sackings, transfers, 
harassment and arrest of many professional leaders. 97 After this painful event, there 
was no effective initiative found until 1989. But the BMA in accordance with their 
`21-point demands'98 continued the movements every year in which the movement 
on the issues related to the status of the In-Service Internee Doctors in 1987 and 
health policy and health budget in 1989 were most inspiring. This movement was 
able to earn the support of all democratic and opposition political forces and other 
professional groups. Although there were some `conflicts between the graduate 
engineers and diploma engineers'99 the overall participation of the engineers in the 
line of the PROKISHI movement were spontaneous through out the whole period of 
the military dictatorship. The leading unions of the journalists including the Dhaka 
Union of Journalists (DUJ), Bangladesh Federal Union of Journalists (BFUJ) etc of 
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the country agitated with their professional demands including the abolishment of 
the black laws that prohibited the freedom of publishing the news, freedom of 
speech and writing and independence of journalism. 100 Although there was press 
censorship all through the period of military rule, the journalists of the country were 
also found to take the streets along with the political forces of the country and their 
role of 1987 during the Dhaka Siege and final mass upsurge of 1990 must be 
regarded as a praiseworthy contribution to establish democracy in the country. 1°' 
The teachers' associations of different universities and colleges, primary, secondary 
and higher secondary educational institutions and their national bodies were 
involved directly and indirectly in the movement with their professional demands 
that also leaned into national issues i. e. for establishing democracy in the country. In 
this way, many professional groups had taken part actively in the movement for the 
implementation of their own demands as well as national cause. ' 02 
6.3.4. The Development of the Trade Union Forces 
The history of the TU movement of the Indian subcontinent is very old and 
carries very rich events since the British rule in this region, which strengthened 
under the repressive rule of Pakistan. 103 After independence, the military dictator in 
the early 1980s banned all TU activities in the country. Then an alliance of the 
National Federation of the Trade Unions (NFTUS) emerged in the name of Sramik 
Karmachari Oikkya Parishad (SKOP) to establish the democratic rights of the 
workers as well as to fulfil their economic demands. 104 The members of this alliance 
reached 11 towards the end of 1982. On 6 December 1982 the BNP labourer's 
wing-Nationalist Labour Party presented 8-points demand before Ershad. The 
mainstream TU movement under SKOP in the country was established following a 
joint meeting of the top leaders of 12 national trade unions in Dhaka on 13 April 
1983 including the labourers' wing of the BNP. At this time, they put forward their 
5-points demand to the junta government. From then on the SKOP became the 
pioneer of many movements in the country and secured support from the opposition 
political forces of country. Under the command of the SKOP the labourers and 
workers of the country observed many strikes which brought them in the lime light. 
In the middle of 1983, the labourer wing of the AL, the Jatya Sramik League joined 
the SKOP. The SKOP movement reached the pinnacle in the May 1983 and in the 
face of 48-hours hartal on 21S` May 1984, the military administration reached the 
`21-points agreement' 105 with the SKOP. Although, some of the SKOP leaders 
including Kazi Zafar Ahmed, Sirajul Alam Khan as ministers and Ruhul Amin 
Bhuiya and Shah Md. Abu Zafar joined the side of dictator in the period of 1984-86, 
the leftist factions of the SKOP were still in the control of large part of the working 
class in all industrial sectors. However, the unity of the SKOP was broken down in 
the wake of the decision to participate in the JS election of 1986 and became 
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reunited after the dissolution of the JS in the end of 1987. The SKOP with its own 
charter of demands participated in all actions with the opposition political forces and 
students side by side, they became a militant component of all opposition actions in 
the final stage movement in 1990. There were some peasant organizations that also 
had very active participation in the movement. The composition of the 8- 
organisations 106 of the peasants and agricultural labourers were mainly working as 
leftist forces in the line of Marx's `class in itself. These peasants and agricultural 
labourers' forces had also their own charter of demands, which was accommodated 
in the demands of opposition political forces. 
6.4. Empirical Observation on the Role Importance of Different 
Movement Forces 
The participants and organising forces of the movement were mainly in five 
categories: political parties in non-parliamentary alliances, students, intellectuals, 
professionals and trade unions. The course of conflict in the movement was solely a 
political event. Hence the democracy movement was always led and controlled by 
the opposition political parties of the country. However, the data in table 6.4.1 
presents the primary role 107 of all of these movement forces. In between their 
relationship, overall, the `fair important role' of students and political parties has 
been supported by 96%-100% of all forces membership. The same role of the 
students has been seen as distinctive, by 100% of S, I, P, TU and NPG groups while 
the political parties has gained same supports from the last four of the above five 
memberships. However, the role of rest three forces has also revealed mostly as 
fairly important in which the TU is found distinctive to have the highest support of S 
(80%) while the professionals and intellectuals have been supported with more than 
80% by TU membership. However, the role of Intellectuals has achieved the highest 
support from PP (89.1 %), P (90%) and NPG (95%) memberships. 
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Graph 6.4.1: I'lhe Icv el of the roles of the torees in the mov einent in 
terms of the relationship of six movement forces membership. 
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However, the role of the student forces in this regard is found to have great 
importance which was accepted unanimously by all movement forces memberships. 
6.5. The `Order of Participation' of the Movement Forces 
The respondents of the survey have been asked to rank these forces according 
to their role and participation in the movement. In table 5.5.1,37.9% respondents 
consider the "S-PP-TU-I-P-O" order, in which the S as first preference. PP as 
second, TU as third, I as fourth, P as fifth and then as all other forces according to 
their role importance and participation in the movement. The other orders for these 
movement forces have also gained some significant supports of the respondents. 1° 
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Graph 6.5.1: the roles of the dittcrcnt `order of participants' in the movement in 
terns of the six movement forces membership 
In the views between the respondents of six forces' memberships (Table 5.5.1 
and graph 5.5.1), overall, the highest supports of the S (56.7%) followed by the NPG 
group (47.5%) is found for "S-PP-TU-I-P-O" order. However, the lowest support 
of PPs (26.1 %) for this order is distinctive. In contrast, they are found to lend their 
highest support (47.8%) for the order "PP-S-TU-I-P-O" following the TU in the 
second place (36.7%). 1 and P memberships are found distinctive as they do not 
have any support (0%) for this order. I (52.4%) and TU (45%) memberships are 
distinctive to support `other orders' of the movement forces, in which they have 
given priority mainly to their own position, mostly in second and third places of the 
order. 
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6.6. Conclusion 
The development of the socio-political forces in organising a successful 
movement for the restoration of democracy against the military dictatorship of 
General Ershad took a long voyage to reach a formative democratic force in the 
post-independence Bangladesh. The history of political development in the post- 
colonial years does recognise a development of a kind of socio political democratic 
forces that aimed at fighting the authoritarian regimes rather than a history of 
practising any form of parliamentary or constitutional democracy. This force fought 
the Pakistan colonial military dictatorships, and its revolutionary formation liberated 
the country in 1971 from Pakistan. In the post-independence years, a socialist, leftist 
and revolutionary trend under the leadership of the ruling AL promoted the 
development of the democratic forces in the pure parliamentary form, which 
deteriorated later in the series of military coups and counter coups. The new struggle 
was started to build up democratic forces that grew under the leadership of the AL 
during the military regime of General Zia and General Ershad. In the assassination 
of General Zia and then, nearly a year later, the overthrow of his BNP regime by 
General Ershad, added the BNP to opposition, although it remained as the civilian 
face of the Army. The AL seemed to grappling for the trust of the Army to secure 
the state power, which also undermined the foundation of this growing independent 
democratic force in the country. This stance of the AL was considered suicidal for 
losing its popular civilian image during the movement against the military 
dictatorship of General Ershad. The military administration cleverly used this 
weakness of the civilian political forces to divide the opposition and was able to 
establish the supremacy of military employees over the state elites of the country. 
However, the revolutionary component of the opposition political forces 
including the students and trade unions of the lower middle and lower class of 
society were basically uncompromising to the repressive military dictatorship that 
was only made it possible to unite the opposition political forces. Moreover, the 
component of the civil society including the intellectuals, professionals, NGOs, 
religious leaders and several other interest and pressure groups of the society had 
their own charter of demands and therefore, took the strong voice against the 
military autocracy that also influence the development of democratic political forces 
in the country. In the beginning of the military regime in 1982, the leading 
opposition political parties including AL, BNP, JSD and ML were suffering from 
intra-party factionalism leading to many divisions and birth of new parties almost in 
every month that was triggered by the military intelligence as part of the strategy to 
keep the opposition forces weakened. Although, there were huge debates on the 
participation or non-participation of the opposition forces in the JS election of 1986, 
it was found that there was less conflict inside the opposition forces after this 
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election. This election compelled the dictator to withdraw several measures of the 
Martial Law after which the opposition forces were found to become more 
consolidated and cooperative in all actions of the movement. The veteran workers, 
those who were underground, got the opportunity to come out to daylight and many 
imprisoned activists became released, which made the street agitations and actions 
more effective that was tremendously seen first in the Dhaka siege action of 1987, 
although the military dictator was able to escape in this time. There was some 
imposition of military measures again in the country in the 1988 and 1989, but the 
intra-party and inter-party relationships in and between all opposition political 
parties became stable in this stage as well as opposition socio cultural groups. In 
1990, the supremacy of democratic forces over the military became established and 
found a way to establish democracy in the country. This was possible only when the 
social composition of democratic forces including the consolidation of all classes, 
interest and pressure groups and divergent opposition political elites was able to 
ensure minimum consensus between them in terms of what they were getting after 
the military dictator to be out of power. 
Notes 
1 See details in Rangalal Sen, The Political Elites in Bangladesh, University Press Limited, Dhaka 
1986, pp. 321-23, p. 327. He categorically stated: "the vestiges of feudalism still exist in land 
relations to Bangladesh, because there has been no fundamental reform", which however was serving, 
in his word, the interest of `rural propertied class' who were the supporter of ruling BNP. Sen again 
demarcated the BNP as the party of big businessmen and rural rich people in Bangladesh regarding 
the failure of solving the crisis of government of the BNP under Justice Sattar. In his conclusion of 
the book, he wrote, "in terms of the social background it may be said that the Bengali Muslim 
political elites belonging to the democratic-progressive opposition parties who fought against the 
conservative Muslim League as well as the civil military elites of Pakistan during the period from 
1947 to 1970, largely emerged from the rural sector. This is also valid in the post-independence 
period of Bangladesh. Their origins were likely to be found in the Jotedar and other similar social 
categories, and self- sufficient-owner-cultivating families which greatly benefited by the concurrent 
shift in the agrarian economy in favour of the jute cultivation in the first two decades of the twentieth 
century. " This was the direction of the analysis of the class character of the political elites of 
Bangladesh in the beginning of 1980s. 
` The member parties of this 10-party alliance that formed in January-February, 1980 included 
Bangladesh Awami League (AL-Malek), Bangladesh Awami League (AL-Mizan),, National Socialist 
Party (JSD), Bangladesh Communist Party (CPB), National Awami Party (NAP-Muzaffar), National 
Awami Party (NAP-Haroon), Jatiya Ekota Party, Bangladesh Workers Party, Sramik Krishak 
Samajbadi Dal, and Gono Azadi League (GAL). 
3After the assassination of Zia in 1981, the ruling BNP became topsy-turvy by the sufferings of the 
conflict of intra party power elites, which welcomed the military leaders in power. Immediate after 
the loosing power as well as loosing the blessing of the Army, this party was no longer in strength for 
couple of years to organise any movement against the new military leader until Begum Zia-the 
widow of President Zia, become the chief of the party. 
° Leaders of Jessore, Ex-State Minister Tarikul Islam, Professor MA Ohab, Professor Golam Mostafa, 
Ali Reza, Jubo Dal Leader Advocate Kazi Monirul Huda, Abdus Salam, Abu Yusuf, student leader 
Aminul Islam Shaheen, include the name of those of the ruling BNP, who were sent to jail on charge 
` AL-the party that had only mass support in the grass root of Bangladesh society, but major portion 
of cadres and workers were still in good faith with socialist spirit was not accepted to be in power by 
the external forces especially to the US, which in fact, went in favour of the military aggression in 
power. The party was deeply tormented and turned upside down by intra party conflict. Sheikh 
Hasina the daughter of the founding father of the county was warmly welcomed as the President of 
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the party in 1981 from exile in Great Britain, as the symbol for the reconciliation of the intra-group 
conflict. However, Abdur Razzak remained as the General Secretary of the party. A very strong 
group under the leadership of Dr Kamal Hossain and Tofael Ahmed developed a pro-capitalist US lobby and reversely, more stronghold part under the leadership of Mr Abdur Razzak vowed ýý ith 
socialist spirit were leading this intra-party brawls. The divisions and conflicts sharpened inside its 
entire branch organisations including student wing, labour and youth front immediately after the 
aggression of General Ershad. In particular, the BCL, student wing of the party took the shape into 
two factions under separate leadership in the beginning of 1983. Sheikh Hasina, leaving her fathers' 
way to socialism, took the side of pro capitalist group. A leadership race was also active between Mr 
Tofael Ahmed and Mr Abdur Razzak for the position of General Secretary of the party. 6In the brief history of AL, in the middle of 1949, in a workers meeting, Shawkat Ali called a 
workers conference at 250 Mugal Tuli, Dhaka in which Mowlana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani and 
Yare Mohammad Khan were elected President and Secretary respectively. Under their auspices the 
AL was born on 23-24 June, 1949 in a workers meeting at the Rose Garden resident of Kazi Bashir in 
Humayun Road, Dhaka as the East Pakistan Muslim Awami League (EPMAL) with Moulana Abdul 
Hamid Khan Bhasani as President and Shamsul Haque as General Secretary. The other two Joint 
Secretaries were Khondoker Mostaq Ahmad and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. In February 1957, the 
party faced splitting in which Moulana Bhasani left the party and formed East Pakistan National 
Awami Party (EPNAP) and the main stream AL were led by Hossein Shahid Sohrawardy as 
President and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as General Secretary. After the death of Sohrawardy in 1964, 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman became the President of the Party and continued until his end of life in 1975. 
In the mean time, there were also some splitting of the as NDF (1963), AL-Amena (1967), Jatya 
League (1970) and JSD (1972). In this period, the party under the leadership of Sheikh Mujb became 
popular and well organised which reflected in their overwhelming victory in the general election of 
1970. The party then successfully turned this victory to lead the national liberation war of 1971 and 
make it possible of the independent Bangladesh. In the post independent period, there was a major 
change in the party in January 1975when Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman replaced the AL 
with the Bangladesh Krisak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL), which was protested by General 
MAG Osmani, who formed later Jatya Janta Party. After the brutal carnage of 1975, the BAKSAL 
was banned by Martial Law regulations. AL leader and coup leader of 1975 Khondoker Mostaq 
Ahmad formed Democratic League. The new regulations for political parties in 1976 enhanced the 
chance to revive the post-Bangabandhu AL with his socialist philosophy of BAKSAL under the 
leadership of Abdul Malek Ukil. This BAKSAL, however, became the core of conflict in the party. 
The conservative and hardliner Mujib followers, specially the youth and students supporters of the 
party wanted to preserve this philosophy anyhow on the one hand and democratic and pro capitalist 
block in the party also slowly advanced as oppositely on the other. In December 1976, a 55-Member 
Convening Committee was formed under the leadership of Mullah Jalal Uddin and Mizanur Rahman 
Choudhury as Joint Convenors. In April 1977, the widow of Tajuddin Ahmad Mrs Zohra Tajuddin 
was selected as Convenor of the Party in a special council, although many old guards of the party 
including Malek Ukil, Mizan Choudhury and M Korban Ali were main contenders for the Convenor. 
However, in the Council of 1977, the factions of the party became exposed. The liberal and 
democratic faction was dominated by Zohra Tajuddin and Malek Ukil, Abdul Mannan, M Korban Ali, 
Sajeda Choudhury and Tofael Ahmad and conservative and pro BAKSAL group was dominated by 
Abdur Razzak. The council of 1978 at Hotel Eden, Dhaka considered these main streams of the party 
and elected Abdul Malek Ukil as President and Abdur Razzak as General Secretary. Mizanur 
Rahman Choudhury formed new dissident of AL (Mizan). In 1981, Dewan Farid Gazi left the party 
and formed another dissident AL (Gazi). 
7 See the Bengali weekly, The Weekly Bichittra, Dhaka, 28 January, 1983, p. 12. The two groups were 
as the BCL (Jalal-Jahangir) with only loyal to leadership of Sheikh Hasina and her pro capitalist path 
and by contrast, the BCL (Fazlu-Chunnu) with pure socialist spirit in the line of socialist Sheikh 
Mujib guided by Abdur Razzak. Both factions of the BCL were ordered not to organise any rallies on 
the 35`x' anniversary of their organisation as the part of the reconciliation of the two factions. But the 
BCL (Fazlu-Chunnu) organised the rallies in the Carzon Hall campus in the University of Dhaka in 
violation of the parent party order on 4th January 1983. This made strong resentment in the party 
leadership, in particular, for Sheikh Hasina. She asked the student leaders of the BCL (F-C) faction to 
beg excuse for their misdeeds to the probe committee set by the party. This order of Sheikh Hasina 
created strong dissatisfaction in Abdur Razzak and on 18 January 1983, a statement bearing the news 
of resignation of Abdur Razzak from the position of GS for discontent with Sheikh Hasina was 
published in daily news papers, although the news was rejected in a further statement by the office 
secretary of the party after two days. On 20th January, 1983, Fazlur Rahaman and Bahalul Maznun 
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Chunnu, the President and Secretary respectively, of the BCL (Fazlu-Chunnu) in a statement in the 
newspapers urged the AL central leadership to be united first as a part of the re-unification of the 
BCL. On 18 May 1983, the BCL (F-C) organised a rally in Mymensing Agricultural University 
campus on the occasion of conference of the party, which was encountered by another faction BCL 
(J-J) resulted in many casualties in both sides. 
8 The Mujib Nagar Dibash on 17 April have been observing every year in the post independent 
Bangladesh by mainly the Awami League leaders and workers along with other progressive and pro 
independence political forces of the country. In this day of 1971, the First Bangladesh Government 
in Exile was formed at Baiddyanath Tala Mango orchard under a border District of Meherpur in 
Bangladesh under the leadership of Prime Minister Taj Uddin Ahmad, Temporary President Syed 
Nazrul Islam, Captain (Rtd) Monsur Ali, and Advocate Kamaruzzaman. Bangbandhu Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, the conquered national leader of the people of the then East Pakistan was sworn as 
President of the Independent Bangladesh at the state of his imprisonment in Pakistan. 
9 See The Bichittra, 29 July, 1983, p. 14. Although Mr Abdur Razzak, at once, in a telephone 
statement in the press informed that there was no decision in the Presidium meeting, which was again 
supported by Abdul Malek Ukil, Mohiuddin Ahmad and Abdul Momin Talukder and Adur Razzak 
himself in a further statement on 22 July 1983. However, this fact was encountered by rest of six 
Presidium Members of the party including M Korban Ali, Syeda Zohra Tajuddin, Abdul Mannan, Dr 
Kamal Hossain, Abdus Samad Azad and Zillur Rahman on 23 July 1983. 
10 On 3 July 1983, it was reported that the supporters of Razzak took the position in the party office 
premises and protested the illegal council meeting that resulted in the day long attacks and chaos in 
the whole area between the supporters of two factions. This made Sheikh Hasina to shift the next day 
ALWC meeting to Bangabandhu Bhavan in Dhanmondhi 32 no. house. 
11 It was encountered in the Executive Committee meeting on 3`d August 1983 in the chair of Abdul 
Malek Ukil at the resident of Abdur Razzak, which also expelled 9 leaders of AL (Hasina) including 
Syeda Zohra Tajuddin, Dr Kamal Hossein and Tofael Ahmed., for details, see The Weekly Bichittra, 
12 August, 1983, p. 11 
12 See The Bichittra, 12 August, 1983, p. 11. The name of the person was believed to be Dr Kamal 
Hussein, who proposed the name of Sheikh Hasina as the President of the party in the council of 
1981. Since the brutal assassination of Bangabandhu in 1975 he was in abroad for five years. Then, 
he was first seen on 10 October 1980 in a meeting of the party at Baitul Mukarram, Dhaka. However, 
It became evident of division of the party and a break away group under the leadership of Abdur 
Razzak formed AL (Razzak) in which along with many other old guards of the party and majority 
student cadres of the BCL, President and Secretary of the Dhaka City AL Mohammed Hanif and 
Hashim Uddin Paheri joined. 
13 A group of dissident party members attending the session, headed by an unknown Prof. Iqbal 
Hossain also announced of a 51-member committee in protest of leadership of Sheikh Hasina-the 
occurrence was treated as a drama arranged by the dictator. 
14 General Ershad commented on the paintings and drawings of the students and cultural activists on 
the city streets on the occasion of Language Martyr Day (2151 February) that these activities were 
unlawful in the eye of Islamic Sharia Law. In fact, he wanted to secure the support of the 
fundamentalist and religious groups of the society for his military rule. 
15 Mowlana MA Mannan was known as a self confessed anti-liberation collaborator element in the 
post independent politics of Bangladesh. He was one of the collaborating leaders with Pakistan Army 
against the national liberation war of Bangladesh. The immediate government after the independence, 
the AL, announced bounties to arrest and bring him to justice as a war criminal for rape and genocide. 
16 For this, they first communicated General Osmani and Ataur Rahman Khan. Both of these two 
leaders, however, denied calling such all-party meeting during the stiff Martial Law. Then the four 
leaders communicated Mowlana Tarkabagish, who was agreed to invite all opposition political 
parties in a meeting. The opposition AL, CPB, NAP (M), NAP (H) and Ekota Party, at first, were not 
agreed to join this type of meeting. 
tA representative from AL (Mizan) and major leftist parties joined this meeting. The main 
participants in the meeting were the AL (Mizan), Gano Azadi League, JSD, Workas Party, BSD, 
Sammyabadi Dal (both factions), Krishak Sramik Samajbadi Dal, NAP (both factions), Ekota Party 
and Mazdur Party. The AL and the CPB were absent and although the representatives of two 
NAPs 
and Ekota party were present, they were not agreed to sign the statement protesting the 
junta over the 
said issue. In this stage, Abdus Samad Azad of the AL made a phone to this meeting that was 
received by Haider Akbar Khan Rano. Mr Samad Azad inquired whether it was possible to 
include 
him individually as he was personally interested to sign for the statement although his party was not 
still agreed to join. The meeting was agreed to include him. 
Just sometimes later, the phone came 
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again from the AL side and requested the meeting to wait for them and they would be present in the 
meeting within an hour and urged not to send the statement to press until they had reached there. At 9: 30 pm, some representatives from the AL reached this meeting and the 'All Parties' statement' 
protesting the junta was signed by Tofael Ahmed on behalf of Sheikh Hasina, President of the AL. At 
this stage, the two factions of the NAP and Ekota Party were also agreed to sign it. Then Pankaj Bhattachargia of the NAP took the responsibility of the CPB and asked to set the name of Mont Sine 
and Comrade Farhad in the statement. In fact, Pankaj Bhattchargia signed the statement on behalf of 
the CPB. In this way, the first statement against the military junta was released by the 15 opposition 
democratic and progressive parties. 
18 The number of the arrested leaders of the opposition progressive democratic forces were 39 in this 
operation including AL chief Sheikh Hasina, Dr Kamal Hussain, Tofael Ahmed, Comrade 
Mohammad Forhad, Rashed Khan Menon, Syed Altaf Hossain, Dilip Barua, Siddiqur Rahman and 
others. 
19 The information is included here from the exclusive audio interview of AL President Sheikh 
Hasina with researcher in May 2003. 
20 The member parties of the '15-party alliance' formed in April 1983 included Bangladesh Awami 
League (AL-Hasina), Bangladesh Awami League (AL-Mizan), Bangladesh Awami League(AL-Gazi) 
Jatya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), Bangladesh Communist Party (CPB), National Awami Party (NAP- 
Muzaffar), National Awami Party (NAP-Haroon), Jatiya Ekota Party, Bangladesh Workers Party, 
Sramik Krishak Samajbadi Dal, Gono Azadi League (GAL),, Sammyabadi Dal(Toha), Sammyabadi 
Dal(Nagen) Bangladesh Samajtantrik Dal (BSD), Jatya Mazddoor Party, 
21 The JSD was formed from a pro-socialist dissident group of AL in the post-independent period 
during the AL regime. The party had also an underground military unit who believed to capture the 
power by armed struggle. But the Mujb regime treated this kind of revolution as anti-state treason 
acts, which was controlled strongly and in some cases brutally. Therefore many JSD workers still 
could not forget their movement against AL regime. But their ideological leader Col. Taher was 
hanged by Zia Government in charges of mutiny in the Army. Till then, they were anti-Zia and in 
times, although got in alliance with AL. Moreover, in a meeting of 10-party alliance at the Baitul 
Mukarram mosque premises on 6`t' April 1981, there were a clash between AL workers and JSD 
workers for chanting 'Joy Bangla' slogans by AL workers, which spread to the nearby area. AL 
workers attacked the JSD office and set ablaze the properties of JSD. Since then, some of their 
leaders and workers still disliked the AL. 
22 'Joy Bangla' (Victory of Bangladesh) was, in fact, the slogan of Bangladesh Awami League in the 
pre independence period. But it got unanimous popularity in the Bangladesh liberation war of 1971 
against Pakistan Army. The freedom fighters of all forces and all parties in the war showed their sign 
of guerrilla attacks applauding this slogan and expressed their victory with this slogan. However, in 
the post independent periods, there developed many leftist revolutionary parties who were repressed 
by the AL regime and naturally anti-AL forces grew day by day as well as a boycott to this slogan. 
However, in times these forces came into the alliance with AL and still exposed their negative 
attitudes in this regard. But the AL chief Sheikh Hasina was strict to this slogan as she argued that 
there should not be any difficulties in 'Joy Bangla' as we all fought together against Pakistan Army 
in our liberation war with this slogan. For details of this inter party collision, please see The Weekly 
Bichittra, 15 April, 1983, p. 14 however, the 'Joy Bangla' slogan was no longer a problem in the 
alliance. Although many of them did not use this slogan, it ran the acceptance of the alliance day by 
day. 
23 For example, the development of the BKSAL from AL and the divisions in BSD and WPB 
increased the members of the alliance. By contrast, leaving of AL (Mizan), Unity of AL (Hasina) and 
AL (Farid Gazi), unity of two NAPs and Ekota Party and the unity of WPB and Mazdur Party 
decreased the members of the alliance. All this splits and re-unions of these parties were happened 
between 1983 and 1986. 
24On 2 April, 1983 at Beauty Cinema Hall in a close door meeting by pro conference group, a strong 
faction cancelled the Committee of the BNP, the main stream under the leadership of Justice Satter, 
which was promptly rejected by the party Secretary General Badruddoza Choudhury and treated the 
initiative of the new committee as 'unconstitutional and undemocratic'. They expelled 43 officials 
and members of the newly formed BNP (Ruda) on 5 April 1983`4. This did not create any reaction in 
the Huda camp. Moreover, the secretary General of BNP (Ruda), Dr MA Matin on 7 April 1983 
urged the BNP (Satter) to transfer the charges of BNP office and properties immediately. As a result, 
the wing of Sheccha Sebi Dal divided into three parts in which one group under the leadership of 
Kazi Siraj joined with BNP (Ruda) and the rest two factions remained loyal to the BNP (Satter). For 
details, see the The Bichittra, 15 April, 1983, p. 15 
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25 See The Bichittra, 6 May 1983, p. 11. On 26 April 1983, the BNP (Ruda) organised a workers 
meeting of Dhaka city unit at Mirpur Beauty Cinema Hall in which SA Khaleque and Hazi Salim 
were elected as President and Secretary respectively. In this meeting, the Secretary General Dr MA 
Matin accused that Justice Satter had no right to demand to return of power as he willingly resigned 
from the post of President, which was broadcasted by the national radio and TV and even he took his 
ýension as Ex-President, not as Justice. Therefore he had no longer moral right to lead the BNP. 6 See The Bichittra, 27 May, 1983, p. 12. It should be mentioned here that the widow of late 
President Ziaur Rahman, Begum Khaleda Zia was given the portfolio of Senior Vice President of the 
party immediate after the assassination of General Zia in 1981. However, on 25`h May 1983, the party 
organised a gathering at the Mahbub Ali Institute, Dhaka demanding the release of all political 
prisoners of the party in which the Senior Vice President Begum Zia joined in an hour late due her 
illness. She could not speak out due to her sickness, which followed the read out of her written 
speech in this meeting. 
2 The member parties of 7-party alliance were Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP-Satter ), United 
Peoples Party (UPP-Zafar), Bangladesh Jatya League, Ganatantrik Party, Revolutionary Communist 
League of Bangladesh, National Awami Party (NAP-Nuru) and Krisak Sramik Party (Nanna) 28 In the later years, the number of the member parties of this 7-party alliance was not stable and 
some factions of the member parties joined with pro-junta groups.. Many insignificant smaller 
components joined with junta, for example, Jatyo Dal, UPP, Ganotantrik Party, KSP etc and some 
other smaller parties joined with the alliance. One important thing was that the BNP was always 
overwhelming dominant in this alliance as the other components have few supports while the AL was 
not-in the 15-party alliance. 
29 See the interview of Begum Khaleda Zia with Kazi Jawad, staff reporter, The Weekly Bichittra, 2 
March 1984, pp. 23-26 
30 The member parties of this National Front were Jatya League, NAP(Nuru), KSP, Islamic 
Democratic League(Shafique), Social Democratic Party, Bangladesh Democratic Party, Bangladesh 
Islami Biplobi Parishad, Jana Gonatantrik Dal, Nikhil Bangladesh Muslim League (Faiz Box) and 
Hindu Oikya Front. 
31 Begum Zia suspended Choudhury Kamal Ibne Yusuf of and two other leaders in an indisciplinary 
charge connected with an incident in Faridpur on 10`h January 1984. In February 1985, a group of 
leaders of the BNP known as ex-Muslim Leaguers including Shah Azizur Rahman, Abdul Alim, 
Abdur Rahman Bishwas, Azizul Haque, Afaz Uddin Fakir, Abdul Matin Choudhury, Maidul Islam 
Mukul, and Kamal Ibne Yusuf met in the resident of Maidul Islam Mukul. Some of them went to 
Justice Sattar and requested him to take the leadership of the party. However, Justice Sattar did not 
agree with their proposal. This faction of the BNP prepared to participate in the election under junta 
administration. On 1` February 1985, B. Choudhury, the Secretary General of Party denounced the 
news of the meeting of Shah faction saying that Shah Azizs' were no longer the factors in the politics 
of the BNP which was however encountered in the next day, although in a further statement on 5th 
February 1985, B. Choudhury denied his earlier position. However, the crisis was resolved later for 
the time being in the mid-February 1985 under the direct initiative of Begum Zia. 
j2 The pro-dictator Jana Dal, BNP(Shah), UPP, GP and a faction of the ML already consented to the 
formation of Front and signed on a draft in this regard. However, Begum Zia, who still headed the 
mainstream BNP, slugged this split saying that the leaving of Shah Aziz would not make any harm to 
the party. In the following couple of weeks, the two faction of the BNP went into a race of press 
statement against each other that ultimately weakened the strength of the BNP under Begum Zia, an 
arch opposition to the dictator. 
33 It seemed to have been loosing its strength in the city and scratched its ability to sustain any 
prolonged movement. The resignation of Mr Hasnat followed the appointment of Col (Rtd) Mutafizur 
Rahman as Secretary General of the Party, even though Begum Zia agreed earlier to appoint K. M. 
Obayedur Rahman to this position. It was also reported in the FEER that the majority of the leaders 
were pressing for a party council convention to elect a new set of top office bearers and 'democratise 
the party set-up', but there was no move to replace Begum Zia as Party Chairperson. 
34 Syed Kamal Uddin "Politics of Splitting", The Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 August 1988, 
p. 25. It was reported engineering of these six leaders' moves by Kazi Zafar Ahmed, political advisor 
of the dictator, had happened against backdrop of manoeuvrings leading to parliamentary elections. 
The confrontation between BNP Chairperson Begum Khaleda Zia and whom she sacked, climaxed 
immediately after the dissolution of the party's standing and executive committee. It was prompted 
by the suspicions of Begum Zia about Obaidur Rahman who was known to have links with the 
dictator. However, Obaidur Rahman and his supporters claimed that they were expelled because they 
had tried to create a democratic milieu inside the party. The new BNP Secretary-General Barrister 
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Abdus Salam Talukdher denied this accusation. He said that the expulsions had been imperative as the party was slipping into confusion due to manoeuvring of Obaidur Rahman to create a parallel leadership. 
35 The practice of breaking up political parties in the third world as well as in Bangladesh was as old 
as the country itself. Although any splitting inside the AL and the BNP would weaken them it would 
not spell their end. Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia had inherited and added to the party leadership 
that was passed on to them as from her father late Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and from her husband late General Ziaur Rahman respectively. It was this more than organisation abilities 
which had helped them withstand repeated defection and party splits. The two women had developed 
into powerful personalities who used this charisma and the politics of agitation to command the 
loyalty of the mainstream of their party members who had given them sweeping powers to deal with 
any situation. 
;G See The Weekly Bichittra, 20 May, 1983, p. 13. In their Working Committee meeting on 13 May 
1983 raised many accusations against the party President Major (Rtd) MA Jalil, which was sent for 
discussion in the next meeting of national committee set for 9 June 1983. A 5-member committee 
was also formed to present all accusations in peaceful way, so that factions' prone party could revive 
a chance for unity. In the next couple months, the internal chaos of this party became worst. The 
popularly called theoretical leader of this party Sirajul Alam Khan gave his resignation and remained 
absence in the meeting of the National Committee 9-12 June 1983, which pushed the party into a 
possibility of further division. On 30 August 1983, the JSD Working Committee imposed 
`quarantine' on the party chief Major (Rtd) MA Jalil, in which he was forced to stop any 
correspondence or make any comment or statement in the press and even ordered to abstain from 
going outside Dhaka without the permission of the JWC. 
37 It should be mentioned here that the Bangladesh Samajtantrik Dal (BSD) was formed as a dissident 
group of the Jatya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) on 5`h November 1980. The cause of that division was also 
mainly personal affairs of the party leaders. 
38 The Dhaka University Central Student Union had been considered to the socio-political and 
intellectual corners of Bangladesh society as the second parliament of the country. Since the post- 
British politics during Pakistan Period until the birth of independent Bangladesh, the University of 
Dhaka and its student community played the key roles in all movements. Many students' 
organisations including socialists and capitalists with progressive thought and actions took place in 
this university and built up a very wide intellectual community around the regions. It was the Dhaka 
University that sacrificed its students for upheld the honour of mother tongue in 1952; brought the 
parliamentary victory for regional autonomy in 1954; protested the Martial Law of Ayub Khan in 
1958-69, led the violent student movement in 1962 against the Education Commission Report of 
Justice Hamidur Rahman and took the six-points of Sheikh Mujb as the charter of freedom for the 
people of the then East Pakistan; and the last, led the national liberation war of the independent 
Bangladesh. In the post-independent period, the left link students of this university even challenged 
the regime of country's ever popular leader Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This is the 
University, where its students burned the meeting stage of Military ruler General Ziaur Rahman in 
1980 in his presence and never allowed the entrance of another military ruler General Ershad in its 
campus. All of these glorious events was led and guided by the DUCSU along with many other 
students' organisation. It was popularly accepted superb that `what the DUCSU says today, 
Bangladesh will tell it tomorrow'. 
39 See the Weekly Bichittra, 17 February 1984, p. 14. The Chief Major (Rtd) Jalil scratched his all 
relation with the JSD on 3rd February 1984. On 12 February 1984, the intra party conflict became 
worst when ASM Rob who resigned from party secretary ship 7 months before, later withdrawing his 
resignation, called the party working meeting and tried to get into the party office forcefully. In the 
clash with his rival group, five JSD workers wounded including women workers. He failed to hold 
the meeting in the party office. The root of the conflict was the issue of participation in Upazilla 
election and 5-points demand of 22 parties, in which Rob wanted to participate in the election and 
favoured the 18-points own party demands in the movement. However, in his meeting Chitta Guho 
became President and ASM Rob as General Secretary. On the other hand, Joint Secretary Shajahan 
Siraj called the party working meeting on 9 February 1984, according to him, where 9 out of 21( in 
which 18 present, 2 neutral) members of executive committee attended, in which Mirza Sultan Raza 
elected President and Shajahan Siraj as Secretary. 
40 The Nine parties under proposed Greater Communist Unity were Two dissidents of Samaj Badi 
Dal, Two groups of BSD, JSD (Siraj), Warkas Party, Majdur Party, NAP(Haroon) and Ekota Partty 
41 In the brief history of Bangladesher Warkas Party, the party was formed from the original 
Bangladesher Communist Party (Leninist) which was in the underground until 1978. In the pre- 
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independence period, this was named as the pro-china Communist Party. After the independence, in 
1972 a dissident group under the leadership of Amal Sen, Nazrul Islam, Kazi Zafar Ahmed, Haider 
Akbar Khan Rano, Rashed Khan Menon, and Nasim Ali form this party. Amal Sen, the peasant 
leader of Narail, was mainly a leader of subgroup of the pro-china communist party and communist 
revolutionary Kazi Zafar, Rano and Menon for a Coordination Committee, which joined the 
Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971 on the one hand, and Nasim Ali came from pro-Moscow CPB, 
a revolutionary led a faction who worked under the cover of a news paper `Hatiar' (arms). In 1974. a 
part of this party formed the UPP together with a dissident group from the NAP of Mowlana Bhasani 
and other part remained in the underground under the leadership of Amal Sen. In 1978, the party 
faced a split in question to join the Nationalist Front under General Ziaur Rahman, the then new 
military leader and of the country, although a underground part of the party tried in 1975 to join the 
BAKSAL of socialist Sheikh Mujib, which was not agreed by the `open' party leadership. However, 
in the same year, the Bangladesher Communist Party (Leninist) was finally changed into the 
Bangladesher Warkas Party (Marxist-Leninist) in a secret Congress, in which Amal Sen elected its 
leader. Side by side, in accordance with the international communist movement, the party followed 
the independent programmes as this had been seen some sorts of similarities in the Indian Communist 
Party. In 1979, the open part of the party participated in parliamentary election in the name of 
Ganatantrik Andolon leaving their cover as the UPP. In the same year, the party fell into the conflict 
with pro-Moscow CPB, when their peasant wing was failed to earn the recognition of Prague based 
International Peasant Labour Federation in which CPB opposed the initiative. In the mean time the 
conflict between the open leaders and secret leaders of the party reached extreme in the beginning of 
the 1980s. In November 1983, in question of the movement against military dictator, the faction of 
Amal Sen, Nazrul Islam and Nasim Ali favoured the participating the election and by contrast, Rano- 
Menon followed the hard line against the dictator. As a result, in January 1984, Rano was replaced by 
the Nazrul Islam in the position of General Secretary. However, the split became unavoidable when a 
faction under the leadership of Amal Sen and Nazrul Islam was serious to from a greater unity of 
communist parties excluding CPB, where Rano-Menon, the youth faction opposed the initiative. On 
17 July 1985, the party in their meeting of Working Committee decided to remove Rano and Menon 
from the 16-member Executive Committee, in their word, for the greater interest of communist unity 
and asked to work in the lower level peasant wing which was seen as a part of punishment. This 
attempt brought the split inevitable. 
42 Here fundamentalist forces are defined as `the individual, groups or parties who prefer to use the 
religion i. e. Islam mostly in their own interest or to climb up the power than that of for proper 
practice in life '. The period under which Bangladesh was the part vis-ä-vis colony of Pakistan, the 
ruling military cliques and their political allies Muslim League and Jamat-I-Islami exploited the 
people of the then East Pakistan in the name of Islam avoiding ethnic, cultural and language identity 
of Bengali people, and they were considered as fundamentalist forces. 
43 In the post-1975 politics, they were revived in full swing under the auspices the military 
administration of General Zia. It should be mentioned here that the ML and the JIB were the main 
collaborator of aggressor forces of Pakistan in the national liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971. 
44 See The Weekly Bichittra, Dhaka, 29 April, 1983, p. 12. For example, On 24 April 1983, a meeting 
of the PDF was held in the Chair of its President Amzad Ali Khan, in which Ittefaq editor Anwar 
Hossen Monzu urged to solve the political crisis by dialogue. 
as The JIB was trying to reorganise at this stage as they organised a 3-days Central Mazlish-e-Shura 
meeting on 16 April 1983 and a workers meeting of Dhaka city unit at Dhaka Krira Samittee 
auditorium on 30th April 1983. Since then, it was only the JIB in the pro-Islamic bloc that took the 
anti-Ershad stance as the part of their strategy to go in touch of mass politics. From the very 
beginning of the military intervention, they followed all along the path of mainstream alliances to 
accomplish the design of their rehabilitation in post independent Bangladesh politics. In their part, 
they also evaluated that the boycott of the election might prolong the withdrawal of Martial Law. 
46 Moulana Hafezzi Hozoor invited all opposition parties in this round table conference at his 
Madrasha complex situated on the opposite bank of the Buriganga. None of the major political parties 
including AL (Hasina), two groups of BNP, JSD, different factions of Muslim League, 10-parties of 
Khondoker Mostaque Ahmed, Jamat-I-Islami Bangladesh. But a group of representatives from 15- 
party alliance under the leadership of Peer Habibur Rahman of NAP(Muzaffar) including two 
General Secretaries of AL (Mizan) and AL (Gazi) as Nur-e-Alam Siddiquee and Mozaffar Hossen 
Paltu respectively, Dilip Barua of Sammya Badi Dal, Monzurul Ahsan Khan of CPB; Moulana 
Abdur Rahim of IDL, Abdul Matin of Revolutionary Communist League, Nur Mohammad Kazi of 
Peoples' League, Shahidul Alam Said of Democratic League (Moazzem), Moulana Khairul Islam 
Jessori of Awami Olema League. Dr Abu Taher of Adarsha Samajtantrik Dal, Abdul Khaleque of 
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Labour Party (Mostafa), Syed Mahbub Sobhan of Islamic Republican Party, and Abdur Razzak of Bangladesh Hedayetul Islam party and Abdur Rahim Azad as observer from the UPP. However, the 
meeting was ended without any decision. In the meeting, Peer Habibur Rahman for 15-party alliance 
proposed three points for the unity: withdrawal of Martial Law; restoration of fundamental rights of 
politics and specific date for parliamentary election in the winter of 1983-84. which however were 
not finalised in the discussion. The same arrangement for unity in the right wing opposition forces 
under the auspices of Khondoker Mostak Ahmed was failed due to lack of responses from opposition 
forces, although a statement released to the press said that a consensus was made among all 
4participant 
parties and groups for a demand of holding JS elections in March 1984. 7See The Weekly Bichittra, Dhaka, 6 May 1983, p. 1 l and 20 May, 1983, p. 12. In this period, all 
factions of the ML tried to unity. On 29 April 1983, the steering committee for unity of ML elected a 
new committee with Justice BA Siddique as President and Begum Razia Falz as Secretary General. 
This committee was encountered by the formation of another committee on 14 May 1983 with T. Ali 
as President and MA Matin as Secretary General. However, the ML under the leadership of Faiz Box 
remained independent. 
48 See The Weekly Bichittra, 6 April, 1984, p. 10 49 At the last stage, the IDL (Rahim) and the Khelaphat Andolon of Hafezzi Hoozoor participated in 
the dialogue on 26 March 1984 and 29 March 2984 respectively. On 20 April 1984,11-party 
National United Front under Khondoker Mostaque Ahmad divided when six leaders of 6 parties out 
of 11 including called an emergency meeting without the concern of Front Chief. The dissident 
leaders of six parties under 11-party National United Front were ASM Solaiman, Mohammad Altaf 
Uddin Talukder, Sharafat Hossain Choudhury, Nur Mohammad Kazi, Mohammad Khalid Hossain 
and Mrs Amena Begum. This normally was considered as the starting point of abolishing the Front 
under Khondoker Mostaque Ahmad. The JIB on 17 April 1984 went in dialogue with the dictator in 
which they demanded the parliamentary election on the basis of 5-points along with a demand of the 
return of citizenship of their leader Golam Azam, 49 the main collaborator leader of aggressor Pakistan 
Army in the liberation war. The Golam Azam issue just set fire on the spirit of pro-liberation forces 
and the demand of his citizenship was protested by the freedom fighters and political parties from 
every sphere of Bangladesh society. For details, see The Weekly Bichittra, 27 April, 1984 
50 The 17 parties included the KSP of ASM Solaiman, Labour Party of Moulana Matin, Muslim 
Jatiyata Badi Dal of Principal Sirajul Haque Gora, Progatishil Jatiyata Badi Dal of Sheikh Showkat 
Hossain Nilu, Bangladesh Islami Andolon of Maj. (Rtd) Jainul Abedeen Khan, Nejami Islam of Syed 
Nazrul Islam, Republican Party of Sharafat Hossain Choudhury, Peoples' League of Professor Nur 
Mohammad Kazi, Olema Dal of Mohammad Delwar Hossain, Tanshimul Olema of Mowlana Ruhul 
Amin, Jamiate Olema Islam of Mowlana Shamshuddin Kashemi, Nejame Islam Party of Hazi 
Mohammad Akil, Islami Sanghati Parishad of Mowlana Mohammad Habibullah, Islahool Muslimeen 
of Mowlana ABM Ishaque, Islamic Party of Sheikh Ashraf Hossain and Islamic Democratic League 
of Advocate Shafiqur Rahman. See details of the Front on the Weekly Bichittra, 14 December 1984, 
pp. 12-13 
The ML (Siddiquee) had joined with the pro-dictator Jano Dal in June 1985 and Salauddin Quader 
Choudhury of this ML faction was rewarded a portfolio in the cabinet. In this process, the ML 
(Siddiquee) was split again into three rival factions. One faction under the leadership of ANM Yusuf 
and Syeda Razia Faiz remained in the opposition, which was formed on 23 December 1985 in a 
council at the Dhaka Metropolitan Bar Auditorium. The leader of another faction BA Siddiquee on 
24'x' December 1985 appointed as permanent representative at the UNO and rest one faction elected 
Sala Uddin Kader Choudhury as the President at DDSA, who joined later with the JP. 
52 Abdul Mannan and Tofael Ahmed of the AL were in favour of this initiative. Rashed Khan Menon 
and Haider Akbar Khan Rano of the Workas Party went to the residence of Begum Zia to discuss the 
possibility of unity with her party. The purpose of the 15-Party leaders was to form a single platform 
of all opposition forces. 
53 The pro-BNP political parties and groups, mainly Kazi Zafar Ahmed of the UPP was against the 
single platform. Even, they were against the joint-programme movement as there was a dispute 
between the AL and the BNP over the system of Government in the country: the AL for 
parliamentary form of government and the BNP for presidential form of government. 
° See The Weekly Bichittra, Dhaka, 19 August 1983, p. 13. The Joint Secretary of the BNP (Satter), 
Ferdous Ahmad Koreishi told the ENA that the successful discussion was held with 15-party alliance 
to form united programmes of the movement while the Secretary of the BNP political liaison 
committee, Captain (Rtd) Shah Abdul Halim Choudhury informed that there was the 'progress' of 
discussion for united programmes and actions with all parties: 15-party alliance, 6-party alliance and 
14-party NUF. Ferdous Ahmed Koreishi gave importance for unity to the 15-party alliance while 
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Capt (Rtd. ) Abdul Halim Choudhury emphasized all opposition parties of country in regard to the 
unity of the opposition forces. It should be mentioned here that both of the Front and Jote were 
extremely anti-AL 
ss In the historical point of view, just a couple of years ago, the AL was struggling along with its 10- 
party alliance against the ruling BNP to restore democracy in the country. Regarding the past political 
roles of the BNP, the AL had many causes in to account to believe that General Zia, founder of the 
BNP, had indirect linkage with the coup makers of August 1975 that killed Bangabandhu and many 
of his family members. According to Major (Rtd. ) Hafiz Uddin Ahmad, Birbikram (a second highest 
title of the country for the contribution in the national liberation), immediate after the coup event, he 
went to the resident of Zia, the Deputy Chief of the Army and informed that the President Sheikh 
Mujib was killed. Zia replied without hesitation "so what, President is killed, Vice President is 
there. " Moreover, using cleverly many stages of political process, Zia later sworn-in as the President 
of the country. Zia government rewarded the killers of Bangabandhu by giving them job of diplomats 
and established them in business. Under his regime, many AL workers found lost or killed and 
thousands of them were tortured in the torture cell of the cantonment. The leaders and workers of AL 
still in 1983 could not forget those cruel memories. Regarding their ideological stands, the AL 
believed in four fundamental principal of states: Bengali nationalism, socialism for economic 
development programmes including nationalisation of private sector, which in 1983 reshaped with 
mix-economy in the incest of welfare state, democracy in parliamentary politics and secularism as 
every citizens have the right in their own religious functions. In oppositely, the BNP believed in: 
Bangladeshi nationalism, pro capitalist economic programme emphasizing private sector, secularism 
with absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah and presidential form of government. In their 
present aim and objectives, the AL wanted to return to the original constitution of 1972 to 
parliamentary form of Government and the BNP wanted to return to the presidential form of 
government on the basis of suspended constitution of 1982. 
6 The five points demand formulated by main stream opposition included: (1) Immediate lifting of 
Martial Law and the Army must be sent back to the barrack; (2) Immediate restoration of democratic 
environment in the country including all fundamental rights of people and withdrawal of ban on 
political activities; (3) Holding the elections to the sovereign parliament only under the non-partisan 
and neutral caretaker government in the country before any other polls. Power to take any decisions 
regarding constitutions only lies with the sovereign parliament elected by the people and none else; 
(4)Immediate release of all political leaders and workers arrested and punished under Martial Law for 
political reasons and withdrawal of all political cases against them. Stop the harassment and arrest of 
political leaders and workers; and (5) Enquiry into the students, labourers, political leaders and 
workers killed so far including those students murdered in the mid-February 1983 incident, trial and 
punishment of those responsible for it, publications of the list of those killed and injured, and giving 
compensation to them . 
Accept the demands of all including students, teachers, industrial workers, 
employees, peasants and agricultural labourers. 
57 It was commonly used practice in the third world backward politics that a uniform man, immediate 
after his aggression in power, suddenly took out a political party from the pocket of his uniform and 
some opportunists, outlawed and hatred politicians were always ready to join there for bounties. In 
his utmost, General Ershad was even able to buy some student leaders and eminent politicians from 
the opposition. First the dictator started with his so called 18-points programme in the beginning of 
1983 and treated these as his visions of development. According to the intimate discussion by 
researcher with the leaders of movement, it was found that the DGFI-military intelligence along 
with all other intelligence agencies of the military administration mainly involved in this process to 
build the new party for the dictator. Their target was fulfilled anyhow: sometimes threatening of life, 
arrest, lawsuits or sometimes the bounties for high rank positions. 
-18 The invitation was sent to the 75 parties of the country, in which 43 responded. It should be 
mentioned here that many of these parties even had no any office or complete committee. Sometime 
the dictator and his agencies created these parties for the interest of dialogue or participation in the 
elections. Because, the mainstream oppositions including the AL, BNP, JSD, CPB and JIB were not 
agree to go to dialogue. The leaders who joined this dialogue were Mizanur Rahman Choudhury of 
AL-Mizan, Shamsul Huda Choudhury , Dr MA Matin of BNP-Ruda Khondoker Mostaque Ahmad 
of 12-party United Front, Shah Moazzem Hossain of DL , 
T. Ali, BA Siddiquee, Faiz Box, and Abu 
Ala from each faction of four f Muslim League. Mrs Amena Begum of Jatya Dal, Major(Rtd) Joinul 
Abedin of Justice Party, Principal Raisuddin Ahmed of Bangla Muslim League. ASM Solaiman of 
Krishak Sramik Party, Advocate Sharafat Hossain Choudhury of Repblican Party, Syed Monzurul 
Ahsan of Nejame Islami Party, Altab Uddin Talukder of PGS(Shahriar ), Nur Mohammad Kazi of 
Peoples League. Khalequzzaman and Sheikh Showkat Hossain Nilu of BNP(Dudu-Nilu), Afazuddin 
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Choudhury of Jatyatabadi Chashi Dal, Salina Majumder of Bhasani-NAP(Salina ), Dr Shahab uddin 
of National Labour Party, Azizul Islam Rana of National Perity Party, Waliul Islam Sukku Mia of Republican Party, Mohammad Zahir Khan of National Republican Party, Nurul Islam Nlollah of Banglar Communist Party, Mowlana Abdul Matin of Bangladesh Labour Party, Dr A Motaleb Sikder 
of National Labour Party(Sikder), Hasmat Ullah of Bangladesh Social Democratic Party. Mafizur 
Rahman Rokon of Bangladesh Progressive Party, Major(Rtd) Afser Uddin of National Democratic Party, MA Samad of Democratic Party, Mawlana Obaidullah Bin Said Jalalabadi, Asraf Ali of Janata Party, Shafiqur Rahman of Islamic Democratic League, Syed Sirazul Huda of Jatya Dal(Huda), Syed 
Sirazul Huda of Front for Natioanal Solidarity, Ruhul Amin of Janoganotantrik Dal, Md. Bajedur 
Rahman Khan of United Republican Party, Rafiqullah Choudhury of Khelafate Rabbani Party, MA 
Malek of Bangladesh Islamic Party, A. K. M Shamsul Huda of Liberal Democratic Party, and Dr Abu Taher of Adarsha Samajtantrik Party. See the Weekly Bichittra, 13 January 1984, pp. 9-10 59 See The Weekly Bichittra, 17 February 1984, p. 7. Of those who joined the dialogue, "11 parties demanded the Presidential election first; 3 parties for parliamentary election first and 28 parties for 
Presidential and parliamentary election in the same day. In addition, 49 parties demanded the normal 
political activities. Among them 28 parties demanded the cancellation or the shift of Upazilla 
elections while in opposite 15 parties demanded the Upazilla election in date. Moreover, 5 parties of 
them demanded to announce the country as "Islamic Republic of Bangladesh" and 6 demanded to 
form Islamic advisory council. However, 17 parties demanded the release or legal rights of political 
prisoners punished by the military tribunal. " 
60 For details of the interview of Major (Rtd) Jalil, President of the JSD, see "The Weekly Bichittra" 
27 January 1984, pp. 21-26; the interview however, described the state of politics in his own JSD and 
overall condition of national politics of the time. He gave birth to a debate on the leadership of AL in 
which argued that `Sheikh Hasina might be the antecedent of the properties of Sheikh Mujib, not at 
all of his politics' and commented on BNP chief Begum Khaleda Zia that `if Zia was alive, Begum 
Khaleda Zia did never get into politics and she came in politics only when Zia was dead. This did not 
mean when Zia was alive, the Bangladesh was not in distresses. 
61 It should be mentioned here that Sheikh Hasina encountered this allegation in an interview with the 
Bichittra on 3 February 1984 in which she replied that she was in abroad when AL delegates in 1981 
elected her as President of the party, which was quite democratic and inconsistent with the allegation 
of ancestral selection. See the details interview of Sheikh Hasina with Bichittra Staff Reporter Kazi 
Jawad, `The Weekly Bichittra, 10 February 1984, pp. 19-23. In the same way, the leader of 7-Party, 
Begum Zia replied this accusation of Jalil in an interview in the end of February 1984 in which she 
defended her selection of the party leader as the result of good wishes of BNP workers. For details, 
See the interview of Begum Khaleda Zia with Kazi Jawad, staff reporter, The Weekly Bichittra, 2 
March 1984, pp. 23-26. 
62 In the pre-independent period, in 1969, when the then East Pakistan was passing the waves of 
mass upsurge, the AL chief Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman attended a round-table conference 
with the military leaders of West Pakistan in Lahore and presented his historical six points demand. 
At the same time the NAP leader Mowlana Bhasani was against the dialogue and moved with 
demonstrations and rallies all over the country. But the dialogue made Sheikh Mujib more efficient 
and acceptable leader than that of Bhasani to military authority as well as among the people of East 
Pakistan. In 1971, when the AL achieved the absolute majority, the military ruler of Pakistan Yahya 
Khan invited Sheikh Mujib for dialogue and Mujb attended the discussion, which was broken down 
following a massacre and genocide on the people of East Pakistan on 25 March 1971. In 1976, 
General Zia, the new military leader of the country invited the political leaders in dialogue to discuss 
the way of how the political parties would be restored which was following a restoration of political 
parties and several stage elections in 1976-1979. In the present situation, General Ershad invited the 
political dialogue when he found the two rival stream of opposition political alliance were united on 
5-points demand and that was following a possibility of mass upsurge. He took this initiative to 
communicate political leaders directly as to find out the leaders for his planned political Front. On the 
other hand, the opposition political parties created the space of dialogue for security and release of 
their thousands of imprisoned party workers. 
63 On March 26 1984, while a political front consisting of 26 parties in support of military dictator 
was completed, the dictator withdrew the ban on political activities. The dictator threatened the 
mainstream opposition that he would return in full swing Martial Law, if they continued their boycott 
the dialogue. 
64 See The Weekly Bichittra, Dhaka, 6 April, 1984, p. 10 
65 For the details of the dialogue and the 33-points demand of 7-party alliance and 10-points demand 
of 15-party alliance, see The Weekly Bichittra, 20 April 1984. pp. 19-26. Both of the opposition 
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alliance presented their separate points of demand to okay out a passage to democracy, ignoring their 
5-points demand, although both of the alliance treated these demands as extension of 5-points. The 7-party alliances sit with dictator three times on 9,12, and 20 April 1984, in which they presented 
their `33-points demand' to restore democracy, in which they demanded to reinstate the related article 
of election matters of suspended constitution of 1982, withdrawal of Martial Law and holding first 
the parliamentary election. On other hand, the 15-party alliance attended the dialogue on 11, .... and 21April 1984 in which they presented `10-points demand'. The 15-party alliances demanded a 
proclamation on the withdrawal of Martial Law and gave importance on the holding the 
parliamentary election and thereafter an elected parliament would decide to reinstate the constitution. 
There it was clear that the 7-party alliance was in favour of suspended constitution of 1982 and 15- 
party alliance favoured the original constitution of 1972. 
66 The rise of JIB in the post-1975 politics was patronised mainly by Zia regime. As a collaborator 
forces, the new generation of the society could not accept this forces in Bangladesh politics. About 
the role of the JIB in present political situation, many students wrote their reactions to the WeeklI- 
Bichittra which was published on 25'' May 1984, p. 41-43. Among other, Syed Istaqur Reza, a 
student of Mass Communication and Journalism, University of Dhaka, wrote: 'those who compared 
the freedom fighters of national liberation war with the unbelievers Jews; considered the country's 
peoples for independence as the shoals of India-Russia; destroyed the Shahid Millar (martyr 
memorial), blood-strained their hands with the killings of 3million Bengali people and raped the two 
hundred thousands mothers and sisters during the period of liberation war; that one of the main 
enemy of '52 and '71, the JIB began to vaunt in the cover of democracy. He expressed his deep 
hatred to the 22-party leaders in regard to considering the JIB as the force of democratic movement 
while the pointed claw of the evil hands of this anti-liberation force tear asunder of Bangladesh 
society. 
67 The dictator started joining the public meeting and rallies under the banner of Jana Dal and called 
the opposition to participate in the forthcoming election, in his word, to restore democracy in the 
country. 
68 See The Weekly Bichittra, 15 June 1984, p. 11. In the advancement of the Jano Dal, at this stage, 
some leaders of the both alliances including the senior leader of the AL Mr Korban Ali and top level 
leader of the BNP and one of the main member of the opposition Liaison Committee Captain (Rtd) 
Abdul Halim Choudhury joined the cabinet of the dictator in August 1984. This co-optation by the 
dictator brought the opposition alliances closer to choose the hard-line against the dictator until the 
end of 1984. 
69 See the Weekly Bichittra, 21 September 1984, p. 8. Moreover, AL President Sheikh Hasina in her 
delivery told that the all regimes in the politics of post independent Bangladesh were illegal, which 
generated scrupulous dissatisfaction in the opposition BNP. The pro-dictator Jana Dal tried to break 
this unity asking Sheikh Hasina in a press statement by Secretary General Mahbubur Rahman if she 
considered the post 1975 regimes illegal. However, the charge was dumped by her counter accusation 
of legality of politics of the Generals in uniforms 
70 See details in the Weekly Bichittra, 28 September 1984, p. 20. The AL considered Bangabandhu 
Sheikh Mujib as the founding father of Bangladesh while the BNP did not recognise it; the BNP 
considered Major Zia (later President of the country and the founder of the BNP) as the announcer of 
the independence of the country while AL did never agree it; the AL government under 
Bangabandhu established one-party socialist government while the BNP set up multiparty politics; 
the main policy of the AL government under Mujib was the nationalisation of industrial sector and 
set up limitation of capital investment while the BNP withdrew the capital from nationalised sector 
and encourage privatisation and free market; the BNP was formed mainly by ex- Muslim League 
leaders while the AL treated these ML leaders as the collaborator with the aggressor Pakistan Army 
during the liberation war of 1971; the AL upheld the Bengali nationalism while the BNP supported 
the Bangladeshi nationalism; the AL wanted to restore the original constitution of 1972 while the 
BNP was strict to the suspended constitution of 1982; the BNP put forward 33-points demand in the 
dialogue with the Junta while the AL formed a 10-points demand and a sub committee for the 
dialogue; the AL demanded first the sovereign parliamentary election while the BNP was for 
parliamentary election under the rules of suspended constitution; the AL demanded the trial of killing 
of Bangabanhu while the BNP supported the ordinance of Khondoker Mostaque that prohibited the 
trial of killers. In this way, there were many doubts about the longevity of the unity between two 
parties in the nearer future. But both of the parties were under pressure from their support base for 
stiffer actions against the junta, which led them to organise a national level rally in Dhaka on 14 
October 1984-the AL at MM Avenue and the BNP at BM mosque premise in which they 
demanded the full lifting of Martial Law. The 15-party alliance repeated their 5-point demand 
- 154 - 
holding the JS elections immediately under the neutral caretaker government and the BNP demanded 
the release of their leaders and workers before the elections. 71 See details report " Sarker: Saya o' Nirdaliyo" (Government : Shadow and Neutral) by Shariar 
Kabir and Kazi Jawad in the Weekly Bichittra, 16 November 1984, pp. 21-28 72 See The Bangladesh Observer, February 10,12,1985. 
73 On February 22, the nomination filing date for General Election on 24`ß' February was postponed 
and the top level military commanders in a meeting with General Ershad in the chair in the following 
day decided for a possible seizure of political rights and revival of Zonal, Sub-Zonal and District 
Martial Courts, which was announced on 1 March 1985 by the dictator in his address to nation. 74 The party of the dictator was formed with former pro-dictator Jana Dal, UPP, GP, BNP (Shah) and 
ML (Siddiquee). The primary allies of the dictator under the JP were found into three stages- 
Presidium (18-members), National Executive Committee (57-members) and National Committee 
(601-members). The dictator tried to uncover his uniform with the formation of the JP. The primary 
allies of the junta under the JP, is therefore important to mention here. The members of the JP 
Presidium were Mizanur Rahman Choudhury, Moudud Ahmad, Kazi Zafar Ahmed, Sirajul Hossain 
Khan, Riaz Uddin Ahmed (Bhola Mia), Saluddin Kader Choudhury, Barrister Sultan Ahmed 
Choudhury, M Korban Ali, Shah Moazzem Hossain, Barrister Anisul Islam Mahmud, Anwar Hossain 
Manzu, Humayun Rashid Choudhury, A. K. M. Maidul Islam, Air Vice Marshal (Rtd. ) Aminul Islam, 
Captain Abdul Halim Choudhury, Shamsul Huda Choudhury, MA Satter and Justice A. K. M. Nurul 
Islam. All of them except the last two were the member of the cabinet of the military government. 
The members of 57-Executive Committee including 10 Ministers were Professor MA Matin 
(Secretary General), three Joint Secretary Generals as Shafiqul Gani Shapan, Lt Col (Rtd. ) Zafar 
Imam and Motafa Jamal Haider. The members included Anwar Zahid, Sunil Gupta, Mainuddin 
Bhuiya, Ziauddin Bablu, Mesbauddin Babul, Sheikh Shahidul Islam, Mamata Ohab, Ex-Minister 
Professor Yusuf Ali, Ex-Minister Shamsul Haque, Col (Rtd) M. Anwar Ullah, Upendra Lai Chakma, 
Ex. State Minister Kamrun Naher Zafar, Ex Minister Barrister Abdul Haque, SA Khaleque, Jahangir 
Mohammad Adel, Nazim Uddin Al Azad, Mahabubul Haque Dolon, Monirul Haque Choudhury, 
Tajul Islam Choudhury, Ex State Minister Nur Mohammad Khan, Enamul Karim Shahid, Ex State 
Minister Professor Abdus Salam, Dr Mansur Ali, Ex State Minister Ruhul Amin Howlader, Palas 
Anwar Moti, Advocate Faiz, Sekander Mia, Shamsuzzaman Mintu, Khurrom Khan Choudhury, 
Hashim Uddin Ahmed, MB Zaman, Asraf Ali Khan, Mumdood Choudhury, Nurunnabi Khan, Abul 
Khair Choudhury, Redoanul Haque Choudhury (Idu), Ismail Hossain Bengal, Kazi Mujibur Rahman, 
Barrister Jamal Hossain Bhuiya, Advocate Riazul Haque Choudhury, Abdur Rahim Azad, Bulbul 
Khan Mahabub, Haroonur Rashid, Khaledur Rahman Tito, Ashgar Ali, Ekramul Rasul, KG Karim, 
Ali Nur Rahman Khan Sajo, Adeel Uddin Howlader, Sarder Sultan Mahmud, Abdul Ali Bulbul, 
Advocate Mohammad Mohsin and Saifuddin Ahmed. The 601members National Committee mainly 
recruited the district and Thana level intermediary leaders. 
75 A large faction of the BNP (Shah) and ML (Siddiquee) did not join the JP. Ex-Secretary General of 
the Jana Dal Mr Mahbubur Rahman was also not happy with the formation of the JP. Ex-Prime 
Minister Ataur Rahman Khan and Shah Azizur Rahman of the BNP (Shah) were not given any 
position in the new JP. Ex- Minister for Food and former Jana Dal leader Air Vice-Marshal A. G. 
Mahmud disagreed his involvement in the formation of the JP. On 1S` January 1985, Shah Azizur 
Rahamn in a meeting in Kustia told that he and his party had no involvement in the formation of the 
JP. But it was found later that Land Reform Minister AKM Maidul Islam and Panning Minister 
Barrister Sultan Ahmed Choudhury of his party joined the JP. A faction of the GP under the 
leadership of Tajul Islam Choudhury and Abdur Razzak protested the vanishing of their party on 2 
January 1985. On the same day, a large faction of the ML (Siddiquee) under the leadership of ANM 
Yusuf and Syeda Razia Faiz protested their involvement in the formation of the JP and expelled SK 
Choudhury and two others from the ML (Siddiquee). 
76 See the Weekly Bichittra, 31 January 1986, pp 12-14 
77 In this connection, the BNP (Shah) leader Shah Azizur Rahman had a meeting with Sheikh Hasina 
of the AL, which however, was failed to gain the approval from BNP leader Begum Zia, even though, 
a strong unity of the workers in all actions against the dictator was glimpsed in the main line 
opposition alliances. However, another initiative in the same time to form an 'All Party Struggle 
Unity' by BNP Chairperson Begum Zia was not successful. 
78 On the occasion of observing the Language Martyr Day (2151 February) a clash involving guns and 
bomb blasts between the rival youth and students factions of the AL and the BNP at the Central 
Shaid Minar (Language Martyrs Memorial) killed an AL worker named Sohrab and many others 
were injured including AL Dhaka City Secretary Mofazzel Hossain Choudhury Maya. 
78 The clash 
started from the unruly attempts by the rival BCL and JCD workers to set the portraits of 
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Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and General Zia-the two political icons of the AL and the 
BNP respectively, on the main pillars of the Memorial structure. The AL leader accused armed 
gangsters of the dictator for this brutal event who were hiding inside the BNP and the JSD. See the 
Weekly Bichittra 
, 28 February, 1986, p. 12 79 See the Weekly Bichittra, 21 March, 1986, p. 13. On 3`d March 1986, Begum Zia of 7-party alliance 
in a gathering in Begumgonj, Noakhali said that the election was nothing but a farce and this date of 
election was announced to destroy the movement. The AL President Sheikh Hasina on 7`h March 
1986 in a gathering of her party urged the workers to form the `Mass Struggle Committee' from the 
capital to the peripheral village community to achieve the 5-points demands aiming at the collapse of 
the dictator from power, which vowed for `no election' under Martial Lawv. However, there was 
seemed to be a dramatic change in the opposition front. It was reported that Sheikh Hasina of the AL 
and Begum Khaleda Zia of the BNP secretly met together for two times, one on 9th March and 
another on 13`x' March 1986 and discussed the possible course of actions in the eve of the 
announcement of the election by the dictator. Their summit was arranged secretly by a non-political 
group. Only 2/1 senior leaders of both parties were present in these meetings of the two key 
opposition leaders. Even the other components of both of the alliances were not communicated the 
contents of their discussion. However, it became clear that both of the two leaders prepared for a 
united participation in the election. However, the participation of all opposition forces was 
enlightened by a dramatic proposal by Comrade Forhad in which the two key leaders-Sheikh 
Hasina and Begum Zia were proposed to participate in 150 seats each that covered whole 300 
constituencies of the JS. This proposal possibly was passing the extreme debates towards an 
acceptance to the two rival opposition alliances. No sooner this decision of the opposition was 
announced, the dictator on 15`h March 1986 had proclaimed a military order with an emergency 
amendment of the Electoral Representatives Order of 1972 of the constitution, which limited at best 5 
seats to be contested by a single candidate. 
80 It was believed that the military dictator was in fear to contest the both alliance in the election. The 
popular argument regarding the participation of the AL was that this party was in the opposition for 
long time. They had lost many leaders and workers in the process of movement against the both 
military regime of General Zia and General Ershad. In this stage, the leadership of the party felt a 
transition of peaceful environment that would be favourable to increase their support base. Therefore 
they chose the participation in the election to protect their organisational strength rather than removal 
of the dictator. In addition, the AL was not still trusted by the Armed Forces in the post-1975 politics. 
They had needed to regain the trust of the military. On the other hand, the ideologies of the BNP and 
pro-dictator JP were same. The participation of the AL in the election might be a part of this 
necessity. By contrast, the BNP had acceptance in the Army as its founder General Zia was popular 
officer during his service in the army as well as serving as President of the country. Zia protected 
the interest of the Army over the political elites of Bangladesh society. The BNP leadership was very 
much understood that win over of the JP in the election must ruin their support base. Moreover, it 
was believed that General Ershad managed the pro-Zia military officers who also worked to restrain 
BNP from the election, so that it would be easier for the dictator to face a single opposition group in 
the election that ultimately strengthen his power under a legal shape of constitution. Political analyst 
believed that the organisational strength of the AL was far better than that of the BNP, which led 
them to be soft for election. Although, the BNP was more united at this time under the leadership of 
Begum Zia, still their many leaders were either in jail or joined the side of the dictator, which 
predicted a loosing the party in the election. This fear of defeat along with a pressure from a group of 
military allies, who were soft for General Zia, was believed to restrain them from the elections 
81 Mohammad Khusbu , Bangladesher 
Chattra Andoloner Itihas: Ershader Shamoykal (The History 
of Student Movement in Bangladesh: Ershad Period), Student Ways, Dhaka, p. 13. The 14-student 
organisations included: Bangladesh Chatra League(Jalal-Jahangir), Bangladesh Chatra League 
(Fazlu-Chunnu) Bangladesh Chatra League (Inu), Bangladesh Student Union, Bangla Chatra Union, 
Bangladesh Chatra Moitree, Bangladesh Chatra League (Aziz-Musharraf), Ganotantrik Chatra Union, 
Biplobi Chatra Dhara, Chatra Oikya Forum, Bangladesh Chatra Kendra, Samajbadi Chatra Jote and 
Samajtantrik Chatra Front, Revolutionary Student Union (Israfil) and Bangla Student Union (Shahid). 
The birth of the CSAC was not planned. It started with an event on 5 November, 1982 in which 5 left 
lining student components including BCL (Inu), Revolutionary Student Moitree, Student Unity 
Forum, Revolutionary Student Union (Israfil) and Bangla Student Union (Shahid) released a joint 
statement against the military junta. After this statement, on the observance of `Taher Day'on 7th 
November 1982, the BCL (Inu) brought out a procession in the Dhaka University Campus on 8'h 
November as the previous day was a closing in the campus. Police attacked on the procession and 
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arrested a woman teacher of the University. 14 student organisations protested this arrest together. 
This was considered as the first step in the formation of the CSAC 82 The historic 10-points demand of the CSAC included l. (a)Issue and materialize an universal, 
scientific, discrimination-less, democratic education policy in no time, taking the opinions of students, 
teachers, intellectuals political activities and the guardians concerned with a view to democratic 
rights and exploitation free of the general people placed before. Education has to be recognized as a 
basic right in the constitution. (b)The autonomous rights of universities have to be kept intact. Instead 
of the government or the president being the chancellor of the university, an educationist has to be 
selected as a chancellor, by rejecting the principle issued before. Reject the undemocratic executive 
bodies introduced in agricultural universities, Islamic and Shahajalal and Khulna Universities and 
introduce democratic executive bodies like other ones. In Islami university, like other universities all 
the departments and subjects must be introduced.. (c) Ensure the real autonomy in all the educational 
institutions and compile educational programmes. In the need of general people the right of changing 
all the principles and amendment has to be given to the educational institutions. Ensure and increase 
the participation of teachers, students, officials, educationist and guardians in the management of 
educational institutions and the illogical power of the bureaucrats has to be stopped. Stop the 
interference of the government and the imperial organizations on educational institutions and its 
programmes. (d) Remove the discrimination in educational sectors like public, private, village and 
towns (Cadet College, Kindergarten, Residential Model School, Pre-Cadet, Tutorial Homes and 
Madrasa etc. ) and introduce all over the country one chancel of education through the same education 
system. Education has not to be used from commercial point-of-views. Stop non-governmental 
medical colleges and universities etc. (e) Prescribe the text book at the aim of building the learners as 
a conscious patriot civilian belonging to democratic scientific and positivistic ideas. In the text books 
the real history and sentiments of freedom struggle, the bravery movements of the students against 
the dictator, national prides and different movements at the aim of freeing the mass people have to be 
included. Redeem all backdated elements from the text books. (f) Select the text books according to 
the capability of the students belonging to those levels. The compulsory 'Diniat' and Arabic have to 
be discarded. All types of terrorism have to be stopped in the educational institutions so that teachers 
are able to teach in classes and laboratories routinely and complete the syllabuses in due time. Allot 
seats according to merits. (g) Education to be free and compulsory upto class X. Distribute the 
essentials books freely and to arrange educational allowances for the poor students regularly in every 
month. Serve free food and uniform for the students in the primary level. To develop the higher 
education in the case of socio-economic conditions of the country, increase the number of medical, 
engineering, agricultural and polytechnic colleges, including houses, books of the primary and higher 
secondary schools. (h) Confirm at least 8 percent of the national budget in to the educational sectors 
according to the request of UNESCO. Reduce the expenditure given in the under developmental 
sectors including military one. Compulsory military education to be given to all the young boys and 
girls. (i)Mother language has to be the process of learning. The books of foreign languages have to be 
rendered into mother language and those have to be made easy for the students and establish the 
national redesign society. General libraries have to be established and regular money to be provided 
at the initiative of the government from the up level to the capital city. Note books business to be 
stopped. (j)Examination system must be modern and scientific. Unfair means and corruption in the 
examination to be stopped. Necessary steps have to be taken against corruption, negligence, inactivity 
and irresponsibility of educational sectors including education ministry. Democratization and 
autonomization have to be given to the primary education official and the secondary and higher 
secondary education board. (k) At the aim of spreading women education, necessary steps have to be 
taken. A large number of women halls and hostels to be set up. In order to eradicate illiteracy and 
materialize adult education by taking necessary steps the illiterate people of the country have to be 
taught and make conscious. Steps must be taken to the backward situation of the minority groups. 2 
(a) In no time, increasing student fees have to be rejected. Increase budget in educational sectors and 
make student fees equal in public and private ones. Adjusted to the education expenditure, the 
number and amount of student-scholarship to be increased. Ensure the student life so that no student 
can stop their education life due to economic problem. Part time jobs have to be given to the students. 
(b) 50 percent to be made concession for the students in the rent of rail, buses, steamers, launches and 
all the vehicles including air lines. Remove the bureaucratic and administrative complexity related to 
it. A huge amount of subsidy has to be provided for dining and canteen of the halls and hostels. By 
founding a shop at the initiative of the governing bodies, books, notes-books, pen, pencils to be 
served to the students at the produced price. The educational implements imported from abroad have 
to be tax-free. Stop the scandals about the board-books, and ensure the books to be available to the 
students on due time at the initiative of the government. (c) Seats have to be increased in every 
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educational institution from university level to lower educational institutions according to the 
proportion of the people and their demands. New schools, colleges and universities have to be set up. 
Expand every education institution by building up class rooms, laboratory, halls and hostels. 
Affiliations and allowances of the educational institutions have not to be rejected due to political 
reasons. Free the session Jam and complete the educational courses and ensure the result publishing 
on due time. Remove the VI. P. quota in admitting students. (d) Increase the opportunities in 
educational institution health check for students regularly, free treatment, gymnasium and play 
ground, including training centres for athletes. (e) Necessary steps have to be taken up at the aim of 
increasing status including the prestigious salary of the teachers and the guarantee of jobs. Lack of 
teaches have to be filled up by employing a large number of capable teachers in the educational 
institutions. Except for any apparent reasons, the teachers living in abroad have to be brought back to 
the country. The problems of the workers in the educational institution have to be solved. (f) At the 
end of education life, the jobs of the students have to be ensured. The age of governmental jobs have 
to be limited to 30 years. Prohibitions of the governmental jobs have to be lifted out. In no time 1 
lack and 35 thousand empty cadres have to be employed. (g) Necessary steps have to be taken to 
desert the armed and terrors from the educational institutions. Ensure peace and safely educational 
environment. 3. Immediately arrest the companions of Ershad corrupted Ministers M. P. S jobbers 
politicians plunderers businessmen military and non-military bureaucrats in the objection of illegal 
possession and corruption, trial them and forfeit all the properties earned in and illegal ways . There 
should prescribe a list of those who had come to help Ershad in various ways and opened fire on the 
students and general people during the long nine years. Arrange their trials. In democratic movement 
from 1982 to date, form a fair investigation committee with teacher's students, Journalist, officials 
and lawyers, make a complete list of the wounded and exhibit a report with real facts. The criminals 
of the crucial killings and tortures have to be punished, The martyrs should be given status by the 
state, They have to be given economic support and reemploy the people who lost their jobs in the 
democratic movement. 4. Ensure the freedom of Voice, Journals, the autonomy of judicial branches 
and all the basic needs and reject all the undemocratic section of the constitution and the amendments; 
issue a democratic constitution and establish the full democratic orders. Laws against the basic rights 
have not to be issued. He has to be accountable to the peoples' parliament. Accountable parliament 
has to be set up. In the last 9 years the student, and the politicians who had been given punishment in 
the military law, involved in the anti-autocratic and communal movement, have to be freed; all the 
false suites to be rejected. In the military court and law the punished people have to be given 
opportunities for appeal and review. The special power act 74, and the printing press and publications 
act 73, to be rejected. The prisoners act introduced in the colonial regime to be changed. State 
prisoners have to be given political status, introducing state prisoner's rules. 5. (a) Reducing the price 
of Daily and customary things including food, and facing the famine and economic crisis have to be 
removed. Increasing rail, bus, launch rent have to be reduced. The rationing system across the 
country to be introduced. In the rationing the existing discrimination in the various services has to be 
removed and follow the balanced principle. Make the treatment facilities expansion and easy for the 
people. Increase the number of health centers. The decision of taking fees from the patients in the 
hospital to be changed the privatization of the health sectors not to be done. Stop all kinds of luxurius 
things to be imported. (b) Increase the government expenditure in the necessary sectors like education, 
agriculture, treatment, vehicles and residence. Ensure the residents of the shelter less people. (c) The 
government has to bear the every responsibility of the wounded freedom fighters, orphans and 
disabled old people. 6 (a) Mass sentiment and aspirations grown out of independence and freedom 
war, have to be made standing high. Ensure the democratic success through freedom struggles. 
(b)There must be rooted out the political bases of Jobbers of 71, reactants fundamental religious 
preachers and communal political forces. (c) Democratic administrations have to be set up. Stop the 
militarization of administration in every sector. Dissolve the retired military officials appointed in the 
private and public autonomous organization by contact. (d) Give autonomy all types of mass media 
including radio, television free from government control on the basis of democratic principles. 7. In 
economy the arsons of lending capital have to be banned. Stop the arsons by the multinational 
corporations. From the state bank the loans of millions taken by the people have to be recovered. 
Reject the given lease to the foreign companies the Haripur oil mine. and for the search and 
extraction of any other material resources no steps against national interest would be taken. Reject all 
the unequal economic and commercial contact with the foreign countries. Ensure all the right of the 
labors according to the ILO convension. Make the EPZ in to general industrial sectors make the 
democratic rights of the labors sure. 5 points demand of the Sramik Karmachari Oikkya parishad 
have to be materialized. Child labor has to be banned. Necessary steps have to be taken for protecting 
the environment, trail jobbers of 71 and killers of the general people. Rusticate in no time. Golam 
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Azam; all the debts of Pakistan have to be taken. Religion must not be used in state activities. 
derogating the bases of the movement of freedom struggles. All the civilians will exercise their own 
religious values in their personal life. On the basis of religion determination of the status of the 
civilians and religious tortuous will not be held. The state cannot patronize religion and come as a barrier. Ban the communal and religious business politics. Religious temples can not be used as 
political activities. 8(a) Stop the expansion and publicity/ broadcasting of the obscene, superstitious 
and the foreign culture. Build up the mass media as the centers of the exercise of public and creative 
arts culture. For the good and mobile movies, in the theater movement and publication, forfeight and 
make open national stage. The report of cultural commissions has to be rejected. Allow the demands 
of the united cultural alliances. The public advertising principles have to be banned. (b) Defense all 
the activities against morality including bribe, corruption, nepotism, smuggling black marketing 
luxury squandering prostitution drugs like heroine, gambling housing have to be banned completely, 
rehabilitate the prostitute socially. (c) Reform the lands. Stop the activities of all the imperialistic aid 
organization for the anti national interest. Permit 10 point demands of 17 peasant and artisan 
organization. Ensure the easy peasant loan and the proper price of agricultural products. Stop 
certificate suite, crock arsons in the name of peasant loan. (d) Ensure the equal rights and status of 
women and men. Make rooms for the salvation of women by ensuring the right of political lawful 
economic, social ones. Women and child trafficking and women and child have to be prohibited 
strongly, bring back the trafficked women and children imprisoned in the foreign countries. In the 
time of working of the women workers in the absence of mother, Nurseries have to be opened up 
with the cost of the state to look after the children. The demands raised by the progressive democratic 
societies have to be accepted. (e) During the 9 year movement. all the equity demands of all the 
classes and professions have to be granted. Ensure the right of living of all the people in every 
profession. 9. The Enemy property Act has to be cancelled. Minority groups across the country 
including the Chittagong Hill Tracts, have to be given recognition and ensure the rights of self 
defiance and should take steps for their cultural and economic development. Stop military torture on 
the minority groups of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and solve the problem politically. 10. Foreign 
policies based on imperialism have to be rejected and introduce the alliance free foreign policies. 
Play the strong role in support of all freedom struggle including Palestine and also against was design 
in the struggle of establishing world peace, Take a strong stand against imperialism foreign 
aggression, hegemonism, racism, fascism, Colonialism and neo-colonialism. Bring back the 
Bangladeshi soldiers sent Saudi Arabia in no time. Solve the legal solution with the neighboring 
countries keeping the national interest intact about Farakka south Talpatti, Three Bigha Corridors. 
Make a friendly relationship with the third world underdeveloped nations and nonaligned countries. 
83 It should be mentioned here that the junta administration sent a proposal through Fazlul Halim 
Choudhury, VC, University of Dhaka, to discuss the issue with the CSAC leaders on 8 January 1983. 
After this proposal, the student leaders were adamant not to sit with the junta until the midnight of 91h 
January 1983. Some bodies could not fix the decision in this stage. In this milieu, the student leaders 
discussed the issue with the leaders of their parent political parties. The political leaders advised them 
to postpone the action plan of 11`h January 1983. Because, the opposition political parties themselves 
were not ready to encounter the junta at this moment. As a result, after 9`h January 1983, student 
politics became divided and unable to forge any direct movement against military junta. In this stage, 
in a meeting of 14th student organisations on 10`h January 1983, the CSAC took the decision to 
discuss the issue with the government. Shortly afterwards, it was not successful as the junta was not 
serious to discuss the issue with the CSAC leaders to avoid direct harassment of the government by 
the student leaders. The junta feared that the discussion might lead to a more difficult situation for the 
military administration. 
84 The newly formed alliance for 9-student organisations consisted of Bangladesh Chatra League 
(Nazmul-Shafi), Bangladesh Chatra Moitree, Bangladesh Chatra League (Aziz-Musharraf), 
Ganotantrik Chatra Union, Biplobi Chatra Dhara, Chatra Oikya Forum, Bangladesh Chatra Kendra, 
Samajbadi Chatra Jote and Samajtantrik Chatra Front 
85 Karl Mannheim (1936), " The sociological Problem of Intelligentsia" in Ideology and Utopia : An 
Introduction to the sociology of knowledge, for details see Chapter-III, Section- 4, , London, pp. 
136-146 
R6 Roberto Michels, "Intellectuals" in The Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Vol-8, 
87 Karl Mannheim, op. cit. p. 9 
88 Abu -Abudullah (ed) (1991), Modernisation At Bay, University Press Limited, Dhaka, p. 117 89The orders and amendments of the dictator regarding the judiciary from 12 April 1982 to 8 May 
1982 destroyed the honest sprit of the judiciary in accordance with the articles of the fundamental 
rights in the constitution. In this period, the dictator amended the rules of the appointment of Chief 
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Justice of the country and appointed his own man in this position. In the name of decentralisation of 
the judiciary, the dictator established three permanent benches of the High Court outside the capital 
in order to disperse the lawyers' movement in the country. 90 On 16'h October 1982,12 eminent lawyers of the country were arrested under the military order of 
14/15/17 including Sirajul Haque, the then President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, Syed 
Ishtiaq Ahmed, Shamsul Haque Choudhury, Khondoker Mahbubuddin Ahmed, Shawkat Ali Khan, 
Shudangshu Shekhor Haider, Mohammad Yasin, Mahfuzur Rahman, Kaiser Uddin Ahmed, Sved 
Sirajul Huda, Khademul Islam Choudhury, MA Wahab and on 19 June in the same year Mohammad 
Hannan was arrested. In protest of their arrest, the dictator had to fact bitter protest and pressure 
from the national and international forces that were able to release these 13 lawyers on 26`h October 
1982. 
91 The six-point demands of the lawyers included: 1. The provisions and articles of the basic rights in 
the constitution shall be reinstated immediately, 2. to withdraw The martial law shall be withdrawn 
and the transfer of the power to an interim national government shall be ensured and it must me 
ensured that this interim government arrange the parliamentary election before the Presidential 
election of 31st March 1984 and transfer of power immediately to that elected government 3. to 
withdraw The military orders that deny the principals of the constitution and established permanent 
bench of high court in the district levels must be withdrawn and reinstate immediately the provisions 
and rights of writ that was stopped by the military orders must be reinstated immediately by which 
the basic rights of the constitution would be safeguarded and removal of the administrative injustice 
would be ensured, 4. The Muncef and Magistrate court in Thana level that was established in the 
name of restructuring and decentralisation of the judiciary, which was unnecessary and an obstacle 
for the healthy judiciary system and created pressure on the overall economy of the country shall be 
cancelled 5. All illegal regulations, ordinances and amendments including the rules of civil and 
criminal procedures, penal codes and civil courts shall be cancelled as these are not helpful for the 
development of free and fair judiciary, 6. The nominated council that was formed by military order 
after the cancellation of the elected Bar Council must be cancelled and the new election date of the 
Bangladesh Bar Council should be announced immediately. However, in favour their demands, they 
started a long-term movement against the attempt of the decentralisation of judiciary, amendments of 
the constitution and against the appointment of the Chief Justice by junta government. They used all 
their efforts like protests in the street and fights in the court for their demands for a fair and free 
judiciary in the country. 
92 The Eighth Amendment of the constitution which ensured the Islam as state religion in the country 
and six branches of the High Court in six regional areas was challenged by the first line eminent 
lawyers of the country. This was declared in appropriate in accordance with the main articles in the 
constitution for the fundamental rights of the people by the High Court verdict by 3: 1 judges on 2nd 
September 1989. After the hearing of 31 days, the panel of the full bench of the Supreme Court 
consisting 4-members including Justice Badrul Haider Choudhury, Justice Shahabuddin (later the 
chief of the caretaker government immediately after the fall of General Ershad), Justice MH Rahman, 
and Justice ATM Afzal. Among them, Justice Afzal rejected the Appeal. 
93 PROKRISI means Prokoushalee (Engineer), Krishibid (Agriculturists) and Chikitshak (Doctors), 
which is the Bengali term of the Central Coordination Committee of the Engineers, Agriculturists and 
Medical Doctors. It was formed in February 1978. The first chairman and convener were Engineer M 
KA Siddiquee and Agriculturist Mirja MA Jalil. 
94 In the beginning of March 1978 the Central Coordination Committee of the Engineers, Doctors and 
Agriculturalists announced some actions in which wearing black batch, two hours strike and full 
strike were mainly. The then government gave hope to fulfil some of their demands, but found no 
progress immediately. As a result, in the third week of April 1978, the Coordination Committee of 
these three professional groups again announced the actions for the movement, which included the 
extreme programme like mass resignation. 
95 In this movement, they won over their demands and the government was forced to announce the 
amendment of the salary scale on 13 May 1978 according to their demands. However, they 
demanded the establishment of rights of all professional cadres in their movement in the next couple 
of years when the Senior Service Pool in 1979 and Cadre Service in September 1980 were formed to 
ensure the participation of all professional groups in the administration. The BCS (Administration) 
association in September 1981 protested this initiative of the government with an advertisement in 
the newspapers, which created bitter reaction among all professional cadres in the administration. As 
a result, they became united and the BCS Coordination Committee excluding the BCS 
(Administration) cadre was formed in November 1981. The primary members of the Central BCS 
Coordination Committee were 21 Cadre Association and later it increased to 23 during the Ershad 
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regime. In 1990, the members increased to 26. These are: BCS (General Education), BCS (Health), 
BCS (Audit and Accounts), BCS (Taxation), BCS (Custom and Excise), BCS (Economic), BCS 
(Statistics), BCS (...... ), BCS (Public health and engineering) BCS (Telecom), BCS (Roads and High 
ways) BCS (Technical education) BCS (Anser), BCS (Information, radio) BCS (Postal) BCS 
(Railway engineer), BCS (Railway transport) BCS (Police), BCS (Information, General), BCS 
(Agriculture), BCS (Forest), BCS (Fisheries) BCS (Animal assets), BCS ( Information engineering) 
BCS (Food 
, General, technical), and BCS (trade). In the same month, Coordination Committee of 
these 23 BCS professional cadres, BMA, Institution of Agriculturists and Central Engineers Action 
Committee signed in a joint declaration, and send their demands to the then Government. The 
Government reached some crucial progress under a Cabinet Committee of the then Premier Shah 
Azizur Rahman, which was later completely ignored with the proclamation of Martial Law in March 
1982. The primary members of the Central BCS Coordination Committee were 21 Cadre Association 
and later it increased to 23 during the Ershad regime. In 1990, the members increased to 26. These are: 
BCS (General Education), BCS (Health), BCS (Audit and Accounts), BCS (Taxation), BCS (Custom 
and Excise), BCS (Economic), BCS (Statistics), BCS (...... ), BCS (Public health and engineering) 
BCS (Telecom), BCS (Roads and High ways) BCS (Technical education) BCS (Anser), BCS 
(Information, radio) BCS (Postal) BCS (Railway engineer), BCS (Railway transport) BCS (Police), 
BCS (Information, General), BCS (Agriculture), BCS (Forest), BCS (Fisheries) BCS (Animal assets), 
BCS ( Information engineering) BCS (Food , 
General, technical), and BCS (trade) 
96 See the leaflet in Bengali circulated by the BCS Cordination Committee in 1990 undersigned by 
MA Hena, as Chairman and Engineer Md Nurul Huda, In-charge Secretary General. The 17-points 
demand of the Central BCS Coordination Committee included: 1. People through their elected 
representatives, not the civil servants, shall be the "eyes and ears" of the government. The long 
practiced autocratic process of control in all stages of the administration should be ended by taking 
the steps to transfer power institutionally to the people's representatives from centre to grass roots 
level of the country. It shall be ensured the active and full participation of the people in the 
administration by appointing the people's representatives as coordinator and controlling agent in all 
stages, which would be able to end the long alienation of the people in developmental activities, 2. It 
should take steps to establish democracy as an institution permanently and ensure the accountability 
of the administration to the parliament by appointing the Ministers as the Administrative Head of the 
concern Ministry in stead of Secretary by changing the present rules of business of the government, 3. 
The government should increase the technical and expertise persons in all functional ministries and 
departments to establish stable and skilled administration and fill up all positions from Assistant 
Secretary to Secretary in all ministries and all positions of the field level departments under the 
ministry by the members of the BCS functional cadres under the concern ministry and members of 
the functional chief of the same departments, boards and corporations under the ministry, 4. There 
were some ministries that were mainly for the professionals including doctors, engineers and 
agriculturists, etc but there was not created any cadre service for them; The government should 
formulate definite functional base and employment policy to upgrade their position immediately into 
the cadre service and should create new cadre in this regard, where necessary. And also, the 
government should include the professionals in the cadres in some ministry in which there were the 
cadre services, but many qualified professionals were not still included, 5. It should be ensured that 
95% participation of all BCS professional cadres in ratio excluding the BCS (Administration) must 
be considered in the Prime Minister's Secretariat, Cabinet Division and Ministry of Establishment 
including the positions of the Secretary; especially it must be ensured immediately that the 
participation of the BCS professional cadres would be appointed in the positions of Secretary in the 
Prime Minister's Secretariat, Cabinet Division and Ministry of Establishment and in the same way, 
ensure the representatives of all professional cadres to be appointed in all departments and ministries 
of the government, 6. The chiefs of the Functional Directorate and Corporations should report 
directly to the Ministers so that they would be able to participate in the policy making of the 
government. It should be ensured that the representatives of all functional cadres shall be 
incorporated in the policy making and planning process of the government. The chief of the 
functional directorate and corporations should be given highest scale salary in conjunction with 
national pay scale. 7. According to the new policies in the reorganised employee structure announced 
by the government, the ranks of the national pay scale of the employees are only the parameters of 
their status in the administration. The government should announce each of these scales to a grade 
for the implementation of the policies in real sense. As a result, the functional officials will be 
introduced according their grade irrespective of their working offices and therefore the warrant of 
presidence of the government should be reorganised, 8. There should not have any BCS cadre 
without the functional necessity of different ministries. The government should end all 
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misunderstanding by taking steps to incorporate the BCS (administration) cadre to their main line of 
function and acoordingly, this cadre should be named as the BCS (Land) and BCS (Magistracy) and 
should be subordinated under the concern functional ministry, 9. Coordination of the Districts: In the 
name of coordination of the district, the DCs (Deputy Commissioners), the members of a functional 
cadre i. e. BCS (administration), were given all responsibilities of the development works and they 
became the functional head of the district administration. This is the complete violation of the policy 
of the equality and status of the inter-cadre service regulations. This has mainly interrupted the 
development activities all over the district. Moreover, an undue chaotic situation through out the 
administration all over the district is happened while these DCs were renamed as the District 
Commissioner, which means, all the members of the other cadre service were to be subordinated 
under the same rank of these DCs. The government should stop use the name these DCs as District 
Commissioner immediately and order for the DCs to coordinate the district should be cancelled. 
Public representatives should run the local administration at District, Thana and Union levels with the 
provision of reviewing the operational aspects of various functional heads working in the District, 
Thana and Union, 10. The government should unite and incorporate the secretariat administration 
with field level public administration and accordingly, the rules of business 1975 and secretariat 
instructions 1976 should be reorganised, 11. The government should build the development oriented 
administration. According to this aim and objectives, the following proposals from the 
recommendations of the Public administration Efficiency Study Group should be implemented: a) the 
filed level divisions and corporations should be given economic and administrative powers and these 
should be established as the basic operating units of the government, b) the inter-ministry 
coordination should be ensured in all stages of the administration and accordingly, the formality of 
unnecessary coordination of the officials excluding the function base relative cadres of the 
department and ministry should be stopped. c) The process of policy making should be more wide 
and enlarged and the chiefs of the corporations, directorates, departments, divisions and units should 
be incorporated in full and active participation of the decision making process up to the ministry 
level. d) The schedule-2 of the rules of business of the government should be reorganised and the first 
class gazetted officers should be given power to sign papers and agreements etc for the government, e) 
The project authorities should be given all economic and administrative powers including the 
appointment of manpower and buying of vehicles etc in the approved projects of the government that 
will end taking the long time in the implementation of the project. f) The real and experimented 
process of inspiration should be innovated to increase the skills of the officials and employees in the 
administration. 12. Accountable management should be ensured in all stages of the administration 
and accordingly, all subordinated positions under every ministry should be incorporated in line of 
their responsibilities and duties and the interruption of the external authority in breaking the 
pyramidal shape of each functional ministry should be stopped permanently. In the same way, the 
appointments of outside cadres including the chiefs, executive and top level positions of different 
corporations and autonomous bodies should be stopped immediately (For example, according to the 
report of the Fulton Commission, the accountable management means clear cut responsibilities and 
commensurate authority and being held accountable for performance against budgets, standards of 
achievement and other tests) 13. A professional civil service ministry should be established in stead 
of Ministry of Establishment and a United Civil Service College should be established for the 
training of all professional groups of the civil service. At the same time, as like as the pattern of 
Great Britain, a Senior Professional Administrative Training Scheme should be developed for all 
higher level officers of different functional groups which would be able to ensure the careful 
appointments in these top level functional administrative and policy making positions. 14. The 
differentiations in the national pay scale for the professional officials of different cadres that is 
created by Motin Committee should be removed and the pay scales of the positions of all professional 
cadres including doctors, engineers and agriculturists of different corporations and departments 
should be re-established to the same status of other cadre service scales in accordance with the equal 
status that was ensured in the national pay scale of 1977-78.15. The main causes of the frustrations 
of the professionals or cadres are the lack of opportunities for promotions, entrance of the outsider 
cadres in their own professional field and limitation of reorganising the institutional structure. The 
equal opportunity for the promotion of all cadres and professionals in all level of the administration 
should be increased immediately in ratio according to the total number of cadres or officials of the 
concern departments and corporations. For this, any department or corporation shall reorganise their 
present cadre structure or create new positions, if necessary. 16. In light of the recommendations of 
the Fulton Commission. Second Cornwallis Commission, Power Commission, Muzaffar Commission 
and Rashid Commission the 'Specialists' employed in different professions and functions in all 
stages of the administration should be established with full power and status and these specialists 
- 162 - 
who are experienced in different functions should be ensured to be employed in the top level 
positions of the administration of the state. In light of the recommendations of the Fulton 
Commission, a policy of accountable and corporate management on the basis of management by 
objectives and corporate planning should be implemented. A policy making unit should be 
established with the long experienced specialists in different functions at the top level of all 
ministries so that specialists of substantive knowledge in different professions and functions could be 
able to provide their valuable contribution in the long term policy making process of the government. 
17. The separation of the judiciary from the executive division is one of the main preconditions to 
establish the legal rights of the people. For that reason, the government should free the judiciary 
from the present control of the administration and hence, the judiciary must be separated from the 
executive division that will establish the freedom and neutrality of this department in the country. 
97 In this period, the PROKRICHI started movement in favour of their 9-points demand. As a result 
of their movement in December 1984 to January 1985, the junta administration discussed some issues 
with them and assured to fulfil these immediately. But it was found no progress within next couple of 
months. Therefore, the PROKRICHI was returned into actions in December 1985. They moved in 
full strikes from 22°d December 1985 to 5`h January 1986 during the full Martial Law period. This 
was the country wide glorious movement of the mainstream professionals, which could reach to grass 
root. The centers of this movement included the all public hospitals' campuses, agricultural building 
and the IEB. In this period, police seized the homes of the professional leaders. On 31st December 
1985, hundreds of engineers were arrested from the IEB and were sent to custody of the Ramna 
Thana. The arrested persons included the IEB elected GS MA K Azad, Engineer Ibrahim Mia, Samir 
Kuzmer Bhattachargia, Md. Moniruzzaman, Simam Fahim, Jauti Das Kundu, Haroon Al Rashid, and 
Dr Shisir Kumer Ghosh. The junta administration, as a part of repressive measures sacked the leaders 
of the movement, which included the Engineers: M AK Azad, Aminul Haque, MH Khan, AH Molla, 
Mirja Shafiq Ibrahim, Abul Kashem, Md Masud Jamal Jahidi, Md. Mostafa Kamal, Somnath Das 
Gupta, Md. Motiur Rahman and Golam Morshed; doctors: Martyr Dr Shamsul Alam Khan Milon, Dr 
AKM Mohibullah, Dr Md. Nazrul Islam; agriculturists: Mirja MA Jalil, Shahidul Islam, Nitish 
Kumer Devnath and D. Wahidul Haque. Even, the then BMA President and member of the PSC, a 
constitutional body Dr Abul Kashem was sacked unconstitutionally. In the same manner, the 
President of Agriculturists Institution Dr Mirja MA Jalil was sacked from his service because of his 
leadership in the movement. Clearly, the end of this movement was painful and the junta temporally 
could establish control over the movement. 
98 The 21-points demand of the BMA included: 1. The budget for the health sector should be 
increased, 2. The infrastructures of primary health care at the aim of safe health for all by 2000 should 
be developed immediately, 3. Extension of the number of hospitals and adequate medical facilities 
for the overall development of health sector should be implemented and the necessary health 
manpower should be appointed immediately, 4. The recommendations of the BMA for equal staffing 
pattern and equal opportunities for promotions for all staffs of the health service should be 
implemented, 5. The problems of the doctors engaged in the health and population control sector 
must be solved immediately, 6. The order of the government of upgrading the salary scale of the 
Thana Health and Family Planning Officer should be implemented immediately, 7. An equal policy 
of appointment and transfer of the health service officials should be formulated and implemented 
accordingly, 8. to give The autonomy of medical colleges and institutes should be given immediately 
and the government should take immediate initiatives for the establishment of a new medical 
university in the country 9. The order to downgrade the salary scale of the Assistant Surgeon and 
Assistant Medical Officer must be cancelled, 10. The senior scale (4800 taka) of the doctors should 
be implemented, who were already due for this scale, 11. All top level posts of the health service 
must be filled up immediately, which were vacant for long time, 12. The Grade-1 scale and status to 
at least 25% of the medical teachers, professors and directors according to the recommendation of the 
National Salary Commission, 1977 should be implemented 13. The problems of the doctors of 
autonomous, semi-autonomous and non-government organisations should be solved and take 
initiatives for the extension of medical facilities in the industrial sectors and ensure the employment 
of doctors and medical staff in industrial set ups, 14. The problems of the medical doctors and staff 
in private clinics should be resolved and ensure the safe medical treatment for public interest in these 
clinics and hospitals, 15. to extend The facilities of getting the drug licence for doctors should be 
extended; tariff in importing the medical books and machineries should be withdrawn; easy loans to 
doctors should be given and the training facilities for the doctors of the private and non government 
organisations need to be arranged, 16, The medical doctors in the related cadres those who were 
employed in Bangladesh Rail Way, Bangladesh Police, Bangladesh Telephone and Telegraph should 
be encadred., 17. The regulations for giving renewal fees for registration of the doctors should be 
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cancelled and the BMDC Ordinance should be more democratised, 18, The equal status of the 
doctors in the administration according to the warrant of Precedence, which was recommended by 
the office order of Admin/l/1-E-9/90/1979, should be implemented immediately 19. The illegal 
business in the name of medical education in the private medical colleges should be stooped, 20. An 
equal and permanent policy in awarding the fellowships and scholarships for the higher education 
and training in abroad for the doctors should be formulated and accordingly to be implemented and 
21. An accountable, democratic and functional administration on the basis of profession in the line of 
fulfilling the 17-point demands announced by Central Coordination Committee of the PROKRISHI 
should be developed. For details of these 21-point demands of the BMA, see the booklet, 'Sober 
Jannye Shastha' Nischit Korte Hoele 21 Doafa Bastabayan Korte Hoebe (Implement the 21-points to 
ensure the `health for all'), published by Bangladesh Medical Association (BMA), 1990 
99 Interview of the researcher with Professor Rangalal Sen, Department of Sociology, University of 
Dhaka, on 23 March 2003 is included here. In his interview Prof. Rangalal Sen says "as an activist 
I'm saying when we arranged meeting at the foot of Shahid Minar. Doctors, engineers, lawyers, 
teachers of college and universities and diploma engineers were present there. A peculiar happening 
happened on that day. Diploma engineers did not want to obey the leadership to the engineers passed 
from BUET. There was an occupational conflict between them. The Diploma engineers said, `the 
task we performed and they only sign sitting idly in the office. You are the teachers of schools and 
universities': you will be the chairperson in the meeting. For the conflict an engineer could not take 
the chair. They accepted the leadership of the university teachers but they would not accept the 
president ship of engineers. " 
00 Motiur Rahman, " Andolone Sangbadpatra o Sagbadik" (The News Papers and the Journalists in 
the Movement) in Sirajul Islam Chowdhury (ed) Gono Ovvuththan 0 Bangali Modhyabirya Samaj 
(The Mass Uprising and the Bengali Middle Class Society), Muktadhara Dhaka, 2001, p. 45 
101 The role of journalists in the emergency situation of 1987 and for eight days from 27 November to 
4 December 1990 could be cited in this regard. The journalist took risk of their lives in publishing 
detailed events of the movement disregarding the pres censorship of the junta administration. 
Especially, on 27 November 1990 Ershad declared that it would have to take permission from the 
Joint Secretary of the Home Ministry if any newspapers wanted to publish news. From that on the 
journalists came to know that the state of emergency was going to be imposed. In this situation, they 
decided in the afternoon that they would not publish newspapers in protest if the emergency was 
imposed in the country. The foreign magazines were giving fresh news and people were feeling 
aspirations. The fall of Ershad was a matter of time. Political parities were praising the journalists. 
The leaders of journalist thought that they should not refrained from the movement of the nation and 
they played a historic role in this regard. 
102 The main objectives of their struggle were to establish a democratic society, rule of law, freedom 
of press, communal harmony and free and fair mass media. They forged movements to increase the 
funds in health and education sectors rather than the defence. They raised the demand to give priority 
of indigenous technology, administrative reforms and the full autonomy of educational institutions. 
103 The period from 1924 to 1935 may be considered as the era of revolutionary trade union 
movement. M. N. Roy, Muzzaffer Ahmed, S. A Dange and Shawkat Osman led the trade union 
movement and as a result, the political consciousness among industrial workers was increased. The 
then British Government in India adopted ruthless measures (e. g. Kanpore conspiracy case and 
Meerat conspiracy case) against the militant workers and trade union leaders. But this strategy could 
suppress the trade union movement against them. Later the trade union movement became closely 
linked with nationalist movement and the working class started vigorous struggle for the 
emancipation from extreme repression and economic exploitation. After the independence of the 
Subcontinent, Bangladesh, the then East Bengal under Pakistan had also a valuable history of trade 
union movement in conjunction with the movement of political autonomy and later independence of 
the country. 
104 Sirajul Islam (ed) Banglapaedia, Vol. 10, Asiatic Society Press, Dhaka, 2003 p. 193 
pos 1) Re-establishment of trade union rights. 2) Job-security of union leaders. 3) no officer of a union 
is to be transferred without his or her consent. 4) Resignation of union can not be cancelled without 
Prior permission of the labour court. 5) The workers shall continue as union leaders even when they 
are sacked from the job by the employer. 6) Ex-workers can become union leaders in the 
establishment where they worked. 7) Termination benefit to be raised from 90 days to 120 days for 
regular workers and from 45 days to 60 days for temporary workers. 8) General members can lodge 
cases against termination like union leaders. 9) Dismissed worker to get full benefit of provident fund 
and gratuity. 10) Labour court to review cases of dismissal. 11) All workers to be provided with letter 
of appointment and service book. 12) Temporary workers working for more than 3 years are to be 
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regularized. 13) All cases of loss of jobs during martial law are to be reviewed for re-instatement. 14) 
Arrested workers and leaders shall be released. 15) 30% DA to be allowed with areas from July 1982 
in the public sector and the government would try to ensure the same benefit in the Private sector 
with effect from 1984.16) Additional 30% DA to all workers under Pay and Wages Commission 
from IS` June 1984,17) Advance of taka 500 paid to workers is to be treated as grant. 18) Minimum 
pay or wage shall not be less than taka 460.19) There would be workers' representative in the wages' 
commission. 20) Gratuity to be increased from 14 days' wage to 30 days' wage. 21) The workers 
who have not been allowed festival bonus under pay commission will get the same. See also Sirajul 
Islam (ed) Bangla Pedia , Asiatic Society, Dhaka 2003 pp. 404-405 106 See The Weekly Bichittra, 14 January 1983, p. 14. The 8-peasant organisations included 
Bangladesh Krishak League, Bangladesh Krishak Shamitee, Jatya Krishak League, Bangladesh 
Krishak Muktee Shamitee, Bangladesh Krishak Shava, Jatya Krishak Shamitee, Krishi Farm Shramik 
Federation and Bangaldesh Khetmazur Shamitee. 
107 Although the political forces had been suffering from the lack of unity and integration in many 
occasions and even if many other socio-cultural forces were seeking to topple the dictator, it was not 
at all possible to forge a vital movement without their support, which is supported fairly by 99%(in 
which 76.2% for `great importance') respondents. The students are regarded as the militant forces in 
all actions. In toppling the dictator in 1990, the students played a pioneering role in forging the united 
movement. This fact has come across the survey by 99.5% respondents in which 83.5% has 
supported their role as `great importance'. The fair important role of the intellectuals is supported by 
88.3C/ (including 34% for `great importance') following the professionals for the same role supported 
by 78.6% respondents (in which 21.8% for `great importance'). The TU workers and labourers that 
linked with mainly with liberal right and leftist political forces had fair important role in the 
movement, which is supported by 86.9% respondents (including 41.3% for `great importance'). 
108 It is important to mention here that only 23.3% supports the "PP-S-TU-I-P-O", in which the 
respondents rated the role of PP as first position and S as the second. Although another order "PP-S- 
I-TU-P-O" put the role of PP and S as first and second place respectively (12.1%) where the role of I 
is found to surpass the role of TU. And a significant group of 24.6% supports the `other orders' of the 
movement forces for their participation and respective roles and sacrifices in the movement. 
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PART III 
THE MOVEMENT FOR THE RESTORATION OF 
DEMOCRACY IN BANGLADESH 1982-1990 
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Chapter Seven 
The Democratisation Movement in Bangladesh 1982-1990 
7.1. Introduction 
The prospect of democratic rule and the fate of the people of Bangladesh were 
turned back for a `second time" at the foot of `military gangsters'2 no sooner had 
General Ershad assumed the office of the CMLA. The state apparatus and the will of 
the civilian administration became shattered under the military orders following the 
frequent forceful repressive activities. But a real strength-the basic instinct of a 
possible democratic society that was developed over the hundreds of years among 
the people of this region in their struggle for freedom, equity and liberty against the 
British and Pakistani rules-was still found breathing in their third and fourth 
generation-the repression-shattered post independent opposition democratic forces 
in the 1980s. Since the seizure of state power took place, the pioneering forces of 
democracy under the leadership of the AL and the BNP-two lost power forces 
along with huge leftist militant components turning on the street agitations were 
fighting for the return of the democratic rule in the country. The political forces and 
other interest and pressure groups including students, intellectuals, professionals, 
trade unions workers and labourers were the key actors of this historic uneven 
political victory that was come to the fact through the collapse of the military 
dictatorship of General Ershad. The actions of the opposition forces saw no limit 
from protest marches to more stiffer actions of hartal and non-cooperation etc in the 
face of which the dictator imposed a ban on political activities on several occasions 
leading to frequent killings of leaders and organisers of the actions and forced 
imprisonments and arrest of thousands of participants. These measures might have 
saved the junta for the time being, but eventually, the regime was defeated by the 
power of the people. This chapter is therefore designed to disclose the discourses of 
the continuous events of the political actions against the military junta, which 
presents, in depth, the consequential interactions between the junta and the 
opposition forces in the process of democratisation. 
7.2. The Beginning of the Resistance against the Military Junta 
Since political activities under Martial Law were banned it was the students of 
the universities and colleges of the Dhaka city who, at first, organised themselves 
against the military seizure of power on the occasion of observing the `Education 
Day'3 on 17 September 1982. Different student bodies organised the rallies in the 
university campus and vowed a sturdy oath against the military rule in the country. 
On 24 September 1982, the Education Minister Dr Abdul Majid Khan announced a 
new Education Policy4, which was completely denounced by the students. 5 The 
students protested against the junta's proposal for introducing Arabic as a 
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compulsory language in Primary Education, which was 'being seen as an attempt to 
islamicize the country's secular educational system'. 6 On 16 October 1982, the 
junta declared that he preferred a constitution based on the principles of the Quran 
and he wished to foster an Islamic revival movement by introducing a compulsory 
Islamic education. Thousands of students under different ideological streams in the 
DU campus protested this blueprint by the junta to sustain power by using the 
religious infatuation of the people. There took place a serious clash between the 
students and police in the campus on 08 November 1982 which resulted in more 
than 150 injuries and 38 arrests of the students. This united the 14 different student 
streams under the CSAC affiliated with democratic and leftist political parties on 14 
November 1982. They announced an action of `Secretariat Seize' on 14 February, 
1983. There was chaos when a mammoth student procession to break a police 
blockade set up where the Dhaka University campus adjoins to the MOE Building 
and the Government Secretariat. They were demanding the end of military rule and 
protesting against the new Education Policy of the junta. At the outset, the police 
used batons, water hoses and tear gas on the participants to extricate them from the 
streets, which forced the students to throw house-bricks towards the police forces 
and tried to break through the police ranks. The police opened fire on the protesting 
students' marches. In the melee, more than hundred students and 63 police men 
were injured and one man identified as Zainul Abedin, an electrician, the 
representative of the lower class of the society, was knifed to death. 7 In the pro tem 
situation, the CSAC was disgruntled with the lukewarm support from various 
political parties and the leaders of their parent political parties went to campus to 
lend their support to the students' cause though they `did not endorse openly the 
CSAC's call for a general strike next day'. 8 The military authorities were stimulated 
promptly to close the campus and imposed the curfew from the very night on 14 
February 1983. As the protests increased, the junta responded on February 15 by 
extending the curfew to the four other divisional cities, closing all universities and 
colleges, imposing press censorship and arresting 1400 demonstrators. A number of 
opposition political leaders were arrested including Sheikh Hasina and Begum 
Khaleda Zia of the AL and BNP respectively. Besides the above consequences, two 
former Foreign Ministers: Dr Kamal Hussain and Abdus Samad Azad of AL were 
detained. 9 Begum Zia was sent under house arrest in the cantonment while Sheikh 
Hasina with more than 100 top rank close associates of her 15-Party alliance were 
taken blind folded to the military torture cells. 1° The students attempted to stage a 
further demonstration on February 16 in the port city of Chittagong. In the face of 
this huge movement, General Ershad suspended the proposed Education Policy on 
18 February 1983. The 8 peasant groups on 2"d January 1983 raised their demands" 
and in a joint-statement, criticised the land reform policy of the junta that eliminated 
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the share-crop farmers from the land. The lawyers took part in demonstrations in the 
mid-October, 1982 against the government measures for decentralizing the judiciary 
that extended the six High Court branches to the different parts of the country to 
segregate the group of vast lawyers, who were considered as strong power house of 
legal assistance for political prisoners. They organised a boycott of the Supreme 
Court on October 10,1982 to oppose this outrageous design of the junta that 
resulted into the arrests of 14 eminent lawyers including a former Attorney General 
for alleging anti-junta activities. 12 
7.3. The Stage of Indoor Politics and Dialogues in 1983 
The martial law ban on `indoor political meetings"3 was lifted on 25 March 
1983 while the campaigning in public remained illegal which came into work from 
1s` April 1983.14 At this stage, the junta proposed a national dialogue between his 
administration and all political groups to defuse the crisis resulting from the student- 
police riots of the 14 February 1983 and to discuss matters such as the drafting of a 
new constitution and transfer of power to a civilian government. The press 
censorship was ceased in order to facilitate discussion of the proposals the junta 
opened with the leaders of individual political parties scheduled from 28 April 1983. 
But only 10 minor parties agreed to participate. In this connection, he also took steps 
to release all the students and political leaders connected with the February riots to 
create an atmosphere conducive to dialogue. This also followed the release of 26 
political leaders including Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia on 1 March 
1983.15 The NUF-an alliance of 11 rightwing Islamic parties was formed on 9 
April 1983 led by Mr Khondhoker Mustaque Ahmed'6-one of the main criminals 
of August coup, which was believed to have support from military leaders to 
suppress the strength of the AL-the principal opposition to military rule. 
The announced political dialogue between the junta and opposition political 
parties, in the end, started on 29th April 1983 in the wake of strictly controlled 
indoor politics under military auspices in which some minor parties attended. The 
15-party alliance set a condition in a statement to press on 19 May 1983 to join the 
dialogue that `they would participate if it be called with all member parties of the 
alliance together'. 17 The junta invited the political leaders, in his second bid, to 
attend an Iftar Party (fast breaking) get together on 8 July 1983. Some political 
leaders belonging to minor parties and the NUF attended the invitation. The major 
oppositions including 15-Party and 7-Party alliances did not take part, though one 
component of 15-Party alliance, the AL (Mizan) did attend. A three stage time table 
for local elections was announced on 8 July 1983: the UP elections were to take 
place on December 27,1983; the rest municipal elections on 11 February 1984 and 
the Upazilla (sub-district) elections on 24 March 1984. Although some smaller 
parties hailed the announcement of elections saying that it had shown Ershad's good 
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intentions, the AL-led 15-Party alliance described the announcement as 'a deception 
and a grand design to institutionalise an undemocratic system under the shade of the 
umbrella of martial law by trampling people's democratic aspirations under foot. "8 
In the August 1983, the lower and distress class farmers of 20 North Bengal districts 
organised a programme named `matir dak' (call from the soil) against military 
administration to discharge the farmers from agricultural loan they took from bank 
in the wake of drought that ceased their crops resulted severe starvation of the 
people in the region. 
Slowly and vigilantly, the latent intention of the junta became manifest in the 
beginning of 1983, when a pro junta group of students-named Nutun Bangla 
Chatra Samaj19 with arms and ammunitions under military auspices started to 
capture the different residential halls of the University of Dhaka that extended very 
quickly through out the educational institutions of the country from January to May 
1983. After the consolidation of his political position, General Ershad announced on 
14 November 1983 that the presidential election would be held on 24 May 1984 and 
the parliamentary elections on 25 November 1984 under the suspended constitution 
of 1982. He also insisted that all the restrictions on political activity would be lifted 
immediately, if peace and discipline were ensured. 2° President Justice A. F. M. Assan 
Uddin Choudhury announced the formation of Jano Dal (People's Party), a pro- 
junta party with a manifesto advocating Islamic ideas and values, democracy and 
progress, and working for Bangladeshi nationalism, which were quite similar to 
those of the BNP. The party provided the dictator with a platform to contest the 
forthcoming national elections. Although Ershad had extended his term for two 
years as the Chief of the Armed Forces on 27 October1983, he indicated in a number 
of statements and interviews during 1983 about his intention to retire from the Army 
and cross the threshold of a presidential election: `if the people of the country so 
desire and they would like me to join politics, I will. If I join politics, naturally I will 
Z have to leave uniform but when and how have not been decided yet'. ' 
7.4. The Actions of the MRD after Lifting the Ban on Political 
Activities 
The ban on political activity was lifted from 1 September 1983 so that the 
junta could be able to put a legal cover on his illegal military rule adopting a 
`farcical practise at the polls'22. In this phase, the 22-Party MRD organised a series 
of demonstrations in the late 1983 in protest of the election timetable. Upon the joint 
call of a one day hartal that was observed on 1 November 1983 throughout the 
country, they announced a further action of sit-in in front of Government Secretariat 
on 28 November1983, which was largest ever mobilisation of masses, and was 
dispersed by brutal police atrocities. This took 11 lives, injured thousands and 
indiscriminate arrest of political activists. The junta imposed a curfew in Dhaka on 
-170- 
that day and later extended it to the port city of Chittagong on 30 November, where 
two demonstrators were also killed during their protest against the police brutality in 
Dhaka. Following this mass protest, the dictator suspended the two week relaxation 
of martial law regulation, thereby restoring the ban on political activities and 
accused opposition leaders of seeking to undermine his attempts. Consequently, the 
two key opposition leaders Sheik Hasina and Begum Zia were put under `protective 
custody'. In the later weeks, General Ershad again lifted all restrictions from 
political activities, which allowed the opposition anti-government campaign that got 
momentum very soon. The junta surmounted the mass movements for the time being 
and risibly termed his success as `Democracy Day' for the event of 28 November 
1983 while the opposition hailed it as `Mass Resistance Day' against the regime. 
However, the `Democracy Day' was later cancelled without any explanation as the 
opposition campaign grew stronger and as some opposition politicians including AL 
(Hasina) leader Tofael Ahmed expressed their concern that a confrontation between 
opposition and junta forces would push the country towards the civil war. 23 
The opposition political forces asserted that the elections were a contrivance to 
perpetuate the power of military authority. They alleged that the reforms of local 
government by the military dictator would ensure his position in the grass root level 
and would lead to his success in the local and forthcoming presidential election. 
Thus an opposition victory in the parliamentary elections would be increasingly 
difficult. As a result, the opposition demanded first the withdrawal of the Martial 
Law and return of power to the elected government of former President Satter, 
which would oversee early parliamentary elections. In this connection it is also 
interesting to note that in a ground convention organised by the SCBA, held on 20 
May 1983, the representatives of the various Bar Councils of the country adopted as 
many as seventeen resolutions for the restoration of constitutional rule including the 
independence of judiciary and other socio-political issues. Extensively, the CCBA in 
their meeting on 19 November 1983 limited their demands to 6-points emphasizing 
only the most urgent and relevant ones in order to return to constitutional rule that 
left an ultimatum to the military dictator to hand over power to the elected 
representatives before 31 March 1984.24 On 11 December 1983, the junta announced 
that he had assumed the office of the President vice Mr Assan Uddin Choudhury 
who became the convenor of the Jano Dal. The erstwhile members of the councils 
of ministers were reappointed as members of a presidential cabinet. The 
appointment of the cabinet was seen as a move to consolidate his position as a 
presidential figure prior to the elections and to increase his room for manoeuvre with 
the opposition over the proposed elections. There were reports that he was also 
seeking to recruit Begum Zia into his cabinet whose popularity had become evident 
in rallies held after the lifting of the ban on politics. 25 
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The military leader made a number of conciliatory moves in early 1984 in 
order to bring the opposition parties into dialogue. The talks with 41 minor 
opposition parties began on 7 January 1984 in which a section of rightwing and 
opportunist political leaders like Khondoker Mustaque Ahmed, Mizanur Rahman 
Choudhury, Ataur Rahman Khan and Nanna Mia participated in the so called 
dialogue with Ershad. But the mainstream opposition forces of 22-Party MRD 
mainly the AL, BNP and the CPB were distracted in slowing in the momentum of 
campaign. The united boycott call of the elections under Ershad came at a time from 
the MRD when there appeared to be a split opening up between the two opposition 
alliances. The alliance led by Begum Zia seemed to move towards a compromise 
with the junta by stating that it had not opposed, in principle, joining a political 
dialogue, although she attached a condition that the President would lift the ban on 
political activities and allow press freedom. As she decided to join the dialogue with 
the dictator, she turned her back on the MRD-the position of the 15-Party 
alliance-the opposition group that was still firm in its position of boycotting the 
talks. In this process, the junta came close to this political circle and were able to 
make split in the opposition camp. 26 On this understanding, the military ruler 
reinstated limited political activities on 7 January 1984. In an attempt to avert a 
hartal on 1 March 1984, he announced on 29 February 1984 that the elections for 
parliament would be brought forward concurrently with presidential elections on 27 
May 1984. The leaders of the MRD had called off an earlier hartal scheduled for 
December 20,1983 due to informal talks with the junta while another call for a 
hartal on 4 January 1984 went largely unheeded. It should be noted here that the 
first two stages local elections in December 1983 and February 1984 were reported 
as it was received enthusiastically by voters despite incidents of violence which left 
8 killed and many other injured, and caused voting to be suspended in a number of 
polling centres. 27 
The AL demanded the immediate postponement of the proposed Upazilla 
elections and called the JS elections at once in the recent two day meeting of the 
ALWC. The resolution argued that the Upazilla elections were being organised to 
implement the decentralisation policy which it claimed was a basic administrative 
reform that the junta had no right to introduce without the peoples' verdict. In 
protest against the Upazilla election, the CSAC organised a protest march on 28 
February 1984 in support of the hartal scheduled on 1 March 1984. A police van on 
patrol to control the students had hit the procession, which killed two BCL leaders 
of Dhaka University named Salim and Delwar. In the 8 hours hartal on 1 March 
1984, it was reported that two opposition activists were killed and 150 injured in 
clashes between demonstrators and police. Notwithstanding the junta announcement 
to bring forward the date of the JS poll, the opposition leaders challenged the 
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dictator that the Upazilla elections scheduled on 24 March 1984 would be held `over 
our dead bodies' and declared the day of election a `black day' which would be 
preceded by an `election resistance fortnight'. 28 The political scene of the country 
took a violent turn following the hartal when a labour leader, named Tajul Islam29 
was killed in the Adamji industrial area by the armed hooligans-popularly believed 
to be military intelligence-to dismantle the labourers movement, which caused 
serious reaction through out the country. The EC admitted on 5 March 1984 that 499 
candidates had withdrawn their candidature from Upazilla elections. In the 
subsequent police crack down, the AL chief Sheikh Hasina and the BNP chief 
Begum Zia were placed under house arrest-and later were released on March 7- 
and more than 300 opposition activists were detained including Shah Azizur 
Rahman of BNP and Mr Abdul Mannan of AL. However, there were further anti- 
junta demonstrations during March and April 1984 in which more than a million 
people staged anti-junta rally in Dhaka. General Ershad on 18 March 1984 
postponed the scheduled Upazilla elections until after the presidential and JS 
elections, uttering he wish `to pave the way for national unity, dialogue and 
understanding for reaching the ultimate objective of transition to democracy by 
maintaining a peaceful atmosphere'. 30 
7.5. The Movement for Holding the Parliamentary Election 1984 
Having headed off confrontation with mainstream opposition political parties 
by postponing controversial Upazilla elections, the military dictator added an other 
ball to his political juggling act by appointing 79-year old Ataur Rahman Khan as 
PM with a mandate to negotiate with the political parties on a return to democracy. 
In the meantime, the BNP chief Begum Zia called on the junta in a huge gathering 
on 1 April 1984 to hold JS elections on 27 May 1984 as he promised earlier saying 
`if you have the courage to face the people and keep your promise at least once'. But 
she deliberately left the situation blurred by not stating whether her party would 
concur to participate in the presidential and JS election as planned. The AL-chief 
Sheikh Hasina pronounced her concern on 2 April 1984 that the JS election should 
precede the presidential one. Therefore it became clear that the opposition had 
pulled out from their previous stands to boycott the JS polls. It happened since they 
were pleased with the uneven situation within the military administration. The pro- 
junta Jano Dal had its own problems in organising different party units through out 
the country that was not good in shape for the May polls and `Begum Zia did not 
wish to give Ershad any more time to pull it together. '31 
The 15-Party alliance agreed on 28 March 1984 to join the dialogue with the 
dictator on the basis of their 5-points demand. On the other hand, General Ershad 
met Begum Zia, the chief of 7-Party alliance on 12 April 1984. The talks between 
the two were on some developments and the military ruler was agreed to leave some 
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concessions to the demands of the opposition. As a result, the military authorities 
released 224 out of 300 people detained following the last 1 March hartal while a 
pardon was made for the students of Rajshahi University imprisoned under Martial 
Law. The restrictions on trade unions were repealed on 11 April 1984. Following the 
talks, it was announced on 21 April that the junta had agreed to draw up procedures 
for lifting up Martial Law and on 29 April 1984, he stated that the forthcoming 
elections would be held on the basis of the suspended constitution setting up a 
presidential form of government. As this announcement was the evasion of the 
opposition demands, the fact was that the military dictator took a malicious strategy 
by playing a dialogue drama with the oppositions, and after the reports on 2 May 
1984 that the talks had broken down, Ershad in a broadcast through military 
controlled national TV, postponed the presidential elections until after the JS 
elections which had been rescheduled for 8 December 1984. On 17 May 1984, the 
FEER reported that the junta in preparation for the elections was making 
arrangements to close all the military tribunals and special Martial Law Court (MLC) 
and abolish all the post of local martial law administration to create a more 
congenial atmosphere. However, one military tribunal and a few special MLCs 
would be retained for specific purposes until the full pledged lifting of Martial Law 
rule. However, in May 1984 there was a serious discussion among the leaders on 
some debates in history-`Mujib: ratting skeletons' in the intellectual level as well as 
in the political leaders' emotional worthy speeches that brought again 
Bangabandhu-the founding father of country in the limelight since his brutal 
assassination in 1975.32 
In June 1984 General Ershad decided to hold JS elections later that year before 
presidential elections in accordance with the demands of the two major opposition 
coalitions. The opposition had brought to the surface their political differences and 
could not reach the unified stand against the dictator. The 7-Party alliance argued 
that the election should be conducted under the suspended constitution while the 15- 
Party alliance opposed that, and insisted that the old constitution being abandoned 
and elections being held under a martial law proclamation, under which Ershad 
would exercise power as President with the resultant assembly then deciding on a 
form of government. 33 But the junta was determined to hold the elections in 
accordance with the suspended constitution and seemed to have no wish to lift the 
Martial Law until after elections at the first session of the newly elected JS. The 
opposition alliances firmly discarded the idea of holding the elections under martial 
law as they were aware that Ershad could then easily scampered the results in his 
favour. A precise date for the elections had yet to be announced and both opposition 
groups complained that Ershad was stalling while he mustered support for his Jano 
Da/. Further more, both of the opposition coalitions had retained the options of 
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either participating in or boycotting the elections. At this stage, the dictator sneakily 
put forward his offer to the opposition to lift the Martial Law in the phases of before 
and after elections. But the opposition forces were strict to their demands to 
withdraw martial law before elections. They were likely to press the dictator for 
interim government in accordance with their 3-points demands. 34 In their part of the 
movement, the 7-party alliance held a countrywide `Mass Resistance Day' on 9 July 
1984. Both of the main alliances observed countrywide `Demand Day' on 27 August 
1984 that included half day countrywide hartal, protests and gatherings, and the JSD 
(S-R) pushed forward their six-point demand to the dictator. 35 In the mean time, all 
lawyers groups of the country decided to observe `Oath Taking Day' on 26 August 
and `Solidarity Day' on August 27,1984 in support of the 22-party opposition's 
actions including boycott of the courts, protest march and demonstrations all over 
the country. 36 
In support of their demand for the immediate withdrawal of Martial Law, the 
opposition forces called the countrywide gherao and demonstrations from 16-20 
September and a full day hartal on 27 September 1984. In this stage, the BMA 
urged the junta to implement their 20-point charter of demands. The lawyers groups 
and 7-party leaders met on 12 September 1984 for exchange of views. The leaders 
of both side discussed steps to strengthen the ongoing movement, and held that `the 
united democratic movement launched by the political parties and the professional 
groups would end the Martial Law once for all from the soil of Bangladesh'. 37 On 15 
September 1984 at the SCBA Building in an extended meeting of the CCBA, the 
mainstream opposition leaders Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia announced together 
that they would not accept any election under Martial Law and Jano Dal 38 of the 
junta, and in the next couple of weeks, the solidarity between the two main 
opposition alliances became strengthened as their Liaison Committee sat on 25-26 
September 1984 that released their firm stand to boycott the elections. However, the 
hartal was observed following 2 killings and more than 200 injuries including a 
veteran AL leader ex-MP Moizuddin Ahmed in Kaligonj, Dhaka. More than 500 
opposition workers were arrested in connection with the hartal through out the 
country. 39 A joint declaration released by the two major opposition alliances called 
countrywide `Mourning Day' on 29 September 1984 and also reiterated the dictator 
to resign as the countrywide dawn to dusk successful hartal amply proved the 
moral and political defeat of the dictator. All opposition forces again called the 
people to observe a `Mass Resistance Day' and `Protest Day' on 3 October 1984. In 
the face of the opposition movement, the dictator extended the summer closing of 
the universities up to the middle of October 1984, which followed a massive 
suspension of examinations due in the beginning of the October 1984. He was keen 
to hold election according to his plan which followed an announcement of the JS 
-175- 
polls on ls` October 1984 to be held on 8 December 1984. The 15-party alliance 
organised a grand rally in the MM Avenue-the largest location for political 
gatherings in the capital, which was attended by several hundreds thousands of 
opposition participants while the 7-party alliance organised a grand rally at the 
premise of BM mosque on 14 October 1984 in which both of opposition forces 
demanded the cancellation of election date and announced new schedule of actions 
in December 1984 to realise their 5-point demand. The 15-party alliance announced 
a broad based 21-point 40 declaration for the socio-economic and political 
emancipation of the people and asked the workers to form `Action Committees' 
everywhere while the 7-party alliance called to form `Resistance Committees' to the 
grassroots to intensify the movement. The lawyers groups observed the `Black Day' 
from 16-26 October 1984 in memories of the event of arrest and detention of the 13 
eminent lawyers that happened in 1982 while the engineers of the country observed 
`Demand Day' on 23 October 1984 in favour of their professional demands. 
The opposition threatened the junta either to fulfil their demands or to face the 
civil disobedience and non-cooperation movement that was planned by them in the 
December 1984. This had set the junta and the opposition on a collision course. The 
dictator announced in Dhaka on 11 October 1984 at a public rally organised by Jano 
Dal that he would withdraw his 30 months old military rule in three phases if the 
major opposition parties agreed to participate in the JS elections. Otherwise, the 
ruler warned `Martial Law will continue with stiff measures'. The opposition 
alliances in three huge gatherings in Dhaka on 14 October 1984 rejected the offer 
saying they would not participate in the elections unless the Martial Law was lifted 
immediately and a neutral government formed for holding `free and fair elections. ' 
The opposition proposed actions including a `Resistance Fortnight' from 27 October 
1984, a 24- hours hartal on 8 December, the day scheduled for JS elections and a 
civil disobedience movement from 9 December 1984. 
The BNP chief Begum Zia asked the dictator to handover to another General 
on his retirement as Army Chief in November 1984 and urged not to seek another 
extension if he wanted the `good of the Armed Forces and the country'. At the same 
time, the AL chief called on the Armed Forces to `resist those who are playing the 
anti-people role'; should they fail to resist the anti-people elements, the people 
would force to confront them' . 
41 Then the junta was compelled to postpone the JS 
elections scheduled on 8 December 1984. Shortly after, the EC announced again the 
date of JS elections on 15 January 1985 to be held on 6 April 1985 in accordance 
with junta's plan for the relaxation of the Martial Law as announced on 15 
December 1984. This was the fourth bogus announcement drama of the clever 
military for elections since 1983, which had to be postponed on each previous 
occasion due to the failure of the dictator to fulfil the opposition's preconditions. 
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The two main opposition alliances were still undecided on whether to accept the 
recent proposal of the dictator for JS elections and the democratisation of the 
country under military auspices. The latest proposal set out a five-point modus 
vivendi which was paralleled closely to the opposition long standing condition for 
election participation. 42 The 15-Party alliance had not rejected proposal of the junta, 
but it had issued an expanded set of pre-conditions for participation in the elections 
and announced that it still planned to go ahead with a country wide anti-Martial Law 
movement. The pre-conditions were mostly concerned with getting guarantees from 
the junta that he and all his agencies would remain neutral in the elections and 
would not interfere, in any way, on the electoral process and all political prisoners 
should be released prior to the elections. On the other hand, the BNP chief Begum 
Zia seemed to be ready to take part in the elections on one condition that nine former 
BNP ministers convicted by military courts on charge of `moral turpitude' must be 
made eligible to contest' which was not possible according to the article 66 of the 
suspended constitution. 43 It seemed to be a crucial political development as the 
opposition took the new strategy to challenge the dictator through the mandate of the 
people. The military ruler was aware of his probable defeat if both the opposition 
alliances would decide to challenge him under a united platform. 
7.6. The Movement against the Ban on Political Activities in 1985 
On 1 March 1985, the junta imposed a ban again on all political activities and 
cancelled the planned 6 April JS polls, and announced that a referendum seeking 
support for his continued rule until elections at a future date would be held on 21 
March 1985. He also announced that reforms which had been introduced on 
December 31 last year and January 16 this year would be rescinded and that the 
Martial Law would be `applied with full force'. The universities of the country were 
forced to close down indefinitely and a curfew was imposed in Dhaka between 
midnight and dawn. The BNP chief Begum Zia and the AL chief Sheikh Hasina 
were placed under house arrest on 2 March 1985 and not released until after the 
Upazilla elections in May 1985. Most of the opposition leaders were also detained at 
this time and a number of them went underground in order to escape arrest. " The 
latest crackdown was not a bolt from the blue, feelers had been sent out by the 
dictator to opposition leaders after they had decided to boycott the April polls 
despite the concessions he had granted on their demands for the move back. But 
while a faction of AL followers tried to create a pro-election tempo, the BNP 
supporters pre-empted them by declaring that there could not be free and fair 
elections under Martial Law and that the 7-Party alliance would resist filing of 
nomination papers. Begum Zia warned that anybody participating in the polls would 
be deemed to have betrayed the people. 45 
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Since the emergence of Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia as the leaders of the 
country's largest opposition parties, they had monitored each other carefully and 
adjusted their programmes accordingly. In doing so, they had been playing more to 
the gallery than following their own political inclinations. As a result, Begum Zia's 
hard-line stance pushed Sheikh Hasina into difficulty because the majority of the 15- 
Party alliance-mostly small parties without much hope of individual electoral 
success were pressing the AL to follow Ershad's concessions not withstanding. 
Begum Zia had her own problems in justifying the hard-line stance although the 
majority of the BNP stalwarts favoured elections and apparently the politicians were 
concerned only with their own problems. In the quest for legitimating his rule, the 
dictator had controlled the referendum of 21 March 1985-basically a voter less 
farcical election drama46-announcing himself with a mandate to rule the country 
until elections he had agreed to hold under the provisions of the suspended 
constitutions. 
The elections for 406 Upazilla chairmen47 were held in two stages, the first 
one on 6 May 1985 and the second on 20 May 1985. A notable feature of this 
election was the use of strong arm tactics and huge expenditure for the theft of the 
results in favour of the candidates. 48 However, the mainstream opposition had 
launched a week long protest action from 23 March 1985 in an effort to force the 
cancellation of the Upazilla elections. Three police men were seriously wounded by 
explosions in Dhaka on 23 March 1985. Explosions also killed two people and 
injured 50 on 13 May, and on the first day of polling on 16 May, at least four people 
were killed and about 200 were injured in clashes between supporters of rival 
candidates. At least another 7 people were killed in similar incidents during the 
second phase of voting on 20 May 1985. Mr K. M. Obayedur Rahman of the BNP 
was arrested on 13 April 1985 along with other opposition figures. After the 
Upazilla elections, the junta insisted that he would soon relax the Martial Law and 
also invite political leaders to confer with him on the future of the country. The 
military dictator then seemed to be more confident about his position than previous 
one and was likely to make some gestures before the Muslim Festival Eid-ul-Fitr 
falling around 18 June 1985. The first step of these was the release from house 
arrest of two key opposition leaders-Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia on 25 May 
1985. In the mean time, a natural disaster-the cyclone of 24 May 1985 gave the 
dictator political exposure at national and international level for the activities he had 
made for the cyclone-affected people in the next couple of months. 49 
The military ruler rescinded the closure decree on universities on 18 July 1985 
and the students were allowed to come back on 23 July. There were wide spread 
student demonstrations against the Martial Law as well as clashes between rival 
groups of students' organisations in subsequent weeks. The ban on political 
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activities was partially lifted, in effect from 1 October 1985, when the political 
parties in the opposition were allowed to re-open their offices and to hold gatherings 
inside them, but demonstrations and rallies in the streets remained prohibited. 
Begum Zia denounced so called `indoor politics' as the `politics of conspiracy by 
the government'. At least four students were killed and about 50 were injured in a 
clash between pro and anti-government student groups at a college in Dhaka on 9 
October 1985. Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia joined meetings at their respective 
offices on 14 October 1985. They called for the cancellation of Martial Law and 
holding the elections under neutral government, because, they were fully aware that 
the elections held under Martial Law would astutely legitimize the illegal military 
rule under the cover of democracy. At the same time, at a rally near Dhaka on 15 
November 1985, the dictator declared that he would hold JS elections early in 1986 
even if the opposition groups boycotted them. 5° 
In the year 1984-85, the anti-autocracy movement by two mainstream 
opposition alliances had produced many chances of getting rid of the military rule in 
the country. But, the splitting of the main parties, constitutional debates between 
them meant they undecided to what to do, which ultimately outlived the dictator in 
power. Especially the events of some killings like ex-MP and AL leader Moizuddin 
of Kaligonj on 27 September 1984 and JSD student leader Shajahan Siraj on 22 
December 1984 by the junta forces had created utmost condemnation in the minds 
of people, which reached the brinks to topple the dictator by huge resistance. 
Moreover, a prominent JCL leader Raufun Basunia, MSS final year student of D. U. 
Sociology Department, was murdered by the armed gangsters belonging to pro- 
dictator student organisation `Natun Bangla Chatra Samaj'. This event had turned 
into a violent student movement and the dictator was compelled to a close of his 
newly formed student front. It should be mentioned here that in the midst of these 
murders of the anti junta activists, the movement for restoration of democracy in 
Bangladesh became more radicalized and consolidated. As many as 17 organisations 
of agricultural labourers, the 15-Party alliance and the SKOP put forward charters of 
demand as 10 points in May 1984,21-points on 14 October 1984 and 5-points on 10 
September 1985 respectively to the military dictator. It could be relevant to state 
here that the charter of 21-points demand by the said political alliance was 
announced in the historic public meeting attended by many from all walks of life. 
7.7. The Parliamentary Election of 1986 
The formation of the pro-dictator political party-JP was announced on Ist 
January 1986.51 In a broadcast address to the nation on 2 March 1986, the junta 
swore that the elections to the JS would be held in the final week of April and it was 
26 April, 1986. He also announced `a number of measures' 52 which would be 
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brought into force as of 22 March 1986, the final day for electoral nominations to be 
submitted for is, on condition that the opposition parties would compete in the 
forthcoming elections. Both the opposition alliances issued separate but identical 
statements on 3 March 1986 rejecting the proposal of the dictator. The leaders of the 
opposition alliances discussed the issue on 9 March 1986 that followed a declaration 
of election boycott on 18 March 1986. Following this boycott announcement, the 
junta, in a radio and television broadcast on 21 March 1986, offered the reschedule 
of the elections for early May that later announced on 22 March as 7 May 1986. The 
causes of this were that he was convinced that some parties in the opposition gave 
him assurances to participate in the elections and all `anti-election programmes and 
activities' were banned from the morning of 22 March 1986. A serious disagreement 
arose within the opposition camp concerning its contest in the polls under the 
illegitimate military regime of General Ershad. Seat sharing issue stood in the way 
of united participation in the elections. The political situation took a dramatic turn 
when the CPB General Secretary Comrade Mohammad Farhad presented a formula 
of seat sharing (i. e. 150 and 150) to Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia-two key alliance 
leaders. But the military ruler hurriedly changed the existing rules of contesting the 
elections by promulgating a new ordinance limiting the maximum number of seats 
to 5 in which one candidate could seek elections. 53 In this situation the 15-Party 
alliances did not like Ershad in walk-over and decided to contest elections as part of 
the movement in the late hours of the night 21 March 1986-a deadline declared by 
the dictator. The AL with a faction of its 15-party alliance and the JIB announced on 
23 March 1986 their intention to participate in the elections. This decision was 
subsequently criticised by Begum Khaleda Zia of the BNP that boycotted the 
election under Martial Law. 54 On the question of the participation in the election, the 
15-Party alliance was divided. A report in the Guardian in early July 1986 stated that 
the alliance had eight strong members to participate in the polls. The squabbling 
within the opposition camp brought about distrust and frustration in the minds of the 
people. The 8-Party alliance also had to shroud bitter criticism for their participation 
in the polls. It was reported on 7 April 1986-the revised final day for electoral 
nominations to be received that 1527 nominations had been filed and the JP and the 
AL had named candidates for all constituencies. At this stage, there was a rumour 
that the BNP Chief Begum Zia was arrested. 55 
The BNP-led 7-party alliance and the newly formed 5-party alliance could not 
be able to take any effective line of resistance against the elections. However, the 
plan of the dictator was exposed for holding the elections as he was trying to win the 
elections at any rate. The elections for JS were held in date and ended with 12 deaths 
and a number of other injured on the elections day violence, the official sources 
revealed, which was protested by the main opposition leader Sheikh Hasina. She 
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claimed that 25 AL workers had been killed and 50 other injured all over the country 
by the pro junta JP supporters. Reports suggested that the electoral malpractice were 
wide spread and included the physical intimidation of returning officers, the early 
closers of polling booths and the mass falsification of votes by JP supporters. 
However, the EC reported on 10 May 1986 that the polling had been suspended in 
284 centres under 109 seats where re-elections were eventually considered necessary 
that took place on 19 May 1986. The British observers led by Mr Ennals, a Labour 
peer, Mr Martial Brando-Smith, a conservative MP and Mr David Lay, a BBC 
election observer had arrived in Dhaka on 5 May 1986 at the request of the Peoples 
Commission for Free Elections (PCFE) and reported huge frauds in the election by 
the dictator. 56 In the evening of polling day, the opposition AL-leader Sheikh Hasina 
called for an immediate re-elections in 50 constituencies, a figure later raised to 100, 
accusing the military leader of `vote piracy'. She had laid the blame on that the 
Army was used in rigging the elections in favour of JP candidates-particularly in 
constituencies, where fresh balloting was ordered by the authorises. In protest 
against the fraudulent elections, Sheikh Hasina, at a public meeting organised by AL 
on 9 May 1986, called for a six hour hartal on 14 May through out the country, 
which caused 5 wounded when a bomb was thrown at a bus in the capital. The EC 
announced on 20 May 1986 that the JP had gained enough of 300 directly elected 
seats to command an absolute majority in parliament. The JP also gained 30 seats 
reserved for women as the majority party in the parliament. The Final results of the 
JS elections for directly elected seats were announced on 29 May 1986 as follows: 
Table 7.7.1 The Results of General Elections 1986.57 
Political Parties Seats 
Jatiya Party (JP) 153 
Awami League(AL) 76 
Jamat-I-Islami(JIB) 10 
Communist Party of Bangladesh( CPB) 5 
National Awami Party (NAP Bhashani) 5 
Bangladesh Muslim League( ML) 4 
Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD-Rob) 4 
Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD- Siraj) 3 
Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BKSAL) 3 
Workers Party of Bangladesh ( WPB) 3 
National Awami Party (NAP-Muzaffar) 2 
Independents 53 
Total 300 
The dictator announced on 17 June 1986 that the `revival of certain 
provisions' of the suspended constitution would only be operational on 10 July 
1986-next day of the first session of the JS on 9 July 1986. Sheikh Hasina, the 
leader of the opposition, demanded the full restoration of the constitution and 
announced on 23 June 1986 that her party and alliance MPs had decided to boycott 
the JS session until the withdrawal of Martial Law. They began to launch procession 
and campaign of civil agitations in protest against the constitution of Martial Law. 
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The inaugural session of the JS started in on 9 July 1986 in which 204 MPs 
attended-the majority being the members of pro-dictator JP while 119 opposition 
and Independent MPs boycotted the session. Sheikh Hasina refusing her entry to the 
JS launched the alternative `Peoples Parliament' outside the JS Building on the 
opening session, where she was elected Leader and Mr Abdul Malek Ukil as 
Speaker and warned the dictator that the `People's Parliament would meet until the 
Martial Law was revealed. Under these circumstances, the dictator was likely to 
encompass his own design in the parliament despite Hasina's determination to non- 
cooperation with the passing of `Indemnity Bill'-the 7`h Constitutional Amendment 
Bill, which would legalize the all orders and activities of the dictator since Martial 
Law was proclaimed. In the People's Parliament with 104 MPs, Sheikh Hasina 
criticised the Bill saying that, "the Indemnity Bill is his baby and I do not see why 
we should help him". 58 There was a violent clash between the police and the 
supporters of the BNP on 9 July 1986-the first day of the opening session of the JS 
which caused at least 30 injured and 100 arrested. It was again violent clash on 11 
July 1986 between the supporters of the opposition in Parliament and police that 
resulted many injuries in the capital. At this critical juncture, most neutral observers, 
however, ruled out the re-emergence of the pre-election opposition unity between 
AL and BNP. Even in the unlikely event of the two leaders Sheikh Hasina and 
Begum Zia joining the hands would not be able to destabilize the dictator through 
violent extra-parliamentary agitations. The popular mood was against violence, and 
street agitations could not last for a more than a couple of days at a time. The recent 
elections had also stood as a hindrance in the way of both the alliances for a united 
movement. Through the elections the AL had retained its countrywide bases as a 
major well-organised party with a large network of dedicated cadres while Begum 
Zia and her BNP, by boycotting the polls, had secured the genuine popularity to the 
urban educated and progressive middle class of the society who were regarded as the 
direct opposition to military regime. 
In an interview with the FEER, Begum Zia affirmed with clear arguments that 
she was kept away from the polls because she knew there were some kind of 
dealings between the junta and the AL adding that there was widespread talk about 
Ershad allocating the seats to be contested by the AL and some other parties, which 
was denied promptly by all of the alleged parties and individuals. In her part, Sheikh 
Hasina, by contrast, was somewhat defensive and pointed out that Begum Zia had 
first agreed to contest personally 150 seats leaving the other 150 to her-in an 
attempt to turn the parliamentary elections into anti junta ballot revolution. The 
military ruler prevented such an eventuality laying a new law under which no 
candidate could contest from more than five constituencies. According to Sheikh 
Hasina, the BNP chief later agreed that her party would contest 120 seats but 
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withdrew her stand at the last moment. The two leaders in the opposition were 
highly reticent about their next moves including participation in the forthcoming 
presidential polls: "both argued that it was too early to talk about it and also that 
they could not express their views without the decision by their own parties and 
other opposition parties aligned with them. Sheikh Hasina said ominously, `we are 
not sitting idle, we are working'... for 11 years the AL had been in opposition, it had 
avoided confrontation and suffered army rule quietly. She added that the people had 
shown that they did not want Army rule and it was up to the Army to decide if it 
wanted to force the country to the brink of a civil war. On the other hand, asked if 
the BNP posed a serious challenge to Ershad, Begum Zia replied: if it is not why it 
is that at every occasion-referendum, local self-government elections and 
parliamentary elections-we are put in jail and why it is that even today a number of 
my party men are in prisons. "59 In fact, Begum Zia faced a dilemma. She could 
keep out of the presidential polls later that year if Martial Law would remain in 
force. But if Martial Law was withdrawn she would be under public pressure to 
contest and should she be defeated in the elections, many suspected, that would 
destroy her BNP. Except for the promise of a return to civil rule, her platform was 
similar to Ershad's, who was also a strong believer in her party's main ideological 
planks: Bangladeshi nationalism, patronage to the religious element and an 
unarticulated but unambiguous suspicion of India. At this stage of the movement, 
the junta was found more consolidated than any time it had passed before, as the 
main oppositions-the AL and BNP-were found to be in a foolish and suicidal 
competition to capture the trust of the military to their safe return in power. 60 
The dictator resigned on 28 August 1986 as the Chief of Army Staff, a post he 
had been holding since 1978, to smooth the progress of his nomination as JP 
candidate in the forth coming presidential elections. The retirement from the post of 
army chief had set off a new chapter for the dictator without military usrdi 
(uniform)-the same process of rehabilitation of the ambitious Generals in politics 
that was introduced in Bangladesh first by his predecessor General Zia. In an 
interview with the BSS on 14 July 1986, the dictator announced that the Presidential 
elections would take place in the first half of the October, uttering the words `to 
complete the constitutional process to establish an elected government' and that was 
confirmed on 1 September 1986 when he announced the 15 October of the same 
year as polling day. At the same time, he played the drama of his joining to the JP, 
which had been formed in the last January largely at his behest. In the following day, 
he was elected Chairman of the JP, and on 17 September 1986 he was formally 
nominated its candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections. Among other 
candidates, the most notable were Mr Mohammadullah Hafezzi Hoozoor, leader of 
the Muslim Khelafat Andolon-a candidate in the previous presidential elections 
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held in November 1981 and Lt. Col. Syed Faruk Rahman-one of the leaders of the 
August 1975 coup in which the country's founding father Bangabandhu was 
murdered; after a further coup in November 1975, he fled to Libya and returned to 
Bangladesh in 1985. The whole country including intellectuals, teachers, 
professionals and all conscious corners of the society promptly reacted against the 
entry of a murderer into politics. In fact, the dictator was frustrated with the stance 
of the AL and the rehabilitation of a killer of Bangabanhu under the auspices of 
military ring leaders was considered as the psychological and political treatment for 
AL. Sheikh Hasina and the front line AL leaders had charged the military junta for 
encouraging Faruk Rahman to contest the election. It was significant as the BNP had 
not put across any comment against Faruk's entry in the political foray. Despite their 
differences on many issues, the AL and the BNP had made common cause in 
opposition regarding presidential polls. The military dictator nonetheless would like 
to win, but thought at the same time that `the emergence of Faruk could weaken the 
opposition's joint 61 
The AL chief Sheikh Hasina announced the boycott of the presidential polls 
and called for a countrywide hartal on polling day that gave confidence to the BNP, 
which was boycotting the elections under military regime from the very beginning 
and Begum Zia announced her decision on 7 September 1986 to boycott this 
elections on the ground that the results had `already been prepared'. However, the 
military dictator launching the campaign on 18 September 1986, declared at a youth 
rally in Dhaka that the forthcoming election would be free, fair and peaceful, and no 
one will be able to resist it. The SCBA, which was protesting several government 
moves involving the legal profession, for example, decentralisation of the High 
Courts etc, had demanded the resignation of the military ruler and urged political 
parties and the organisations of students, intellectuals, professionals, trade unions 
and journalists to launch united actions against the dictator. The dictator repeated the 
old pattern of abusing the power as he proclaimed a Martial Law Order on 6 October 
1986 prohibiting anti-elections rallies and publishing of any views opposing the 
elections. It was reported that approximately 70 opposition supporters were arrested 
and detained under new regulations in between 8 and 10 October 1986. The two 
main opposition leaders Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia were put under house arrest 
on October 13,1986 and were not released until after the elections. Sheikh Hasina 
described the elections as a 'momenta] fraud' and the Reuters on the same day 
reported frequent instances of voting irregularities, including the use of pre-marked 
ballots, forging of voting registers and multiple voting by individuals. 62 In the event, 
the dictator-a General-turned politician, was declared President of the country and 
fulfilled his promised so called transition to democracy. The military autocracy was 
thus seemed to be shaped as a civilian dictator with the full support from the 
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politicised military institution-the army was still running their full activities in 
force throughout the country-a new definition of the Martial Law-the deception 
of the people repeating in this way, the second phase of the military aggression 
started in the garb of civil-military administration. 
7.8. The Opposition Movement in the Parliament and Streets 
For the second time in the brief history of independent Bangladesh, parliament 
had put a legal cover of an existing Martial Law regime. The Seventh Amendment 
of the Constitution63 ratifying all actions, reforms and laws created by the dictator 
since the introduction of Martial Law and the suspension of the constitution in 
March 1982, was passed on 10 November 1986 by 223 votes to none. The AL-led 
mainline opposition MPs and the fundamentalist JIB boycotted the session. The 
BNP Chairperson Begum Zia, who called a half-day hartal on 10 November in 
protest of the Bill, was placed under house arrest on the same day. There were 
violent clashes in the capital through out the morning between police and students of 
different universities and colleges that resulted in one death and at least 10 injuries. 
The BNP supporters set fire to the Dhaka office of the CPB in protest of the decision 
of the AL-led alliance for not supporting the hartal. In a televised address to the 
nation on 10 November 1986, the dictator announced the lifting of Martial Law and 
the restoration of the constitution first adopted in November 1972. The AL President 
Sheikh Hasina told a hurriedly called press conference at her official chamber in the 
JS Building that the Bill was a `black chapter' in the nation's history, adding that it 
was a fraud perpetuated through the Parliament without the approval of the people. 
Sheikh Hasina also described the support of the Bill by two smaller component 
parties of her alliance as `betrayal of the people'. 64 The 7-Party and 5-Party alliances 
who were left out from the parliamentary poll, however, continued their anti-junta 
agitations in the street that kept the AL under pressure to return to the opposition 
movement outside the parliament. 
The opposition movement began to get further impetus in January 1987. The 
majority of the opposition 8-Party alliance MPs-the principal `left of centre 
components' under the leadership of AL President Sheikh Hasina attended the 
Parliament on 24 January 1987 for the first time since initiating a boycott at the 
inaugural session in July 1986. The opposition MPs stayed in the session for a very 
short time before staging a walk out in protest at the formal address of the dictator to 
JS as President, in which he emphasized the so called `role of the Armed Forces in 
establishing a democratic set up' in Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina, the leader of the 
opposition, assured later: "we have boycotted (dictator's speech) as we did not want 
to listen to the speech of a `self proclaimed' President. "65 The same afternoon, the 
7-Party alliance BNP called for the dissolution of the Parliament with a rally in 
downtown Dhaka, where political assembly were banned and which sparked 
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violence. A police crack down on the rally resulted in the arrest of 15 top-leaders of 
the alliance including the BNP Chairperson Begum Zia who was released a few 
hours later. The BNP supporters had, by then, burnt several public and private 
vehicles in protest. The following evening, Begum Zia attacked the AL for the first 
time saying that its character was identical with that of the Government. She 
defended her stand: "we are on the street and our movement will continue till the 
removal of this autocratic government. "66 
The three main opposition alliances-the 8-Party, 7-Party and 5-Party 
observed `Black Day' on 24 March 1987-the day in which the dictator seized 
power in 1982. The military administration was facing a number of civil unrests 
from the very beginning of this year. Many opportunities were created to strengthen 
the movement against the dictator both inside and outside the parliament in 
connection with the passing of anti-people budget, decentralisation of judiciary and 
administration, policies for the formation of holding company, denationalisation and 
militarization of the civil administration. In every step, the dictator was facing 
serious challenges from the people through out the country. In fact, it was the first 
time for the opposition alliances to organise their movement against the autocratic 
regimes of General Ershad from a relatively comfortable position. They demanded 
the resignation of the dictator as President. The hartal, a serious effective action 
against the military autocracy called ostensively in protest at the government's 
economic record-actually indicative of wider political and social discontent, was 
observed in Dhaka and other major cities on 16 February and 30 June 1987 
respectively. These were not supported only by AL and the BNP and their alliances 
but also participated by Marxist-Leninist 5-Party alliance and students, trade unions, 
professionals and intellectuals, and many others interest and pressure groups of the 
society. A 24 hour hartal on July 12-13,1987 originally called by the SKOP in 
protest at the privatisation plan of the Government, turned into the longest and most 
violent anti-government protest since Martial Law was lifted in November 1986. 
The hartal coincided with the unexpected passing through JS, on 12 July 1987, of 
the controversial Local Government (District Council) Bill which gave the Armed 
Forces a constitutional right to share administrative power with the civilians of the 
country's 64 rural district councils. 
The opposition in the JS, who had staged a walkout during the Bills' passage, 
alleged that the Bill was part of a `gradual militarization of the entire administration'. 
The pro-dictator JP, however, defended the Bill on the grounds that any military 
personnel sitting on the District Councils would have no voting rights and would be 
there only as so called development work expert. According to the Times of July 
1987, the 24-hour hartal included over 100 injuries including 20 policemen and 35 
arrested in Dhaka as riot police attempted to disrupt opposition rallies which 
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continued through out 14 July 1987. In the aftermath of the July 12-13 strike. 
Sheikh Hasina issued an ultimatum to the dictator to resign by midnight on 18 
July1987, when he failed to do so the combined opposition announced a 54-hour 
hartal falling 22 July 1987 with the specific aim of forcing the downfall of the 
military ruler. Although this was a significant and seemingly united move by the 
two major opposition alliances, the decision for the joint action was announced 
separately by the two groups. Begum Zia, the BNP chief, said, "we prefer to unite 
on the streets rather than at meeting. " 67 
However, the current offensive against the government had been spearheaded 
by the AL chief Sheikh Hasina. According to a report in the FEER on 30 July 1987, 
Sheikh Hasina wanted to strengthen her party's image which had been suffering 
because of its last-minute participation in the elections last year. The political 
analysts of the country explained the situation that Sheikh Hasina had taken the lead 
of ongoing anti-Ershad actions equally inside and outside the parliament as she was 
convinced that her competitor, the BNP chief Begum Zia, was gaining popularity by 
sticking to the persistent demand for the resignation of the military dictator. 
According to the political observers, domestic compulsion had long been at logger 
heads with the military establishments. Sheikh Hasina was convinced that as long as 
the military was able to call the shots, it would try to prevent her from coming to 
power. Therefore, she had tried to take advantage of the District Council Bill. On 
the first day of the 54 hour hartal on 22 July 1987, at least 100 people were reported 
injured in wide spread violence which included an arson attack on the Army 
Recruitment Centre in Dhaka Residential District at Azimpur. According to the 
Financial Times of 24 July 1987,7 people were killed on the second day of the 
hartal and many more were injured in clashes between police and anti junta 
protesters. Street fighting between opposition demonstrators and junta supporters 
occurred in Dhaka, Chittagong and Sirajgonj. At a rally on 24 July 1987 to mark the 
end of the hartal, Begum Zia claimed that the opposition had `inflicted a serious 
blow to the hatred dictator'. According to the press note by police on 24 July 1987, 
700 people including 100 police men were injured and 300 people were arrested 
during the hartal. Sheikh Hasina on 30 July 1987 led a protest march at the 
government offices in Dhaka in an attempt to force the resignation of the dictator 
despite the imposition on previous order of 15 days ban on rallies within one mile of 
the area. On 1 August 1987, the dictator sent back the Local Government (District 
Council) Bill to parliament with a request that would be reconsidered. He argued 
that there was `scope for detailed discussion of the Bill. This was widely interpreted 
as an attempt to defuse the confrontational situation between the dictator and the 
democratic forces. At this stage, Freedom Party-a new party was launched on 3 `d 
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August 1987 by the August coup leaders under the green signal of the dictator-the 
move widely accepted as to suppress the strength of the opposition AL. 68 
The opposition alliances announced a plan on 22 October 1987 to observe a 
`Dhaka Seize' action on 10 November 1987-the anniversary day of fake lifting 
Martial Law in last year. They planned to assemble millions of people on that day to 
overthrow the dictatorship. The military leaders were frightened and banned all 
activities and publicity relating to this action plan on 9 November 1987. In the three 
weeks period leading up to 10 November a large number of opposition activists, 
between 1000-4500, including at least 12 prominent leaders were arrested. Frequent 
clashes between junta forces and opposition supporters in the major cities resulted in 
over 200 injured including a member of the dictator's cabinet, Lt. Col. Rt. HMA 
Gaffar on 1 November 1987. 
During this period, the two key opposition leaders Sheikh Hasina and Begum 
Zia met at least on two occasions. Both of them made up a joint statement on 9 
November 1987 expressing their strong commitment to the successful culmination 
of the struggles. As a part of the security built up in preparation for the `Dhaka 
Seize', the dictator banned all gatherings of more than five people; closed the 
University of Dhaka and drafted troops and paramilitary forces in the city. On the 
day of `Dhaka Seize', thousands of cadres of the opposition political parties put the 
capital under siege, mounting massive demonstrations to force the dictator to resign. 
In the rare show of the opposition unity, agitators led by trained political cadres 
fought pitched street battles with the military, para-military and police forces. 
Instead of all efforts of the opposition to bend on forcing the hands of the wily 
dictator, for this time, he was able to survive his worst political crises. The Home 
Minister of the junta cabinet announced on the evening of the siege day that three 
people had been killed during the day's `disturbances' and 73 were arrested. The 
counterclaims made by Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia had put the number of deaths 
at 12 when police opened fire on the demonstrators. The main area of conflict had 
been at an intersection between the BM mosque of the capital and the government 
secretariat, where the members of dictator's cabinet had their offices. Thousands of 
demonstrators congregated at this point chanting "we have one point, one demand- 
Ershad must go. "69 A representative of the working class of the Dhaka city, Nur 
Hussain (scooter driver, a worker of the AL youth front) sacrificed his life while 
carrying the slogans: "Swairachar Nipat Jak, Gonotantra Mukti Pak" (Let 
despotism be destroyed and democracy be established) written on his chest and back. 
Nur Hussain came to join a procession which was passing near the secretariat where 
the police opened fire and he was killed along with at least six others and many 
injured. 70 The heroic sacrifice of Nur Hossain was undoubtedly an uncommon 
instance for democracy around the world. This however, was undermined by the 
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dictator when he arrogantly termed the event: "a drag addict was hired in the 
marches by opposition and shoot out. "" 
In protest of this killings and atrocities, the opposition called for a nation wide 
hartal in the following two days. As a pre-emptive measure, the military junta on 11 
November 1987 arrested the two leading opposition figures-Sheikh Hasina and 
Begum Zia and put them under house detention for a month. Their continued 
detention led to further hartal and street violence up to 17 November 1987. 
According to the FEER, "Khaleda' s arrest was dramatic; she was picked up in a 
downtown Dhaka hotel ( Hotel Purbani) suite after the police broke open the door. 
She was later detained at her residence in the military cantonment, where access to 
the public was restricted. Sheikh Hasina had been confined to her late father's house, 
Bangabandhu Bhavan in the Dhanmondhi residential area under heavy police 
guard. 72 The military dictator told the foreign reporters on 13 November 1987 that 
he was willing to meet Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia for discussions. Attributing 
the week long demonstration to `street urchins, miscreants and criminals', the 
dictator stated that the security situation, in his words, was `very much under 
control', and he warned that the police had been issued with orders to `take very 
serious measures' in the event of fresh disturbances. The Financial Times of 18 
November 1987 reported that two Cabinet Ministers had met with Sheikh Hasina 
and Begum Zia late on 16 November 1987 in order to discuss the possible 
government concessions including an increase in the powers of parliament and of 
the Prime Minister. The initial opposition response had been reported negatively. 
Speaking to the police forces and volunteer guards on 20 November 1987, the 
dictator stated that parliamentary elections might be held earlier than the scheduled 
for 1991 if the opposition would enter into the dialogue with the government. Three 
people were killed and over 250 injured in a bomb attacks and fighting through out 
the country during a hartal held on 21-22 November 1987. The dictator on 23 
November1987 detained Mr Ataus Samad, a famous journalist and BBC chief in 
Dhaka, under the 1974 Special Act. 73 
The struggle for pushing the dictator out of power was not an end in itself as 
the opposition would not be catapulted into power automatically. The opposition to 
the dictator had two contenders for power- Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia. Their two 
alliances agreed to install a caretaker government which would hold `free and fair' 
general elections. And the party that wins would form the next government. The AL 
favoured a Westminster-style parliamentary form while the BNP preferred the 
existing presidential system, which was also enshrined in its party constitution. 
Political analysts believed that the BNP could be persuaded to back a parliamentary 
system. However, any prospect of the AL, which was known as anti-military, 
coming to power was likely to alarm the Armed Forces. In that situation, the AL was 
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unsuccessful to have the confidence of the Army. On the contrary, the Army feared 
that the AL was bent on cutting the military down to size. But the longstanding 
rivalry between the AL and the BNP was unlikely to forge a sustainable mass 
movement to oust the military dictator. Their leaders were also worried over the 
strength of the leftist parties in the alliances. In the first few years of the street 
politics, the CPB had emerged as the single largest organised and disciplined leftist 
force. 
At this stage of the movement, the demand for the resignation of the dictator 
from power easily incorporated the demand for the dissolution of the JS. The various 
organisations of the students, professionals and intellectuals including cultural 
activists, notably the CCA and NPC, brought out processions one after another in 
the city streets and voiced their demands for the resignation of the dictator and 
dissolution of the JS laid making various statements both severally and collectively, 
or all the elected members belonging to opposition camp should quit the JS. 74 In this 
situation the dictator on 27 November 1987 proclaimed the `state of emergency' 
throughout the country. The introduction of the state of emergency was 
enthusiastically protested by the mainstream three opposition alliances as they 
announced three day hartal from 29 November to 1 December 1987.75 The military 
dictator, having arms with him under emergency provision, addressed the nation on 
the state owned TV on 28 November 1987 with a proposal to the opposition to reach 
a negotiated settlement of the political crises, 76 which was considered as his old style 
to overcome the crisis. 
Reports from India alleged that police in Bangladesh killed five people and 
injured over 350 whilst suppressing demonstrations throughout the country on 29 
November 1987 and a police press note on 30 November 1987 recognised two killed 
and some 2500 opposition supporters had been arrested since the introduction of the 
state of emergency. The dictator, in an unexpected move on 6 December 1987, 
dissolved the parliament to pre-empt collision of the opposition AL to resign from 
the legislature, which could have resulted in a constitutional crises. However, he 
later recognised this step as his great political blunder in his period of reign. 
77 The 
move cleared the way for new elections to the parliament. In this dilemma, 10 MPs 
of the JIB supported the call of the BNP to quit the parliament, who therefore, 
resigned on 5 December 1987 pulling the main opposition AL to do like wise. 
Sheikh Hasina, and Begum Zia remained under house arrest since the state of 
emergency was declared. The AL Presidium met and indeed took the similar 
decision in the chair of Presidium member Abdul Mannan who along with other 
opposition leaders including Dr Kamal Hossain had been released from detention by 
the military authorities-popularly believed as an arranged release-on 30 
November 1987. However, a split developed in the parliamentary group of the AL, 
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which challenged the decision of the Presidium of the party, and resolved that matter 
of the resignation of the AL MPs from the JS should be settled by the party 
President Sheikh Hasina. Asadul Haque Khosru, a leading AL MP described the 
decision of the Presidium as "an attempt coup by the section of the party old group 
which has failed" . 
7g However, leaving Sheikh Hasina under house arrest, Kamal 
Hossain had played a remarkable active role during the recent ALWC meeting, 
which took the decision for party MPs to resign from the JS. This helped him 
reassert his individual position in the party. 
7.9. The Movement against the Civilian Face of the Military 
Dictatorship 
Maudud Ahmed, a high rank political parasite and intellectual collaborator to 
all military regimes in the post independent Bangladesh politics, and the then 
Deputy Prime Minister of the dictator's cabinet, asserted that a new general election 
must be held within 90 days from the date of the dissolution of JS. Before a firm 
polling date was announced, the dictator was likely to dissolve his Cabinet to form a 
new one, which he might call his `caretaker' cabinet, demanded by the opposition 
and reconstituted the EC according to his evil design to sustain the power under 
civilian cover. The JS elections were scheduled for 3 March 1988. Sheikh Hasina 
and Begum Zia along with 20 opposition leaders were released from detention on 10 
December 1987 that followed a further release of 430 political detainees in the same 
week. The Liaison Committee of the three main alliances on 20 December 1987 
raised the demand for holding the elections to the JS under the caretaker government. 
The election to 4400 UPs79 were held amidst, possibly the worst election related 
violence in the country's history. According to the Hindu on 12 February, 1988 at 
least 150 people were killed, although the official statement supported the deaths of 
80 and over 8000 injured during the polls. The voting was suspended in a large 
number of polling centres and wide spread rioting was reported in many areas. The 
election was non-partisan and had not been directly opposed by the main opposition 
parties. The Times on 6 February 1988 reported that much of the violence in the run 
up to the elections had been exacerbated by family feuds and the `setting of old 
scores among land barons'. According to the FEER on 25 February 1988, time 
round, most political parties including the AL and the BNP who were boycotting 
the general election became involved in supporting local candidates-favoured by 
them, where the organised parties were interested in getting their supporters 
elected. The major opposition parties had held the dictator and his JP responsible for 
the violence during the local elections. The AL chief Sheikh Hasina accused that the 
dictator had destroyed `all democratic institutions' in which the junta under civilian 
cover did not hesitate to massacre the people to cling the power. The BNP chief 
Begum Zia also condemned the violence and reiterated its stand that only an election 
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under caretaker government could control the violence and could overcome the 
present national crises. 80 The run-up to next months' parliamentary polls, boycotted 
by the major opposition parties, had been blemished by widespread violence, but the 
dictator was determined to go ahead with his plan of elections. 8' 
The fourth parliamentary polls since the independence of Bangladesh and the 
second since the military dictator came to power were held to 282 elective seats in 
the 330 member JS; unopposed in 18 seats and election in the one constituency had 
been post-poned after a candidate was shot dead. The remaining 30 seats were 
traditionally reserved for women and were filled with indirect election by the JS. 
The elections was originally set to be taken place on 18 February 1988, but 
rescheduled in mid-January to avoid a clash with Muslim holidays of Ramadan, 
which was later announced by the EC on 1 January 1988. Sheikh Hasina and Begum 
Zia, the two main opposition leaders issued a statement immediately denouncing the 
electoral process of the country as meaningless and calling for a fresh programme of 
the anti-government agitation. However, the leaders of 76 political parties, most of 
whom had few members and little public support, issued a statement on 2 January 
1988 saying that they had formed a Combined Opposition Group (COG) to contest 
the forthcoming elections. The COG was led by Mr A. S. M Abdur Rob, who was 
described by the FEER on 28 January 1988 as the dictators's `loyal' opposition 
leader. In the period leading up to the election, the opposition alliances held a 
number of rallies calling for non-participation in this JS polls and hartals were 
frequently called in the major cities that were spontaneously supported by the 
masses of the all corners of the society. The dictator-mindful of unprecedented 
violence that had accompanied the local elections-banned all public rallies; closed 
educational institutions and deployed the Army as additional support force for the 
police and paramilitary BDR troops who had already been posted in preparation for 
polling. The security police arrested over 20 senior opposition leaders on 16 
February 1988 including the AL-GS Sajeda Choudhury and a number of former 
ministers and BNP officials. According to the government press note, 5 people were 
killed and 80 injured on the Election Day violence, but the police report suggested 
that the number of deaths might have been as high as 13. Most of the western media 
reports were agreed that the vast majority of the country's 48,000,000 voters had 
obeyed the guidelines of the opposition to boycott the election. The Guardian of 4 
March 1988 commented that the ruling JP had `showed its contempt for the 
electorate with massive rigging of the polls' and the Independent, on the same day, 
reported that `none of the 65 foreign correspondents there for the elections reported 
witnessing normal voting at any of the polling stations in Dhaka'. As of late March 
1988, the unofficial results of the elections were as JP-251, COG-18, Freedom 
Party-2, JSD-2 and Independants-26. 
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The mainstream opposition forces mentioned that only about 1% had 
exercised their franchise and accused the ruling JP of massive ballot rigging. 
According to the FEER of 17 March 1988, the AL President Sheikh Hasina accused 
the dictator of destroying the electoral process under which either the polling officer 
did not turn up or the ballot boxes were missing. She also claimed that the 
government owned radio and TV networks had announced predetermined results. 
The abnormal situation created by the dictator resolved to announce the pre- 
determined results. Sirajul Islam, the AL secretary for International Affairs told the 
Review that the JP candidate was declared elected with 1,27,000 votes though 
registered voters were only 99000 at Burichang seat under Comilla District. Sheikh 
Hasina assured that the opposition would continue its `peaceful and constitutional 
struggle to oust Ershad whom she termed a `shameless liar'. The BNP chief Begum 
Zia staged a rally with several thousands supporters admittedly not a significant 
number by the country's standard to protest against election fraud. 82 
The 8-Party alliance organised a mammoth rally at Chittagong on 24 January 
1988 which was led among others by the alliance chief Sheikh Hasina. The police 
without any cause, opened fire on the peaceful procession that marched from the 
airport to Laldhighi, which killed 24 activists on the spot and injured and arrested 
thousand others, most of whom belonged to the poorer sections of the society. The 
countrymen were stunned at this tragic incident. Sheikh Hasina immediately charged 
the dictator of repeating the massacre of unarmed people as like as the Pakistan 
Army against Bengali people during the liberation war in 1971, and vowed that the 
people would take appropriate revenge by ousting the dictator from power. She 
subsequently softened her stance and stated that too much blood had already spilled. 
She also absented herself from a later procession in Dhaka to mourn the Chittagong 
killings in the following day at Central Shahid Minar. The presence of Begum Zia- 
a rival leader of Sheikh Hasina in the opposition camp-at the procession made the 
latter's absence all the move conspicuous. Questioned about her absence, Sheikh 
Hasina replied: ".... I had information that an attempt would be made to kill me if I 
was there-Could anyone guarantee that the presence of the two of us [Hasina and 
Khaleda] on one platform would have toppled the government? " Although her 
critics were quick to accuse Sheikh Hasina of `providing a fresh lease of life to the 
Ershad regime' by diluting the strength of the opposition movement, 83 the political 
analyst believed that Sheikh Hasina was keen to prevent a further military takeover 
by another General that would create an opportunity for Begum Zia to be in power. 
There was a National Poetry Festival on 1-2 February 1988 at the TSC area of 
Dhaka University which inspired the activists of the opposition movement specially 
the students of colleges and universities who profusely shed their blood for the 
restoration of democracy. 
84 The Poetry Council organised poetry festivals 
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consecutively from 1987 in the first week of February in every year with the theme 
of burning political issues, for example, `poetry against autocracy', `poetry against 
communalism' and `poetry for democracy'. 
The opposition in Bangladesh like the partisans of many other third worlds' 
domestic conflicts had brought its battle to the Washington, the capital of the 
USA-the super power of world politics. The recent Washington visit of the Foreign 
Minister H. R. Choudhury tried to portray the US blessing for the latest controversial 
JS elections. On the contrary, the two opposition leaders Dr Kamal Hossain of the 
AL and B Choudhury of the BNP arrived at Washington, soon after the visit of the 
Foreign Minister, to lobby against the military dictator. They urged the US Congress 
and administration to use the leverage of aid to restore democracy in Bangladesh. 
Kamal Hossain told a press conference, the "Noriega of South Asia should not be 
treated differently from the Noriega of Central America or else where. "85 In a bid to 
oust the Panamanian military strongman, General Manuel Noriega, the US had 
recently cut off all aid and credit to Panama. However, the analogy used to catch 
public attention was interpreted as an appeal for a total cut in aid to the military 
dictator; the opposition representatives repeated by saying that US food aid to 
Bangladesh should not be touched. Although the Bangladesh opposition leaders 
were received accordingly to protocol by a mid-level state department official they 
had meetings with a number of powerful congressional leaders and addressed other 
influential policy makers. It was reported that the two opposition leaders made a 
strong impression on congressional leaders with their agreement that the rule of 
Ershad had eroded faith in democratic process, institutions of the government and 
the independence of the judiciary causing instability and violence that could not 
affect only Bangladesh but also the region. Edward Kennedy, a supporter of 
Bangladesh since its birth, was going to introduce a resolution expressing concern 
about the situation in Bangladesh and influential members of House of 
Representatives were looking into the possibility of partial suspension of aid, if the 
Ershad regime did not take steps to restore democracy. In the meantime, the House 
Sub-committee of Asian and Pacific Affairs was scheduled to hold hearings on 
Bangladesh, and the USA administration was likely to come under congressional 
pressure to look a tougher approach to Ershad-the Noriega of Bangladesh. The 
House in December 1987 passed the Foreign Assistance Act with an amendment, 
which required the US President to take into consideration the existence of a 
credibly eligibly elected government, free press and judiciary while offering aid. 
Once the Bill was passed by the Senate in the summer, the administration had put to 
a test in the light of last parliamentary polls, marked as `voter less election' by one 
congressional member, which created serious difficulties in providing Bangladesh 
with the proposed US $133 million in aid. Inconsequentially, Dhaka had hired a 
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lobbying firm for reported US $200,000 initial fee to promote the interests of the 
military dictator in the US congress. 86 
The dictator on 13 March 1988 announced at a religious gathering in Barisal, a 
southern district of the country, that the JS would consider a Bill in its coming 
session to `provide religious identity to the nation by incorporating Islam as a state 
religion' 87 which in fact was regarded as a new fundamentalist cover of the 
dictatorship to sustain its power. Moudud Ahmed, the Prime Minister, introduced a 
Bill into parliament on 11 May 1988 to amend the constitution to make Islam the 
state religion. The move came as a surprise. It was generally believed that he would 
not act on such a critical issue during the first session of new JS. The new article 2A 
to be inserted in the constitution read: "the state religion of the Republic is Islam, 
but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in the Republic. "88 
Besides, introducing new article 2A related to the state religion, the Constitution (8th 
Amendment) Act 1988 also aimed to amend article 100, which would allow, the 
setting up of six permanent branches of the High Court divisions of the Supreme 
Court at Barisal, Chittagong, Comilla, Jessore, Rangpur and Sylhet. 
The AL chief Sheikh Hasina accused the dictator of using Islam as a tool to 
cling to power and exploit popular religious sentiment. The BNP chief Begum Zia 
said that it was a useless step in an overwhelming Muslim majority country to 
proclaim Islam the state religion as she said that he had little regard for Islam and 
that its move would be harmful for religion. The opposition alliances reacted sharply 
and condemned the Bill soon after its introduction. At least seven vehicles in Dhaka 
including six government buses were damaged in opposition inspired protests 
against this Bill. Begum Zia declared that `vigorous movement' would be launched 
later in the month `to topple the Ershad government' and the people did not 
recognise the new JS and that it had no legal right to enact a new law or amend the 
constitution. Sheikh Hasina said, "the love for religion does not mean [Ershad's] 
respect for it., 89 However, `the Bill was passed in the JS on 7 June 1988. The 
passage of the Bill was opposed in parliament by the so called `loyal' opposition 
which staged a walk out. The leader of the parliamentary opposition, A. S. M Abdur 
Rob said that the move would divide the nation further. Protest marches and one-day 
hartal were organised by the mainstream three opposition alliances. The 8-party 
alliance chief Sheik Hasina told a large protest meeting on 9 June 1988 that that it 
was `a heinous move to destroy the spirit of the liberation war and reunite 
Bangladesh with Pakistan'. 90 
The BNP Chief Begum Zia termed the amendment as `highly politically 
motivated' and was an attempt to exploit religion to divide the nation and would 
generate a communal atmosphere. While the move had cut the ground formed under 
fundamentalist groups calling for an Islamic state, it continued a trend towards 
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Islamisation which began in late 1979 by the Constitutional (5`h amendment) Act 
that removed four state principles including secularism, and inserted 'Bismillah-ar- 
Rahmanir Rahim' (in the name of Allah, the beneficent, the merciful) in the 
preamble to the constitution. The actual features in the reactions of the state religion 
bill were different. According to the FEER on 26 May 1988, senior BNP and AL 
leaders publicly expressed their anger at the Ershad regime, but privately said that it 
would be extremely difficult to organise any effective movement on such a sensitive 
issue. ' However, Abdur Razzak, GS of the BKSAL, said that the new Act would 
`negate the spirit of the liberation struggle' and "I think we can mount an effective 
movement to force the government to withdraw the bill. "92 A well known poet and 
agnostic who asked not to be named, told the FEER correspondent: "Jackfruit is our 
national fruit but we are not obliged to eat it everyday... so let the state religion 
safely be tucked in its exalted position. How does it matter? "93 
The intellectuals agreed that no special honour would be shown to country's 
predominant religion by making Islam as state religion. At this stage, there were not 
many people appeared ready to risk alienating people by contesting the move of the 
dictator. Actually there were no strong movement launched outside the JS by any of 
the three main opposition alliances against the decisive measures of the dictator 
accepting making some statements and organising few demonstrations. According to 
Rangalal Sen, "the making of Islam the state religion of the Muslim majority of 
Bangladesh only further alienated the non-Muslim minorities from the socio- 
political life of the nation. It may be argued that the failure to organise any effective 
movement against the passing of the state religion bill on the part of the mainstream 
opposition forces only demonstrated their fragile commitment to upholding 
secularism which was one of the state principles enshrined in the constitution of 
1972. It is sometimes said that the people belonging to the major religious group did 
not demand that Islam should be made state religion. It is also equally true that the 
people did not oppose it openly. What really happened politicians and professionals 
appeared to be helpless and seemed to be shy in this delicate issue. "94 However, the 
diplomatic missions in Dhaka felt that an Islamic constitution could possibly hurt 
the government and they predicted that a fundamentalist could question the 
government policy in future on the grounds that it did not confront with Islamic 
Sharia (Law). Since there were no strong protests against the state religion bill from 
the political elites, some secular and progressive intellectuals of the country formed 
an organisation called 'Swairachar-Sampradayikata Pratirudh Parishad' (Council 
for Resisting Autocracy and Communalism) which on 2 June 1988 declared its 
sincere desire to defeat despotism and to maintain communal harmony at any cost. 
In a protest on 10 June 1988, they warned the dictator that the amendment would 
result in `religious extremism and discrimination' (against minority groups), 
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obstruct intellectual freedom and ultimately put medieval restrictions on the rights of 
women. 95 In addition to that the Hindu-Buddha-Christian Oikva Parisbad (Hindu- 
Buddhist-Christian Unity Council-HBCUC) also came into being which had 
indirect patronage and support from the secular and non-communal elements 
belonging to major religious group of Bangladesh society. 96 
The minorities, secularists and womens' organisations of the country had also 
roundly criticised the move of the dictator. The different women groups thought that 
the law was unnecessary and could even erode the rights of women. The minorities 
argued that the move would negate the spirit of liberation war, which was fought by 
all citizens regardless of their religious identity. Despite repeated assurances of the 
dictator that the new law would not affect the minority communities, non-Muslims 
of the country appeared deeply concerned. Secular Muslims of the society seemed to 
be thoughtful that the move was uncalled for in a country where more than 87% of 
the population are Muslims, Hindhu less than 10%, with Christians and Buddhist 
making up the rest. The HBCUC organised several protest meetings and managed to 
stage a march on JS, where 20000 demonstrators handed a petition to the Speaker. 
The petition said, "declaration of Islam as the only state religion will result in 
destroying national unity, curtail equal rights of other communities and even 
encourage them to take separatist stands. "97 The Christian churches led by the 
Archbishop of Dhaka, Michael Rozerio, and Bishop Barnabas Mondal of the Church 
of Bangladesh ran a front page advertisement in an English language Daily 
appealing to the President, government leaders and MPs to reconsider the move to 
`preserve the patrimony of independent Bangladesh'. 98 Independent MP Nurul 
Islam Moni in the JS, asked: "will the corrupt give up taking bribes after the Bill is 
passed? Will everyone become religious? Will all become angels? And he added, 
`Are you sure you are not creating Move problems? "99 
Among the problems the new law would create was the fear of the rise of 
fundamentalism and curbing the rights of women. The women's bodies argued that 
the new law is unnecessary as it was well served by the 1937 legislation on Muslim 
personal law incorporating aspects of the religious Shariah (Islamic law). They were 
also deeply frustrated at the half hearted protests mounted by the mainline 
opposition parties and termed that the opposition leaders had chickened out because 
of the fear that any concerted protest against the Bill could be used by dictator to 
claim that the opposition was agitating against Islam itself. Various women 
organisations including the United Women's Forum, National Women's Lawyer 
Association, Jatyo Manila Parisbad ( National Women Council), and Nari Pakhya 
(Women Sides) continued to protest so that any attempts at introducing 
fundamentalist laws, especially those discriminating against women, became 
frustrated. Sigma Huda, GS of the NWLA told that `she had never believed that 
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Bangladesh would become officially an Islamic country, but that process had just 
started. " 100 The United Women's Forum organised a number of rallies and 
procession led by well known poets and authors including Begum Sufia Kamal and 
Nilima Ibrahim, but it failed to dislodge the administration from its chosen path. 
Though communal harmony had been maintained with no major communal 
disturbance since the riots in 1964, the reports of wide spread insecurity was being 
exaggerated. But the rumble of a united opposition movement to unseat the dictator 
had turned into a whimper of protest unity, totally demoralising the political activists. 
As a result, the danger of the fundamentalist factions reviving communal forces was 
not ruled out. 
Although the half day hartal called by the 7-party alliance and the JIB on 28 
November 1988 was successful, the various opposition groupings remained as 
divided as ever. The last hartal was ignored by the two other major opposition 
alliances-8-party and 5-party alliances, and thus neither marked a revival of last 
year's popular anti-dictator protest nor proved there was wide support for the BNP 
led 7 party alliance. The close link of the BNP with the anti-liberation force and 
fundamentalist JIB had widened the rift between itself and two other opposition 
alliances. A left wing activist said, "it was clear from past hartals that such actions 
can not effectively change the government and people were increasingly feeling that 
suffering" and added "it is a waste of time and energy. " 101 
The Constitutional (9th Amendment) Act passed hurriedly on 6 July 1989 that 
limited a President to two elected terms of five years each and creating the post of an 
elected Vice-President that came into effect from I" March 1990. Predictably, the 
mainstream opposition reacted sharply to the Bill and described it as a step to 
prolong the rule of the dictator. The BNP described the present government as 
illegal and said it had no right to amend the constitution. Sheikh Hasina of the AL 
said, "when the nation is continuing the mass movement to remove the present 
regime from power and establish a democratic government through a free and fair 
election, this amendment has been moved to perpetuate the rule of the present 
autocratic regime. 102 Dr Kamal Hossain of the AL described the amendment as 
`contemptuous not only of the constitution of the republic but also of the people as 
well as of democracy'. A former Attorney-General and President of the SCBA, 
Barrister Syed Istiaq Ahmed said that it was a cleaver attempt by the government to 
`confuse the people'. It should be importantly mentioned here, in the amendment 
debate, Ali Ashgar Khan, a retired Major, and an independent MP even suggested 
that the Army Chief of Staff should be made the Vice-President of the country to 
remove any apprehensions of a violent army take over. ' 03 In August 1989, while the 
elevation of Moudud Ahmed to Vice-President had not been entirely unexpected the 
unceremonious ousting of retired High Court judge Nurul Islam from the Vice- 
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presidency and the appointment of Kazi Zafar Ahmed as PM had sparked a roý\ 
within the ruling JP. 104 In fact, the dictator never did care about the provisions of the 
constitution and had already established his desires and orders to be treated as the 
laws and constitution of the country. 
The anti-autocracy movement remained disorganised throughout 1989. Earle 
in this year, Moulana Delwar Hussain Saeedi, a self-styled Muslin fundamentalist 
leader of the JIB, had enraged large segments of the Muslim clergy because of his 
unorthodox interpretation of the Holy Quran. As a result, he had become one of the 
most quoted personalities in the national press. Saeedi was invited to attend a 
religious meeting in the early January 1989 in Chittagong by Tafsirul Quaran, a 
body devoted to discussions on Islamic matters. The meeting acquired distinct 
political overtones. He reportedly accused government and secular opposition 
leaders of letting women out in the street, which claimed was erodin4-- 
values. 
Islamic 
105 He targeted mainly, among other, the opposition women leaders i. e. the 
AL President Sheikh Hasina and the BNP Chairperson Begum Khaleda Zia. He also 
accused government ministers of shaking hands with women to `please their sexual 
instinct'. Saeedi went on openly to argue those present in the meeting to join the JIB 
and the BICS, its student wing. 
The provocations of Saeedi led to citywide hartal in Chittagong for several 
days by anti-JIB forces, which included the AL and its allies, leftwing 5-party 
alliance, the Freedom Fighters Association and all national level student 
organisations. The JIB supporters and their opponents were involved in violent 
clashes on the streets in Chittagong. There was also another reason for the violence 
against JIB. A few days before its surrender on 16 December 1971, the Pakistan 
Army worked out a plan for the large scale killing of Bengali intellectuals. As the 
active collaborators with the Pakistan Army at that time, the JIB implemented the 
plan ruthlessly. Large numbers of mutilated bodies of executed Bengali intellectuals 
were found at Rayer Bazaar Baddah Bhumi in Dhaka on 14 December 1971, the day 
has since then been observed as the `Intellectual Martyr's Day'. Sheikh Hasina in 
her statement called upon the people to unite against increased provocation from the 
fundamentalist and anti-liberation forces. She warned the anti-liberation forces to 
watch their words, `otherwise, people will tear off (their) tongues'. 106 The political 
analysts of the country pointed out that strong measures were not used against 
Saeedi and his party because they were actively supported by the Saudi and Middle 
East countries, which were also a major donor to Bangladesh. It was reported that 
the Macca-based non-official humanitarian body, Rabita-ab-Alamal-Islame, which 
was currently raising funds to repatriate some 250,000 stranded Pakistanis from 
Bangladesh, used its influence to push for Saeedi's participation at the meeting in 
Chittagong. 107 The JIB had gained considerable strength in recent years despite 
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opposition from secular parties and rival religious groupings. The mainline 
opposition alliances were disunited and individual parties were toned by 
factionalism that had strengthened the JIB argument in the minds of people that it 
deserved to wield power for its so called Islamic approach to national problems. 
In the second week of September 1989, the 8`h amendment to constitution, 
which was passed on 9 June 1988 for judicial reforms, received a block when the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court declared ultra-vies a constitutional 
amendment that would have allowed the creation of permanent High Court branches 
outside Dhaka. The ruling had restored article 100 of the constitution, which stated 
that `the permanent seat of the Supreme Court shall be in the capital , 
but sessions of 
the High Court division may be held as such other place or places as the Chief 
Justice may, with the approval of the President from time to time, appoint. 108 The 
legal battle began soon after the passages of the amendment by parliament. The 
original writ by three private citizens challenging the constitutional validity of the 
amendment bill was dismissed by the High Court. But the appeal was supported by 
some leading lawyers of Bangladesh including President of the SCBA, Barrister 
Syed Istiaq Ahmed and Dr Kamal Hossain. Kamal Hossain, giving his reaction, said, 
"the judgement is a milestone in the history of constitution and it is a victory of the 
people who want to live under constitutional rule..... the case involved two parties- 
one is favour of constitutional rule and other desirous of disrupting it by arms and 
forces". Istiak Ahmed said that the verdict proved we are capable of discharging our 
constitutional responsibilities. 109 However, political observers believed the court 
verdict was unlikely to lead to any major political changes in the country, given the 
absence of a united opposition movement. Not surprisingly, opposition political 
parties were delighted by the verdict calling it a major victory for their movement 
against what they called the `undemocratic measures' taken by the parliament whose 
election the opposition boycotted last year. 
It seemed in the last week of September 1989 that the opposition parties had 
transferred their battle from street to court. Four writ petitions, in which three 
challenging the 8`h amendment that established the Islam as state religion and other 
challenging certain provisions of 9th amendment passed by the parliament in last 
July, were awaiting the courts' decision. The Supreme Court judgement in early 
September affecting the 8`h amendment did not touch on the state religion provisions 
of the amendment. The three writ petitions challenging the declaration of Islam as 
the state religion were filed by lawyer Shakti Das Goswami, Naripakhya, a women's 
rights organisation and Nagarik (citizens) Committee, an organisation comprising 
the prominent personalities of Dhaka city. The writ petition challenging the 9th 
amendment's contingency provision filed by former ambassador Abdul Barek MP 
was being supported by the lawyers belonging to the contingency provision: "if for 
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any reason the President can not discharge his functions, parliament is automatically 
summoned the next day to make alternative arrangements. After that the parliament 
stands dissolved or prorogued as the case may be, " 10 critics maintained, would be 
used to legitimate the coup through this provision. In the mean time, the lawyers of 
the opposition AL were planning to challenge the 5`h amendment passed on 6 April 
1979, which gave legal force to all proclamations and martial law regulations set out 
by the governments of the day between 15 August 1975 and 5 April 1979. The AL 
lawyers were seeking to remove the provision of the amendment only that prohibited 
the trial of those responsible for killing the founding father of the country, 
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. "' 
The opposition political parties were disorganised through out the year 1989. 
The clash between BCL and JCD in the Dhaka University campus and gun battles, 
bombings and killings of the members of rival student factions had become almost 
routine affairs in the universities. A report showed that a total of 116 students were 
killed on the campuses in 1971-1987 when student riots took place during this 
period, injuring thousands and leaving many crippled for life. Some 219 rooms in 
the student dormitories and 12 houses and shops were burned in clashes between 
rival student groupings. In late September 1989, police raided DU dormitories and 
seized large quantities of modern weapons and arresting 33 JCD supporters. The VC 
of the University issued a statement holding the BNP and its leader Begum Zia 
responsible for campus casualties. The student body of AL in the opposition 
received similar treatment in the early October 1989 when police arrested 29 
supporters of the BCL and confiscated large quantity of arms. The AL President 
Sheikh Hasina insisted that campus should be made violence free by ensuring that 
no weapons could slip into the area. A university teacher told the FEER that October 
action had seemingly restored the balance of forces within the campus, but also 
provided rival students with the steps to be united against the dictator. However, the 
police raid was `only the tips of the iceberg....... much of the arms have been moved 
elsewhere or are lying in other halls. 112 The violence in student politics had been a 
recent event under the auspices of the military intelligence-tactful handling to 
destroy the image of glorious student politics, which represented a remorseful 
degeneration of original political activity of the students in Bangladesh society. The 
students' bodies had a vanguard role in the 1950-60s in helping to evolve 
democratic values that glorified the national liberation struggle of the nation. The 
political analyst argued that the student groups under military regime had become 
the appendage of their parent political parties and the tools to orchestrate political 
manoeuvres of these parties. 13 However, the dictator made a comment-making 
him a laughing stock-that `the son who was sent to the university for building a 
career was returning home as a dead body' and said in crocodile tears: `What a 
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shock to the parents who sold their land or livestock for financing the son's 
education'. ' 14 But it nothing was done by his administration to prevent the violence 
in the campus. It was clearly understood that the students were the major threat to 
the dictator that led him to employ his all efforts to disunity of the opposition 
student leaders. The violence among the student bodies in the campus was popularly 
believed as a part of the blueprint by military intelligence so that the uniformed 
student movement could not be launched against the dictator. 
7.10. The Mass Uprising of 1990 and the Removal of the Dictator 
The movement for restoration of democracy could not make any further 
headway until the middle of 1990. It was only the month of June and July of 1990 
that some sort of unity and understanding were restored within the three main 
opposition alliances. The various cultural and professional groups became united 
and urged the opposition political alliances to formulate a realistic programme for 
removing the dictator from power in the shortest possible time. In a seminar held at 
Chittagong on 28 September 1990 under the Mukta Forum (open forum), this idea 
was categorically communicated to some central leaders belonging to three alliances. 
The dictator, in late May 1990, announced his candidacy for the next Presidential 
election with Moudud Ahmed as Vice-President running mate. In this situation the 
main opposition leaders Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia had, on occasions, managed 
to put aside their past differences to forge united movement. The dictator had caused 
further confusion by telling his JP officials that major opposition parties would take 
part in the presidential polls and he was looking forward to having a strong opponent. 
The BNP chief Begum Zia repeated her demand that the election should be held 
under neutral government while the AL chief Sheikh Hasina had described the 
candidature of Ershad as a `bluff' and demanded the prior holding of JS elections 
which currently were scheduled for early 1993. But the past record of AL to 
participate in the election of 1986 made its credibility suspect. The BNP which had 
been more consistent in its demand had yet to announce its course of actions and 
was then taking to other political parties to coordinate its programme. In June 1990, 
the dictator in a recent party address criticised the previous regime of the opposition 
AL, 115 however, spared the BNP from criticism on this occasion, which prompted 
the AL to accuse the BNP of conniving with the dictator. This seemed likely a 
tactics of the dictator to keep the two opposition groups on the wrong-foot. 
However, the three main opposition alliances after a long time organised a 
`Secretariat Siege' on 10`h October 1990 that resulted in 5 killings including some 
students by police shooting on the participants. It should be pointed out here that it 
was the students who joined this opposition action in large numbers. They forcibly 
took away from the hands of the police the dead body of a fellow student named 
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Nazir Hossain Jehad of Ullapara College, Sirajjgonj and held a mourning rally at the 
foot of `APARAJEYA BANGLA' 116 in the premises of Arts Building of the 
University of Dhaka that attended by national leaders where Sheikh Hasina 
conducted the oath to the students at the rally who stood besides the dead body of 
Jehad. "7 The move to develop a solid anti-dictator opposition suffered a jolt, when a 
terrorist JCD cadre named Danny brought out a knife to hurt the AL chief Sheikh 
Hasina who ended the speech with her party slogan `JOY BANGLA' "8 (win for 
Bangla)-a slogan largely used for inspiration of the freedom fighters in the 
country's liberation war of 1971-at this APSU gatherings. The leaders of the 
mainstream opposition were still hesitating to take this killings issue in forging a 
united movement against the dictator, which was clinched by the APSU leaders. On 
the other hand, the student wings of respective political parties announced their 
combined actions to dethrone the dictator since the formation of the APSU. They 
called on the two key opposition leaders-Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia for unity 
disregarding their past differences in order to throw out the dictator regime. They 
warned: "otherwise [two leaders'] offices will be seized by the students to force 
them to unite". ' 19 
The APSU on 11 October 1990 called a half day hartal through out the 
country. Almost all the top leaders of the APSU were injured with police attack at 
Shahabugh crossing, a place adjacent to the north of the Dhaka University, when 
they were organising a protest rally and sent to the hospitals. In protest against this 
police atrocity on the procession, the students burned scored of cars and stormed and 
ransacked the Atomic Energy Commission Office adjacent to Dhaka University, 
after police shot on the student marches. The response of the dictator to turmoil was 
dismissive and very rough and ready, when he commented: "a sit-in of a few 
thousand people in a city of 7 million people can not change the government. "120 It 
was out of the ordinary to note here that in this critical juncture of the movement, all 
the political, cultural, professional alliances and groups came very close to the 
APSU which began to demonstrate it's pre-eminence in the current political 
situation of the country as if they became a deciding factor for the success of 
struggle that carried on for the last nine years against the junta. However, there was 
another mammoth rally held in the Dhaka University campus on 13 October 1990 to 
protest the murder of Moniruzzaman, a student of Dhaka Polytechnic Institute at 
which the mainline opposition leaders also attended and gave their unanimous 
support to the students' actions. 
In this situation the dictator adopted two different strategies simultaneously to 
stop the tide of this vigorous student movement. First, the dictator in the Gazette 
Notification dated 13 October 1990 promulgated the Educational Institutions (Law 
and Order) Ordinance, 1990 by which it closed down the educational institutions of 
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Dhaka city at different levels including the University of Dhaka. 12' Second, it tried 
hard to win over some influential student leaders by any means so that the unity 
established among the various student organisations could be impaired. The military 
intelligence of the dictator used the ideological and organisational differences 
between the components of the APSU. But all of those evil designs of the dictator 
were disclosed in an official document. '22 There was an adverse reaction to the 
closure of all educational institutions of Dhaka city among the conscious section of 
its population. Dr Kamal Hossain, a prominent lawyer, challenged the ordinance of 
the government in the court. The teachers of the University of Dhaka demanded its 
opening immediately. Otherwise, they threatened to open the University themselves. 
In fact, they had to do so by taking classes on 11 November 1990 in order to 
safeguard the autonomy of the University in the utter disregard of the said 
prohibitive ordinance of the government with great indignation against the alleged 
connivance of the VC of the University at it. 123 At this stage of the movement, as 
many as 14 teachers associations forged unity and formed the `Combined Teacher's 
Movement'. The teachers of all levels were thus drawn into the political movement 
of the country. 124 The APSU organised a mammoth rally in front of the Educational 
Ministry Building at the Secretariat on 25 October 1990 to protest against the new 
ordinance. 
It was evident that the urban middle class became more active and bold enough 
against the dictator as the movement achieved greater momentum in Dhaka, which 
had a profound impact upon the agitating masses of other big and small towns 
including divisional cities of Chittagong, Rajshahi and Khulna. On account of the 
continuous strikes and wide spread agitations through out the country, the 
administration of the dictator appeared to have collapsed in October 1990. When the 
dictator failed to distract the rising student movement in spite of its various tricky 
steps, it let loose the anti-social elements to create communal frenzy as a reaction to 
the heinous attack on the historic Babri Mosque by the Hindu fundamentalist forces 
in India. The destructions of temples and looting of properties in Hindu houses in 
the different parts of Bangladesh included Dhaka and Chittagong for at least 3 days 
from 31 October to 1-2 November 1990. But the tactics of the dictator could not be 
successful. Rather people joined the anti-autocracy movement in large numbers in a 
more conscious and determined way. 
At this stage of the movement, the students and political leaders undertook 
countrywide tours in order to maintain communal harmony and to spread the 
movement to the grassroots rural masses. There was serious clash between police 
and students on 4 November 1990 at the Gulistan Square in the capital in which as 
many as 15 prominent student leaders were seriously injured. The APSU took a vow 
in a very sentimental voice by saying that they would not go home before the 
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removal of the dictator. The 8-party alliance chief Sheikh Hasina, in a ww el l attended 
public meeting at `Panth Path' of Dhaka city on 6 November 1990, explicitly stated 
the constitutional provisions to removal of the dictator under which a Caretaker 
Government could also be formed for free and fair elections. On 19 November 1990 
the three main alliances published the historic `Joint Declaration'''' in which the 
outlines of the removal of the dictator, holding of sovereign parliament elections 
under the interim government, and the establishment of the government by elected 
representatives in the country were clearly defined. The administration of the 
dictator, for the first time, became really perturbed, when the joined declaration by 
the opposition was published. 
The dictator was particularly concerned in this time by the unusual unity 
among the student bodies of the various opposition political parties of the country. 
These groups had even threatened their own political leaders that they would take 
the movement into their own hands if the parent parties did not unite to oust the 
dictator. The military intelligence had tried to split the APSU during the movement 
in October and November 1990. The administration of the dictator used many anti- 
social elements including some armed student hooligans who were expelled then 
from the JCD for their alleged linkage with the junta administration that turned the 
Dhaka University campus into battle field on 25 November 1990. The dictator said 
that a `foreign country', a euphemism for India, was involved in conspiracy to 
destabilise his regime which was dismissed hurriedly by all opposition parties. In the 
mean time, a retired army officer on 20 November 1990 attacked the cantonment 
house of the BNP chief Begum Zia and assaulted her son and two servants. The 
BNP condemned the incident as an attempt on its leader's life. At a rally held after 
this incident, Begum Zia, for the first time, accused Ershad of being involved in the 
death of her husband-General Ziaur Rahman. It was reported that the army officer 
was the DGFI chief during Zia regime and was very close to the Zia's family. 
Although The Banglar Bani, a Bengali daily, presented a photograph of attesting 
two family's members closely on the occasion of a picnic party, this incident created 
a large reaction in the people's sentiment and added new dimension to anti- 
autocracy movement. 
The APSU announced a `Chattra-Gono Jamayet' (student-people's gathering) 
on 25 November 1990 in the afternoon at the Zero Point (presently Nur Hussain 
Square) in the Capital. But the Dhaka University campus became a battle field from 
the morning. The armed student hooligans backed by the DGFI-the military 
intelligence-of the dictator, attacked the APSU rally held at the foot of 
APARAJEYA BANGLA and were being resisted by the thousands of the APSU 
supporters. After two hours battle, the armed hooligans were defeated and 
compelled to leave the campus through a safe way created secretly by military patrol. 
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In the afternoon, when the students were preparing themselves in organising the 
announced rally at Zero Point, the armed activists again attacked on the students 
from the side of the Bangla Academy premises and Curzon Hall, the way by which 
thousands of students were going to student-peoples gathering at Zero Point. The 
APSU and the general students were resisting them until they were leaving the area 
at 10 pm. In this clash, Kanai Shil, a TSC tea stall keeper was killed and many 
students were injured including the researcher himself sent to the hospitals. In 
protest, the APSU had called a hartal on 26 November in Dhaka and other cities. In 
fear of this huge students resistance, the ruling JP postponed its own rally in the 
capital. 
On 27 November 1990, Dr. Shamsul Alam Khan Milon, joint-Secretary of the 
BMA, was seriously injured by the bullets of unknown armed gangster near the TSC 
crossing in the Dhaka University campus who died later on the day at DMCH. The 
professional bodies of the country, especially the medical doctors in all government 
and non-government hospitals, became furious with this killing and turned into an 
indefinite strike throughout the country and demanded the immediate resignation of 
the dictator. In the evening of 27 November 1990, the dictator in an unscheduled 
address on the state owned TV proclaimed a state of emergency, a draconian 
measure in an attempt to suppress the movements throughout the country. He said 
that he was taking the measures, in his word, to `preserve national security and save 
the national economy from the clutches of violence and destructive politics' 126 of the 
opposition. The ordinance, which went into effect soon after the proclamation 
suspended civil rights and banned all processions, meetings, rallies, demonstrations, 
strikes and lock outs. Under this emergency powers' ordinance 1990, the dictator 
imposed press censorship stating that it would `control the receiving and sending of 
news through post, radio, telegram, telex and telephone. The curfews were imposed 
for an indefinite period, along with the capital city of Dhaka and port-city of 
Chittagong, in the major cities of the country. The state owned TV also announced 
that all the school, colleges and universities of the country would remain closed for a 
month. As troops moved to impose the curfew in Dhaka on 27 November 1990, the 
students of the Dhaka University had broken the curfew and came out of the campus 
shouting: "we do not accept emergency" and "down, down with Ershad. " 27 Large 
numbers of students and common men of Dhaka paraded the city streets protesting 
the proclamation of the state of emergency. The people in this time staged 
demonstrations against the arrest of Sheikh Hasina, when she was moved from her 
house into detention. There were several clashes between the protesters and the 
police in different parts of the country. The union of journalists stopped publication 
of news papers in protest. The union of Dhaka University teachers announced their 
resignation in a body on 29 November 1990 in front of the APARAJEYA BANGLA. 
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Many government officials also threatened to resign. In this respect, it wý as rather 
surprising to see that a patriotic part of the police forces in a secret circular 
expressed their total solidarity with the people who were fighting for the restoration 
of democracy in the country. It was also more astonishing to know that in an 
extended meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Bangladesh Civil 
Service (Administration) Association on 3 December 1990 had adopted certain 
resolutions in favour of the mass movement against the autocratic regime of General 
Ershad. At least 100 civil servants including some top officials also resigned 
demanding the resignation of the dictator. The bureaucrats held their own 
demonstration chanting: "we will not serve under Ershad. " 128 The mainstream 
political leaders utilised the situation adroitly by showing their astuteness, which 
was reflected in their appeal to the Army, BDR and Police so that these regular 
forces remained restrained in dealing with the struggling masses. ' 29 In this situation, 
the government machinery was practically paralysed. The strikes and 
demonstrations severed roads, rails and air links in the country and the normal 
business came to a standstill in the capital and the port city of Chittagong. The 
security forces that had fired on demonstrations in the previous week stood by and 
watched everything in silence when crowds of thousands masses chanted anti- 
Ershad slogans in the capital on 4 December 1990. In this situation, supporting the 
popular feeling, 19 MPs of the ruling JP including Deputy Prime Minister MA 
Matin resigned their seats. 
7.11. The Departure of a Military Tyranny-the Arrest of General 
Ershad 
The dictator was known to have hurriedly consulted with the key Generals as 
the mass movement continued on 4 December 1990. It was reported that the top 
Generals were unwilling to take over as the mass revolution achieved the power to 
put at risk the survival of whole military institution. There were rumours spread 
throughout the capital that the dictator was planning to flee the country and 
thousands of opposition supporters converged at the Dhaka airport ostensibly to 
abstain him from leaving the country. The Generals thought that if Ershad fled or 
were allowed to leave, they would have been in a worse situation to maintain law 
and order as well as it would place at risk of ring leaders of the military takeover. In 
the event, the early resignation was only available option for the dictator. In this 
grave moment, the dictator announced on national television on the night of 4 
December 1990 that `he would resign as soon as the opposition alliance named the 
successor'. `The ball', Ershad declared `is now in the opposition's court. " 30 The 
decision of Ershad was welcomed by two key opposition leaders-Sheikh Hasina 
and Begum Zia. Both of them, who had their own ambitions heading the future 
government hailed it as a `people's victory'. But since the previous week had seen 
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so much violence, they called on the people to maintain calm and not jeopardise the 
political process. Under the proposed plan, the Vice-President Moudud Ahmed 
would resign to help the parliament, which was scheduled to be convened on 8 
December 1990 to name another candidate. Upon the election of the new Vice- 
President, Ershad would hand over the power to him. The mainstream opposition 
lost no time in responding to the challenge. 
The imminent departure of the dictator from the office of the President was 
celebrated on 6 December 1990 by millions of democracy loving people of 
Bangladesh when they paraded the streets of the capital and all over the country. 
According to the joint declaration of the three alliances, the opposition leaders 
nominated the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Mr Shahabuddin Ahmed to head 
a caretaker government until the national elections to be held in early next year. The 
successor of the dictator hailed the ousting of dictator as `the victory of democracy' 
and called on the countrymen to `build up democratic institutions and establish the 
rule of law'. For a moment, however, the opposition seemed to be more bent on 
punishing the dictator and his associates. In a public statement, the opposition 
leaders demanded to the interim government to seize the passport of Ershad, freeze 
his bank accounts and place him on trial for alleged corruption. The opposition 
demanded that the dictator must be held for substantial misuse of his power during 
the nine year reigns. The BNP chief Begum Zia said, "we want a trial of those who 
committed crimes, atrocities and injustices during the last nine years" and the AL 
President Sheikh Hasina said, "we want the fair elections that Ershad could never 
give, he has resigned, and the nation is relieved of a stifling situation. It has been 
once again proved that people's power is stronger than bullets. " 131 Under the 
pressure of the militant opposition supporters, the interim government on 9 
December 1990 arrested the dictator and detained in a resident at Gulshan in the 
capital which was declared later on as sub jail and was shifted to central jail after a 
few days under the pressure of people's demand. The bullet of the assassin military 
coup leaders fell down the founding father of the country-Bangabanhu, and several 
military coups toppled others, however, the people's power brought down the 
General Ershad-the last foot-step of military terrorism in nearly 20 years of the 
nationhood. Thus the black chapter of nine years regime of the dictator came to an 
end and the ground was prepared for the restoration of the democracy in Bangladesh. 
According to the editor of the independent weekly, `Holiday': "it took over eight 
years to eliminate only one element of authoritarian state power namely personal 
rule. Now Bangladesh must look ahead to life after Ershad. Transition under an 
interim government, and subsequent democratic revival, will have to be undertaken 
painstakingly and patiently. " 132 
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7.12. Conclusion 
Bangladesh, a poor country with limited wealth fighting with its huge 
problems in socio-economic and demographic life, was pushed into political 
struggle by its military in an attempt to tear down the rule of democracy. The nine 
years of military rule of General Ershad from 1982 to 1990 was indeed the darkest 
episode in the history of post independent Bangladesh in terms of killings and 
injuries, arrests and warrants, lies and blunders, corruptions and plundering, and 
degradations of moral values of the society that all together triggered the 
annihilation of liberty, equality and freedom of the nation. The period was regarded 
as the hoard of heroic stories of the thousands of political activists who sacrificed 
their lives and limbs to guns, times and tides to prison and embraced huge trouncing 
of their social life at the trance to establish a dream worthy democratic society for 
the people of Bangladesh. This movement of the people was non-stop since the 
aggression of the military took place-a dragon tyranny theft the peoples' wisdom; a 
servant institution began to destroy its master's institutions-government, 
parliament, elections, bureaucracy and political parties etc, and was, however, never 
defeated under curfew, and was always unlocked to ban; appeared to be win over the 
bullets, tanks, gas, batons and prisons, and even a civilian hooliganism under the 
patronisation of military itself-could not be able to hold back the peaceful and 
huge upsurge of masses ardent for democracy. The students were the first vanguard 
element of this society who embarked on this resistance as well as a great mode of 
their contribution essentially merited the removal of the military junta. The dictator 
took many ill-tactics-what these militia men do elsewhere to sustain the power. In 
his nine years malice and repressive rule, he started with ban on political activities 
under Martial Law regulations-setting the guns to the back of the innocent people, 
imprisoning the thousands of political leaders, took some times to collect his civilian 
plunderers and played some drama of indoor and open door and dilemma of 
dialogue politics. This also included some staging of the political show-the 
announcement and cancellation of election dates to consume the times until he 
completed to collect some mastans, robbers and hooligans to rigging the polling 
centres throughout the country. Bangladesh saluted those of her heroic sons who 
sacrificed their lives and limbs and lost their valuable times and tides in uprooting 
the draconian military dictatorship of General Ershad-the most oppressing 
despotism on her heart-that opened the vast sky of the freedom of mankind-a 
realm of democratic society. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Actions of the Movement 
8.1. Introduction 
The opposition democratic forces used a variety of actions in the movement 
for the restoration of democracy. These continuous actions of the organised political 
parties and interest (pressure) groups of the society constituted a significant political 
development in the history of the post independent Bangladesh. These were the 
contents of conflict between the opposition forces and the military administration of 
General Ershad. The forms of collective action the opposition organised against the 
military rule could be subsumed under two dimensions: first, the actions that 
operated during the ban on political activities-under the period of stiffer Martial 
Law and second, actions under the period of normal political activities. However, 
the both dimensions of the actions are considered under two broad categories 
according to their character of formation: violent and non-violent. The non-violent 
actions included protest marches, signing petitions, petition marches, mass 
gatherings or public meetings, demonstrations, sit-in, hartal' (strikes), hunger strikes, 
non-cooperation or civil disobedience, human chains, Dhaka siege, elections etc. 
The violent actions included attacks, barricades, blockades, riots, damaging public 
transport, guerrilla fights resulting harassing, bombing, setting fires, killing of forces 
and government officials etc. These actions created a precarious and menacing 
situation for the citizen's lives during the whole period of the military regime. 
However, the details, as follows, of the actions organised by the opposition 
democratic forces received a great deal of support from the all walks of the society. 
8.2. Actions under the Ban on Political Activities 
The opposition political parties and their frontier wings including students, 
youths, labourers, peasants and women as well as the rest of these groups outside the 
political affiliation challenged the proclamation of the Martial Law of General 
Ershad from the very moment it happened in March 1982. The political veterans of 
the students and youth groups risked their lives to protest against the military junta, 
even under the strict period of Martial Law-under curfew and ban on political 
activities in the country. According to a student activist, on the very next morning of 
the declaration of the Martial Law, the student wings of different progressive and 
democratic political parties in the Dhaka University campus and the main colleges 
of the capital brought out protest marches against the new military junta under the 
strict period of the curfew, although they were afraid of being arrested at any timet. 
Even when the Martial Law measures became stricter, it was the veteran students 
and youth political workers, who continuously tried, on many occasions, to break 
the military ranks and orders of the ban on political activities. The members of the 
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military and police intelligence were moving in `white dress'3 in the important areas 
of the cities including the campuses of academic institutions, city centres, press club, 
business areas, market places, bus terminals, offices of political parties and the trade 
unions etc, and the army along with all other law and order forces were patrolling 
throughout the country ensuring compliance with the Martial Law regulations. 
During this period, the pattern of the various actions of the opposition forces 
was very exciting and was able to draw significant attention and popularity among 
the general mass of society. First, the youth and students political activists carried on 
the chicka mara (wall writing) and labelling posters on the walls in the curfew 
imposed mid-night in the cities that retained many slogans against military rule. 4 
Second, they circulated secret leaflets in the crowded areas, for example, canteens, 
common rooms, teacher's lounges of the academic institutions, market places, 
cinemas, press club etc, which carried the flare-up theme against the military rule in 
the country. Third, the `hit and run' 5 protest march was very exciting and 
challenging for the veteran youth and student cadres in which came in close contact 
planning the location and timing of the protest, and took position distantly around 
the locations and suddenly, one of them shouted the slogans against the junta and all 
together came out running into the street and joined the protest march. 6 Fourth, there 
were some instances of the defiant actions like guerrilla attacks on the army convoys 
in the night in Dhaka when the forces were patrolling throughout the city. On some 
occasions, ittas (pieces of bricks and stones), bombs and crackers were thrown at the 
military officials and convoys. However, only the youth cadres of the political 
parties under definite instructions were involved in this type of protest. Fifth, the 
gatherings and meetings of the unit and branches' officials of the political parties did 
not stop during this period and were held very secretly at very insignificant spots i. e. 
in slum houses or infamous restaurants, or home of normal political supporters 
where the plan of actions against the junta was mapped. Sixth, the indoor politics, 
however, was a pattern of permitted political activities under the pre relaxed Martial 
Law period-a part of test case played by junta side to estimate the political strength 
of the opposition-in which the opposition were able to organise gatherings and 
discussions only `inside' their party office or at home-any type open of actions like 
rallies, gathering or processions in the street were still prohibited under this 
controlled political activities. 
8.3. The Actions under the Normal Course of Political Activities 
The military leader outlawed all political activities on several occasions during 
his nine years' rule. Once the ban on political activities was relaxed or withdrawn, 
the opposition democratic forces went ahead to organise their support base very 
quickly and organised various actions in support of their demand of the withdrawal 
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of Martial Law and the resignation of junta from power. All of their actions took 
several strategic, non-violent or even violent turns in the different stages of the 
movement. However, the actions under the normal course political activities could 
be divided into five distinct forms according to different pattern of their uses by 
opposition forces: (i) actions to increase mainly the mass supports and awareness, 
which includes protest march, public meeting or gathering, long march, hunger 
strike, human chain, signing petition, torch light procession, press conference and 
press release etc., (ii) actions to create direct pressure on the military regime to 
compel the dictator to relinquish the power, which includes auvorudh (block traffic), 
gherao (block govt. office), hartal (general strike), Dhaka siege, non-cooperation, 
civil disobedience and setting fire on the portrait of the dictator etc., (iii) actions to 
protest specific issues, decisions or policies of the junta, which includes 
demonstration, gherao, strike in the academic institutions and non-agricultural and 
industrial sectors, (iv) uses of the violence as the part of drastic actions, which 
included setting fire on effigies, setting fire and destroy public and private transport, 
disruptions in the road or rail networks, charging crackers and bombs, preventing the 
govt. and non-govt employees to work, guerrilla attacks on the army and law and 
order forces, gun fights with govt. forces and killing junta officials and supporters 
etc., and finally, (v) programmes of the CCA-a distinct cultural and intellectual 
movement, mainly to awake the mass people against military dictatorship, which 
includes patha natak (open drama), popular songs, arts and crafts symbolic march 
and writing and reciting poems etc. Outside these dimensions, there were the uses of 
slogans in the actions, painting on the wall and distribution of the leaflets had 
become a very popular part of the movement. 7 Details of these actions-as 
follows-could be considered as the components of the history of the movement 
against a military autocracy in 1980s Bangladesh, which created a passage to the re- 
birth of a democratic nation in the world. 
8.3.1 Actions to Increase Mass Supports and Awareness 
The opposition forces observed various types of protest march during the 
whole period of the movement. First, general protest marches were held almost 
regularly in the late morning mainly in the campuses of the universities and colleges 
of the major cities all over the country, and sometimes, there were also organised 
marches in the residential halls of the students in the late evening. 8 The political 
parties and alliances and the TU workers also organised marches in every evening 
from their office premises to the press clubs or city centres through the designated 
locations. However, the main rationales of these marches were twofold. The student 
organisations demonstrated their strength in a competitive manner on the one hand, 
and laid bare their objections to the military junta composing and popularizing many 
`anti-Ershad slogans'`', on the other. In the same way, it became a practice for 
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political parties and their different wings to bring out marches, by and large, every 
evening through their network of units all over the country. 10 
Second, the planned protest marches were organised on the specific issues 
ranging from arrests, attacks, killings and injuries, lawsuits etc to any type of policy 
decision by junta administration against the interest of people. In these marches, the 
opposition forces organised a mass protest, in which they ensured a large 
participation and used to carry different placards-marking the issues and 
demands-with themselves. " The type of issue shaped the demeanour of the 
protest march. Issues like killings and injuries, attacks on the procession and arrest 
of vital political or student leaders, however, led the protest to become violent, i. e. 
clashes with police forces or setting fire to the public or private vehicles. This was 
called the sudden action protest march, in which a sudden crack down of the 
protesters moved forward with an attacking temper on the forces of law and order, 
and the whole area fell into turmoil in a moment and resulted into huge casualties' 2. 
This type of action however, brought immediate outcomes and compelled the 
military authority to give a positive announcement on the concerned issue. These 
marches started with limited participants, however, ended, by and large, with a mass 
protest. Third, stick protest marches were belligerent in nature and took place 
suddenly on several occasions. 13 The participants of these marches, normally 
carrying 3-4 feet long bamboo sticks or other sticks, showed their extreme 
resentment that broke out with the mass upsurge in a greater sense, which happened 
several times against the military autocracy of General Ershad. Besides, at a micro 
level, during the observance of important actions like hartal or aborodh (blockade 
around the communication), as a part of counter protest, a smaller group of 
participants came out with sticks or anything they had had with them to confront the 
junta forces. 14 
Fourth, running protest marches were organised by the brave political 
cadres-mostly the students and youth participants, to create panic among the forces 
of junta. Generally the police baton charged on the marches to disperse participants; 
but a daring part of the participants continued their protest in running until the end. 
15 
This inspired the youth forces largely to participate in the movement. The 
participants of this action were limited to 20-30. They were running through and 
around a specific location and shouted anti-military slogans for 10-20 minutes. 
Sometimes, they became partially bared with several anti-Ershad slogans written on 
their chest and backs, which created a very emotional reaction among the general 
masses. However, the cruelty of the junta forces led to the killing these protesters in 
several occurrences at the pinnacle of the movement. 
16 Fifth, torch light protest 
marches were organised in the evening mostly in support of pre announced actions 
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like hartal or bigger public meetings and gatherings'7. These started from the 
premises of political parties and were normally due to finish at the same place after 
moving round the main streets of a specific area, but sometimes they had to end it 
suddenly due to the baton charges by police forces'8. 
Sixth, mourning protest marches were organised all over the country in 
protest of the killing of the participants. The aggrieved student bodies or political 
parties along with all other socio cultural components like TU workers, professional 
and intellectuals participated in these marches. They wore black badges and carried 
placards with many anti-military slogans. 19 However, all these marches were 
organised in a peaceful situation mostly on the following day or two after the killing, 
and was always cordoned by the police forces. Seventh, petition marches were 
organised in protest of a specific issue, like price increases, arrest of leaders etc that 
carried a written memorandum. These marches reached to the authority concerned 
and their leaders handed it over on behalf of the marchers. 20. Eighth, corpse or coffin 
protest marches were organised that carried the dead body of the killed participants 
or leaders of the movement both in peaceful and turmoil situations. 21 Ninth, long 
marches were organised from the countryside to urban agglomerations or from the 
capital to smaller towns in the demand or protest of specific issues related to the 
greater interest of the people. 22 Tenth, rides using vehicles or trains were organised 
when the key leaders of the party or alliance moved from city to city or one region 
to another region to recruit the masses to the movement. 23 Eleventh, marches of joy 
were organised by the political parties and students when they won over any legal or 
political victory against the military dictator at any stage of the movement. 24 
Janoshova and Somabesh (Public meetings and gatherings) were mainly mass 
oriented non-violent actions that showed the strengths and ability of opposition 
forces. They announced their upcoming programmes and activities in these actions. 
These were several types. First, the opposition forces organised large public 
meetings in the bigger locations in the cities, 25 and warned the junta on the vital 
issue where the key leaders delivered their speeches and set in motion a series of 
programmes and actions. The opposition political cadres joined these meetings with 
musical bands and banners by marches on foot, buses and trains from the different 
corners of the city and the suburbs. 26 Second, meetings in cities and towns27 were 
organised in the district and sub-district metropolises where the first line opposition 
leaders diffused their plan of actions. 28 Third, spot (street corner) meetings were 
always smaller that organised in the different important locations in the cities such 
as bus terminals, rail stations, launch ghat, academic institutions, community centres, 
important streets, and premises of the DC office, municipality office, language 
martyr minaret, shrine, monument, mosque, cinema hall, super markets and press 
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clubs and road junction etc. 29 The main aim of these meetings was twofold: linking 
all sections of the masses in the movement and making close union to their demands. 
Fourth, support action meetings were organised mainly in support of the hard line 
actions i. e. large public meetings, hartal, student or industrial strike, Dhaka siege, 
blockade etc. 30 Fifth, meetings on the actions were organised during the observance 
of hard line actions, 31 and were swallowed by the sense of turmoil and revulsion in 
their attitude. Sixth, sudden protest gatherings were organised by the opposition 
student and youth forces mainly, when any of their leaders was arrested or killed. 32 
Sometimes, these gatherings turned to violence that set fire on the vehicles or 
attacked the police forces. Seventh, routine gatherings were organised regularly or 
once after a particular interval of time. After the end of marches or without marches, 
the student bodies organised these gatherings in their academic campuses. 33 The 
aims of these gatherings were to uphold their continuous agitation against military 
dictator and to show down their strength of supporters. Eighth, protest meetings of 
interest groups were organised in their respective offices to support the opposition 
movement for democracy. The SKOP and the unions of professionals and 
intellectual bodies including university teachers, doctors, engineers, journalists, 
lawyers etc were in the forefront of this action. 34 Ninth, Pre-fixed gatherings were 
organised at least once in a year on the occasion of annual councils and 
anniversaries and conventions of political parties and student, youth, labourer, 
professional and intellectual bodies. 35 Tenth, condolence or mourning meetings were 
organised by the opposition political parties, trade unions, bodies of students, 
professionals and intellectuals, when any of their activist were killed by the 
regime. 36 Sometimes the mourning meetings were also organised on the observance 
of the anniversary of the death of the veteran activists of the movement and the 
founding leaders of the parties or organisations. Eleventh, gatherings at cultural 
functions were organised by different cultural groups under the auspices of the UCA 
which always maintained their link with the opposition political forces, and 
designed their cultural programmes in accordance with their support and 
directions. 37 
The Anoshon Dharmaghat (hunger strike) was an extreme non-violent action 
organised by the opposition socio-cultural political groups in which the participants 
put their lives at risk by taking no food until their demands were accepted. 38 
Sometimes it was a famous personality, who observed the hunger strike in support 
of his personal demand or to protest a burning national issue. However, sometimes 
the opposition political parties announced this action as a `mass hunger strike' to 
force the junta to take immediate steps on the issue concerned, for example, 
communal riots and the brutality of the police forces. The duration of the action 
ranged from a day to several weeks until an assurance came from the government. 
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The Manov Bondhan (human chain) was a non violent action that manifested 
into calm and quiet lines of the participants alongside the important and busy roads 
of the city. 39 The length of a chain was 5-50 kilometres or more in many occasions. 
Sometimes, they had placards attached to their bodies that referred to the military 
dictator, for example, `Desk Aj Bishaya Behayar Khappore'(The country is in the 
grasp of a world class impudent) 40 `Shairature, Santrash, Moulobad-Nipat Jak, 
Nipat Jak'(Down, down with autocracy, terrorism and fundamentalism) etc. In most 
cases, the issues of this protest included the memories of the killing of popular 
leaders and participants of the movement or the terrorism and fundamentalism 
instigated by military autocracy. 41 The depth of this protest seemed to be very 
effective as it was able to attract all stopping the city life in the action area. 
The procession was a non violent and malleable kind of march in the 
movement that was organised widely by the socio-cultural components-the 
exteriors to the political forces of the society. The intellectuals and professionals of 
the society-teachers of the university and colleges, poets, authors, journalists, 
lawyers, doctors, engineers and the like-were the main participants in the 
processions. This march was very quite and grave for a near destination, 42 and did 
not involve any loud slogans, although it used placards concerning the issues or 
demands of the time. The rallies were the non violent peaceful marches or 
gatherings organised by the different socio-cultural and political forces on the 
43 occasion of their annual conferences or anniversaries. 
A major task of the opposition forces was to handle the press in a proper 
way. 44 In this interaction process, the opposition used three means of action: press 
releases, press conferences and press statements. The press releases were sent to the 
offices of the dailies in the every evening, which contained details of day activities 
of the individual party and organisation, where they also included their next action 
schedules. In this way, the present dimensions of the movement and future action 
plan of the opposition could reach by far to the general masses of the society. The 
press conference was called in emergencies on the event of killings or arrest of 
leaders of the opposition forces, 45 where the opposition leaders explained their 
concern over the issue and declared hard line actions on the spur of the moment. The 
news editors of the national dailies as well as many journalists of international news 
agencies like BBC, VOA, PTI and AFP were present in these press conferences. The 
press statements were given by an individual or group of participants in support of 
the opposition movement against any decision of the junta. In most cases, a group of 
intellectuals or professionals that included university teachers, honoured citizens and 
notable personalities who organised a signature campaign on the issue concerned 
and sent their opinion in a body to the press in the form of a statement. 46 
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8.3.2. Actions to Create Direct Pressure on the Dictatorship 
The Abosthan Dharmaghat or Aborodh (stay-in strike) and sit-in were very 
important and effective actions of the movement in which the participants were 
asked to arrive at a defined location individually or in a number of smaller marches. 
These were non-violent actions by definition, although changed to an offensive 
violent one due to the police incursion on the crowds. The opposition forces 
organised these actions normally in and around the government secretariat, DC 
office and MOH while the students mostly observed these around the MOE and the 
offices of the chiefs of the academic institutions. The thousands of the opposition 
activists used to join the stay-in-strike or sit-in in front of the entrance premises and 
around the all entry points of the office buildings. They tried to observe their action 
peacefully by `sitting-in' at the location. But, due to the police attacks, they could 
not do so peacefully and had to stay on the location forcefully which was, therefore, 
being termed as a `stay-in strike'. 47 The period of this action usually took 8 office 
hours of the day. They were chanting anti junta slogans and their leaders used to 
deliver speeches demanding the resignation of the military dictator. This, in fact, left 
the capital paralyzed-exactly seemed to have the full preparation of battle between 
two sides-none of either the opposition or the junta could be able to predict the day 
for the range of violence and casualties that were to be occurred in both sides. The 
stay-in actions especially in the capital, ended with many casualties and mass arrests 
in most cases, which hastened the announcement of more violent actions by the 
opposition. 48 The peaceful sit-in, however, was observed mainly by the various trade 
unions of government and non-government employees demanding the 
nationalisation of the employments, increase in salaries, in most cases at the press 
club premises. The students, teachers and intellectuals used mainly the premise of 
central Shahid Minar or other famous places in the city. 49 
The Rajpath- Railpath Aborodh (blockade of high ways and train lines) was 
an action used very effectively by the opposition forces, which was non-violent in 
definition, however, often turned into offensive violent actions. 50 The opposition 
forces ordered their thousands of cadres to block the high ways, naval and water 
ways and train lines to disrupt the communication networks throughout the country 
that turned the junta under pressure. In these actions, the participants always 
encountered clashes with the police and paramilitary forces and armed men 
employed by the junta that resulted into many fatalities in both sides. The 
participants brought out marches in support and responded violently to any 
disruptive measures of the junta. These kinds of blockades, however, usually 
lingered from eight hours to two or three days. 
The Hartal (general strike) was an extreme action used frequently by the 
opposition democratic forces. This has been widely used in all political movements 
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since the middle of twentieth century throughout the whole region of the Indian 
subcontinent. This action was announced as an ultimatum for the resignation of 
junta and in protest against the brutal killings, injuries and arrest of vital leaders, 
election frauds, price increases, anti-people budget, and the like. The main aim and 
objective of this action was to isolate the junta from its socio-economic and political 
control of the country. 51 The people were requested to stop their all works and 
transportation that led to a total closure of all academic institutions, offices of 
government and non-government organisation, industrial set up, service sector, road, 
rail, air and water communication etc excluding some emergency units of 
ambulances, fire service, electricity and water supply etc. 
There were three geographic varieties of the hartal: local-district and sub- 
district level, regional-divisional level and national-countrywide. The opposition 
activists took the position for picketing in many of their planned locations of the 
cities and towns during this strike. They tried to stop the vehicles, and stooped 
employees from working, if any body was found to break the conditions of the 
hartal. They also brought out a number of marches and protest gatherings 
surrounding their areas to ensure the proper observance of the action. The working 
class activists of political parties were the main participants in these picketing 
marches under a lower middle class or middle class leadership. The floating tokI'S 
(street urchins)-the boys from the lower lower-class of landless and day labourers 
living in urban slums were also the vital participants in these picketing marches. 52 
Although all activists brought out the marches under the banner of their party and 
alliance, it was the students of colleges and universities who always organised 
separate picketing and marches in this action. The junta troops patrolled to arrest the 
picketers. Although the action was non-violent in nature, it usually turned into a 
violent milieu that led clashes between the opposition groups and junta forces which 
caused many casualties and arrests and law suits against the activists. The length of 
hartal ranged from 6 hours to 96 hours, even for indefinite period at the pinnacle of 
the movement. 
Dhaka siege was an offensive and extreme action of the opposition against the 
military dictator. It paralysed the capital city of Dhaka on 10 November 1987, which 
was organised to overthrow the military dictator. All the cadres and supporters of 
opposition forces from the countryside were ordered to march towards the capital by 
any means. The military junta became frightened that led them to deploy thousands 
of troops on the all adjacent entrances of highways-water ways-train lines, which 
stopped all communications to the capital. The key opposition leaders Sheikh 
Hasina and Begum Zia were put under house arrest. Many repressive measures were 
used by the junta to oppose this action. The middle class of the capital led this action 
while the working class ensured huge participation. Among 6 others, a veteran 
-- 227 -- 
activist of the working class of Dhaka city, Nur Hussain was killed and hundreds 
other arrested. 53 Non cooperation was an action organised by the opposition in the 
climax of the movement as a hard-nosed political protest that refused to cooperate 
the junta no longer in running the state power. 54 Similarly, civil disobedience ww as a 
peaceful political protest that refused to obey particular law, for example, to pay 
taxes, which was organised against the military junta in different places in the 
country. 55 
The portrait ablaze was organised by the enthusiastic youth participants of the 
opposition. The students of different universities and colleges were uncompromising 
in their character and the gatherings and protest marches they organised usually took 
a violent turn where they set ablaze the portraits of the junta and associates passing 
their anger to military regime. 56 Furthermore, the students of the Art Institute of the 
University of Dhaka brought out many protest marches that carried countless bizarre 
cartoon caricatures, banners and festoons reflecting the heinous activities of the 
junta, which echoed to the end of military rule in the country. 57 Sometimes, the 
violent youth or student mob forcefully entered the offices of academic, government 
and semi-government offices and pulled down the portrait of the dictator from the 
office wall and trampled it under foot and enjoyed burning it. 
8.3.3. Actions to Protest against Specific Issues and Policy of the Junta 
The Gherao (besiege) of a government authority was organised to force them 
to accept the demands of the opposition generally concerned with education and 
foreign affairs and release of the prisoners or the resignation of the Ministers. The 
opposition forces, in most cases, the students' marches from their party offices or 
academic campuses went forward to the MOE, MOH or MOFA or DC offices and 
siege them until the authority agreed to accept their demands. 58 The participants 
used to block the office for some hours, however, in most cases, the forces of junta 
dispersed the gathering with baton charges, shootings and arrest of the participants. 
At the peak of the movement, the students organised the Gherao of the Montri para 
(residential area of ministers) in Dhaka city, which panicked the junta machinery 
and attracted huge public attention. 59 Besides, different student groups used to 
organise the Gherao of the head of academic institutions-mainly the universities 
and colleges-in protest of the failure of peaceful situation in the campus. 60 
The Chatra Dharmoghat (student strike) was observed in all higher 
educational institutions including colleges and universities of Bangladesh. During 
this action period, the student bodies called the general students to stop attending the 
classes in their respective academic institution. The academic and non-academic 
administrative staffs were also included in the action and were urged to boycott the 
offices. On the strike day, the workers of the student bodies came in groups to the 
campus in the dawn and locked up the entrance gates of the academic buildings. 
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Sometimes, they started protest marches with slogans in favour of the issue 
concerned. The police forces on the campus kept their position silent unless there 
was any turmoil. However, this was mainly related to the various demands of the 
students. The first issue was the resignation of the military dictator from power and 
the restoration of democracy in the country. All student organisations in a body or 
individually or along with their parent political parties called the strikes in the 
universities and colleges through out the country in this cause. 61 In this case, the 
strike was called for an indefinite period and the military junta was forced to close 
the higher academic institutions. Second, the students called strikes against the 
specific policy of the military administration like education and foreign policy and 
differentiations in annual budget allocation. 62 Third, the strikes were called in 
protest against the severe repressions including arrest of leaders, baton charges on 
the marches and killings of the student participants in the movement. 63 
Fourth, the students had also their own charter of demands including the 
demand for free education, lower costs of academic instruments-books, pen and 
papers etc and the implementation of Dr Khuda Education Commission Reports etc. 
The student bodies, mostly the leftists were very vocal in these issues and were more 
active to organise frequent strikes64. Fifth, the strikes were also called in protest of 
any decision of the authority of academic institution that went against the interest of 
students. In this situation, the authorities discussed the issue with the student leaders 
concerned or called a meeting of the Sharbo Dolyo Shikkha Paribesh Parisbad (All 
Party Academic Environment Council) and resolved the problem. 65 Sixth, 
sometimes, the student organisations had their own problems-conflict between two 
rival organisations-for example, BCL and JCD, or intra party conflict, which 
became manifested and clashes grew between the factions. In protest of an attack or 
clash event, the victim organisation or the student bodies outside the event called 
strike demanding a peaceful academic environment in the respective campuses. 66 
Seventh, the rise of fundamentalist BICS-the student wing of JIB, an anti- 
liberation force and their subsequent clashes with progressive student forces was 
also a vital issue during the Ershad period. It was found that the BICS was attacking 
the progressive student forces under the direct instruction of the military dictator. 
They came to the centre of attention for the cruel methods they applied in their 
attacks, in which they abducted the progressive student leaders and workers, and 
used to cut the arteries and veins on the joints of the hands and legs by knives that 
left them disabled, and killed them with Chinese hatchets. This kind of cruelty 
produced huge anger all over the country and in protest, the progressive student 
organisations called a number of strikes in the academic campuses demanding a ban 
on the political activities of fundamentalist BICS. 67 Eighth, it was a normal event 
during the period of the military regime that police and paramilitary troops entered 
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the university and college campuses and residential halls without any prior 
permission of the authorities to arrest the student leaders. For this, the sufferings of 
the normal student reached an intolerable level, which led them to call strikes 
against the authorities of the concerned academic institutions. 68 Ninth, the student 
wing of the military junta started the capture of campuses of the universities and 
colleges, and the opposition student wings tried to resist them, which also resulted in 
protest strikes in the academic institutions. 69 Finally, the students also observed 
strikes called by the International Student Union. 70 
The Demonstration was a kind of non violent protest action-turned into a 
defensive violence by the participants-in the movement. The political cadres 
organised marches leading to gatherings-in chanting slogans-towards the 
distinctive offices of the military administration in favour of their demand concern. 
Sometimes, the participants were asked to arrive individually at the planned location. 
However, they took a position in front of the entrance or premises of the office, and 
chanted slogans and after sometimes, the leaders used to deliver speeches in support 
of their demands.. Normally, the student bodies organised this type of protest in 
front of the office of the chief of higher educational institutions, DC offices, MOH 
and MOE buildings. 7' The issues of these demonstrations included the demand for 
the release of political prisoners, price rise and the demand of the resignation of the 
military dictator. 
8.3.4. Use of violence in the actions of the movement 
The use of violence in the movement was not deliberate on the part of 
opposition forces. Most occurrences of violence came out with steps taken 
unwittingly for the sake of their own protection. Some use of violence, however, had 
been designed to play an associative role to stimulate the planned actions. In fact, 
the use of violent measures by the junta forces produced counter violence in the 
opposition actions. However, there were several uses of violence found in the 
opposition actions in the movement. First, the planned use of violence was found 
during the observance of hartal and student or industrial strikes and other major 
actions. In the midnight to the dawn of the day of these actions, the whole city and 
vicinity shook with the sounds of bombs and Molotov cocktails. The opposition 
youth and student forces were engaged mainly in these kinds of violent activities, 
which alerted the public and private transports authority not to go outside with their 
vehicles, and all employees and business groups to stop work during the strike hours. 
Second, the most usual violence by the opposition came suddenly when the police, 
BDR or paramilitary troops dispersed the opposition marches or gatherings, and 
used batons, gases and firing on the participants of the actions. In clashes with the 
police, the participants threw house bricks, stones and shoes on the police target, and 
a furious part of them set fire to the public vehicles and then ran from the scene. In 
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extreme cases, they destroyed the government office setting it ablaze. ', Third, the 
daring participants used to throw patrol bombs or cocktails on the police and troops 
convoys during the curfew hours, which panicked the junta. 73 They even used to 
throw bombs on the police camps, government secretariat and important offices and 
the homes of civilian associates of the junta. These uses of violence, in most cases, 
were pre-planned and were agreed by the commanding leaders of the opposition 
political forces. Fourth, in the violent situation, the exasperated opposition 
participants snatched the members of military forces from market places or vicinities 
who were stripped off their uniforms by angry mobs and mass beaten to death74-an 
extreme outburst of political resentment against the repression of the military 
dictator. Fifth, the gun battle with the junta forces were also in the part of action of 
the opposition youth and student forces. The furious youth cadres of the opposition 
opened fire on the police ranks when the veteran student and opposition leaders 
were arrested. It was a normal trend found during the military rule of General 
Ershad. In the fight between the opposition forces and the civilian supporters of the 
junta, the later were given full backing from the military intelligence with arms and 
forces. 75 Sixth, the actions like the blockade of train lines and high ways always 
caused severe violent activities in which the opposition participants used to pull out 
the train lines and set fires on the trains and rail stations, and destroyed the culverts 
and bridges to disrupt the communication network. 76 Seventh, the physical attack on 
the members of the military cabinet by opposition forces was a very attracting event 
that carried huge mass interest. The opposition youth and student participants were 
ordered to beat up the civilian and military associates of the junta at once, whenever 
they would be found. It was maintained strictly, and many cabinet members and 
high officials of the junta administration were assaulted by the opposition forces 
when they were found in public places. 77 
8.3.5. Actions of the Cultural Forces 
The cultural forces of country under the banner of the CCA organised many 
cultural functions to raise awareness amongst the non-political general masses 
against the military autocracy of General Ershad. These actions attracted millions of 
people especially on the occasion of Independence Day (16 December), Mother 
Tongue Day (21 February) and Bengali New Year (ls` Baishakh). Many cultural 
groups organised concerts of popular songs, open dramas, comedies, cartoons, 
placards processions and poems recitations, which inspired people to adore their 
mother land, language, culture and the like. The cities and towns were infatuated by 
the charms of these cultural functions. The themes of the drama, comedy, poems and 
popular songs were most patriotic and demonstrated the misdeeds of military 
dictator. These cultural functions were five types. First, concerts of popular songs 
included a new style of folk melody that mixed up the rural and urban life styles and 
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thematised the problems of city life under military rule. Thousands of city dwellers 
with a rural origin enjoyed these popular songs. 78 Second, open drama written by 
famous dramatists carried a humorist theme and was popularly able to characterise 
the repressions, corruptions and misrule of military leaders. The presence of the 
national level artists of TV and cinema in public at these drama locations carried a 
unique mass attraction leading to a huge gathering. Third, cartoon and caricature, 
were sketched in groups and protests were organised by mainly the students and 
staff cartoonists of the Art Institute of Dhaka University. 79 The target of these 
caricatures was none but the military leader, which also gripped a huge mass at the 
institute galleries and premises and in their march in the city streets. Fourth, poem 
recitations were a different kind of cultural protest in which rebellious, humorous 
and patriotic poems were recited by the famous poets in many occasions, and that 
attracted the thousands of citizens in the movement. The annual poem festivals in 
the Dhaka University campus were the gatherings of poets with thousands of their 
poems against military rule. 80 Fifth, the short film show was an attractive means, 
free of cost, in which the huge mass could watch the rural and urban social problems 
and repressions under military rule including killings, injuries and arrest of political 
workers. These cultural events, however, were organised in the crowded famous 
corners of the cities, for example, Martyr Minarets, residential halls of students, on a 
closed road or big street, designated open spaces and public library premises. 
8.4. The Analysis of the Frequencies of Four Major Actions: 
Marches, Public Meetings, Hartal and Use of Violence 
The frequencies of the four major actions have been collected from the three 
national dailies by dates from 1982 to 1990-the period of the movement for 
democracy against the military dictatorship. It should be mentioned here that these 
frequencies of actions are able to reflect only a little of the original number of 
actions of the opposition forces as there was the strict press censorship imposed in 
publishing news on the movement. The Graph 8.4.181 shows the comparison of the 
frequency curves between four major actions-protest marches, meetings (public), 
hartals and use of violence during the whole period of the movement. 
Broadly speaking, the years under political ban and stiffer Martial Law were 
found to have least frequencies of actions than the years under those measures were 
relaxed as well as the level of unity between opposition became an imperative factor 
for the account of actions of the movement. 82 For example, the years 1982,1983, 
and 1985 were under these measures that led to the lower frequencies of four 
actions-total frequency was only 2,59 and 48 respectively in which 34 meetings 
and 5 hartals in 1983 and 26 meetings and 8 hartals in 1985 are worth mentioning. 
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Graph 8.4.1: Comparison of the frequency curves for tour major actions 1982-1990 
In comparison, the years under relaxation of these measures are found to have 
most high frequencies of actions. Especially, in 1990-the year in which the dictator 
was ousted from power-was seen to have highest frequencies of actions (total 560) 
including highest count of each actions-marches (62), meetings (107), hartals and 
strikes (54) and use of violence (64). However, the level of consolidation of the 
opposition unity could also be regarded as one of the most important factors that 
determined the frequencies of actions. The consolidation of the opposition unity in 
1986,1987,1988 and 1989 were found to have been lower to moderate-these years 
were also marked by sudden disruptions of political activities by military order of 
the dictator. The chronological and continuous rise of violence was found 
distinctive-41,48,51 and 75 respectively for these four years. Although the 
frequency of protest marches did not vary sharply between these years (33-39), the 
rise of public meetings in 1988 and 1989 were found distinctive which was 90 and 
85 respectively. This may be regarded as that the political forces were engaged to 
building up their organisation and support base in these years. The rise of violence 
denotes the increase of inter-party clashes-ruling vs. opposition, AL vs. BNP and 
inter-party clash between rival student organisations. The rise of hartal and strike 
are also related to the rise of violence as these actions observed as the follow up 
protest of the violent repressive measures of the junta forces. However, the lower 
frequency of hai"tals and strike in 1988 was found distinctive (only 20), which was 
related to the large scale floods in the country that disencouraged the opposition 
forces to take such stiffer actions. 
The statistics in Table 8.4.2 and graph 8.4.2 presents the relationship between 
the five movement forces and their participation in four major actions from 1982 to 
1990. In this relationship, the frequency of public meeting were found most likely 
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1999 1990 
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actions participated by all movement forces memberships. For example, 90-100 in 
1984,59-65 in 1986,79-85 in 1988 and 90-99 in 1990 are found as the highest 
frequencies for this action by all of the five movement forces. Comparatively, 
protest march, hartal-strike and the use of violence were dominated by students 
followed by the political parties. For example, the number of protest marches by 
students in 1984 and 1990 were 35 and 58 respectively while this was 28 and 36 
respectively for political parties. The number of hartals and strikes by students in 
1989 and 1990 was 49 and 48 while this was 34 and 33 respectively for political 
parties. The use of violence by students in 1987 and 1990 was 47 and 53 
respectively while this was 21 and 33 respectively for political parties. In this way, 
the student forces were found distinctive to be dominant participants for protest 
marches, hartal and use of violence through out the whole period of the movement. 
However, for use of violence, the TU workers were seen close to the PP forces in all 
the years of the movement. The intellectuals and professionals were found to have a 
lower proportion participation in violence and strikes-hartal-which considered 
perhaps when they participated as their direct involvement with political forces 
rather than individually or in bodies. Their distinct participations in violent activities 
were mostly limited in setting fire on effigies or on portraits of the dictators and its 
collaborators. The relationships shows a strong coherence between all movement 
forces regarding their desire of higher participation in non-violent protest march and 
meetings or gatherings rather than violent hartals and strikes and use of violence as 
the means of the movement for the restoration of democracy. 
8.5. Empirical Observation on the Effectiveness of the Actions of the 
Opposition Forces 
Table 8.5.1 also presents the statistics on the relationships between the 
memberships of six social movement forces and their views about the effectiveness 
of different types of actions. Broadly speaking, the non-violent forms of actions 
were more likely to be seen more effective than violent actions. For example, 
extreme violent actions like guerrilla attack, gunfights with junta forces and killings 
of junta supporters have been supported by 30%-35% respondents and were all seen 
as ineffective tactics by a majority of all types of respondents. In comparison, 
overall, over 95% respondents in the first stage have considered the non-violent 
actions as much more effective means of the movement including public meeting, 
protest march, block traffic, gherao, press conference, press release, hartal, student 
strike, and cultural movement actions like street drama, poems, popular songs and 
caricature arts and crafts by artists. 
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In the second stage, more than 80% (below 95%) have categorised non-violent 
torch light procession, long march, Dhaka siege, non-cooperation, civil disobedience. 
setting fire on the portrait of military dictator and demonstration as effective while 
hunger strikes, human chain and signing petition have gained 77%-80% support. All 
of these non-violent forms were seen as effective ways of opposing the military 
regime. In between these extremes of violent and non-violent forms of protest were 
actions such as setting fire to effigies and transport and properties, use of crackers 
and bombs and preventing employees to entering places of work. In these cases 
opinion about their effectiveness were more evenly divided, which have gained 
supports from more than 50% respondent social movement memberships. 
In the relationship on the views of movement forces, public meeting and all 
kinds of Gherao (block government offices) have earned 100% supports as effective 
actions from the student, professional, TU and NPG while protest march finds the 
same supports from the above first three forces' respondents. The student strikes 
have been considered 100% effective by students, professionals and NPG while 
hartal has gained the same support from the professionals. On the other hand, most 
of the cultural actions have gained 100% support from the students, professionals 
and TU. Generally speaking the professionals and TU and NPG, in most cases, are 
distinctive in finding many actions as effective as they have rendered their 100% 
supports for protest march, public meeting, gherao, hartal, demonstrations, student 
strikes and most of cultural actions followed by the close supports of the student 
forces. It is also distinctive in the statistics that more support in favour of violent 
actions has come from the intellectuals and TU social movement memberships 
whilst the supporters of other forces had not. The relationship shows a strong 
coherence between all movement forces regarding their difference and support for 
the use of non-violent and violent actions as the means of the movement for 
opposing the military regime in which the non violent and peaceful forms of protest 
have been found favourable for the movement for restoration of democracy. 
The statistics shows that the views of six movement forces memberships have 
no major differences regarding the effectiveness of all of these actions to oppose the 
military regime of General Ershad. The actions of the opposition democratic forces 
to oppose the military dictator were more or less effective and these tools of the 
actions increased the chances of the removal of the junta in every moment in the 
years of the movement for restoration of democracy in Bangladesh. 
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8.6. Conclusion 
The actions of the opposition democratic forces-violent and non-violent- 
against the military junta received continuous and spontaneous supports from the 
general mass of the society. In fact, the dictator became a most hatred individual in 
the eyes of democracy loving people of Bangladesh society. These actions seemed 
to have involvement of the participants in four stages: first, the leaders who planned 
the actions; second, the organisers who constructed the constituent of participants, 
third, the participants who chose to be involved directly with the actions; and finally, 
the general masses who were the sources of huge inspiration. None of these four 
groups of people of the society liked the dictator. Only the branded thieves, 
plunderers, robbers, killers, collaborators, loan defaulters and the like under the 
auspices of armed men-civilian and military, who were the main impediments to 
the development of democracy, had supported him. In the face of draconian 
repressive measures of the junta, these actions seemed to become ineffective 
sometimes, but the influence of each action on the individuals, groups or on society 
were very active-functional--concurrent-alive for ever-psychologically and 
spiritually-that slowly built up the structure in the peoples' mind for uprooting the 
military junta. Although these actions have their own literary definitions like violent 
or non-violent, the practice of them in the Bangladesh movement was always violent. 
Beyond doubt, they started in a non-violent form, but turned, in almost all cases, 
into a violent shape in the wake of the harsh measures by the junta forces. The 
actions of the opposition were generally planned and designed earlier but the follow- 
up actions went after the demand of the turmoil situation-mostly were out of the 
control of the leaders and organisers on the wake of using repressive measures by 
junta forces. Sometimes it was found that the vested groups, party, factions or 
individuals could influence the actions of the movement-when the variety of their 
interests involved with the issue-however, none could ignore the popular sentiment 
of the issue-if anybody did so, just had the risk to distract them from the central 
and popular stance of the movement which also carried in some instances-for 
example, the participation of the AL in the general election of 1986 had detached 
them from the mass base. The success of the actions depends on the level of the 
unity of participants-between individuals, groups, parties, and interest and pressure 
groups of the society. In the Bangladesh case, the participants of the political parties 
were divided and that sometimes limited the strength of the actions, but they could 
not ignore the popular expectation for the unity of the movement forces. Once the 
unity of the opposition forces was achieved in 1990, all of their actions gained 
strength leading to the success. Although various actions were organised against the 
junta regime, the most used and effective actions were protest march and hartal that 
always turned into violence, where were able to paralyse the junta administration. 
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The actions are the components for the construction of the movement. The patterns, 
strategies, methods of use, strength of the frequencies and the strength of their 
participations-both in number and courage can ensure the success of the movement. 
The culmination of all of these attributes of the actions led the Bangladesh 
democracy movement to success in uprooting the military dictatorship of General 
Ershad. 
Notes 
' 'Hartal' is one kind of frequent movements' programme taken by the opposition forces to military 
regime. It is a country wide large scale general strike under which the whole country seems to be 
paralysed as everything has been urged to keep stop. The business centres, academic institutions, road 
communication everything accept some emergency units are urged to keep close by the movements 
forces, which ultimately leads to the violence resulting killings, injuries, arrests , riots and clash between police and hartal protesters 
2 Personal interview of Mr Maruf Ahmed with researcher, who was the Secretary of the Bangladesh 
Student League (BCL) of the Dhaka College unit, Dhaka at the time of military intervention in 1982. 
The importance of Dhaka Colleges was that it was famous for the student movement next to the 
Dhaka University in the capital. He has described details of how they organised protest actions from 
his unit against the declaration of Martial Law along with other fellow progressive student bodies. He 
described that they operated all actions from hiding and underground including non-violent marches 
and violent use of cocktails and crackers and firing on the military patrolling during the strict curfew 
imposition. 
3 The 'white dress' was always used to mean the dress of the normal civilian. In the emergency 
situation of the period of the Martial Law, the intelligence agencies were moving in civilian dress. It 
was only because the veteran political leaders could easily avoid the military and police with formal 
uniform. In this stages, thousands members of military forces and police unit were deployed in 
civilian dress under all intelligence machineries including DGFI, SB, DB and NSI. They were 
frequently successful to arrest thousands of opposition political leaders and workers in the beginning 
of the Martial Law. Even the term 'white dress' was frequently used to create fear in normal socio- 
political life. The mighty man in a social setting used the term popularly to threat his rivals. They 
always free to use modern arms and suddenly opened fire in many operations that created terror 
feelings in the normal social life. They were entitled to arresting, beating and even to kill the 
political opposition of the military government. For this reasons, many political leaders and workers 
were caught and lost; there was no news of them of still they were alive or not. Sometimes they were 
found to misuse their ranks and files were engaged with anti-social activities like snatching, 
smuggling and robberies, which however, were believed to have connection to the top of the military 
administration in terms of monitory arrangement. These were the normal activities of the 'white 
dress' intelligence of the military administration. In fact, they were the main agent of the 
administration that directed the political decisions of the military dictator in the period of Martial 
Law. 
° The 'chicka mara' or wall writing is popularly used means of protest of the student, youth units of 
the political forces. They used to paint and write popular and famous words, sentences, slogans or 
lines of famous poems and slogans on the walls of big buildings around the city, markets, and 
academic institutions regarding the demand of peaceful social and political life. These writings and 
painting carried the themes against military dictator, freedom, liberty and democracy, against state 
terrorism, their own political philosophy and many patriotic verses for the nation which attracted the 
general mass and made a political consciousness among them in favour of democracy. In particular, 
the walls of the higher academic institutions all over the country wore the black and red paintings of 
writing during the period of military rule of General Ershad. As a student of the time at the 
University of Dhaka, the researcher is able to describe the Dhaka University situation in this regard 
that there was hardly any space left on the walls of all buildings around the university without the 
paintings of writing against the military administration of General Ershad. 
The 'hit and run' approach was used to mean the actions of the students and youth units of the 
opposition political forces that they operated from the hide out during the imposition of the curfew in 
the city. In most case, a group of participants came out suddenly in or close the street; threw the 
bombs on the military patrolling and went way in a moment. Sometimes, especially in the early 
moment-in the dawn of the day military intervention, some smaller groups of students especially in 
-240- 
the campuses of university and colleges in some part of the city brought out protest marches suddenly in the street and went away before the military patrol reached the location. 6 This type of protest march continued for only 200-300 yards along the streets and maintained a 
perfect timing and lasted for 10-15 minutes. The number of participants of these marches was not 
more than 30 to 50. However, to escape arrest, they fled away from the locations according to their 
pre-designed plan before the army and police patrol could reach the scene. Many student and youth 
protesters, however, could not avoid arrest in this type of risky protests in the very early stage of the 
military rule. This type of protest march was frequent mainly in the campuses of the universities and 
colleges, outside the cinema halls, crowded market places, and the terminals of the bus, trains and launches, press club premises and city centres of the major cities, especially the capital city of Dhaka. 7 Slogans give life to the actions of the movement. Among the protesters, those who had a very strong 
and high range-clear and loud tone-of voice were selected to be leaders to command the slogans in 
marches and gatherings and rest of the participants used to carry out and to follow the same together 
in a more strong and loudly tone in favour of their demand-the general masses came out with 
applause at the actions. There was a range of slogans that used in various actions in many issues in 
the movement. These elevated the huge hatreds, revulsion, horrors and gripes against the military 
regime that always aimed at the forced removal of the dictator from power. First, slogans directly 
against the dictator: Ek dafa-ek dabi, Ershad tui Ekhon jabi (One point-one demand, Ershad you 
quit just now); Ershad Shairature-Ei Muhurte Bangla sar (Autocratic Ershad-leave Bangladesh 
just now); Ershader Shamarik Shashan-Mani na Manbo na (Military rule of Ershad-never obey, 
will not obey); Ershader dui gale, joota maro taale taale (On the two checks of Ershad-give 
drubbing with shoes every times); Dafa ek-dabi ek, Ershader podotag (one point, one demand- 
resignation of Ershad); Ershader chamra-tule nibo amra(the skin of Ershad-pull out now); 
Shairature nipat jak, Gonotantra inukti pak (let despotism be down, democracy be restored); Police 
tumi jotoi maro-beton tomer noisho baro-Police! You beat ever so-salary your only nine 
hundred twelve (very small); Chatra beton briddhee kore army posha cholbe na (let not maintain the 
army while increase the student fees); Shikkha aane chetona, chetonai biplob-biplobe mukti 
(Education brings spirit, spirit brings revolution and revolution brings freedom); Je jibon shahosher, 
shaejibon amader(The brave the life-is the life of us); Jamat-shibir rajakar ei muhurte bangla sar 
(Jamat-shibir collaborators(with Pakistani army in the liberation war of 1971)-leave the land of 
Bangla just now); Shamarik khate bai komao, shikkha khate bai barao (decease the expenditure in 
defence, increase the expenditure in education), Diechi to rokto-aaro debo rokto, rokter bonnave, 
bheshe jabe oinnyae ( we have sacrificed bloods-will sacrifice more bloods-the flood of our 
bloods would remove all unjust (of the junta)); Chatra shramik jonota, gore tolo ekota (students- 
labourers-people-build up the unity against junta); Amader dhamanite shaheeder rokta, e rokta 
konodino parajoy mane na (Bloods of the martyrs are flowing in our vein-that knows never to be 
defeated! ); Shaheeder rokta-britha fete pare na (Bloods of the martyrs-can not be go in vein! ); 
Jamil tomai kotha dilam-tomer hottyer badla nebo (Jamil! You are given the word-we must take 
revenge of your killing); Fatta! Tomai kotha dilam-tomer hottyer badla nebo (Fattah! You are given 
the word-we must take revenge of your killing); ek Basu lokantare-lakkha Basu rajpathe (One 
Basu is dead-hundred thousands Basu (s) have born in the movement); Shamraik junter kalo bath, 
Bhenge dao, guriea dao-Black hands of the military junta- break down, destroy at once); Deichi 
tou rokta -eber nebo rokta (already sacrificed much bloods-time to take bloods now (of the junta); 
Shamrajjyabader dalalera-Hushier s/zabdhan (the collaborators of the imperialism-caution and 
warning! For you all ); Moreover, the participants used to carry out slogans in the name of their party 
key leaders: Arara shabai Mujib sena, netri moder Sheikh Hasina (We all are the soldiers of Mujib 
and Sheikh Hasina is our leader); Ek Mujib locantare, lakkha Mujib ghare ghare (One Mujib is dead, 
but hundred thousands Mujib have born in all houses); Arara shabai Mujib hobo-Mujib hottyer 
badla nebo (We all will be Mujibs and will take revenge of the killing of Mujib); Desh Gorechen 
Shaheed Zia-netri nioder Khaleda Zia (Mertyr Zia has built up the country-Khaleda Zia is our 
leader); Gonotantrer Manasli Konna-Jano netri Sheikh Hasina (Pupular leader Sheikh Hasina- 
spiritual daughter of democracy); etc. 
8 For example, see the Daily Ittefaq, Daily Sangbad and Daily Banglar Bani on 11 November 1989. 
All these news paper covered the news of the student protests in the mid-night of Dhaka University 
North campus, where there were also clash between rival student organisations. However, in every 
morning of opening days of the universities and many important colleges all over the country became 
full of processions of various student organisations in demand of the resignation of General Ershad. 
Normally these marches were organised in between 11 am to 1 pm of the day. All student 
organisations brought these marches generally to show their strength as well as protest the military 
junta. Normally, the individual student bodies first brought their own party marches. Later they 
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brought their marches together under alliances and unity. However, sometimes they started the 
marches under the banner of the alliances such as the SSU, SAS and APSU. HoweNer, the frequencies of individual protest of these organisation became decreased while the APSU was formally came into light and since then all protests were organised under the banner of the . ASU in the final days of the mass upsurge. 
9 The main slogans of the oppositions political forces of the country included: Ek Dafa Ek Dabi- 
Ershad Tui Ekhon Jabi (One point one demand- Ershad you quit now), Ershader Dui Gale, Jura 
Maro Tale Tale (Let give a drubbing of shoes on two cheeks of Ershad), Ek Dafa Ek Dabi Kuttlia 
Ershad Ekhon Jabi (One point one demand, dog Ershad- quit now) Abilombe Sliamarik Avne, 
Protthere Koro, Korte Hobe (let it ensure of immediate lifting of Martial laww ), Ganotantra 
Hottyakari-Ershader Bicher Hobe Bangler Matithe (Trial of Ershad, the killer of democracy, would 
be happened on the soil of Bangladesh), Chor chor Bara Chor-Ershad Tui Bhishya Chor (Thief! thief! 
big thief! - Ershad is world thief! ), Ershader Chamra, Tule Nebo Amra (we must pull out the skin of 
Ershad! ), Khuni Ershader Bicher Hobe, Bangler Matithe (Trial of killer Ershad must tale place on the 
soil of Bangladesh)etc 
10 It was really beyond belief that the opposition forces in Bangladesh were able to demonstrate their 
grievances with these marches to the junta almost in every day. The participation of these regular 
general marches was always countable, i. e. 50-500 on the basis of the strength of an individual 
student organisation and 500-5000 participants for major political parties. 11 For major student bodies, the participation was more than a thousand while many thousands for 
mainstream political parties. If the issue was strong enough, the protest marches of students and 
political parties came out of their campuses and party office premises respectively, and marched 
around the important locations of the city. 
12 In many occasions, marches were brought out suddenly in the protest of the arrest of the leaders or 
killing of participants of the movement. The arrest of JCD Publicity secretary Mahabubul Haque 
Bablu and International secretary Sanaul Haque Niru on 30th December 1985 had sparked a huge 
protest in the campuses all over the country 3151 December 1985. For details of the event, see daily 
lttefaq, ls` January 1986, see also Weekly Bichitra, 10th January 1986. The killing of prominent 
student leaders Salim and Delwar of BCL also provoked huge sudden protest all over the country as 
they were killed while a police truck went over the student procession of the SSU in 1985. The arrest 
of main line opposition leaders including Sheikh Hasina, Begum Khaleda Zia, Comrade Forhad, 
Rashed Khan Menon and Hasanul Haque Inu also influenced huge sudden protests and processions 
all over the country many times under the period of military regime. Even, sudden protest marches 
were brought out in the campuses of universities and colleges all over the country while police or 
military forces had entered into the residential halls of the students without genuine causes. 
13 In protest of forgery and cheating of military dictatorship, on many occasions, for example 10 
November 1987 and the final days of the mass upsurges in December 1990, the thousands people of 
Bangladesh under the banner of anti-autocratic opposition democratic forces came out with bamboo 
sticks and pieces of branches of trees to the street on the turmoil situation in the wake of huge 
protests. This was happened several times in the peak of the protest against the military dictatorship 
of General Ershad, which were brutally controlled by the military of Bangladesh In this regards, it 
should be mentioned here that there been a history of this stick protest marches as the Bengali people 
also showed against the military dictatorships of General Ayub Khan and General Yahya Khan while 
Bangladesh was under the then Pakistan before 1971. 
14 Almost all of important actions like bloc traffic or full range hartal (general strike), there were 
many events of clashes of oppositions' forces with the junta forces. In these clashes, the participants 
of opposition actions used bamboo sticks, pieces of stones and bricks. In the extreme situation, the 
participants came out with stick to street and carried these up their head in the procession, which also 
developed fear in the junta forces. For example, see the news of all events of the long hour strikes 
observed by the opposition forces. See the Bangladesh Observeri, 11 November 1987 
15 In the final stage of the mass upsurge, when the military administration of General Ershad 
announced the special ordinance to close down the Educational Institutions in October 1990, the 
student workers of the APSU brought out huge processions in the capital city of Dhaka, which was 
dispersed by the junta forces. In the day long conflict, the hundreds of students were running through 
streets from DU campus to Zero point under the leadership of Moniruzzaman Badal (BCL President, 
DU unit) and Mahabubul Alam (mid-rank leader of JSD). However, the researcher was also 
participant of this running march that was followed continuously by the military, BDR and police to 
arrest the participants. However, this type march was able to challenge the junta forces and also 
developed courage in the dispersed participants to reunite them immediately. 
-242- 
16 Nur hossain, a youth veteran in the history of democracy movement of Bangladesh on 10 November 1987, with many others, was killed brutally in the wake of police shooting while he was 
participating in a running march in the Paltan Area of Dhaka city. For details, see Dail, Ittefaq, Daily Bangler Bani and Daily Sangbad 11 November 1987. 
" For example, see Bangladesh Observer 10 October 1990 in which torch light procession was 
organised in the last evening by the 6-party alliances in support of today's sit-in demonstration in front of secretariat. See Bangladesh Observer 15'h October 1990 in which the same procession was 
organised by Jatyo Gantantrik Party last evening in support of two days hartal for next Monday and Tuesday. Almost all major parties brought out torch light processions in the evening in support of 
their large scale actions against the military dictatorship i8 See the Bangladesh Observer 10 November 1987 in which the police forces dispersed the torch 
light processions of the major opposition parties in the capital city of Dhaka. 19 The slogans included `khooni Ershader patan hobe, Banglar Matithe', `Ershader Bicher hobe 
Banglar Matithe', 'down, down with killer Ershad'. 'Ek dapha Ek Dabi, Khooni Ershad Ekhon jabi'. 
'Amar Bhaiyer Rakta, Britha Jete Debo Na' etc. For example, See the Bangladesh Obsenver on 16th 
February 1983 in which the students of Dhaka university under the banner of the CSAC brought out 
the mourning procession in protest of the killing of Zafar, Jainal, Kanchan, Mozammel, Dipali Shaha 
and unknown many others on 14`x' February 1983. See also Daily Ittefaq, 17`h February 1985, in 
which the student of Dhaka University brought out procession in protest of the killing of Jatyo 
Chatra League leader Raofun Basunia, a meritorious student of the department of Sociology, 
University of Dhaka on 16`h February 1985. However, in protest of many killings in many places 
from capital to Thana level, participants of opposition democratic forces including students and youth 
in huge number organised this kind mourning protest. See also ibid, 13 November 1986 in which the 
5party alliance observed a mourning day on Wednesday as a mark of respect to the departed soul of 
Shadat, who was killed on the hartal hours of last Monday, 10`h November 1986. See also ibid, 17 
February 1985 in which the main opposition alliances including 15-party and 7-party alliances 
observed separate mourning procession on 16`x' February 1985 in the capital in protest of the killing 
of Raufun Basunia. 
20 Normally what happened in this regard was that the marches were blocked before end and the 
leaders were allowed to hand over their memorandum to the police official on the spot or at best, the 
leaders were carried by the police vehicles to the authorities. There the leaders handed over their 
written demands to them. For example of petition march, see the Bangladesh Observer, 18 December 
1984. The Central Student Action Committee (CSAC) and Bangladesh Jatytabadi Chatra Dal(JCD) 
brought out protest march towards the National Broadcasting Authority (NBA)and thereafter staged a 
sit-in demonstration following the handing over of a memorandum for equal coverage of the 
opposition parties in the state owned radio and television. 
2i In peaceful protests, the outbursts of the grief of the opposition forces were expressed where the 
general masses along with thousands of political workers participated and this alienated the dictator 
from the general masses of the society. However, in the turmoil situation, the participants snatched 
the corpse from the hospital morgue or police custody instantly after the occurrences, and brought out 
the protest marches carrying the corpses which turned into mass revolt in a moment For that reasons, 
the military authority always tried to capture the dead body of the victim as a first and foremost 
priority. Even the junta employed all their efforts to capture of the dead body if it was already held by 
the protesters. For example see the Bangladesh Observer, 14 October 1990. The student of the Dhaka 
University took the dead body of Maniruzzaman Azad, a first year student of Polytechnic Institute, 
Tazgaon, Dhaka who was killed by police shooting during the observance of protest on 13`s October 
1990. The students along with the political leaders brought the procession at 2 pm and they were 
obstructed at Doyel Square by the police and in the event of pitched battle for two hours between 
police and students, Moniruzzaman Azad was killed. The dead body was taken first from the Dhaka 
medical college hospital through the back gate to adjacent Jagannath Hall and later to the 
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rhaman Hall of the Dhaka University. The students decided to bring 
corpse procession which took a huge gathering in the campus in a moment. The angry students 
during the melee set on the vehicles of Atomic Energy Centre on fire and also earlier one red plate 
(foreign agencies') car was burnt in the Topkhana Road in front of National Press Club. All 
opposition key leaders rushed to the campus immediately including Sheikh Hasina of the AL and 5- 
party leaders and Afser Ahmed Siddique of the BNP. They all gathered at the Aparajaya Bangla in 
the campus. Sheikh Hasina delivered oath for the thousands of students in front of the dead body of 
Moniruzzaman Azad that we must not go home until the resignation of the military dictator. 
22 In the direction to the countryside, the opposition forces organised long marches to spread the 
movement among the rural masses while the marches towards the capital or city towns were 
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organised to demonstrate strong resentment to any decision of the junta against the public interest. These mass marches with hundreds of thousands participants passed long way that took 1-4 weeks to 
reach the destination. For example, see the long march of the Bangladesh Communist Party on i'h January 1989. The party organised this action from four periphery routes of the country from Tetulia, Sylhet, Chattagram and Khulna which ended at Dhaka on 28`h January 1989. For this, see, Mohammad Khusbu, Bangladesher Chattra Andoloner Itihas: Ershader Shoinoykal 
. (The History of Student Movement in Bangladesh ) Dhaka: Student Ways, 1991, p. 144. 231n the train march, the key leaders rode on the trains and stopped in the every city or smaller town 
stations, where they delivered their speeches against the Martial Law rule at the gatherings of the 
general mass. Similarly, vehicle marches included the cars, motor cycles, motor vehicles or track lorries to carry the leaders and supporters of the political parties and moved round the city streets 
chanting the anti-Ershad slogans, which also attracted a great interest of the general mass of the 
society. 
24 Sometimes, the opposition student bodies' victory of the elections against the candidate supported 
by junta in the colleges or universities, or the opposition supported candidate's winning against the 
candidate of the junta in any local elections led a protest march with joys that accelerated the 
opposition movement. For example, The winning of the CASC (Central Student Action Committee) 
in February 1989 in the DUCSU or the winning of the JCD in the DUCSU in 1990 was celebrated 
with huge marches with joys as these were regarded as the victory against the military regime. In this 
way, the winning of most of the student unions in universities and colleges was found to be 
welcomed by huge processions and marches with joys that, in fact, vulcanized the student movement 
apainst the military dictator in 1989-1990. 
2 For example, the MM Avenue, BB Avenue, Gulistan Square and BM Mosque premise of Dhaka 
city, Lal Dhigi ground of Chittagong, Alya Madrasha ground of Rajshahi, and Shaheed Hadis Park of 
Khulna, Bangabandhu Uddhan of Barisal and Alya Madrasha ground of Sylhet, were, among others, 
the main places for these kinds of large public meetings in which several hundreds of thousand 
people could gather at a time. For example of these meetings and gatherings, see the Bangladesh 
Observer, 15 February, 1985. In a separate public meeting, Sheikh Hasina of 15-party alliance at 
Central Shaheed Minar and Begum Zia of 7-party alliance at Baitul Mukarram, Dhaka on 14`h 
February 1985 announced to resist the farcical holding of general election by the military dictator. 
26 A huge quantity of non-political masses also joined these meetings to hear and see the key 
opposition leaders in public. The military administration took measures to prevent possible outburst 
damages by the participants on their way to return home. 
27 For example of smaller public gathering addressed by opposition leaders through out the country, 
see the Bangladesh Observer, 10 August 1987, in which Sheikh Hasina of the AL addressed at 
Nagarbari Ghat, Pubna, demanding the resignation of Ershad while Begum Zia of the BNP addressed 
at Rangpur demanding the declaration of Rangpur as flood victim distressed area. See also, Ibid, 1 
August 1987 in which Begum Zia addressed at Faridpur, a district town, demanding the dissolution 
of the parliament. See also, Ibid, 12 August 1987 in which Sheikh Hasina of the AL addressed at the 
district town of Rangpur in which she complained against the Government for inadequate relief 
operation for flood victims and also urged the military dictator to resign immediately. See also ibid, 
12 April 1987 in which Begum Zia addressed at the district town of Jhenidah and urged for the 
dissolution of parliament. 
28 The general masses from the country side were the main participants of these peaceful and non- 
violent gatherings, which turned out to 25-50 thousands in number. Sometimes, the opposition 
leaders planned the medium level public meetings throughout the country to increase the mass 
awareness which developed movements in the countryside 
29The number of the participants of this meetings and gatherings was always smaller ranging from 
500-5000. For the examples of the street corners meeting, see the Bangladesh Observer 6 December 
1984.7-party alliance held street corners meetings at Gulistan, Fulbaria, Sadar Ghat, Badamtali, 
Chawkbazar, New Market, Mauchak MARKET, Farmgate and Kamlapur on 5th December 1984. For 
this kind of spot meeting, see also Bangladesh Observer, 10 April, 1987 in which the BNP chief 
addressed a gathering at Nawab Yusuf Market and urged all opposition MPs to quit the parliament 
immediately. In the same day, acting Ameer of the JIB, Mowlana Abbas Ali Khan addressed at the 
premise of Baitual Mukarram Mosque, who urged for fresh polls. See also ibid, 21 April 1987 in 
which BKSAL Chairman Mohiuddin Ahmed addressed at the central Shaheed Minar in the capital 
and accused the AL to stab the movement from the back by participating in the poll under military 
administration. See also /bid, 21February 1985 in which the leaders of 15-party alliance including 
Moulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabugish (GAL), Mrs Sajeda Choudhury (AL), Mr Shajahan Siraj (JSD- 
Siraj), Rashed Khan Menon (WP), Comrade Forhad (CPB), Altaf Hossain (EP). Md. Toha (SD). 
-244- 
Pankaj Bhattacharya (NAP), Khalquzzamman(BSD), Kamal Haider (NAP-Muzaffar), Shah Alam 
(Majdur Party), Mahamudur Rahman Manna (BSD-Mahbub), and Dilip Barua (SD-M-L) addressed 
the meeting at stadium gate in protest of filing nominations and holding the pre-designed polls by the 
military dictator. See also, ibid, 29 May 1989. AL presidium member Dr Kamal Hossain addressed a 
public meeting at Nayatola Shishu Park and urged to people to unseat the present autocratic 
government. 
° The policy makers of the movement normally organised smaller support meetings in different spots 
in the cities in the day or days before the observance of the main action as a part of the preparation of 
activists. These support meetings sometimes ended with a torch light procession passing through the 
main spots of the city. For the example of support meeting, see the Bangladesh Observer, 15 
February 1985 in which the CSAC brought out many support meetings through out the campuses of 
educational institutions of the capital following the hartal in the next day in the city in protest of the 
killing of CSAC leader Raofun Basunia. See also, Ibid, 5 November 1989 in which the 7party 
alliance brought out torchlight procession in the previous evening in support of the hartal in the 
following day. See also, Ibid, 27 September 1989 in which the SCOP brought out torch light 
procession from the National Press Club in the previous evening in support of their half day hartal on 
27'h September 1989. 
31 On the day or days of the hartal, strike and blockades, the opposition activists took the position in 
important spots for picketing and brought out marches. At the end of these picketing marches, they 
gathered on the roadside of the spots or party office where the leaders used to deliver their thanks 
through speeches to the participants. For example, see the Bangladesh Observer, 6`h November 
1989 in which 8-party, 7-party, 5-party and 6-party organised many meetings, rallies and gatherings 
in the hartal day in the different part of the city on 5`h November 1989. Among other, a meeting of 6- 
party alliance was held near the HBFC office in the post-hartal period that demanded the resignation 
of military dictator. 
32 The students came out of their rooms following news of this kind of events, and demanded the 
immediate release of their leaders or expressed their deep concern over the killing in these action 
gatherings. For an example of sudden protest gathering, see Bangladesh Observer, Daily Ittefaq, 
Daily Sangbad, 28th November 1990 in which huge sudden protest were brought out to streets, 
hospitals and medical colleges, when Dr Shamsul Alam Khan, the Joint Secretary of the BMA was 
killed by miscreant hooligans on the eve of mass upsurge on 27`s November 1990. See also, ibid, 11 
October 1990 a huge sudden protest marches were brought in the campuses of the educational 
institutions all over the country, while the news of the killing of six people at the sit-in demonstration 
on 10`h October was broken out. 
33 Personal interview the APSU leaders including Mr Ashim Kumer Ukil, JS of the BCL(H-A), Mr 
Shafi Ahmed, JS of the BCL (N-S), Mr. Khairul Kabir Khokon, JS of the JCD, Mr. Mostafa Farook, 
GS of the Socialist Student Front (SSF) and Mrs. Moshrefa Mishu, President of the Chatra Oikya 
Forum. These leaders informed the researcher that the units of their student organisation through out 
the academic institutions, all most all public universities and colleges of the country, from capital to 
thana area, brought out processions in all opening days. The aim of these regular processions showed 
the strength of their own organisations as well as stayed behind the continuous protest against the 
. 1unta administration. 
° These meetings were organised to protest the repressions of the dictator and to support of their 
respective demands and immediate resignation of the junta for the sake of democracy. They passed 
many resolutions in these meetings in support of the opposition movement. For the meetings of 
different interest and pressure groups, see the Bangladesh Observer, 5 March 1990. The meetings of 
the BMA was held at the IPGMR premise in the wake of two days doctors strike through out the 
country, See also, ibid, 1-15 August 1990, Doctors held several meetings and rallies as their part of 
strike against the government health policy. See also, ibid, 12 September 1990. Journalists, 
newspaper workers observed pen-down strike on 11 September 1990 and held a rally in protest of 
conspiracy against the wage board reports regarding their salary and allowances at the press club 
premise in Dhaka. See also ibid. 9 December 1984. The Dhaka Union of Journalists (DUJ) in an 
emergency extended meeting condemned the 'barbaric attack' on the photographers and reporters by 
police on 8`s December 1984 and demanded the exemplary punishment of responsible police 
personnel and officials connected in this event. See also, ibid. 15 December 1984, the SKOP in a 
public meeting on 14`h December 1984 at Baitul Mukarram Mosque premise urged the military 
government to implement their charter of demands that was signed with government before 22 
December 1983; See also, ibid, 16 December 1984, an extended meeting of the central executive 
committee of the coordination council of the bar associations of Bangladesh held on 15`s December 
1984 decided to abstain from attending courts through out the country from 20 January 1985; See 
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also ibid. 23 October 1984, the Engineers services structure and welfare committee of the Institution 
of Engineers observed `demand day' on 22°d October 1984 for the implementation of order issued by his secretariat for a solution to their professional problems; 35 These meetings designed their plan of actions for the next one year so that the workers could hale 
sufficient time to prepare themselves for the movement. Although these were mainly related to the improvement of their organisational structure, all decisions of these meetings had been jeopardized 
by the repressive measures of the dictator. For prefixed rally of the student, see the Bangladesh 
Observer, 26 December 1984. The Central Student Action Committee (CSAC) would hold a rally on 26`h December at 11 am at the premises of Dhaka University in protest against the killing of three 
persons including a student leader Shajahan Siraj in police firing at Rajshahi on the Saturday last. For 
political parties; see ibid, the 15-party alliance would hold a rally followed by a protest march in the 
following day at the Stadium Gate in protest of the arrest of political leaders during last hartal hours; 
for professionals, see ibid. 5 December 1984, The central Action Committee of the News Papers and 
News Agencies would hold a rally that day (10: 30 am) at the National Press Club in protest of the 
Government ban on the publication of Dainik Desh and retrenchment order served on the journalists 
press workers and the general employees of the daily by its management; for pre-fixed meetings of 
the student, see the DUCSU convention on on ls` October 1990 where 12-points action programme 
announced; the pre-fixed meeting of the ALWC on 24`h March 1988; the meeting of professionals on 
27'h February 1988 at Dhaka Press Club, and poem festival of the poets on 02 February 1988 and the 
like. 
36 The objective of these meetings was to inspire the new generation to learn about the sacrifice of 
their antecedents, which in turn, reinforced the movement in progress. For the meetings of 
condolence and death anniversary, see the Bangladesh Observer 16 August 1989. The Bangladesh 
Awami League observed the death anniversary of the father of the nation Bnagabandhu Shaikh 
Mujibur Rahman. See also ibid. 151 June 1989. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party observed the death 
anniversary of its leader late President General Ziaur Rahman. See also, ibid, 15-17 February, 1985. 
The student organisations and major two alliances of the opposition political parties arranged 
condolence meetings and moruning rallies in protest of the killing of JCL leader Raufun Basunia in 
the Dhaka University campus. 
37 They performed mass songs, stage drama, jokes and poem recitations etc mainly in the university 
and college campuses and Language Martyr Minarets all over the country, which exposed the tyranny 
of the dictator, and inspired the masses to join in the opposition movement. In the final stage of the 
movement, the activities of the UCA were extended though out the country and helped to uproot the 
support base of the dictator in the country side. For example, see the theatre festival of the Dhaka 
Theatre in mid-November 1989 for 11-days in Mohammad Khusbu, op. cit, p. 138. Most of the 
cultural functions organised on the occasion of the important days of the nation such as Independence 
Day, Victory Day, Language Martyrs Day and 151 Boishakh (Bengali New Year). 
38The opposition socio cultural and political activists or bodies expressed their support for them, 
which always turned into a mere mass attention, when it exceeded generally more than a week. The 
locations of this action were normally the Language Martyrs Minaret or the premises of Press Club 
and DC office or other notable places of the cities. Sometimes the students observed this action in 
their own academic campuses. The bodies of the professionals, intellectuals and labourers linked 
indirectly with opposition political parties used this action as the last means to actualize their 
demands to the military dictator. The unions of teachers, journalists, and government and non- 
government employees were among other main groups, who organised hunger strikes in favour of 
their demands. Although it was very much an inoffensive and peaceful action in nature, generally 
were dispersed by the baton charges by the police following the arrest of the participants. For 
example of hunger strike, see the Bangladesh Observer, 21 October 1984. The leaders of Central 
Action Committee of Bangladesh News Papers and News Agencies broke their 24-hours token 
hunger strike at 6 pm on last Saturday (1S` October 1984) A total number of 17 leaders including 
journalists, general employees and press workers joined the hunger strike to press the demand of 
withdrawal of ban on the publication of Dainik Desh, warrant of arrest against two journalists and 
publisher of the Daily and lay-off order by the Dainik Desh Management. See also ibid, 25`h October 
1990. Many students under the banner of Bangladesh Chatra Kallyan Sangstha observed a one day 
token hunger strike on 20 October 1990 at the premise of National Press Club in protest of 
Presidential ordinance that had closed down the educational institutions all over the country. They 
were demanding the immediate reopening of the educational institutions all over the country. See also 
/bid, 14 November 1989 in which opposition backed 9-student parties including JCD backed SAS 
and pro-CPB BSU took up the fasting programme as part of their action plan simultaneously 
announced on 10 November 1989. Their demands included the end of campus violence and 
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resignation of General Ershad, etc. See also, Ibid, 2°d November 1989. Begum Zia with her party's 
central leaders had participated in a token hunger strike on 151 November 1989 at Muktangan. Dhaka. See also, the hunger strike of the students in Sylhet on 6`'' May 1990 for the release of Bighit Choudhury-a veteran student leader who was in jail with 40 false law suits against him. 39The time and locations were scheduled earlier by leaders and participants of the action. The 
responsible leader used a loud speaker to deliver the announcement and sometimes, whistles were 
used to give the signal for the beginning and finishing of the action. The participants were mainly the 
supporters of the political parties, intellectuals and general masses of the society. They stood side by 
side and fastened their hands with each other, which produced a long chain of people on the roadside 
and stayed at a standstill in this way for 30 minutes to an hour. 40 Artist Patua Kamrual Ahsan originally hailing from village Narayanga of Kalna Subdivision of 
Burdwan district was born on December 2,1921, in Calcutta in a respectable Muslim family. He 
graduated in Fine Arts from the Calcutta Art College in 1947. He settled down in Dhaka and joined 
the Government Institute of Art , which was later renamed as the College of Arts and Crafts. He 
played a pivotal role in establishing the Art College under the leadership of Shilpachaivva Zainul 
Abedin. He earned his name and prominence as a very distinguished painter through using folk 
Motifs in his works. He held the first solo exhibition in Lytton Hall of Dhaka University in 1951. He 
designed the National Flag of Bangladesh, the official monograms of Bangladesh government. He 
built three main den sculptures for Bangladesh Biman, Bangladesh Bank, Parjatan Corporation and 
Muktijuddah Kallyan Trust. He died on 2°d February 1988. For details about his life and works, see 
Bangladesh Observer, 3`d February 1988. He was regarded as one of the pioneer leadership of the 
cultural movement against the military regime of General Ershad. 
41 The action of human chain was first introduced in the country to demand the trial of the killers of 
the father of the nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rhaman on every 15`h August, the day in 
which he was killed brutally with most of his family members. Then it was turned with many issues 
against the military rule of General Ershad. Mostly, the intellectuals including poets, famous novelist, 
all types of artists, authors, university teachers and social and cultural activists of the society 
participated in this action. The action with silent mood could touch the heart of the general mass and 
was able to soften the people by emotional appeal. 
42 In the foremost cases, the participants in the procession walked one by one in two lines along the 
planned direction and expressed their apprehensions regarding the specific steps taken by military 
government. For example, the procession of the students, political parties, intellectuals, professionals 
and TU on the observance of 2l February-the Language Martyr Day. Moreover, the Coordinating 
Committee of the Professional groups and intellectuals frequently organised this type of processions 
in protest of different issues. 
43 The participants carried the banners, festoons, placards and different colourful decorations 
concerning the objectives of the day. These rallies were eye-catching and could attract the general 
masses of the society. The number of the participants at a rally depended, however, on the size of the 
support base of the organisation. Although the overall situations was found to be very much joyful 
with the sound of bands' melody, these rallies turned into a protest rally as all the banners, festoons 
and placards carried the anti junta slogans along with the objectives and ideologies of their parties. 
For example, see the Bangladesh Observer 10th January 1989. The huge processions with colourful 
banners and posters were held on the birth anniversary of Bangladesh Chatra League (BCL). In this 
way, JCD, BSU and JSD, Oikya Forum and many other student organisations brought out rallies on 
the birth anniversaries. These also led an anti-autocracy oath to establish democracy in the country. 
441n this connection, it would be worth mentioning here that press freedom was suppressed under 
Martial Law regulations and the professionals and intellectuals of the press community were opposed 
to the dictator from the very beginning of the military aggression. The opposition groups in all unions 
of journalists were strong enough to play a role in relation to the media. However, the dailies and 
weeklies of the printed media mainly came forward to expose the brutality of the dictator. 
45 For the examples of press conference, see the Bangladesh Observer, 24 October 1989. In a press 
conference, on 23 October 1989, the pro-CPB, BSU accused the BCL for foiling the move for greater 
student unity and blamed the nine students' organisation for splitting the CSAC. See also ibid, 26 
October 1989. In a separate press conference on 25`" October 1989, the JCL called for greater unity 
of the students. See also, ibid, 15 September 1990. The leaders of three major road transports 
organisations in joint press conference at press club in Dhaka on 14 September 1990 announced 
country wide indefinite strike from 18 September 1990 to press home their six point demands. See 
also ibid. 26 November 1984, the press conference of Bangladesh Non-Government College 
Teachers Association on 25th November 1984 demanded the announcement of the policy for the 
nationalisation of college education by November 30 and its implementation by 1985. 
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aG For press statement by the eminent citizens of the country, see the Bangladesh Obsen cr, 1 April 
1987.31 eminent persons chose to ignore the offensive language used against them by the 
government leaders but restated in a press statement issued on 2"d April 1987 (Thursday) for the 
demand of interim government under article 55 of the constitution which had no conflict ww ith present 
constitutional process. Notable among those who had signed the statement were Prof. Abdur Razzak, 
Kamaluddin Hossain, Debesh Chandra Battacherjee, Sufia Kamal, Dr AR Mallik, Dr Nilima Ibrahim, 
Dr Khan Sarwar Murshid, Prof. Zillur Rahman Siddiquee, A. K. M. Ahsan, Sanaul Haque, Abdul 
Khaleque, ABMG Kibria, Syed Ishtiaq Ahmed, Kabir Choudhury, Sarder Fazlul Karim, Dr. 
Salauddin Ahmed, Dr. Iqbal Mahmud, Dr. Anisuzzaman, Kamrul Ahsan, Shamsur Rahman, Favez 
Ahmed, Dr. Muzaffar Ahmed, Dr. Mosherraf Hossain, Mainul Hossain and Dr. Fasihuddin Mahtab. 
See also ibid, 19 July 1990. The leaders of the lawyers, university teachers, journalists and cultural 
activists in a joint press statement demanded the repeal of blacl laws including Special Power Act, 
Printing Press and Publications Act and Drama censorship laws. See also, ibid, 13 September 1990. 
56 DU teachers in joint statement to press slated sending of troops to Saudi Arabia. 
47 In fact, the military authority hardly allowed the participants to reach the planned areas and set 
blockades earlier round the ways of action location. What happened in this regard was that the 
opposition participants were compelled to take the position for the stay-in strike around the 
blockaded location-for example, around the far ways to the secretariat, radio and TV relay centres 
in the capital and the DC office in the district towns. 
48 For example, see the Bangladesh Observer, 11 October 1990. The sit-in demonstration action was 
observed by 8-party, 7-party, 6-party, 5-party alliances and Jamaat-I-Islami around the Government 
Secretariat on 10th October 1990. The streams of processions and marches from different corners of 
the metropolis converged at Bangabandhu Avenue, Northern Gate of Baitul Mukarram and General 
Post Office (GPO) area chanting anti-government slogans. However, in the mid day, police started 
batons and shooting on the sit-in participants continuously. Five people were killed and over 2000 
other injured in a series of pitched battles between the police and political activities during the 
observance of this sit-in demonstration by the opposition forces of the country. The clashes were 
concentrated mostly at the Motijheel Commercial Area, Gulistan, Nawabpur and New Market Area. 
All of five persons killed in the incident had bullet wounds. Three of them were identified as Najir 
Hossain Jehad of Ullah Para College, Sirajgong, Zahid Hossain, a student of the Finance Department 
of Dhaka University and other as Monowar Hossain of Kazi Alauddin Road of Old Dhaka. 
49 For example, see Bangladesh Observer 2"d November 1989, the stay in strike of 127 leaders of 7- 
party alliance under the leadership of Begum Zia at Gulistan Square for 10 hours on 151 November 
1989 see also, the Bangladesh Observer, 29 May 1990.20 persons on hunger strike at the Shaheed 
Minar of Comilla in protest of eviction of 8000 families of 11 villages of the district, which was 
supported by all socio-political forces of the areas. 
50 The opposition blockaded the major high ways by destroying the small bridges; created obstacles 
with falling the pieces of big trees, and digging holes on the roads etc. They removed the sleepers of 
the rail lines that disrupted the rail network to and from the capital. The dock or port labourer groups 
did not allow the docking in of the launches and ships alongside the shore, which almost stopped the 
water and naval communication all over the country. This was not a very easy task for the opposition, 
and they had to be forceful and strategic to counter the forces deployed by the military 
administration. For example see the Bangladesh Observer, 28`h November 1990. Normal life all over 
the country came to a halt on 27th November, Saturday, following road and rail way blockade 
by 
opposition alliances and parties. The day was marked by sporadic violence in the city and elsewhere 
in the country. Leaders of the 8-party and 7-party alliances took their positions on the main road 
in 
front of the Science Laboratory, Dhanmondhi, Dhaka. All over the country, the action was organised 
successfully by the opposition forces. 
51 This action involved several objectives. First, the political objective of the hartal was to dislocate 
the military junta from the general masses of the society. The sixth sense that was developed 
by 
picketing, marches and gatherings of the opposition forces were able to motivate the people against 
the corruption, inefficiency and atrocities of the military dictator. Second, the social objective was 
more significant. The action of hartal created more mass involvement. All corners of the society-top 
to bottom, upper class to lower class, and business elites to landless floating people-were involved 
in this action. Subsequently, the junta and his associates became unwanted hateful group that was 
socially isolated. Third, the economic objective was very cruel and carried a 
huge financial setback in 
the national economy. In the domestic account of a hartal day, due to the disruption 
in the export- 
import business, service and entertainment sectors, transports and industrial sector etc, the country 
lost billions of currency in a financial year. The intense use of this action let down the 
foreign 
investment that also led domestic loses. This however, according to the objective of the opposition, 
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detached the junta from the direct involvement of international bourgeoisie or multinational 
companies to extend their business in Bangladesh. Hence, the opposition used it repeatedly to keep incessant economic pressure on the military dictator. The distresses of the landless class day labourers, who earned their livelihood by manual labour, i. e. rickshaw pullers, porters and the like became helpless as they had no work for day long, for which, they had to starve occasionally at 
nights. However, this class was allowed to work during the long hours' hartal. But interesting enough, 
this class was also a significant participant in the political activities during the hartal hours. Fourth, 
the cultural objective of the hartal was distinctive. The action made it clear that politics was for 
politicians, not for the armed forces. The political workers practiced a culture of political action i. e. 
marches, gatherings, peaceful picketing, whereas the army practiced a culture of repression i. e. baton 
charge, arrest, shooting, killing and chaos. The two distinct cultures by the two actors, however, 
revealed the acceptance of a courageous resistance of political workers among the general masses of 
the society. It was established that the culture of the army institution was to fight external forces, not 
to create any chaos in the domestic politics. Even the culture of chaos in the Army leading to the 
cruel repression on their own people frightened the youth of the new generation in the 1980s that 
discouraged them to choose the Defence as their future carrier. 52 The Tokys (street urchins) were the despised floating children, 5-14 years old, who, in fact, did not 
have any guardian and were displaced from their shelter or homestead. The social background of 
these children was very heart-rending. They were grown up as the remnants of the city life. They did 
not have any connection with schooling and did have neither adequate food nor proper dress up. In 
most cases, they had rare connections with their mothers who lived in the street or in the slum and 
their fathers left them with their mother or died. They had been growing up in the street of the cities 
in a huge quantity in the 1980s Bangladesh society. They became sometimes very important 
component of the actions to be successful. As they do no have food or money to buy food, they were 
given food or very small money to participate in the actions. Especially, in the days of the actions 
like hartal and use of violence, in the very stiff situation, they were used as the careers of violence 
elements and could easily use it on the law and order forces. In this way, when they became 
habituated with the actions in the streets, they willingly participated in all actions especially, in the 
actions of protest marches and hartal. In the hartal days, although it was immaterial and less 
important, but a very cruel and real fact, these urchins of the street (first 10-12 in number, then 
became in huge number within hours) started slogans in the early dawn before the veteran picketers 
of the political parties had been in the street. In most cases, they were always in front or in the side of 
violent processions and had many instances of being killed and injured along the political workers in 
the wake of police shooting on the marches. 
53 For details of the Dhaka Siege action organised by the all alliances and parties of the opposition 
democratic forces, see the Bangladesh Observer, Daily ! ttefaq, Daily Sangbad, and Daily Bangler 
Banff of 11-19 November 1987. The action was called by the opposition forces to overthrow the 
military administration of the dictator by closing all networks between the capital and rest of the 
country. According to the instruction, the opposition forces marched towards Dhaka on 100, 
November 1987, which was obstructed by huge deployment of junta forces including army, police 
and BDR. In the ensuing violent clash and shooting by the forces of junta on peaceful marches for 
democratic aspiration, many uncounted participants were killed in which 4 was exposed to press and 
thousands others got injuries. In protest, there was continuous hartal observed from 12-19 November, 
1987, which was marked by the thousands of opposition leaders to be arrested including the house 
arrest of Sheikh Hasina of the AL and Begum Zia of the BNP. 
sa See the Bangladesh Observer, 9 December 1984. The main opposition alliances called upon the 
people to observe the non-cooperation action and urged to stop payment of land revenue, tolls on hats 
and bazaars and municipal and union parishad taxes. See also, Bangladesh Observer, 29 December 
1984. The two day meeting of the Organising Committee of the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami 
League (BAKSAL) called to intensify the ongoing non-cooperation movement against the military 
regime of General Hussein Muhammad Ershad. 
See, The Bangladesh Observer, 31 December 1984. The advisory committee of the BAKSAL 
called the people for carrying forward the civil-disobedience movement for the realisation of five- 
point demands. 
6 For many events, see the Daily Ban gier Bani, Daily Khobar and Daily Songbad, from 4-7`h 
December 1990. The events of the removal of portrait and photos of the dictator in the wake of mass 
uprising in 1990 are worth mentioning here. From 151 December to 6`h December 1990, the portraits 
of the junta were damaged and ablaze. However, the students of the universities and colleges pull 
down many portraits of the junta from the offices of VCs and Principals in a number of events during 
their movement. 
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57 For marches of the students of the Arts Institute of the University of Dhaka, see the Bangladesh Observer, 16 April 1990. They students brought out huge grotesque processions that carried different 
pattern of caricatures criticising the military junta and many cultural symbols of the nation. 58 For example of the Gherao by student forces, see Bangladesh Observer. 15 November 1990 in 
which the APSU on 14th November 1990 observed countrywide Gherao of Union. Upazilla and Zilla Parishad offices to press for various demands including the repeal of Educational Institutional Ordinance 1990. The resignation of the military dictator, reduction of fare on transport and release of detained student leaders were also included as their major demands. The APSU units across the 
country commenced their day's programme with hoisting of black badge and flags and holding rallies in educational institutions. In the capital itself, the unified body of all student organisations brought 
out processions which marched towards the office of the Deputy Commissioner at the Johnson Road, 
Dhaka. See also, /bid, 19 April 1987 in which the 7-party alliance observed the action to Gherao 
offices of the Deputy Commissioners in all districts of the country on 18`h April 1987 for the 
realisation of their 15-points demands. See also, ibid 14 October 1989, the 8-party alliance announced Gherao of Upazilla Parishad all over the country. 59 Although the supporters of the dictator organised several pre-caution gatherings in different 
locations in this secure area, thousands of students' marching from the university campus and different city areas to the Montri para just compelled them to run away from the scene. However, the 
crackdown by troops cordoned the secure zone from any kind of damage. For the example of the 
Gherao of the Ministerial residential area by students, see the Bangladesh Observer, 18 November 
1990 in which the APSU brought out marches with thousands of the students to the Minto Road, the 
designated and secured residential area of the cabinet members of the military administration on 17'' 
November 1990. Pitched battle with exchange of Gun shots and bomb explosions between the 
students and supporters of the ruling JP disrupted the city life during the Gherao action. The angry 
students set fire to five vehicles and three motorbikes of police and damaged the police box near the 
Science Laboratory crossing and also a BRTC double Decker was set ablaze in front of New Market. 
The Sicily. a Chinese restaurant was ransacked near Jonaki Cinema Hall during their sporadic clashes 
with police and ruling JP workers on the day. The students also stormed and destroyed a pro-junta 
Bank Employees Federation's gatherings in front of Sheraton Hotel. It was assumed that all residents 
of the ministers became emptied in fear of this action of the students on that day., See also, /bid, 10 
December 1989 in which the 7-party alliance observed Gherao action around the office of the 
Bangladesh Biman on 9 December 1989 on their part of nation-wide anti-corruption campaign. See 
also ibid, 21 December 1989, the same alliances observed Gherao around the Ministries of Food, 
Agriculture, Industries and Education on 20 December 1989 on their part of anti-corruption campaign. 
60 For example, see the gherao of VC resident of the University of Dhaka by the JCD on 5th February 
1987 in protest of the arrest of their 12 leaders from the Hazi Mohammad Muhasin Hall, and at one 
stage, they attacked on the resident of the VC. For this, see Mohammad Khusbu, op. cit, pp-55-56. See 
also, the Gherao of the VC office by the BICS at Chittagong University on 4`h September 1990. 
Mohammad Khusbu, p. 153. 
61 In fact, all strikes of students, along with other issues, always include their prior demand for the 
resignation of the junta and to begin the process of democratic rule in the country. 
62 For example, see the student strike of the JCL-the student wing of the BKSAL in Dhaka 
University on 30`h November 1986 in protest of the government withdrawal of law suits and all 
charges against the killers of Raofun Basunia who was killed on 14`h February 1985 by the pro-junta 
student groups. This student strike was supported by all other student organisations and alliances in 
the opposition. For this, see Mohammad Khusbu, p. 42. 
63 For example, see the student strike of all major student organisations on 13 December 1982 in 
protest of the Education Policy formulated by Majid Khan Commission. See also the student strike 
in educational institutions on 14`h March 1986 in the capital and on 16`h March 1986 all over the 
country for the release of the student leaders arrested in the wake of the events related to the death of 
JCD secretary Mahbubul Haque Bablu in a bomb blasts in Dhaka University. For this, see 
Mohammad Khusbu, p. 15 and p. 61. 
64 For example, see the student strike called the CSAC and SAA on 151 July 1987 in protest of the 
increased tuition fees for the students in higher educational institutions all over the country. For this 
see Daily, Sangbad, and Daily Angler Bani 2°d July 1987. P. 1 
65 For example, see the strike of the JCD on 16 August 1988 for the withdrawal of the expulsion of 
the JCD leader Sanaul Haque Niru from the University of Dhaka. However, this strike was protested 
by the CSAC and the University Academic Environment Council also requested to the JCD to abstain 
their demand. For this, see Mohammad Khusbu, pp. 102-03. 
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66 For the examples of the strikes flowing student clashes, see the Bangladesh Obserber, 4 October 1989. Following a student clash between the BCL(H-A) and JCD on 3rd October 1989 in the Dhaka University campus, the JCD called student strike in protest of violence by the armed hooligans of the BCL. See also, Bangladesh Observer 13`h February 1989, the CSAC called strike in Dhaka University Campus in protest of the attacks of the JCD on the processions of the girls' students on 10th February 1989 on the wake of victory of the CSAC in the DUCSU election. 67 For the strike due to clash between the anti-communal student forces and BICS, see the Bangladesh Observer, 20 September 1989 in which the general students of the university of Dhaka 
under the banner of all anti-communal student organisations observed student strike on 19 September 
1989(Tuesday) in the Dhaka University in protest of ransack and damage of Institute of Social Welfare and Research (on Monday) by the BICS, the fundamentalist and anti-liberation forces of the 
country. See also, ibid, 3 September 1989 in which the JCD observed strike on 2"d September 1989 
in all educational institutions in the capital in protest of the killing of their veteran worker, Habibur 
Rahman Kabir by the BICS at Jahangir Nagar University, Saver, Dhaka 
68 For example, the strike of the student organisations on 14`h March 1987 in protest of the police 
raid and repression of students at Dhaka University on 11-12 March 1987. See Bangladesh Observer 
15 March 1987. 
69 For example, see the student strikes on the wake of clash between pro-junta student groups and 
opposition mainstream student organisation in Dhaka University after the killing of Raofune 
Basunia-a prominent JCL leader on 13`x' February 1985. 
70 For example, see the student strike on 6th December 1989 called by International Student Union to 
open the schools of Palestine that captured by the Israel. This strike was also observed in Bangladesh 
by the opposition student organisations and their alliances. 
71 When the demonstrators reached the locations, the sounds of the closing of the gates of the 
entrance and other protective measures by the authority created a horror in the whole area. It was a 
rare event if any official came out to face the demonstrators to give any consolation on their demands. 
The gatherings, almost always, lasted not more than an hour. For example, see the Daily Sangbad, 
15th February 1983. The students organised the demonstration around the Ministry of Education 
Building in protest of the New Education Policy of the military government. In the event, some 
students were killed and many other injured in the wake of police shooting on the demonstration. 
72 For setting fire on transports and vehicles, see the Bangladesh Observer, 12 August 1989. The 
unruly mobs burnt and damaged 22 vehicles through out the day in protest of attack on 23 
Dhanmondhi Mujib's residence widely known as Bangabandhu Bhavon by unknown gunmen where 
the AL chief Sheikh Hasina had been living. 
73 Personal Interviews of the researcher with the CSAC leaders including Mr. Akhteruzzaman, VP, 
DUCSU, Mr Mostafa Jalal Mohi uddin and Mr. K. M. Jahangir of the BCL (J-J), Mrs. Shirin Akhter 
of BCL(Inu), Mr. Fazlur Rahman of BCL (F-C). The CSAC leaders informed the researcher that the 
veteran students of their organisations took part in the risky operation from the under ground to throw 
bombs on the military patrolling, especially in the areas of the capital and divisional cities where 
most of public universities were located. In these operations many members of the junta forces were 
injured. 
74 Personal interview of the researcher with a CSAC leader, who did not want to be named. It was 
reported, some members of the military on patrolling were trapped and abducted by the guerrilla 
insurgencies and later, at least one of their dead bodies was found in the hitch of the city. As there 
was strong press censorship, this news of the brave activities of the students of Bangladesh against 
the military rule could not be published. 
75In opposing these armed hooligans employed by the military dictator, the opposition youth and 
student participants had to collect illegal arms to forge a counter attack. It was, however, true that the 
illegal arms became a part of the opposition action against military administration that frequently led 
to gun battles resulting many casualties in both sides. For example, see the gun battle between APSU 
supporters and Niru-Ovi group patronized by junta forces on 25" November 1990 in the morning in 
the Dhaka University campus and around the Bangla Academy to Education Building area in the 
evening. In this battle, the dictator group ran way the scene in the face of huge protest by the APSU. 
For this see Daily ! ttefaq and Daily Ingilab 26th November 1990. See also, the battle between CSAC 
supporters and pro-junta student groups on 13`h February, 1985 around A. F. Rahman Hall at the 
University of Dhaka, in which pro-junta students factions used guns against the opposition students' 
organisation. This resulted the killing of Raofune Basunia, a veteran JCL leader and MSS student of 
the sociology department of the University of Dhaka. cite example of the gun battle between the 
opposition and JP supporters or police 
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76 For example, the opposition forces pulled out rail line at Tongi near Dhaka on 12`h November 1987 
after the police atrocities in the opposition Dhaka Siege action on 10`h November 1987. The 
researcher himself was staying in this area at that time. See also, the pulling out the rail line on the 
occasion of the opposition actions-`Railpath, Rajpath and Pani Path Avorodh' on 27`h October 1990. For this, see Daily Sangabd 28 October 1990. 
"For example, among many other such events, Mr Mizanur Rahman Choudhurv, the Vice Chairman 
of the pro-junta Jana Dal party was badly humiliated and assaulted at the midnight 21" February 
1984 at Central Shahid Miner on the observance of National Language Martyr Day. The opposition 
student forces made him naked, however, later rescued by the junta forces. 78 For example, see the cultural functions on the occasion of the observances of Language Martyr 
Day (215` February) ls` Boishakh (Bengali New Year) and victory day (16`h December). These 
national level cultural programmes were organised mostly in the superb of the Dhaka University 
campus. These popular songs included the traditional folk songs, Najrul Shangeet (songs written by 
famous poet Nazrul Islam), Robindra Shangeet (songs of Robindranath Tagore). These reflected 
themes of socio-cultural life of the Bengali people as well as reflected their heroic events in the 
history of struggle for nation-building and liberation of the country. 79 The students of the Arts and Craft Institute and painting and solo artists of the country organised 
these caricature and grotesque marches mainly on the observance of Bengali new year (151 Boishakh, 
mostly 14th April in English ). This attractive and huge participated grotesque marches carry many 
effigies and caricatures that reflected the repressions of the junta. 
80 For poetry festival, see the Bangladesh Observer, 2°d February 1988 in which the two days Second 
National Poetry Festival began on 15` February 1988 (Monday) at the TSC crossing of Dhaka 
University with a clarion call to turn the grief of the language martyrs into strength for the ousting of 
the military regime. The main theme of the festival was poetry against autocracy. The country's 
eminent poet, Begum Sufia Kamal in her address to the festival regretted that there was no justice in 
the country as lawyers were passing days in the dark cells of the jail. She called upon the youth of the 
country to come forward with courage to fight the autocracy. 
81The graph 7.4.2 is constructed according to the statistics of the table 7.4.1. below: 
Table 8.4.1: The frequencies of four major actions by years 1982 -1990 
Four Ma'or Actions of the Movement Total of Four 
Year Protest Meeting Hartal Use of Actions by year 
March (public) /strike Violence 
1982 0 0 1 1 2 
1983 9 34 5 11 59 
1984 40 109 16 23 188 
1985 4 26 8 10 48 
1986 33 67 25 41 166 
1987 36 42 34 48 160 
1988 39 90 20 51 200 
1989 32 85 66 75 258 
1990 62 107 54 64 287 
Total freq. of 255 560 229 324 1368 
each action 
Sources: Collected by dates from Daily Ittefaq, Daily Sangrain and Daily Sangbad, 1982-1990 
82 In the first year of the military rule in 1982, there were no actions at all due to stiffer press 
censorship and the ban on political activities. The indoor politics was allowed by junta from 25 
March 1983 to 1S` September 1983. From September 1983 to December 1983 under the relaxation of 
the ban on opposition political activities, there were found some frequencies of actions in which 
public meetings were found higher then rest of three actions, however, overall frequencies of the 
actions were still lower in the year 1983. Comparatively, the frequencies of all major four actions 
became very high in the year 1984 in which the frequency of public meetings (109) was found very 
high followed by the protest march (40). The number of hartal and use of violence was also higher in 
this year following an increasing trend for the rest of years except the year 1985. It was only because 
of the absence of the ban on politics in the year 1984 in which there were huge protests against the 
Upazilla election and in favour of the opposition demand for JS polls. The unity of the opposition 
forces in this year was also very strong, which led the higher frequency of all actions. Overall, public 
meeting was the most likely actions followed by protest marches in all the years of the movement 
from 1982 to 1990. Comparatively, the frequencies of these two actions have been found higher in 
1984 and 1990. The frequencies of these four actions became lowest ever in 1985. Almost all the 
year of 1985-March 1985 to December 1985-was under the ban on political activities and there 
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were also cyclone disaster in May preceding the calm political mood leading to a lof%er frequency of 
actions. In 1986, although there was a split in the opposition unity in the wake of JS elections in 
which the AL led 8-Party alliance joined and the 7-Party and 5-Party alliance boycotted, the trend of 
increasing frequency of these actions was continuing where the public meeting followed by protest 
march was still dominating. The hartal and use of violence were comparatively higher in 1986 than 
all previous years which continued up to 1990 in addition to meetings and marches. In 1986-87, the 
unity of the opposition was worst that continued up to 1989 in the same level. However, the hartals 
and strikes became higher in 1989 distinctively. This was only because, there was frequent clash 
between student organisations that ascended the student strikes-especially the protest of progressive 
student forces-both of BCL and JCD against the fundamentalist BICS was significantly higher. The 
overall trend of these actions unveils the fact that the hartal and strike and the use of violence were 
the growing use of actions by years against the dictator while the protest march found, more or less. 
static between the years 1986 to 1989 and the public meeting was found to have no clear dimension, 
although the frequencies of this action were always dominating. However, in the end of 1990-from 
October to December, when the opposition unity was very strong-the student forces became united 
under the APSU and therefore, the movement was getting strength-in fact, in these four months of 
1990, more or less 90% actions of the year for all four actions were organised that was continuous 
and spontaneous, which ended with the mass upsurge. 
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Chapter Nine 
The Leadership of the Movement 
9.1. Introduction 
The leadership is the fundamental concern of any movement that concentrates on 
any change of power in the society. The leadership of the democratic forces in the 
movement for restoration of democracy in Bangladesh against the military regime of 
General Ershad was a dichotomous exertion of two women leaders of two opposing 
opposition political parties. The two supreme leaders, Sheikh Hasina of the AL and 
Begum Khaleda Zia of the BNP, had some intrinsic worth of charisma that was 
achieved from their own political performance as well as from the political background 
of their family dynasty. The two women leaders had some parallel-painful and 
emotional-setbacks in the ways they were sworn into political leaderships. ' The socio- 
economic background of the two did not differ much as both of them inherited an upper 
middle class position by status-but had a sense of proletarian grace in their livelihood. ` 
Both were born and brought up prior to general civilian environment, although Sheikh 
Hasina had more popular connection since her father was a genuine public figure while 
Begum Zia had also some sorts of public image as she was arrested and held as a 
`prisoner of war' during the whole period of liberation war in the Pak army barrack in 
Dhaka while her husband Major Zia was genuinely leading a sector command of the 
liberation war of Bangladesh in the battle field under the supreme leadership of 
Bangabandhu. In this connection, her acceptance was further accelerated as General Zia, 
the Army's own man, was a member of the military institution that was built as a 
popular Army through the liberation war. These similarities of the background of 
popular images between the two leaders could be a formative force for an affirmative 
union of the opposition forces, which, however, did not happen due to their diverse 
political as well as ideological background. 3 This difference leading to the failure in the 
unity of the opposition forces was considered as the serious limitation of the foresight 
and grave disadvantage of the leadership that developed major frustrations in all stages 
of the movement. This situation was considered by the leading intellectuals of the 
country as the `crisis of leadership' in the opposition forces. 4 Consequently, the 
evaluation of the political leadership became a matter of civic concern in the wake of 
different issues related to their success as well as failure in the movement: their 
personality, leadership performance, experience, stand on issues, level of non- 
cooperation with regime and the popular political decisions they took during the 
movement period. The conflicts between the two central leaderships of movement were, 
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however, overcome by the effective and genuine functioning of different sectarian 
leaderships as of student community, trade unions, intellectuals and professionals 
groups of the society, who were competent enough, at critical stages, to establish 
control over the whole movement leadership. In particular, the diverse student bodies 
beyond their direct affiliations with contrasting political parties had a genuine aspiration 
for the removal of the military dictatorship. These sectarian leaderships had to play a 
greater important role over the frustrating central political leadership. This was also 
seemed to be interesting to describe the fact how the various level of leaderships of the 
movement were acting from center to periphery, urban to rural and 'Teknaf theke 
Tetulia, Rupsha theke Pathuria. '5 The analysis of the divisions between the leaders-in 
addition to political forces, is, therefore, also necessary to upheld the genuine 
contributions of the students, youths, intellectuals, professionals, trade unions, peasants 
and many other socio-cultural forces in the movement for restoration of democracy. 
9.2. The Division of the Leaderships 
The strong and effective division of leadership in the opposition democratic forces 
had a greater function in organising the successful movement. The intra-party or intra- 
organisation leadership structure, according to their division of work and command, 
could be seen in two functional dimensions: vertical and horizontal structure. 
9.2.1. Vertical Dimension of the Leadership 
In the vertical dimension6, all types of leadership, in particular, the opposition 
political parties had have five stages leaderships pattern-from top to bottom-in 
accordance with the division of local government units i. e. central (capital), city 
(divisional), district level, thana (police station) and union or ward. All of the actions of 
the movement were designed, planned and announced by the key leaderships under the 
central command, which were coordinated and followed by all of the five stages of 
leaderships. Each of these stages had also the own power to organise any action on their 
local issues, which in foremost cases, took place in accordance with the permission of 
the central command. Although, the vertical dimension of leaderships involves mainly 
the political forces, a number of socio-cultural forces including students, intellectuals, 
professionals and trade unions had also the same functional division of leadership in 
organising the actions of the movement. 
9.2.2. Horizontal Dimension of the Leadership 
The horizontal structures of leaderships were mainly the expansion of each 
vertical unit leadership paralleled to the horizontal line in different magnitudes- 
associated groups, which follow the role importance and the division of work of the 
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leaderships. This horizontal expansion was mainly integrated into the wings of students, 
youth, women, peasants and the labourers and workers of political parties. In some 
cases, professional and intellectuals bodies were also found to be affiliated with the 
main political forces. Each of the five stages-a unit of the vertical leadership had their 
own scope to form the horizontal leadership through the individual wing of students, 
youths, labourers and workers, women and peasants committee. The numbers of the 
members of these leaderships' committees were always pre-designed. All vertical stages 
of the parties and organisations maintained their own horizontal characteristics. In 
contrast, all of these horizontal components-student, youths, women, trade unions or 
any other occupational or professional groups-in an individual point of view-could 
form and expand their command in the vertical dimension. Although every vertical unit 
maintained individual horizontal wings of different forces, the student leaderships were 
more functional as if in the educational institutions; professionals and intellectuals in 
their respective government and semi-government set ups while the labourers and 
workers leaderships were found more effective in the industrial base. 
9.2.3. Interaction of Vertical-Horizontal Leadership 
All types of leaderships including political parties and alliance, students, trade 
unions, women, youths and peasants or farming labourers were diversified under their 
own separate leadership, and were coordinated with the central and supreme political 
leaderships of the movement. Consequently, when the supreme command or central 
leadership announced the actions from the capital, this was strictly followed through the 
vertical stages along with their horizontal wings to the lowest unit of the UP command 
and in this unique manner, leaderships in all these stages were involved to organise the 
actions through out the country. The communication of the announcement of actions, 
first, followed the all vertical stages up to the grass root UP unit and secondly, was 
again expanded through the horizontal wings. The horizontal wings also carried out the 
announcement through their own vertical units, for examples, students followed the 
command through their committees in the center-city-district-thana-UP and unit of 
educational institutions, however, the similar instructions came from the vertical units 
of professional, intellectuals, women and trade unions of the society. At one stage, this 
seemed to be the cyclical process of interaction between the vertical and horizontal 
leaderships, although the beginning of the command used to follow absolutely the 
vertical dimension of leadership (see below: Figure 9.2.3). 
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Figure 9.2.3.: The interaction between the horizontal and vertical leadership. 
9.2.4. The Command of the Leadership 
The vertical and horizontal structures of the leaderships were always controlled by 
the supreme and central leaderships of the movement through their subordinate stages 
and wings up to the bottom of the Union level units. Every subordinate stage followed 
the instructions of the immediate upper vertical stage leaderships in this regard. In the 
Bangladesh case, the major two opposition parties along with their leftist allies 
maintained this sort of the chain of command in organising the actions of the movement. 
In the part of the controlling the subordinate stages and wings or branches, the supreme 
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leaders enjoyed extra ordinary power to the formation of the new leadership or 
cancellation of any leadership following the disciplinary actions against the concern 
stage or units of the political party or socio-cultural organisations. In this process, many 
leaders of the opposition forces become opted out while they seemed to have engrossed 
in the cooptation of junta administration. 
9.2.5. The Formation of the Joint Leadership 
The formation of the alliances with like minded groups and parties was a unique 
phenomenon in opposition forces that gave birth to a structure of joint leadership in the 
decision making process, which developed a consensus of sharing the power in a 
unified political formation. The individual or the top level leaderships of each of the 
member parties of the alliances were included in the joint leaderships. This kind of joint 
leadership was found more effective in forging stronger movement as well as activating 
and practicing the democratic values between them, although the principal leadership of 
the alliance was focussed according to the strength of the support base of their party. 
The development of the 15-party, 7-party and 5-party alliances of opposition political 
parties, the APSU of the student community and the SKOP of the trade unions or the 
PROKRICHI of the professionals (doctor,, engineers and agriculturist), BCS 
Coordination Committee etc had developed this kind of joint leaderships in the 
movement. 
9.2.6. The Formation of the Liaison Committee Leadership 
The formation of the Liaison Committee with the potential leaderships between 
the individual political parties or alliances was also a crucial phenomenon in the 
analysis of the division of leaderships of the movement. The joint leaderships of the 
diversified political parties and alliances used to take a uniformed decision to organise 
the actions in joint endeavour in wider unity of the opposition forces. In this regard, the 
strategic leaders of the political parties and alliances formed a committee, and 
maintained liaison among them in the crucial stage of the movement. In the Bangladesh 
movement, there was an effective Liaison Committee between the 8-party, 7-party and 
5 party alliances. They held many meetings, secretly or openly, to formulate the plan 
and schedules of the joint opposition actions against the military dictator. This type of 
joint leadership under the formation of the Liaison Committee in Bangladesh 
democracy movement was an effective alternative to the failure of the unity of whole 
opposition forces. These liaison leaderships might be considered as a last hope-linking 
the ways to maintain least amount unity between the diversified opposition forces-the 
basis on which they were able to formulate plan and organised the actions together. 
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9.3. The Key Leaderships of the Movement 
The Bangladesh movement was not able to give birth to a single supreme 
leadership as the divergent opposition forces could never be united under a single 
platform against the military dictator. The key leaderships of the movement were 
therefore formed on the basis of each individual political party and in a more stretching 
way, there developed a joint leadership under the structure of coalition or alliances. This 
limitation of the political parties led to the formation of many sectarians' leaderships 
from students, trade unions, professional and intellectual groups who also became 
important to play key role in leading the movement, however, they were always in 
touch with the major political parties. Overall, the leaderships of the major political 
parties, the AL and the BNP, were able to keep the supremacy over the all other 
sectarian movement forces in their individual line of liaison. However, key leaders of 
the movement were divided into eight categories: supreme leaderships, alliance 
leaderships, strategic leaderships, leaderships of students (APSU) leaderships of the 
trade unions (SKOP) and peasants groups, leaderships of the youth groups and 
leaderships of socio-cultural forces. 
The executive heads of the two major opposition political parties, i. e. Sheikh 
Hasina, the President of the AL and Begum Khaleda Zia, the Chairperson of the BNP, 
were considered jointly as two supreme leaderships of the movement. They played the 
decisive roles in determining the dimensions of the movement. They led the major two 
alliances in the movement: Sheikh Hasina for the 15-party and Begum Zia for the 7- 
party alliance. The alliance leaderships consisted of the executive heads of all 
opposition political parties under alliances other than the AL and the BNP i. e. in most 
cases, Presidents for right wing political parties and Secretaries for the left wing 
political parties. Under the 15-party alliance, the main leaders of this category included 
Comrade Forhad, Saifuddin Ahmed Manik of the CPB, Professor Mozaffar Ahmed, 
Pankaj Bhattachargia of the NAP, Abul Basar and Rashed Khan Menon of the WPB, 
Kazi Aref Ahmed, Hasanaul Haque Inu and Shajahan Siraj of the JSD, Mohiuddin 
Ahmed and Abdur Razzak of the BKSAL, Advocate S. M. Nurul Islam and Alhaj Abdus 
Samad of the Gono Azadi League, Nirmal Sen of Samajbadi Dal, A F. M Mahabubul 
Hauqe and Mirza Sultan Raza of the BSD, Comrade Khalequzzaman Bhauiya and 
Najrul Islam of the UCL were worth mentioning. A detail of the leaders for shadow 
cabinet of this alliance had also been come under public attention in 1984.7 Under the 7- 
party alliance Kazi Zafar Ahmed and Shamsul Arefin Khan of the UPP and Sheikh 
Showkat Hossain Nilu were notable leaders. Details of possible shadow cabinet of this 
8 alliance came under huge discussion in 1984. Among Islamic parties, Moulana Abbas 
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Ali Khan, Motiur Rahman Nizami and Delwar Hossain Saidi of the JIB, MA Matin of 
the ML (Matin), A. N. M. Yusuf, Faiz Box Kaderi of ML-(Yusuf) and Hafezzi Hozoor, 
Mowlana Azizul Haque and Mowlana Mohiuddin of Islam] Shashontantra Andolon 
were prominent figures of religious group political parties. 9 Oll Ahad and Mohammad 
Toha of 6-party alliance were two other prominent leaders, although they did not have 
any effective support base. On the question of participation in the 1986 general election. 
5 radical leftist parties split from the 15-party alliance under the leadership of Menon, 
Inu, Nirmal Sen who became later the core leaderships of the 5-party alliance. However, 
Comrade Forhad, Rashed Khan Menon, Hasnul Haque Inu and Abdur Razzak of this 
category of leadership were the dominant figures in planning the strategies and 
stimulating the actions and took part in all crucial decision with the supreme leaders of 
the movement. Moulana Abbas Ali Khan and his party JIB had distinct strategies and 
separate way of actions in the movement. 10 
The strategic leaderships of the movement were responsible for planning all kinds 
of strategies and the actions. In the party level, they were known as the nucleus 
members, who were exceptionally influential and senior position leaders. They were 
also members of the Liaison Committee of the 8-party, 7-party and 5-party alliances. 
The strategic leaders or the leaders of the opposition liaison committee included many 
second line prominent leaders of the opposition political parties. ' 1 The leaderships of 
the students under the APSU had a central role in the movement. The students' 
organisations were united under two broad alliances: CSAC and SAA from the 
beginning of the military seizure of power and continued until the formation of the 
APSU in October 1990, although the CSAC split in the wake of JS polls in 1986. 
Almost 22 student organizations were united under the banner of the APSU in which a 
joint leadership of the students' community formed that controlled the student 
movement throughout the country. Although almost all student bodies were basically 
the students' wings of major political parties, the `leaderships of the APSU' 12 enjoyed 
all types of freedom in the formation of their own plans and strategies of the actions. 
The leadership of the TU and Peasants groups had also an important role in the 
democracy movement who mobilized vast working class-industrial laborers, 
government and non-government lower grade employees under their national alliance- 
SKOP. They had their own actions against the junta as well as followed directly the 
actions of the opposition forces. The majority leaderships of TU were attached directly 
or indirectly to the opposition political forces, in particular, to the leftist parties. 
Moreover, the labourer wings of the AL and the BNP were also the members of the 
SKOP. Therefore the TU leaderships always maintained a political liaison with the 
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central leadership of the movement for restoration of democracy. 13 The leadership of 
the socio-cultural forces under the UCA included the famous personalities of the 
different socio-cultural, professional and intellectual bodies of Bangladesh society who 
had the vital role to bring the huge non political section of the mass in the movement 
against the military dictatorship of General Ershad. The leaderships of these socio- 
cultural forces consisted of the leaders of different professional and intellectual groups 
including doctors, engineers, agriculturalists. lawyers, diploma engineers, university 
teachers and the teachers of all level-primary, secondary and college, cultural activists, 
dramatists, poets, authors, all types of performers and artists including singers, actors 
and actress, officers of the government and non-government organisations and many 
others. 14 The leaderships of the youth groups 15 were mainly attached with the youth 
wings of the political parties who also played a key role in organising the youth 
movement against the military junta. 
9.4. The Evaluation of the Political Leaderships 
The evaluation of the political leaderships included three stage leaders of the 
political parties and alliances. They were supreme leaders of the movement, party chiefs 
of major political parties and the second rank senior and influential leaders of the 
political parties and alliances. In the process of evaluation, the survey interviewees were 
asked to evaluate the leaders with six criteria which determined their leadership choice 
in the movement. The six criteria included personality, leadership qualities, experience 
in leadership career, strength to stand on issues, non-cooperation with military dictator 
and capacity of taking popular decision. The survey respondents of six movement 
forces memberships including PP, students, intellectuals, professionals, TU and NPG 
were asked to grade these criterions of the leaders, listed in the table 8.3.1, by (1)like 
most, (2)like, (3)like least and (4) no answer. 
In category one, the survey presents a comparison between the two supreme 
leaders of opposition democratic forces: Sheikh Hasina, President of the AL and Begum 
Khaleda Zia, Chairperson of the BNP. There were `some resemblances as well as 
difference between the two leaders"6 in their personal political careers that influenced 
widely their pattern of leadership through out the movement for restoration of 
democracy. Even though, there had been a number of controversies between the two 
key leaderships regarding their failure in the formation of a united front of the 
opposition democratic forces for movement, the fact was that both of the two leaders- 
Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia had achieved a range of support and popularity among 
the democracy loving people of Bangladesh society. 
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In the table 9.4.1 the survey shows a very impressive rating for the personality of 
both of the two leaders, although a marginal higher support has gone in favour of 
Sheikh Hasina. She has gained the support of 79.6% respondents (with 57.317c like most) 
while Begum Zia has secured the support of 74.7% (with 51.9(-7(- like most) respondents. 
14.1% respondents have rated `like least' for the personality of Begum Zia, which was 
for Sheikh Hasina 11.7% only. In the evaluation of leadership performance, both of 
them have been considered to inspire support, although more support is found in favour 
of Sheikh Hasina. She has earned the support of 82.1% respondents (with 54.4 % like 
most) while Begum Zia for 72.8% (with 43.2% like most). The 'like least' rating for the 
leadership performance of Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia was, however, supported by 
9.7% and 16.0% respectively. In relation to their experiences in leadership, both of 
them have been considered as the most insightful in their thoughts and actions in 
steering the movement. Nevertheless, 79.1% respondents (with 49% like most) 
respondents have chosen Sheikh Hasina while 64.1% (30.1% like most) considers 
Begum Zia as the most experienced leader of the movement. In the same attribute, 
27.2% respondents have rated `like least' for Begum Zia in comparison to Sheikh 
Hasina with 13.1% only. Concerning their ability to stand on the issues in the 
movement, the survey has given a variable verdict for both of them; although a 
marginal higher support is found in favour of Sheikh Hasina. She has been provided 
with the support of 78.6% respondents (with 51.9% like most) in comparison to Begum 
Zia with 73.8% (with 50% like most). However, 17% negates her position falling into 
the `like least' scale following Sheikh Hasina with 13.6%. In the same way, in question 
to their level of non-cooperation with military regime, both of them are competing for 
the same position, although an inconsiderable slightly higher rating is found for Sheikh 
Hasina with 79.1% supports (with 58.7% like most) in comparison to Begum Zia with 
72.8% (57.3% like most). Sheikh Hasina again has been with lower `like least' rating 
from 13.1% only contrasting Begum Zia with 17%. In relation to the ability of taking 
popular decision in the movement to achieve the trusts of the people, Begum Zia has 
gained the genuine support of 73.8% respondent (with 54.9% like most) followed by 
Sheikh Hasina with 77.2% (with 53.9% like most) support. The `like least' rating has 
been left in favour of Sheikh Hasina with 14.6% contrasting that of Begum Zia (16.5%). 
Table 9.4.1: The Evaluation of the major political leadership of the Movement 
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Graph 9.4.1: Leadership comparison between Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia 
according to the respondents in terms of six leadership criteria. 
The most noticeable trend of the survey is that respondents are mainly 
interested to evaluate the two key leaders, i. e. Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia. They 
are found comparatively less interested to evaluate the leaders other than these two 
prime leaders of the movement. This trend is reflected for category two with more 
than 25% to 63% without any rating; however, they were also able to achieve 
satisfactory ratings for all of these leadership criterions. 17 In category three, the 
leaders in the senior position of the main line opposition parties mostly from the AL 
and the BNP were supposed to be comparatively more accepted by the respondents. 
Although 50%-60% respondents did not evaluate them, their level of acceptance, 
however, has achieved the limit of all standards set for them. '8 
The relationship between six movement forces membership in all criteria of 
leadership are more likely for Begum Zia than that of Sheikh Hasina, although 
Sheikh Hasina, in general, won the opinions for her weight of personality, leadership 
performance, experience, stand on issues and non-cooperation with military junta 
while Begum Zia won the verdict for her capacity of taking popular decision.. 
9.5. Social Background of the Movement Leaderships 
In the post independent years, two distinct political and business elites have 
been developed on the basis of a more progressive orientation-in both senses of 
either capitalist democracy or socialist-leftist ideas. In both sides, a richer section 
grew on the basis of capturing enemy property-left by the West Pakistani 
bourgeoisie and their local collaborators. The development of these two distinct 
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political currents in the ruling elites fell soon into conflict in which the socialist and 
leftist forces was thrown out of power by the military coup in 1975 in support of 
bourgeoisie section in the background. Under the post 1975 administration of the 
military regimes of General Zia and General Ershad, another richer section was in 
the process of the formation of new power elites-most of them were from the 
quarter of military and civil bureaucracy. 
For the first time, General Zia floated his BNP with a significant number of 
retired members of the army and civil administration along with a section of ultra 
leftists from the NAP and the UPP as well as anti-liberation forces of the ML and 
extreme rightist faction of the post independent AL government. The new power 
elites-dominated by military-turned politicians became the owners of huge wealth 
irrespective of their positions in the party-from centre to periphery leaders. General 
Ershad was the representative of the same quarter-what was the difference from his 
predecessor General Zia was that he was cleverly able to manage all these new 
elites-keeping them with him in cabinet and administration as well as giving them 
business outside. Although the BNP lost some oldguard in the rise of new junta- 
Ershad in power, but did not face any problem to running their business and capital 
safely staying in opposition-as they were the similar characters of interest. On the 
other hand, the opposition AL, which was out of power since 1975 and were under 
stiff repressions by military regimes of Zia and Ershad became set free following 
the relaxation of Martial law in the country after the General election of 1986. The 
thousands of AL and leftist workers and leaders who got the break to return to the 
normal life considered at any rate as the genuine participants of all actions, and 
posed a huge threat to the existence of military dictatorship within next two years. A 
group of neutral civilian businessmen and industrialists were developed as partners 
of the leaders of military richer sections as well, who became in the internal 
competition and conflict while they were not able to compete with military business 
groups, had also turned their support in fuelling the opposition movement. This 
pattern of capitalist and bourgeois class configuration was effective in patronizing a 
movement against the military dictatorship. However, the more change of this class 
is required to the effective practise of democracy in the society. In fact, the sense of 
capitalist development and its ensuing conflict-in any sense and shape-was not 
matured yet in western sense, but a `locally-fitted symbolic constructive' 19 presence 
of this class and ensuing conflict in the class structure surely was able to steer the 
movement for democracy. 
A noteworthy characteristic in the transformation of the political elites into the 
bourgeois class in third world authoritarian nations are always required to be ruling 
class in which they are found to increase their wealth by illegal influence on 
government machineries. The formation of the political elites-especially the 
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military turned politicians-as they were the owner of the guns and uniform in 
addition-were found to have huge assets while they were attached with the ruling 
party. Almost all of the leaders of major opposition parties-at least in the cities and 
towns of Bangladesh society were found to have this basic characteristic. Almost all 
the opposition parties in the movement for democracy were ruling parties at least 
once since the Pakistan period so their financial circumstances were sound enough 
to maintain them and their parties. For example, the ML was the main partner the 
ruling civil military government of Pakistan-a significant leaders and workers 
joined the BNP in later stage, which also ruled the country until the take over by 
Ershad. The undivided AL was in the provincial government of the East Pakistan 
under UF and again was in power until 1975 in the independent Bangladesh. Many 
radical leftists joined either to BNP or took the incentives from the military regime 
of General Zia. The JIB and some other IPs were also the partners of ruling military 
government of Pakistan who were also richer section of the society. Only some 
leftist components in the opposition including CPB, JSD and WPB and the like were 
not solvent enough to lead them and their parties as well, but their militant forces of 
cadres added a revolutionary surge in the movement along with huge lower class 
and lower middle support base of the AL. Hence, the financial circumstances of the 
opposition political elites were protected enough to provide the expenses of the 
movement. Therefore, the main opposition political elites-of the AL, BNP, JIB and 
ML-were in the process of bourgeois development while they were leading these 
party institutions and was able to provide the financial security of the movement in 
which their lower class mass supports along with the huge leftist militants workers 
provided the ideological, spiritual and uncompromised participants for the 
movement that was functional enough to uproot the military dictatorship of General 
Ershad in Bangladesh. 
The social background of the leaderships of different political parties was not 
different from the usual socio-economic circumstances of the third world countries. 
Most of the senior leaderships of opposition political parties were from the far-flung 
rural socio-economic background. Although their life styles through their 
educational qualifications and occupations adapted to urban culture, they could 
never be segregated from their original traditional values of the rural agricultural 
society. Comparatively, younger leaders those who participated and organised the 
liberation war in their students and youth age, were faster to change their life style 
from the rural backgrounds. However, this social context of the leaderships was 
changing very quickly in the touch of the opportunity for education, urban utilities 
and westernised life style of the cities. This was found in the comparison of the 
differences of change in family pattern, occupation and livelihoods etc of the 
leaderships. The size of the households of the political leaderships was different 
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from generation to generation leaders. This size of their families was found greater, 
(5-10) in the leaders who were brought up in the pre Bangladesh period than that of 
the young leaders (1-4) who were grown up in their career in the post Bangladesh 
period. 20 The monthly expenditure of the livelihood of the leaders was taka 7000- 
15000 in an average, which was the income of upper middle class in Bangladesh 
society. In the sense of third world patrimonial society, the father of the majority 
leaders were land lords, school teachers, business men, servicemen and advocates; 
majority of them were not agreed to provide the market value of their own property 
and other investments; all of them had own telephone and majority of them had cars 
and homes in the capital city and some of them paid more than 3000 Taka for rent, 
which was also considered as the upper class rental expenditure. 21 Although, each 
of the leaders had a parental home in the village, they used to live in the city. All of 
these middle range leaderships had at least graduation from the universities and were 
settled in the city. It was widely believed that they were more habituated with 
informal income than formal earnings. The informal incomes mainly included the 
money that they received from the businessmen, servicemen and foreign agencies 
for the expenditure of political activities for which, in fact, there was no process of 
declaration. 22 
9.6. The Success and Failure of the Leadership 
The immense achievement of the leaderships of the opposition democratic 
forces was to throw out the military dictatorship of General Ershad from power by a 
mass uprising in the form of an urban revolution. By contrast, a huge failure of the 
leadership was `not to bring the military leaders and their civilian collaborators 
under trial' for their illegal act of aggression into the state power and their crimes 
against humanity-killings and jailing and destroying the lives of a number of 
thousands of political workers, unlimited spread of corruptions in every sphere of 
society and wild repressions on the peaceful masses. In this regard, the leaderships 
failed to consider the possibility of a further intervention or else pressures with 
inevitable further influence on the civilian rule from the same quarter as these state 
terrorists escaped punishment. This developed into an enduring risk in the growing 
democratic norms and values of the society. The unprecedented success of the 
principal leaderships was to build up a charisma, both for Sheikh Hasina and Begum 
Khaleda Zia, among their own supporters and workers of the party and in the same 
time, they failed to restore a unity of leaderships and to stand together in public 
voices under a single platform for the united movement in response to the popular 
expectation of the participants of the movement as well as general mass of the 
society. 
The success of the opposition leadership, in particular, for the leaders of the 
AL and the BNP, was to create the strong support base of their parties from urban 
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vicinity to the rural periphery through their struggle for democracy. Since being 
sworn in as President of the AL, Sheikh Hasina struggled to return in the 
constitutional rule through election. For the AL leadership, since the party was out 
of power for almost a decade, it was popularly accepted for them to participate in the 
general election of 1986 that was widely believed to retain its support base all over 
the country. The party needed to increase the grass root support base which depends 
only on the participation in the elections. Until 1990, the AL leadership allowed its 
periphery leaders to participate in the Upazilla and UP elections that basically 
organised the party in the rural periphery. However, Sheikh Hasina was praised as a 
very strategic leader to keep the military dictator under pressure both inside and 
outside the parliament until the dissolution of the JS in the end of 1987. By contrast, 
since her election as the Chairperson of the BNP in 1984, Begum Zia was able to 
stop the flow of the party leaders joining with junta side. Since then, she slowly 
organised her party and the brave decision of her non-participation in the election of 
1986 under military regime had developed-for her party and herself-a huge 
popularity in the youth and student sections of the society. Until 1990, she was able 
to achieve her party acceptance to the all possible power elites including military 
and civil bureaucracy of the country. The popular image of the leftist leaderships 
and their attached students and TU leaderships were the key element of the violent 
and non-violent protest. Also, the leaderships of all quarters including PP, students, 
intellectuals, professionals and TU reached their maturity in the beginning of 1990 
that did not compromise with the movement and made it all success in the removal 
of the junta from power. 
The leaderships of the leftist political forces, above all, the leaders of the CPB, 
JSD, WPB, BKSAL and the Sarnaj Badi Dal were always considered as experienced, 
dynamic and strategic in planning the actions of the movement. The leaderships of 
their students and TU wings were more organised, articulate and sacrificing than 
that of the others. Sometimes it seemed to be the fact, for the success of the hard line 
actions, that the true movement leadership was meant the leaderships of the leftists. 
The JIB and some IPs' leaderships were the innovators of the religious fanaticism in 
the movement. Although they were on the side of the movement, they in fact made 
stronger the position of military dictator who also followed a phoney life style in the 
line of religious zeal that implanted the seeds for the rise of fundamentalism 
contrasting the `communal harmony in the society'-the main spirit of the Bengali 
nation that had been brought up since the creation of independent Bangladesh. 
However, the opposition leaderships of all of the secondary and tertiary stages- 
intermediate and peripheral organisers of the actions at the divisional, districts and 
thana (sub districts) levels-through movement-became well capable to resist the 
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autocracy independently, who could be regarded as the new architects for the 
advancement of the democracy in Bangladesh society. 
9.7. Conclusion 
In all consideration, the leaderships of all stages of the movement-from the 
capital to UP or central to peripheral or principal to tertiary-were successful to 
organise a historic mass upsurge vis-a-vis the urban revolution that resulted in the 
overthrow of an autocratic military dictatorship from the edge of power interior of 
Bangladesh society. It was the fact that the politics of Bangladesh opposition forces 
in the beginning of the 1980s started with completely new hands in leaderships in 
comparison with the experienced form of the military intrigues-that had grown-up 
in the wake of clutches of coups and counter coups involving both of the local and 
international patronisation in the illegal capture of the state power. However, these 
new leaderships-especially Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia, however, became 
experienced shortly through the movement for democracy and repressions of the 
junta-harassments, house arrests, batons and tear gases and shootings, losing 
hundreds of workers and witnessing the pools of blood and discarded bodies. 
Beyond these two supreme leaderships, there were some notable strategic and 
alliance leadership in opposition forces, most of them from AL and leftist parties, 
who led the liberation war of the country, posed a real threat to the military intrigues 
for their existence in power. The supreme leaders were more accepted as the 
emotional icons for the unity of the parties and participants of the movement while 
these strategic leaderships could be considered as the architects of the success of the 
movement. The absolute credit for the unity of opposition movement that ousted the 
junta must be conferred to the APSU leadership. However, in the final stage, the 
opposition leaderships were found to have been in a compromising state to leave the 
culprit military leaders under immunity of trial that left a threat from the same 
quarters for the future growth of democracy in Bangladesh society. Let it to be left 
for the potential aptitude of how the political leaderships and military of the country 
would interact in the process of democratisation. 
Notes 
1 Sheikh Hasina, a daughter of Bangabandu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of 
independent Bangladesh who was assassinated in his period of Presidency in a military coup in 
August 1975. This dark and painful event was however, treated later as a capitalist move of the 
country from the ongoing socialist reform by Sheikh Mujib, one of the ever popular leader of the 
world political history. Sheikh Hasina, the first daughter of Sheikh Mujb, was elected President of her 
father's party AL in 1981 while she was in abroad in Great Britain. On the other hand, Begum 
Khaleda Zia. a widow of General (Rtd) Ziaur Rahman, who was one of the pioneer field commander 
of the liberation war of the nation, later President of the country and was able to gain popularity in 
building an alternative political approach with his BNP. He was also killed in a similar military coup 
in May 1981. Begum Zia was sworn in as the Chairperson of her late husband's party, BNP in 1984. 
2 The socio-economic background of the AL leader Sheikh Hasina belongs to an upper middle class 
phenomenon. Since the grand father of the AL leader Sheikh Hasina was in a clerical job in a court 
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under British period, thereafter the generation of Sheikh Mujib, as a popular leader, did not ha'. e any 
possessions, and as President of the country, his whole family was killed except the survival of his two daughters and as a leader of party, Sheikh Hasina had to struggle against the military rule. In this 
socio-economic formation, she was a member of middle class inherited by status as well as a 
proletariat leader in the sense of her financial condition. On the other hand, the position of Begum Zia was not so much up to date, although she was a widow of an army officers leading a luxurious life style of socio economic background of General Zia and Begum Zia were not satisfactory. Both of 
them originated from a middle class farming background of the rural Bangladesh. General Zia, being 
a junior officer as Major, joined liberation and thereafter, the economic situation of the nation as well 
as our military was not as much as satisfactory that Zia could be able to earn a huge possession. In 
this sense, Begum Zia was also a member of upper middle class by status and might have a feeling of 
proletarians in his leadership. 
The differences between the two parties are mainly ideological. Moreover, the AL had been 
suffering from bitter experiences of the repressions under the military regime of General Zia, which 
were the events of recent past for them. These things did not allow both of the two parties to be close 
in the movement. 
4 Ahmed Nur-e- Alam, "The Discussion of the CPB with Intellectuals- Only the Crisis of 
Leadership is the Main Problem of the Opposition Forces" in The Weekly Bichittra, 16 March 1990, 
19. 
Teknaf is the last south-east border location of the country while Tetulia in the North-west. In the 
same way, Rupsha is last west-south Border River of the country and Pathuria in the East-north. The 
verse has covered here the whole geographical boundary of the country. 6 For example, in the vertical structure of leadership, the AL under the central command of Sheikh 
Hasina is divided into five stages: Central Executive Committee, divisional city committees, district 
committees, Thana Committees and union/ward committees. Seemingly, the BNP and other parties 
are also divided into same stages leadership from center to grass root of the country. All of 
leaderships of the movement including students, intellectual, professionals and trade unions were also 
constructed in the same way, which was mainly centred on the leadership of the political parties. 
However, the major parties including AL and BNP have one or more upper layer leadership over the 
central committee, such as, presidium and advisory board for the AL and standing committee for the 
BNP, polite bureau for CPB and Majlishe Sura for JIB and other Islamic parties. 
Please see The Weekly Bichittra, 16 September 1984, p. 25. A possible shadow cabinet of the 15- 
party alliance has been published here in which the name of major leaders of this alliance include 
Sheikh Hasina, Abdul Malek Ukil, Syeda Johra Taj Uddin, Abdus Samad Azad, Abdul Mannan, Dr 
Kamal Hossain, Abdul Momin Talukder, Tofael Ahmed, Mohammad Forhad, Rashed Khan Menon, 
Syed Altaf Hossain, Professor Mozaffar Ahmed, Surunjit Sen Gupta, Mohammad Toha, Shajahan 
Siraj, Nirmal Sen, Khalequzzaman, Mirza Sultan Raza, Mohiuddin Ahmed and Abdur Razzak. 
8 Ibid., A possible shadow cabinet of the 7-party alliance include the names of Begum Khaleda Zia, 
Shah Azizur Rahman, Barrister Moudud Ahmed, Kazi Jafar Ahmed, Abdul Matin, K. M. Obayedur 
Rahman, Sirajul Hossain Khan, Anwar Zahid, Saifur Rahman, Zahir Uddin Khan, Col. (Rtd. ) 
Mustafizur Rahman,, A. K. M. Zia Uddin, Mazedul Haque, Dr AR Gani, Barrister Salam Talukder, 
Mostafa Zamal Haider, Kazi Mujibur Rahman, Barrister Sultan Ahmed, Jamal Uddin Ahmed, 
Col. (Rtd. ) Waliur Rahman, Dr Akhtaruzzaman, Aminul Haque Bishwas Tipu and Farida Rahman. 
9 In the leadership of the JIB, Ameer-Mowlana Abbas Ali Khan, Deputy Ameer-Motiur Rahman 
Nijamee, Dhaka City JIB-Ali Ahsan Mujahid, Abdul Kader Molla, Azharul Islam and Senior 
member of the Central Majlishe Sura-Mowlana Delwar Hossain Saidee and Muhammad 
Kamruzzaman.; For Islamic Shashon Tantra Andolon, Ameer Mowlana Hafeezi Hozoor and Naebe 
Ameer, Mowlana Allama Azizul Haque and Senior Leader Moulana Mohiuddin; For divided Muslim 
League, MA Matin, President of ML(Matin), Mowlana ANM Yusuf (President) and Faiz Box Kadri 
(Secretary) of ML (Yusuf) were prominent political figures. 
1°Some times, the leadership of the JIB followed the schedule of the actions of the mainstream 
opposition forces. As they were regarded as the anti-liberation and collaborating forces and* were 
completely isolated from all the mainstream political parties of the opposition, the leaderships of this 
party were not allowed to gain entry to any alliance of the opposition forces. In any case, the JIB 
chief Moulana Abbas Ali Khan was considered as a close ally of the right wing BNP leadership 
Begum Zia. 
Among them, the most notable strategic leaderships of different parties and alliances included 
Abdus Samad Azad, Syeda Johra Tajuddin, Abdul Mannan, Dr Kamal Hossain, Zillur Rahman 
(Presidium Members), Sajeda Choudhury (GS, AL), Amir Hussain Amu (JS), Tofael Ahmed (OS), 
Sheikh Fazlur Rahman Salim, Salauddin Yusuf, Motia Choudhury, Mohammad Nasim and Mozaffar 
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Hossain Paltu of the AL"; KM Obaidur Rahman Barrister Abdus Salam Talukder (SG), Barrister 
Rafiqul Islam Mia, Saifur Rahman, Col(Rt) Mustafizur Rahman, Major General (Rtd) Mazid-ul- 
Haque, Col. (Rt) Oli Ahmed,, Col (Rt) Akbar Hossain, Barrister Nazmul Huda, Abdul Matin 
Choudhury and Jahanara Begum of the BNP; Comrade Shaidullah, Comrade Mujahidul Islam Salim, 
Nurul Islam Nahid, Monzurul Ahsan Khan and Shamsuzzoha of the CPB; Ahmedul Kabir, Shurunjit 
Sen Gupta and Peer Habibur Rahman of the Gonotantri Party; Kamal Haider, Fakir Abdur Razzk and Professor Abdul Hafiz of the NAP; Sharif Nurul Ambia, Mainuddin Khan Badal, Nazrul Islam, 
Mahmudur Rahman Manna, Siddiqur Rahman, Bimol Bishawas, Comrade Sushanta Das, Khorshed 
Alam, Abdullah Sarker, Comrade Tipu Bishawas Haider Akbar Khan Rano of the 5-party alliance; There were also some prominent organising leaders of the opposition democratic forces in the divisional cities of the country. In Dhaka, Mozaffar Hossain Paltu (President), Abdul Aziz (GS), 
Mohammad Hanif and Mofazzal Hossain Choudhury Maya of the AL. In Chittagong, MA Mannan 
(President, ), ABM Mohiuddin Choudhury (GS), Md. Ishaq Mia, Ataur Rahman Kaiser, and Akhteruzzaman Choudhury Babu of the AL; Md. Ekramul Karim Choudhury and Abdullah-al-Islam 
Noman (President), M Kofil Uddin, Sirazul Islam and Golam Akbar Khondoker of the BNP, Shahe 
Alam and MA Wahab of the CPB, Ahsan Ullah Choudhury, Abdul Hye, Kamal Azizul Haque, 
Nuruddin Zahid Monzu and Advocate Abul Kalam Azad of 5-party-A were distinguished opposition 
leaders. In Rajshahi, Ad. Mozaffar Hossain (President), M Moniruzzaman(GS) and Khairuzzaman 
Liton (OS) of the AL, M Kabir Hossain (President), Mizanur Rahman Minu(GS) and Saleh Uddin 
Baby(OS) of the BNP, Mohsin Pramanik of the NAP, Mohammad Nasim and Mohammad Shafiqur 
Rahman, Fazle Hossain Badsha and Liakat Ali Liku were prominent leftist leaders. In Khulna, Md 
Monzurul Imam (President), Sheikh Haroon-or-Rashid(Secretary), Talukder Abdul Khaleue and 
Mostafa Rashidi Suza of the AL, Sheikh Razzak Ali(President), M. Nurul Islam(GS) and Shajalal 
Bablu of the BNP, Sheikh Moniruzzaman, ABM Nurul Islam and M Hafizur Rahman of the left- 
wing parties were prime organisers of the actions as strategic leaders of the opposition movement. 12 The central leaderships of the APSU included Aman Ullah Aman, Khairul Kabir Khokon, Habibur 
Rahman Habib, Ashim Kumer Ukil, Mustafizur Rahman Khan Babul, Nasiruddoza, Nazmul Haque 
Prodhan, Shafi Ahmed, Jahir Uddin Shwapan, Nur Ahmed Bakul, Mostafa Faruk, Bazlur Rashid 
Firoj, Jahangir Satter Tinku, SM Kamal Hossain, Akhter Sobhan Masroor, Moshrefa Mishu, Abdus 
Satter, Aminul Islam, Anwar Hossain Mintu, Obaidullh Sagar, MA Awal, Faizul Hakim, 
Razekuzzaman Ratan, Abu Bakar Iqbal, Kazi Shafi Uddin and Mukhlesur Rahman. 12 In the 
divisional cities, there were some prominent APSU leaders, who organised the students in the 
movement. In Chittagong, Nazim Uddin, Azim Uddin, Rafiqul Islam Khokon, Sadek Hossain, M 
Razekuzzaman, M Mansur Ahmed and Md. Mamun were prominent student leaders of the APSU. In 
Rajshahi, Mr Haroon-or-Rashid, Ragib Ahsan Munna, Ruhul Kuddus Babu, Md. Rabiul Alam Budu, 
Helal Uddin, Salauddin Baby, Nafiqul Islam Setu and Shariful Islam Babu were worth mentioning. 
In Khulna, Mr Shameem Reza, Rafiqur Rahaman Ripon, Mr Ruhul Azim Rumi, Mezbaul Razon, 
Shameem Ahsan, Ismail Hossain, Lahuar Rahman, and Moniruzzaman were notable traits among 
others in organising the students' movement. 
" The central leaderships of the SKOP during the period of whole movement period, above all, in the 
mass upsurge against the military dictator included Mohammad Toha 0, Habibur Rahman Siraj, 
Dinen Sen, Kamrul Ahsan, Ayubur Rahman, Mahmudur Rahman Manna, Golum Mohiuddin (BSL- 
AL), Choudhury Haroon-ur-Rashid, Saifuddin Ahmad Manik (TUC), Shah Atiul Islam, Shafiqur 
Rahman Mazumder (TUC and President, JSF), Yakub Ali Bhuiya, Shahe Alam (Joint Secretary, 
Secretariat Combind Workers Union), Abdur Razzak, Abdul Wahed (JSJ), Nurul Islam (TUC), 
Nazrul Islam Khan (Secretray, JSD-BNP), SM Rumi (BSL-AL), Shohorab Hossain, Shariat Ullah, 
Shukur Mahmud, Shirin Akhter, Nurul Haque Zahid, Nasim Ali (TUC), Ali Azam, Syed Kutubur 
Rahman and Rafiqul Islam (President and Secretary, BTESKOP), Iskander Ali (President, JSD-BNP), 
Abdus Salam Khan (TUC), Wazi Uddin Khan and Shajahan Khan ( President and Secretary, 
Bangladesh Road Transport Federation), Mukhlesur Rahman (President, BSSF), Protap Uddin(TUC), 
Fazlul Haque Montu (BSL-AL), Dr Wazedul Islam Khan (GS, TUC), Abdullah Sarker (SSF), Abdul 
Matin Master (BSL-AL), Ahsan Ullah Master ( Joint Secretary, BSL-AL), Abul Basar, Abul Hossain 
(JSF) Mezba Uddin (JSJ), Manzurul Ahsan Khan (TUC), Habibur Rahman Khan (Vice-President, 
Bangladesh Transport Labourers Federation), Abdur Rashid (Secretary, Bangladesh Transport 
Labourers Federation) Ray Romesh (Secretary, Bangladesh Track Shramik Union), Ramesh Chandra 
Sheel (Joint Secretary, Bangladesh Transport Labourers Federation), Rehan Uddin (JSJ, Adamjee 
Jute Mills ), Abul Hossain, Khan and Rafiqul Islam, 
14 The leading intellectuals of the country those who had a very active participation in the movement 
for restoration of democracy included Poet Sufia Kamal, Patua Kamrul Ahsan, Professor AR Mallik, 
Professor Kabir Choudhury, Professor Ajoy Roy, Justice K. M. Sobhan, Justice Kamal Uddin 
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Hossain, Faiz Ahmed, Dr Ahmad Hossain, Kalim Sharafi, Gaziul Haque, Dr Khan Sarwar Murshid, 
Dr Zillur Rahman Siddiquee, Barrister Moinul Hossain, Poet Shamsur Rahman, Professor Sarder 
Fazlul Karim, Professor Anisuzzaman, Artist Kaiyum Choudhury, Artist Rafikkunnabi, Bazlur 
Rahman, Professor Rangalal Sen, Professor Sirazul Islam Choudhury, Professor Saa'd Uddin, 
Professor Moniruzzaman Mia, Professor Zahurul Haque, Professor Abul Kalam Azad Choudhurry, 
Professor Sultana Shafi, Professor Durga Das Bhattrachargia, Professor Abdul Mannan (Chittagong). 
Professor Anupam Sen (Chittagong), Professor Abdul Khaleque (Rajshahi), Professor Abdul Kader 
Bhuiya (Rajshahi) Zahanara Imam, Belal Choudhury, Dr Muntasir Mamun, Poet and author Syed 
Shamsul Haque Poet Nirmalendu Goon, Poet Mohadeb Shaha, Syed Hassan Imam, Shahariar Kabir, 
Kamal Lohani, Poet Rudra Muhammad Shahidullah, Ali Zaker, Ataur Rahaman, Maidul Hasan, 
Shahidullah Khan Badal, Sheikh Muhammad Shahidullah, Engr. Shahidullah, Aziz Meher, Binod 
Das Gupta, Abdul Matin Khan, Professor Mansoor Musa, Ramendu Majumder, Ferdousi Mazumder. 
Dr Enamul Haque, Lucky Enum, Nasir Uddin Yusuf Baschu, Pijush Bandapadhya, Asaduzzaman 
Noor, Hashem Khan, Mamunur Rashid, Jamal Uddin Hossain, Golum Mostafa, Shubarna Mustafa, 
Humayun Faridi, Fakir Alamgir, Professor Humayun Azad, and Professor Abul Kashem Manzoor 
Moshed, Golum Kuddus, Panna Kaiser, Kamruzzaman, Poet Muhammad Samad and many others. 
Most of these intellectuals leadership were the Persona Greta-famous personalities of the country: 
famous poets, selection grade professor of the university, eminent authors and columnist, journalists, 
dramatists, TV artist, singers, and leaders of the United Cultural Forces (UCF). In broader sense, the 
UCF included primarily a non-political educated, skilled and cultural groups and sections of the 
society-regarded as cultural and social activists-more specific, a new dimension in the formation 
of the civil society. The intellectuals included all civic quarters-professionals and interest or 
pressure groups in the sense when they were involved outside the primary business related to their 
specialised field. In Bangladesh, all of these professionals and skilled interest groups were also 
treated at one stage as the intellectuals of the society, mostly under the banner of the UCF through 
out the country. The prominent professional leaderships of country included Advocate Shamsul 
Haque Choudhury, Dr Kamal Hossain, Barrister Syed Ishtiaq Ahmed, Barrister Amirul Islam, 
Advocate Ozaer Farook, and Syed Altaf Hossain of lawyers' groups. Among them, Advocate 
Shamsul Haque was the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association and also convenor of the 
United Professionals Struggle Committee which was formed in the early 1990. Advocate Ozaer 
Farook was the General Secretary of Supreme Court Bar Association. Barrister Syed Istiaq Hossain 
and Dr Kamal Hossain, Barrister Amirul Islam and others were also the leaders of different national 
level lawyers association. In the final stage of the movement in the 1990, the 13 national level 
teachers' organisations together formed United Teachers Movement (UTM) in which Professor 
Iazuddin was the Convenor who was the President of the Dhaka University Teachers Association 
(DUTA) at that moment. The others members of the UTM included Professor Nurul Amin Bapery 
(in-charge General Secretary of the DUTA), Professor M Akhtaruzzaman (President, Bangladesh 
College-University Teachers Associations), Professor A. N. Rasheda (Joint Secretary, Bangladesh 
College-University Teachers Associations ), Md. Badruddin Howlader (President, Bangladesh 
Secondary School Assistant Teachers Associations), Nazrul Islam (Secretary General, Bangladesh 
Teachers Associations), Professor M Shariful Islam (Secretary General, Bangladesh College 
Teachers Association), Dr Muhammad Shahidullah Talukder (Secretary, Bangladesh Agricultural 
University Teachers Association), Dr Alauddin Ahmed (Secretary, Jahangir Nagar University 
Teachers Association), MA Jalil(Secretary General, Bangladesh National Teacher Associations 
Federation), Fazlur Rahman (President, Bangladesh Primary Teachers Associations), Md. Khalilur 
Rahman(Bangladesh College Teachers Association), Professor Abul Kashem (Additional Secretary 
General, National Teachers Association Federation. ), Dr Salim Jahangir, Hena Das, Mrs. Sufia 
Khatun and Abdul Karim and many others: Professor Mujibur Rahman, Professor Yusuf Sharif 
Ahmed, Professor Zoinul Abedin, Professor Abdur Razzak, Professor Abul Kalam Azad, and 
Professor Abul Hassem., M. Muzaffar Hossain, of the Federation of University Teachers and the 
United Teachers Movement; The leaderships of the BMA included Professor Dr MA Mazed 
(President, BMA), Dr Mostafa Jalal Mohiuddin (Secretary General, BMA), Dr Shamsul Alam Khan 
Milon(Joint Secretary, BMA killed), Dr MA Hadi, Dr Rashid-I-Mahbub, Dr Sarwar All (Chittagong), 
Dr Ibrahim Hossain Choudhury Babul (Chittagong), Dr Abdus Zalil (Chittagong). However, Dr 
Milon was killed by an unknown arms hooligan on 27`h November 1990. Through the killing of Dr 
Shamsul Alam Khan Milon, the mass upsurge against the dictator got momentum and the military 
leader was compelled to leave the power. There were also many active BMA leaders in divisional 
cities who organised the professionals' movement through out the country. The leadership of the 
engineers included Professor Anwar Hossain (President, Institute of Engineers, Bangladesh (IEB)), 
Eng. Abul Kashem (Vice-President. IEB) and Ibrahim Mia (Secretary, IEB, Dhaka Centre). The 
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leadership of the Bangladesh Economical Association included Professor Mozaffar Ahmed, Professor 
Rehman Sobhan, Dr Atiur Rahman, Dr Abul Barakat as economists; The leadership of the NGO 
movement included Fazle Hossain Abed (BRAC), Kazi Farook Ahmed (PROSHIKA) and Shafiqul 
Islam (ASA) under the ADAB; the leaderships of the journalists included Md. Riaz Uddin Ahmed 
(President, BFUJ), Mozammel Haque, Shafiqur Rahman, Amanullah Kabir (Secretary, BFUJ), 
Jahurul Haque (President, DUJ) and Ruhul Amin Gazi (Secretary, DUJ), of the BFUJ and DUJ; the 
leadership of agriculturalists included Dr Mirza Abdul Zalil (President, Bangladesh Agricultural 
Institutions), Abdul Mannan, Badiuzzaman Badsha and others of agriculturists institutions; 15 On 17 November 1990, eight leading youth organisations of the country formed the Juba Sangram 
Committee (Youth Struggle Committee) and announced 14-point actions programme against the 
military dictator. The central leadership of this Youth Struggle Committee included Mostafa 
Mohshin Montu and Fulu Sarker (Youth League-AL), Mirza Abbas and Gayesshor Roy (Youth Dal- 
BNP), Mahbub Jaman and Muhammad Helal Uddin (Youth Union), Nurul Fazal Bulbul and Mujibur 
Rahman Choudhury (Jatyo Jubo League), Fazle Hussain Badsha and Anil Chandra Moron 
(Bangladesh Jubo Moitree), Pijoosh Benerjee and Farook Ratan (Bangladesh Jubo Oikkya) Parimal 
Guha and Ruhul Amin(Jubo Oikkya Samittee), and Altaf Ali Hasu and Ayub Khan(Jatyo Jubo 
Oikkya) 
16 Both of them inherited political leadership as to function of their dynasty in the politics of 
Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina is the daughter of the country's founding father Bangabandhu Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, who was assassinated in a military coup in 1975. During this brutal event, she was 
in abroad and took political shelter of the British government for the period until her return to 
Bangladesh in May 1981. Before her return home, she was elected President of the AL in the early 
period of the same year. On the other hand, Begum Khaleda Zia is the widow of the late President 
General Ziaur Rahman, who climbed up in the state power in the wake of clutches of coups after the 
first military coup in 1975 and was also assassinated in a further unsuccessful military coup in the 
end of May 1981. After Zia's death, his BNP was still in power and had been suffering from a 
leadership crisis. It fell into conflict among several factions of the party under the leadership of 
Justice Abdus Satter. Begum Zia as the symbol of unity, well accepted to major factions, however, 
took the charge of the BNP in 1984 and slowly encapsulated the control of the party. The two women 
leaderships, who were representing the two antagonistic political dynasties, were however, accepted 
by a Muslim majority society of Bangladesh and were able successfully to lead the movement for 
democracy against a vicious military dictatorship of General Ershad. But the prehistory of the AL and 
the BNP were completely poles apart which did not allow them to make it possible for the unity 
between the two parties through out the whole period of the movement. The AL was originally born 
at the aim of protecting the interest of Bengali population under a new colonial state of Pakistan. It 
grew up with a Bengali nationalist sprit and gained colossal popularity among the Bengali population 
that led, in fact, the birth of Bangladesh. This party was, no doubt, the pioneer of an independent 
nation and the reign of the party was stroked and ended with the killing of its leader Bangabandhu in 
1975. By contrast, the BNP was born on the strength of the unusual change in the state power in the 
post 1975 politics of Bangladesh that was largely supported by the pro-Islamic groups and defeated 
forces of the liberation war of 1971. 
17 Comrade Forhad of the CPB has been evaluated as the most accepted leader in the second line key 
leader followed by others in the category two. Respondents of the survey evaluated his personality as 
up to medium (59.2% with 28.6% like most), leadership (58.7% with 25.7% like most), experience 
(60.2% with 34.5% like most), stand on issues (55.4% with 21.4% like most), non-cooperation with 
military regime (54.9% with 23.8% like most) and popular decision (53.4% with 18% like most). The 
'like least' rating for his all these criteria is ranging from 12% to 18% while 28% around were not 
interested to evaluate him. The second accepted leader in this category is Rashed Khan Menon of the 
WPB. The survey has evaluated his personality as medium (55.9% with 21.4% like most), leadership 
(54.3% with 16% like most), experience (59.2% with 28.6% like most), stand on issues (53.9% with 
19.4% like most), non-cooperation with military regime (52.5% with 17.5% like most) and popular 
decision (48.5% with 13.1% like most). The 'like least' rating for his all of these criteria is ranging 
from 15% to 25% while 24%-26% respondents were not interested to comment on him. Hasnul 
Haque Inu of the JSD and Abdur Razzak of the BAKSAL have been revealed as close to medium 
level leader in the survey. Inu has secured the support of 44.7% (with 14.1% like most) for his 
personality, 48.1% (with 10.2% like most) for leadership, 50% (with 19.4% like most) for experience, 
45.2% (with 14.1% like most) for stand on issues, 44.2% (with 13.1% like most) for non-cooperation 
with military regime and 43.2% (with 9.2% like most) for his ability of taking popular decision. 
Comparatively, Mr Razzak's acceptances in these criterions are 43.7 (17% like most), 43.7% (14.1 % 
like most), 44.7% (23.3% like most), 42.7% (16.5% like most), 44.2% (17.5% like most) and 41.3% 
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(11.2% like most) respectively. The 'like least' rating for Inu and Razzak in these criterions are 15(7(-- 
22% and 7%-11% respectively that favours Abdur Razzak overall while 33%-35% and 47%-48% in 
the same order are not interested to comment on them. Interestingly, acceptance level for Moulana 
Abbas All Khan of JIB has been found very low in the survey with only 13%-20% support by these 
criterions. Even, more than 60% respondents were not interested to comment on him while the 
highest 18%-24% has rated him 'like least'. In table 8.3.2., the test statistics for category-2 shows 
that Comrade Forhad, Rashed Khan Menon and Abdur Razzak possessed close similarity in the 
strength of relationships between the same types of respondents followed by the Hasanul Haque Inu 
while Mowlana Abbas All Khan kept a considerable distance from the above four. 
18 In the first consideration of this category, the respondents have supported Tofael Ahmed of the AL 
(37%-41%), Mr B. Choudhury of the BNP (36%-39%) Nirmal Sen of the BSP (37%-4117r) and 
Abdus Samad Azad of the AL (35%-39%) in an average in all criterions set for evaluation. They are 
identified as the key policy maker of the parties as well as of the movement. The 'like least' rating for 
them are 6%-10%, 8%-11%, 9%-13% and 8%-12% respectively while 49-51% for Nirmal Sen and 
52%-53% each for the rest of three leaders are not interested to comment on them in these criteria. In 
the second stage consideration, the survey has supported Barrister Abdus Salam Talukder, Secretary. 
BNP-SG (28%-30%), Syeda Sajeda Choudhury, AL-GS (32%-34%), Saifur Rahman of the BNP 
(22%-24%) and Amir Hussain Amu of the AL (2217r-25%) in an average almost in all of the 
criterions set for evaluation. The 'like least' rating for them are 14%7 -16%, 12%-14%. 17%-19% and 
14%-18% respectively while 'no answer' have been found for them as around 56%, 55%, 59% and 
60% respectively. When the respondents are asked to name any other leaders beyond this list many 
respondents have considered Motia Choudhury of the AL. The test statistics in table 8.3.2 shows that 
the strength of relationship between the respondents of different movement forces memberships for 
Nirmal Sen, B Choudhury, Amir Hossain Amu and Tofael Ahmed are more likely than that of the 
Abdus Samad Azad, Sajeda Choudhury and Saifur Rahman leaving Barrister Abdus Salam Talukder 
at the end 
'9 See Jocelynn Linnekin, "Why 'Exporting Democracy' Is a Contradiction in Terms" ,a paper 
presented in a conference on Exporting Democracy organised by Harry Frank Guggenheim 
Foundation, USA, at Ascona, Switzerland, 22-24 April, 2004. pp. 6-7. Although Linnekin used the 
term in regard to the local socio-cultural tradition for democracy, the researcher has borrowed the 
term to use for the locally fitted bourgeois development prone to democracy movement. 
20 Elahi Neyaz Khan and Amir Khusru, "Rajnitibidder Paribarik Jibon" (The Family Life of the 
Politicians) which included a series of interviews with 24 contemporary political leaders of the 
country, The Weekly Bichittra, 8 February 1985, pp. 19-26 
21 Ibid, this expenditure was accounted in 1985 that the leaders agreed in their interviews with the 
correspondent of the Weekly Bichittra, 8 February 1985, pp. 19-26 
22 The more mighty the leader or the party was, the more money they were able to earn. However, 
sometimes these contributions were voluntary and sometimes it was forceful. Sometimes, even the 
big men that included high rank military and police officials, civil bureaucrat and the cabinet 
members of the junta administration were reported to donate money to the opposition leaders as they 
could be protected after the change of the regime. The military and civil bureaucrats and political 
leaderships both in opposition and ruling military administration had no any accountability for their 
sources of income. But it was widely alleged that the most of the corrupted politicians and 
bureaucrats were always sided with the military rule and that was teeming in Bangladesh under the 
military dictatorship of General Ershad. 
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Chapter Ten 
The Analysis of Some Critical Issues of the Movement 
10.1. Introduction. 
The movement for the restoration of democracy went through many critical 
stages in its nine years journey since 1982 to culminate in success in 1990. There 
had been many differences between the opposition forces during this period on 
many issues of the movement. The divisions of the opposition forces delayed the 
intensification of their principal objective of the movement to restore the democratic 
rule in the country. Sometimes, these differences came across the controversies in 
their decisions regarding the plan and strategies of the movement, and even could 
not escape the personal wrangles between the supreme leaderships of the opposition 
forces. This division in political forces swelled up among the students, TU, 
professionals and intellectuals from central leaders to grass root workers, which 
undermined the aspiration for democracy of the non-political mass of the society. 
The divergent opposition forces took many critical decisions in the wake of 
uprisings that thwarted many opportunities for the forced exit of the military dictator, 
which created huge frustration in the constituents of the movement. This chapter is 
designed to investigate some key issues of the movement that developed grave 
discontent between the opposition forces. The major issues included pre-movement 
debates on the link of political parties, if any, with the military in power, the role of 
opposition in the student movement of 1983, the failure of the formation of UMP, 
the issue of the participation in the elections under the military regime, the formation 
of the caretaker government, the formation of the APSU, the failure of the Dhaka 
siege actions, the different sacrificing role of the individual movement forces and 
the role of the diplomatic missions in the process of democracy. 
10.2. The Pre-movement Debates on the Role of Political Parties 
The division of the ruling BNP that lost power with the introduction of military 
seizure of power by General Ershad anticipated some ambiguities about their 
future 
steps in the movement for democracy. A huge number of ruling BNP stalwarts took 
the side of the new junta. The opposition AL was already in the `movement 
for 
democracy" against the ruling BNP during the takeover. The debates centred on 
whether the ruling BNP or the opposition AL was responsible, if at all, 
for bringing 
the military into power. It was argued that the conflict between the top officials and 
the fragile chain of command led the civilian BNP administration to fail to rule the 
country. The structural weakness of the BNP-having in its fold 
divergent political 
elements ranging from the liberation forces to the fundamentalist and collaborators 
anti-liberation forces, were also perceived by the military 
junta as advantageous to 
their interest. The BNP-cemented mainly by Zia's military power-'protected 
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under uniforms'-returned automatically to the hand of Generals after its leader's 
death. The conflict between Ershad and Begum Zia-as both of them were the 
representative of the barracks-was who would be sworn into power. 2 After the 
election as President in November, 1981, Justice Sattar was never able to be free 
from the control of the military leaders, and within a very short period of time, the 
BNP became factionalised in the hands of army coterie under the leadership of 
General Ershad. 3 On 15 February, 1982 President Satter in his speech in the JS 
admitted the fact that the country was passing through a great crisis and there was 
rampant corruption at all levels particularly on the top. 4 The BNP government failed 
to solve this crisis because `this party was composed of big businessmen and rural 
rich people in Bangladesh'. 5 It was even reported that Begum Zia, who was 
nominated once as party chairman and later was forced to withdraw by Satter groups, 
had withdrawn her support from the Government-as it was believed that the Army 
Chief gave her an assurance to reinstate as President, which was later betrayed. In 
the course of inevitable outcome, President Satter lost all of his control over the 
administration that gave a passage to military leaders to takeover with the support of 
the right wing rebel group of the BNP, who later became the cabinet associates of 
the military junta. By contrast, the opposition AL along with its leftist allies was 
trying to restore a parliamentary democracy as they participated in the all elections 
under Zia and Satter administration. Being disliked by the dominant repatriated 
faction who controlled the Army at this stage, it was likely that the AL was not in 
favour of military intervention in their own interest. Moreover, it was presumed at 
that very moment that the failure of the Satter administration could bring the AL 
into power in the next general election. However, General Ershad argued that he 
took power with the support of both the ruling BNP and the opposition AL. 6 
10.3. The Critical Steps of the Students Movement in 1983 
The debates mounted about whether the mainstream opposition political forces 
of the country approved the bloody student movement started on 14 February 1983 
that took a number of lives in protest of the Education Policy of the Junta 
Government. It was found that the leaders of the opposition AL and 14 other leftist 
and progressive political parties went to the campus to lend their support to the 
student cause, but they did not endorse the strike of the CSAC in the following day. 
The movement spread within hours from cities, towns to rural areas, which panicked 
the junta administration. In this stage, it was claimed that none of the BNP or their 
student front supported this student movement. In this critical stage, more than 50 
leaders of the opposition AL and leftist parties were arrested on 15 February 1983, 
while they were said to plan an action schedule in support of the student movement. 
On the same cause, Begum Zia of the BNP was under strict intelligence observation 
in her cantonment residence. Later it was claimed that the JCD, the student wing of 
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the BNP, became interested in forging a united action, which was not accepted by 
the BCL and the extreme left wing components of the CSAC, which was dominating 
the student movement at that time. 7 Thus, the possibility of a grave student uprising 
against the junta went out of the hands of the movement forces. 
10.4. The Issue of Elections under the Military Dictator 
The issue of the participation and non participation of the opposition forces in 
the election under the military administration of General Ershad developed an 
indefinite series of debates in the history of the movement for restoration of 
democracy. In fact, the JS election of 1986 created numerous debates that stunned 
the ongoing movement and had developed many puzzling questions whether the 
participation in or boycott the election had lingered the military rule. Since the 
military seizure of power General Ershad tried his utmost to give a civilian contour 
to his regime. In this process, he was partly successful in 1986, when a very popular 
section of opposition group under the control of AL-A, JIB and IPs had decided to 
participate in the JS election designed by the military dictator. It was, however, 
argued that both of the opposition the AL-A and the BNP-A were agreed primarily 
to participate in the election. Later the BNP-A had withdrawn its decision to 
participate in the late hour of the deadline declared by the dictator while the AL and 
a major part of its alliance, newly renamed as 8-party alliance stayed behind the 
decision to participate in the election. This major debacle in the opposition forces 
merely stopped the spirit and wisdom of the movement against military rule. 8 In the 
end of November 1987, the opposition bench in the parliament under the leadership 
of AL-A was about to resign from the parliament9 and compelled the junta to 
dissolve the JS. However, the decision of the AL-A to participate and the BNP-A to 
boycott had a long-standing impact on the movement which had weakened the 
opposition forces. 10 It was also mysterious whether these two opposition parties 
were the victims of the tacit policy of the junta to take one in the election and keep 
another out of election so that the passage to power through election would be easier 
for the military authority. " The debates on this issue however, took a sharp turn 
over whether the decision of AL or the decision of the BNP was right in the course 
of the movement. The survey statistics in table 10.4.1 and graph 10.4.1 could also be 
a rich source to answer this historical debate. 
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Graph 10.4.1: General views of the respondents of six movement forces 
memberships regarding the decision of AL and BNP on the 1986 election. 
The table 10.4.1 gives a clear indication that the decision of the AL-alliance to 
participate in the JS election of 1986 was seen as immoral by the movement forces. 
The decision of the BNP to boycott the election was accepted by the highest 55.8% 
respondents while 51.0% supports the participation of the AL. However, only 35.9% 
respondents disagree the decision of the BNP while a major part, 44.2% disagree the 
decision of the pro-election group. It further strengthens the decision of the BNP 
alliance and the 5-party group when 58.7% respondents disagree with the claim that 
the boycott of the election lingered the military rule in the country, which differs 
clearly with 45.6% for the decision of the pro-election group. However, only 25.2% 
of respondents for BNP agree with this accusation while a major section of the 
respondents, 40.3% agree the same content for AL. 
The statistics in table 10.4.1 and graph 10.4.1 also shows the relationship 
between the respondents of six movement forces' memberships and their position 
over the issue of participation and non participation in this election. Overall, the 
decision the BNP for the boycott of the election was more likely, more or less, to the 
all groups of respondents although TU (66.7%) and NPG (60%) favoured slightly 
the decision of AL to participate. The intellectuals (50%) and professionals (56.7%) 
stand out with disagreeing the decision of the AL while PP (50%) took the middle 
view in this regard. However, the statistics unveiled the truth that the decisions of 
these two parties on election did not influence widely in the length of the military 
regime apart from the views of the PPs (54.3%) and students (50%). 
10.5. The Failure of the Exultant Dhaka Siege Action 1987 
The opposition 8-party, 7-party and 5-party alliances called a non-cooperation 
and civil disobedience 'Dhaka Siege' action on 10 November 1987.12 Although the 
unity between the opposition forces was close and effective on the actions, there was 
still a lack of trusts between the supreme leaderships of the movement. On the day 
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of the siege, Sheikh Hasina with her alliance leaders took the position in the streets 
of the center of the city-Press club to Zero Point to Gulistan Square-in which a 
number of her party's veteran workers were shot dead by junta forces-while 
Begum Zia was found by police in the Hotel Purbani, a very restricted five star hotel 
and later she was sent back to cantonment under house arrest. On the other hand, 
Sheikh Hasina was arrested with her car and forcefully taken to her residence in 
Dhanmondhi. 13 Moreover, all killings and the majority of the injuries of this action 
were by participants in the 8-party alliance. The internal doubts and mistrust of the 
leaderships led to the failure of this action. There might be many explanations. 
However, the popular explanation was that the BNP might have doubts about the 
sincerity of AL in the actions, and thought that this action might be a way for the AL 
to take any latent concession from the junta administration. Therefore, they 
maintained a counterfeit liaison with the 8-party and 5-party alliances. Another 
popular view was that the BNP never did want any popular movement against the 
Armed Forces as this party was born in and within the army coterie. Moreover, this 
was clear to the conscious quarters of politics that the dictator expected Sheikh 
Hasina and her party as an obliged opposition in the JS, which was not fulfilled with 
the AL in opposition. This led the JS to the annulment. The junta then tried to 
manage the BNP, the other opposition which they thought of as their own party of 
General Zia. ' 4 
10.6. The Failure in the formation of the UMP 
The extensive differences between the two mainstream opposition forces were 
the central barrier to forge the UMP against the military dictator. There were 
frequent and severe clashes and counter activities in the opposition groups that in 
fact, always created the door way for the military leaders to linger in power. ' 5 The 
non-communal AL and leftist progressive forces had to resist the fundamentalist JIB 
side by side in the movement for democracy that resulted in frequent clashes, 
killings and injuries between the two groups. The military junta cleverly used this 
conflict patronising the JIB to keep the opposition 8-party alliance under pressure 
that undermined the strength of the opposition in the movement. However, the main 
conflict was between the AL and the BNP, which was the main barrier to form the 
UMP of the opposition forces. Both of the parties were ideologically separated from 
each other and might have the issue of leadership conflict that they were not sure of 
who would be in power in the post junta period. The AL always feared the BNP, the 
party basically guided by heavy weight retired army Generals and believed to be 
favoured by the Armed Forces. By contrast, the BNP was always afraid of the 
organisational strength of the AL. They were not happy to share power under a 
national government in the end of military regime-the popular demand of the grass 
root participants of the movement. 
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There were also some in-group conflicts in both of the AL and the BNP, which 
also influenced the party decisions regarding the movement for democracy. The AL 
had been suffering from factionalism of left wing and right wing groups since the 
independence of the country. '6 On the other hand, there were two distinct factions 
inside the politics of the BNP, which was marked by the liberation force and anti- 
liberation forces. " However, the BNP under the leadership of Begum Zia was under 
the firm control of the pro-liberation forces during the movement for democracy, 
although a significant part was still remaining as pro-Islamic forces inside the party. 
Moreover, the retired General turned politician group in the BNP were also a vital 
factor, which influenced the decisions of the movement against Ershad regime. 
Another important factor was that both parties were rivals since the assassination of 
Bangabandhu in 1975 and the AL considered the BNP as the main beneficiary of the 
post 1975 politics. 
In general, all of these differences between the two currents of opposition 
political forces that were barrier to the formation of the UMP have been supported 
by the survey. 18 The survey statistics in table 10.6.1 and graph 10.6.1 presents the 
relationship between six movement forces' memberships and their views about the 
failure to form the UMP. The students are least likely (46.7% and 56.7%) to support 
the `SID between AL and BNP' and `COL between SH and BKZ' respectively to be 
barrier in the formation of the UMP while the intellectuals (86.7% and 83.3%) and 
professionals (90% and 83.3%) have considered both as major factors for the same 
cause. 
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Graph 10.6.1: The Causes behind the failure of the formation of UMP against the 
military regime in terms of the relationships of six movement forces membership. 
The NPG (70%) along with intellectuals and professionals (56.7% each) stands 
out with many disagreeing that the AL was not interested in the UMP while the 
NPG (67.5%), PP (60.9%) and the students (63.3%) are found distinctive in 
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disagreeing in this cause for BNP. The intellectuals (83.3%) and professionals (90%) 
are identical to support the UPC between the two parties and an 'up to moderate 
position' is found for PP (69.6%), TU (66.7%) and NPG (70%) while the students 
(53.3%) have shown comparatively a lower concern for the same factor. 
10.7. The Failure of Opposition Unity in the Aftermath of 
Chittagong Massacre in January 1988 
The brutal event of the genocide by the military junta in Chittagong on 24 
January 1988-barbaric and heinous brush fires on the procession of Sheikh Hasina 
created a wave of united protests all over the country irrespective of parties and 
opinions, which produced an immediate hope to forge long expected unity in 
opposition movement that had lost the chance to do so. In protest of this genocide, 
all opposition forces observed a countrywide hartal on 26`h January 1988 and the 
three main opposition alliances organised a joint rally on 30th January in Dhaka at 
central Shaheed Minar which was participated by all veteran opposition leaders 
including Begum Zia of the BNP, Dr Kama] Hossain and Abdul Mannan of the AL, 
Mohiuddin Ahmed and Abdur Razzak of BKSAL, Saifuddin Ahmed Manik of the 
CPB, Pankaj Battachargia of NAP, Hasanul Haque Inue of the JSD and Rashed 
Khan Menon of the BWP, which was turned into a popular demand for the unity 
between Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia. The thousands of participants voiced 
eagerly-ai michil karo noy, ai michil janater (this march is of none, this march is 
of the people), in which AL Chief Sheikh Hasina did not join. Since the attack was 
targeted on Sheikh Hasina, she wished to avoid the chance of further such events- 
in her words, `in fear of the possibility of further brutal attack on her way to 
procession'. 19 There might have many reasons in the dark-behind the scene, but the 
popular mood was expecting Sheikh Hasina to be present for the greater unity of 
movement, which was shattered due to her absence from the rally. 
10.8. The Issue of the Formation of the APSU in 1990 
The formation of the APSU was expected for a long time by all students and 
political forces of the country. Since the formation of the nationhood and language 
movement in 1952, the students of this bank of the Bay had developed a trustworthy 
position in the heart of the general mass as an imperative force of their freedom . 
20 
Once the APSU was formed on 10`h October 1990-the long expecting unity of the 
student community against the military junta, none had taken the risk of splitting it 
as it would be a parallel risk to collapse the whole movement . 
2' However, in the 
beginning of the formation of the APSU, the popular section of the JCD under the 
leadership of Sanaul Haq Niru and Golum Faruk Ovi started to move against the 
APSU and its own DUCSU leadership. Once the situation became worse that the 
JCD and their DUCSU leaders were compelled to stop coming to the campus in fear, 
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which however, came to control within the couple of days by the united resistance of 
the thousands of students under the leadership of the APSU. Once it was spread that 
Aman Ullah Aman-the VP of the DUCSU-one of the ring leaders of the APSU 
was about to join the side of military dictator as he was not found for some days. 
However, he returned to the movement later on, and rejected all kinds of rumour 
against him. Besides, a strong counter faction of the BCL known as `pro-conference 
group'22 was also not in favour of the steps taken in this regard. In this way, the 
APSU beyond the snags from their political setback, was able to keep the opposition 
forces-the two arch rivals, AL and BNP-unyielding to the movement, the key 
role that, in fact, provided a long expected passage to democracy in Bangladesh. 
10.9. The Debates on the Role of Movement Forces in the Final 
Stage of the Movement in 1990 
In the end, the military junta was forced by a mass upsurge on 6`h December 
1990 to give up power to the Chief Justice of the country. 23 Although the student 
wings of all the major political parties including AL and the BNP were united under 
the single platform of the APSU, the mainstream political parties still failed to come 
in a united platform for movement. However, they agreed to follow similar schedule 
of programmes in the movement and formed a Liaison Committee to sort out the 
plan of actions. It seemed that the whole opposition was now keen to remove the 
dictator from power. It was the first time since the liberation war of the country that 
the student forces of the society became wholeheartedly united and promised to 
remove the junta and their all efforts were concentrated to achieve this objective. 
The trade unions of the country came to the forefront all together with students and 
political parties in observing the all actions. The professionals and intellectuals 
became involved in opposition actions with their own demands. 
The evaluation of the role of the different movement forces in the formation of 
this great political event-the mass upsurge in 1990 is, therefore, essential in the 
understanding of the movement for democracy. In the event of the ousting of the 
dictator, the important role of all of the political forces has been primarily 
recognised by the survey24, along with variations of the views of six groups of the 
respondents. The statistics in table 10.9.1 and graph 10.9.1 on the relationship 
between the movement forces respondents present a unanimous acceptance of the 
students' credibility (100% supports) from the PP, P, TU and NPG memberships 
while the S and I memberships supports them with 96.7% as `a good deal' to unseat 
the regime along with disagreeing by none. 
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Graph 10.9.1: The role of the opposition forces in the 1990 uprising in terms of 
their relationships of six movement forces' memberships. 
lt is interesting that the PP (95.7%), S (90%) and TU (93.3°o) supports more 
role of the BNP-A in the uprising than that of the AL-A credited oppositely by I 
(93.3%) and P (100%) for same cause and the NPG (87.5%) considers an equal role 
for both of them. Generally, the role of 5 Party-A is recognised moderately by all 
forces memberships with a higher supports from S and TU memberships (80°% with 
`a good deal') while the JIB & IN are unable to reach a satisfactory supports 
including more lower rating from TU, NPG and the I memberships (13.3°%0 15% and 
16.7% respectively). The role of I is highly supported, more or less, in the same 
level by all groups' memberships allowing a comparatively lower supports from PP 
membership (76.1 % with `a good deal'). The P follow the same dimension of higher 
supports from all groups' respondents with a limitation of lower acceptance 
comparatively from the S memberships (66.7%) while the TU has found lower 
supports from the I respondents (73.3%) in comparison to the other forces 
memberships. 
10.10. The Issue of the Formation of the Caretaker Government 
The modus operandi of the Caretaker Government was formulated by a pro- 
AL lawyers group of the SCBA including Advocate Shamsul Haque Choudhury, 
Barrister Syed lshtiaq Ahmed, Dr Kamal Hossain and Barister Amirul Islam and 
many others, which later was discussed and accepted in the meeting of the Liaison 
Committee of three main opposition alliances. On 6 November, 1990, in the 
afternoon, AL President Sheikh Hasina in a huge gathering of the 8-party alliance at 
Panthapath, Dhaka, for the first time, declared the formula of the constitutional 
removal of the junta regime. This later evolved into a common formula to all the 
opposition forces for the transfer of power to a transient administration who would 
he accepted by all existing political forces, in particular, by the three main 
opposition alliances. The complete damage of the electoral system by junta created 
the basis of the long standing demand of the opposition for caretaker government. 25 
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The opposition forces declared that they would not participate in any elections under 
a junta government and would prevent the holding of elections by any means. They 
would participate only in the election of a sovereign JS under a non-partisan neutral 
caretaker government. The main demands and aims formulated in this regard %ý ere 
known as `Teen Joter Ruporekha' (The Joint Declaration of Three Alliances). 26 
However, there was a debate on the constitutional basis of the formation of the 
Caretaker Government. The dictator rejected its formation as an unconstitutional 
process. 27 As it was argued by the pro junta group in their word, the President (junta) 
could never ask the Vice President to resign as he was elected by the JS and 
moreover, the question was raised `what would have happened if the Vice-President 
had refused to resign'. 28 The fact was that the whole regime of the junta was 
unconstitutional and illegal, and there was not any scope of constitutional arguments 
under the constitutional provisions enacted by the junta in the face of peoples' 
revolution. The gun the junta once pointed to the people's back was now pointed by 
people to the junta's back. In the face of the mass uprising, while crowds were 
setting fire to army vehicles, allies of the junta fled the country, went hiding or were 
dragged into mass beatings to death, setting fire to their residences and offices, 
employees of the junta took to the street in fear; a revolution swept the country on 
Is` December, 1990-the realm was that the millions of the opposition forces 
marched forward towards the cantonment that was about to be burnt if the junta 
waited to resign more than 48 hours. The legacy of the Caretaker Government was 
that they were able to calm down the situation-a genuine and legitimate peoples' 
revolution and consequently, the junta and many of his army and civilian allies were 
safeguarded without minimum trial, which would endanger-as widely argued-the 
future passage of a new born democracy. In this critical juncture, there was also the 
point who would be the non-partisan personality to be the chief of the Caretaker 
Government. The whole military mechanism and some of their latent allies in the 
opposition forces tried their utmost to transfer the power to the Speaker of the JS-a 
trustworthy personality to the Army. However, popular sentiment was for a more 
neutral man-that was named first as the Chief Justice of the country by AL chief 
Sheikh Hasina with which the last effort of the heinous militia men was defeated. 
This enacted the people's message for them that the military must be sent to the 
barracks, which would be their permanent address in the process of nation building 
through the supremacy of political elites in state power in the practice of democracy. 
10.11. The Sacrifice of the Movement Forces' Constituents 
The sacrifice of the movement forces constituents mainly includes the loss of 
life, injuries, lawsuits, arrests, detentions and individual harassments of the leaders, 
organisers, workers and participants of opposition democratic forces in the course of 
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actions of the movement. The propensity of participation and sacrifice in the 
movement, however, varied between different constituents of the participants. The 
opposition democratic forces were divided into various constituents that consisted of 
different political, student, intellectual, professional and trade union groups of the 
movement. Although all of the opposition forces had a general stand to establish 
democracy in the country, the way of their thought and actions were not similar. The 
socio-economic status, demographic variables, class position and different political 
stands, urban-rural variance of the movement participants were important 
constituents that led to a diverse effort of their participation and therefore, made a 
difference in their levels of sacrifice in the movement. The survey statistics has 
`primarily supported the sacrifices of the all participant constituents of the 
movement'29 focusing on the variation of views of six groups of the respondents. 
The statistics in table 10.11.1 and graph 10.11.1 also present the relationships 
between six movement forces' memberships on the level of sacrifices of different 
constituents of the participants. Overall, the sacrifice of the students is accepted by 
all forces memberships (100%) with slightly lower supports by PP (97.8). Regarding 
the political workers, the BNP-A secures more `LOS' supports from PP (93.5%), S 
(90%), TU (86.7%) and NPG (92.5%) in comparison to that of the AL-A from I 
(100%) and P (96.7%) memberships. The constituents of the leftist participants are 
provided with a moderate rating from all group membership along with the highest 
93.3% of `LOS' support from TU membership. By contrast, the workers of the JIB 
&IPs are found with no significant sacrifices that is supported in lower proportion 
by all types of memberships and are distinctive in getting lowest support from TU 
and NPG memberships (6.7% and 7.5% respectively). The sacrifices of the TU 
workers are next to the students, who are provided with the higher proportion `LOS' 
supports from all types of the memberships and distinctive in achieving highest 
supports from both of S and TU respondents (96.7% each). The sacrifices of the 
intellectuals and professionals have been supported by all forces memberships 
moderately, although the sacrifice (LOS) of the intellectuals is slightly higher than 
that of the professionals. In class constituents, the participants of the middle class 
followed by lower class advances the higher proportion supports of LOS from most 
memberships except I respondents as distinctive, who support equally each of two 
classes (90%). By contrast, the sacrifice of the higher class is supported with very 
lower proportion by all types of memberships, however, distinctive in lowest rating 
by PP(4.3%) and 1 (3.3%)memberships. 
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The `LOS' of the urban participants is again accepted unanimously with the highest 
rating by all of six memberships, in which I, TU and NPG memberships (100%) are 
found distinctive following the rest memberships for more than 90% supports in the 
same scale. However, for rural participants, the LOS supports from the PP (32.61-'() 
and S (30%) membership are slightly higher than that of the other memberships. It 
was only because of the students and PP forces had the support base up to rural 
periphery for which other forces had not. In gender category, the male participants 
are accepted with highest proportion of LOS supports from all types of memberships 
including 100% from I, P, TU and NPG memberships in comparison to 95.7% and 
96.7% supports from the PP and S memberships respectively. On the contrary, the 
sacrifice (LOS) of the female participants is accepted with proportion from almost 
all types of membership except I and P (50% each) as distinctive. In the sacrifice 
level of age-group constituents, the youth age group (15-35) is accepted by the 
unique recognition from 100% respondents with LOS from almost all six 
memberships with exception of the PP (95.7%) followed by the adult age group (35- 
55) from more than 80% with `LOS' support from all forces' memberships. The 
sacrifices of the older age group participants (55+), however, are not ignored and 
proportionately lower supports from all forces respondents in which a slightly 
higher rating is counted as LOS by PP and NPG (23.9% and 22.5% respectively). 
The street urchins, a minor constituent of the least developed city life, had many 
sacrifices in the movement. They are supported for LOS by 50% around from almost 
all six memberships, although gains significant supports from P and NPG 
memberships (80% and 61.5% respectively). 
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10.12. The Role of Diplomatic Missions and Foreign Aid Groups 
The role of diplomatic missions and foreign aid organisations in the process of 
democratisation of any peripheral third world nation is a belligerent but important 
factor. This usually depends on how much strong or weak are the political 
institutions of the affected society. Generally, they seem to be sinuous and ardent to 
serve their own political and economic interest at any change of power. They also 
often try to cope with the changing circumstances and substantiate their control over 
the state of affairs. For the Bangladesh case, it has been widely argued that the 
international power hubs bolstered the military intervention in 1982.30 Since then to 
the end of military regime in 1990-nearly a decade long struggle of the people for 
democracy concluded with pools of blood, discarded human bodies, secrete and 
arranged killings and countless events of suppressions of thousands of political 
workers of the country. These events were associated with many attempts and 
efforts from all corners of socio-political aspiration for democracy. There was not 
any effective initiative from the international community against these suppressions 
of the junta, and this perhaps was limited in a statement or letter from the human 
rights groups of the west. This was beyond the imagination of the conscious quarters 
of any society, how the leaders of the democratic nations could support an 
undemocratic, authoritarian and autocratic military dictatorship for other nations 
around the world. It was the painful truth, this had happened in the event of 
Bangladesh where a military dictator, `as the CMLA and in uniform to boot' was 
able to get entrance to Capital Hill and the White House. 31 This was regarded as 
cheating by the then White House leader to the struggle of the people of Bangladesh 
for democracy. However, in the early part of this period of military aggression, the 
diplomatic missions and foreign aid organisations played their accommodating role 
towards the new military leader as well as for the opposition political forces in their 
movement for democracy. In the end, when the opposition movement grew stronger 
and went beyond the control of international core allies of the military dictatorship, 
the diplomacy became an inevitable negotiator between the opposition forces and 
the junta, and that was to favour the military leaders in the process of how it would 
be possible to save the lives of the later. Like other democratic transitions in third 
world nations, the diplomatic representatives of the international core countries 
mainly the USA and geopolitical forces, to some extent, also became involved in the 
democratisation process of Bangladesh in 1990. All of their efforts in Bangladesh 
were mainly latent and purely moulded within the diplomatic norms and values. 
However, a moderate role of the diplomatic missions in Bangladesh has been 
supported generally by the survey statistics32, where there is range of variations 
between the views of six groups' respondents of movement forces membership. 
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However, the survey statistics shows that the involvement of the diplomatic 
missions and aid organisations in favour of democracy movement is supported by 
52.9% respondents in general and in their sense, it was only limited in the wake of 
the mass upsurge in 1990, when the international community did not agree to 
continue their support for military dictator. But there were also significant parts 
(47.1 %) of the respondents, who do not believe in any such role played by them in 
the process of democratisation, and many of them especially PP (52.20o), P (53.3°ö) 
and TU (56.7%) memberships accused the international powers for lending their 
continuous support to sustain the military autocracy. These groups of memberships 
believe in the peoples' power, which was only able to throw the military junta out of 
power. By contrast, the S (63.3%), 1 (66.7%) and NPG (52.2%) memberships have 
supported the role of international communities in the process of democratisation. 
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Graph 10.12.1: The role of the diplomatic missions in Dhaka in the democratisation 
process in terms of the relationships of six movement forces memberships. 
The statistics in table 10.12.1 graph 10.12.1 also presents the relationships of 
six movement forces memberships and their views on the level of involvement of 
different diplomatic missions in the process of democratisation. Overall, majority of 
those respondents who consent the positive role of the diplomatic missions, have 
supported, first of all, the greater role of the USA mission in Dhaka. Among them, S 
(401/0) and I (43.3%) memberships are found distinctive in lending their highest 
support while the TU membership (46.7%) undermines them for the same cause. In 
the second stage, the Indian High Commission in Dhaka accomplishes the highest 
supports from I (43.3° o) and P (36.7%) membership as `geo-political forces' 
33 
followed by the British High Commission from S (33.3%) and 1 (36.7%) 
memberships in their respective roles in this regard. The EEC mission, 
Commonwealth Secretariat, UNO mission and Japanese Embassy in Dhaka have 
also some moderate supports from all types of the movement forces memberships. 
34 
In general. I memberships have been found for higher supports for an important role 
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of diplomatic missions in the process of democratisation while TU position has a 
lesser support for the same cause. Among the donor organisations, the World Bank 
and IMF are provided with the higher supports from I (33.3%), P (33.3%) and NPG 
(32.5%) memberships followed by the Foreign Aid Consortium from the same 
membership respondents (30%, 36.7% and 32.5% respectively) for their important 
role in the process of democratisation. 35 The result does imply that a moderate 
initiative of the international communities in a sensible removal of the military 
regime was visible without major interruption in which they had played a role of 
negotiator between the junta and democratic forces. 
10.13. Conclusion 
These critical issues of the movement for restoration of democracy had 
developed many discontents among the main stream opposition democratic forces 
and delayed the success of the movement. This was widely argued that the dictator 
was cleverly involved in making the most of these issues to keep the opposition 
divided. Sometimes, the divergent opposition forces could not compromise with 
their own political interest that developed a sense of conflict among each other. 
Although the military autocracy was sustained in power by applying all of his means 
for nearly a decade, none of the major opposition, having a very popular party 
institution with vast mobilisation ability, could evade their own responsibility in this 
regard. The debates on the JS election of 1986 that divided the opposition has 
developed into a long standing argument; although it has got a definite momentum 
by the survey that different corners of the movement forces did not favour the 
participation in the election, it also keeps alive the fact whether the united 
participation in the election could be able to eliminate the military dictatorship. In 
this way, the failure of the formation of the UMP for the opposition movement was 
not possible as they could not be able to compromise over ideological and leadership 
conflicts, individual party interest and competition for future power etc. The pre- 
movement debates mainly have focused on the accusation and counter accusation of 
the political parties on whom is responsible for welcoming the military leaders to 
power. The student movement of 1983 evolved the argument whether both of the 
main opposition including the AL and BNP were equally serious to the student 
aspiration for building the movement. The critical review of the failure of Dhaka 
siege in 1987 or brutal shooting on the procession of Sheikh Hasina in Chittagong in 
1988 has developed the similar arguments whether these were consequence of 
uncompromising stands of the opposition or the pre-designed factors of the junta 
administration. The credibility of the formation of a caretaker government or the 
different sacrifices of the constituents of the movement forces were also of some 
debate and conflict and an issue of accusation and counter accusation among the 
opposition democratic forces. The role of diplomatic missions had also some critical 
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substance, as they had never taken any manifested role against the military dictator, 
though people always had some ambiguity about their role, however, had found 
some lower conformity in the survey statistics. The presence of these critical issues 
could never be ignored nor could be resolved in any sense; and this was the reality 
of Bangladesh democracy movement. 
Notes 
' The opposition AL was leading a 10-party alliance in the movement against the ruling BNP as they 
did never believe the BNP as a democratic party. The AL often accused General Zia, the founder of 
the BNP for stopping the trial of the killers of the Father of the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, the commanding leader of the independence of the nation and ideological leader of AL 
supporters by 7th amendment of the constitution in 1979. Also General Zia gave top jobs and bounties 
to the 1975 Coup makers in home and abroad. It is evident to mention here that General Zia became 
Chief of the Army after the 1975 coup and dictated the civil-military government until he became a 
full-pledged Martial Law administrator in 1976. He started his regime with Martial Law along with a 
puppet democracy until there was a rubber stamp parliament in the country in 1979. The all 
opposition forces along with mainstream AL were in the movement against the Martial Law regime 
of General Zia. After the killing of General Zia in May 1981, his civilian Deputy, Justice Abdus 
Satter became President in November 1981. Still then the opposition forces of the country along with 
mainstream AL was in the movement for the restoration of democracy. 
2 As Begum Zia came into the limelight on the huge emotional events relayed by the media after 
Zia's death-after failing to declare Martial Law, General Ershad as Army Chief cleverly took the 
side of constitution to bring hospitalised-unable to walk and speak-Vice President Justice Sattar as 
acting President, before the popular sentiment had reached to ripe for the election of Begum Zia as 
President. 
3 Consequently, President Justice Satter faced a great problem after his election in regard to the 
formation of the new ministry which comprised 42 members with old and new politicians. In this 
context, a conflict developed between the civilian government and the army. The difference of 
opinion also assumed a serious proportion in the ruling party and a right wing strong rebel group 
composed of a few high level leaders and member of parliaments having linkage with the military 
intrigues demanded the restoration of democracy within the party. At this stage, the ruling BNP could 
not be able to compromise its splitting opinions and in the outcome, the said large ministry was 
dissolved and a small cabinet was formed comprising 18 members of whom 14 were from dissolved 
one. The motive behind the changes in the ministry was to strengthen the right-wing and pro- 
Pakistani elements in the cabinet including former members of Muslim League, which supported 
Pakistan Army in the liberation war of 1971 at the `expense of freedom fighters'. This action aroused 
strong opposition from the left-wing elements of the BNP under the leadership of its General 
Secretary of the party, Professor B Choudhury on Is' February 1982. The drama of the `arrest of a 
serial killer named Imdu on 8 February 19823 from the ministerial resident of Abul Kashem, a pro 
Satter cabinet member push the credibility of the ruling administration into crisis. 
° See The Bangladesh Observer, 16 February, 1982, p. 1 
Sen., R. The Political Elites of Bangladesh, Dhaka, UPL, 1986, P. 323 
6 General Ershad in an exclusive audio interview with the researcher in May 2003 exposed the fact 
that a right wing segment of ruling party and a faction of the opposition AL supported him to take 
over. Asked about the name of the leaders who communicated him, he unfolded the name of Sheikh 
Hasina and Dr Kamal Hossain of the AL , but was not agreed to mention any particular name of the 
then ruling BNP, although they all were exposed as his associates within the very few days after the 
military take over. The time of the interview between the ex military leader and the researcher was 
during the second phase of the BNP regime after the fall of the military dictatorship since 1990 under 
which the verdicts for him for a number of lawsuits for corruptions and misuse of power were 
pending. Therefore, it was not unlikely for him to name the Sheikh Hasina, the arch political rival of 
the Begum Zia, hiding the truth in fear since he was lobbying to get the relief from the lawsuits by 
the then BNP government in 2003. Moreover, it is not unlikely for the ousted dictator to take the side 
of the BNP in crocodile tears-both of them homogenous representatives of the barrack-trapping 
and disclosing the name of the AL leaders Sheikh Hasina and Kamal Hossain who have been widely 
accepted as the genuine and pioneer civilian and democratic leaders of the country. 
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7 In fact, the leftist and progressive student components of the CSAC were in the movement against 
the military regime of the General Zia and later the BNP administration under Justice Satter. Ntanv 
workers and supporters of these student groups were suppressed and jailed and still these were visible 
in their mind. There fore, within the short span of time of the departure of the BNP from power, these 
student bodies were not ready to incorporate them under the CSAC. 
8 Under the new circumstances, General Ershad survived by an elected JS with the AL in opposition 
bench; while the BNP-A and the newly formed 5-party alliance took the street as the means of their 
resistance. However, the AL-A could not successfully hold back the autocratic activities of the 
dictator by the parliamentary process. They also went back to the street confrontation bit by bit. 
`' In fact, it was argued that the AL high command was not in favour of resignation of the party MPs. 
The AL leader Sheikh Hasina was kept under house arrest in the peak stage of the movement in 
November 1987. At this stage, the opposition BNP-A and 5-party alliance was strict to suspend the 
parliament that was further fuelled by the resignation of 10 MPs of the JIB. In this critical moment, a 
group of senior AL leaders including Dr Kamal Hossain and Abdul Mannan, Abdul Momen those 
who could not be able to be elected in the election decided to resignation of the party MPs in an 
emergency working committee meeting, which however closed the pressure on the dictator to 
dissolve the parliament. 
10 It was argued that the AL could have its own way of thinking to build their party organisation 
through election and the BNP was in fear if they would not be able to win the elections according to 
their target as many leaders of the party were in the underground. However, the pro-AL political 
analyst argued that if the whole opposition including BNP-A had participated in the election; there 
had been a chance to wipe out the military rule by the ballot verdict of the people. On the other hand, 
the pro-BNP intellectuals argued that there had not any possibility of free and fair elections under the 
junta administration, which became partly true later when the AL claimed that the massive frauds had 
taken place in the elections. 
11 For details see Moudud Ahmed, ibid, p. 316, where he categorically mentioned that `the strategy of 
keeping the two female leaders apart was the cornerstone of Ershad politics-not so much for the 
benefit of AL but for his own political survival', although the researcher feels the later stage 
explanation of the author was inappropriate and politically biased by his own quarter of political 
opportunity. 
12 Since the parliamentary election of 1986, the divergent opposition forces tried to be reunited on the 
basis, at least, for same action schedules against the dictator. The AL led 8-party alliance tried to 
oppose the activities of the military administration inside the parliament and in the tail end of their 
failure to protest the autocracy in the parliament drama, they took the street agitations, which speeded 
up the ongoing movement under the leadership of Begum Zia. In the end, two central leaderships of 
the opposition forces, Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia met twice before the non-cooperation civil 
disobedience movement of Dhaka siege that had been taken place in the beginning of November 
1987. The aim of the action was to blockade round and to discommunicate the capital by peaceful 
mass gathering, marches and procession and slowly, to paralyse the state machinery which would 
alienate the junta in the cantonment and would compel him to surrender to people's movement. 
13If anybody would like to see the photos of the news papers of the following days, it was easily 
observed, the car with Sheikh Hasina inside had been picked up by the police crane in a violent attack, 
a medieval barbarism by the junta forces while Begum Zia was sweeping her hand to the people 
freely from the police van. Please see the photo released in the news paper. For the photo of the arrest 
of Begum Zia, see The Daily Ingilab, 12 November, 1987 p. 8 and for the arrest and atrocities on 
Sheikh Hasina, see The Daily Sangbad, 11 November 1987, p. 1 
14 There was every consideration to believe this fact from the later political events of the country 
including shooting on the resident of Sheikh Hasina and a number of brutal killings in her procession 
at Chittagong in January 1988. There might also have another dimension that it was the policy of the 
junta to sow the seeds of doubts and mistrusts between the two parties-AL and BNP-to spoil the 
opposition unity that would be able to weaken the strength of the movement. 
" The opposition forces were mainly divided in to three currents. First, the non-communal 
progressive and leftist political forces that included mainly the AL led 8-party alliance and 
5-party 
group. Second, the pro-Islamic rightist and a part of anti-liberation pro-China radical 
leftist elements 
that were integrated into BNP led 7-party, and third, the fundamentalist and anti-liberation 
forces that 
included the JIB and some other IPs in the country. The political activity of the JIB was banned 
during the AL period under Bangabandhu government as they were the collaborating force with the 
Pakistan Army against the country's liberation war of 1971. But the JIB was revived during the BNP 
regime under General Zia. The anti-liberation role of this party 
isolated them to form any type of 
unity with other opposition during the movement against 
General Ershad. 
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16 During the liberation war, the leadership of this party was concentrated on the left wing groups and 
lost their control over the party with the killing of Bangabandhu in 1975. The right wing faction 
established their full control over the party in 1983 when left wing group under the leadership of 
Abdur Razzak left the party and formed the BAKSAL with a full socialist spirit. However, the split in 
AL had weakened its organisational strength for the time being to challenge the military intervention 
in the country. 
1' In the post-1975 politics, the BNP was formed under the military regime of General Ziaur Rahman, 
who mainly gathered some veteran politicians of different political parties mainly from anti-liberation 
forces and some of his army colleagues who fought together with him in the field of liberation war. 
After the killing of General Zia, the new leadership of the party Justice Abdus Satter could not deal 
properly with these rivalry factions of the party that led the failure in power. The pro-Islamic anti- 
liberation forces inside the BNP welcomed the new military leader and joined in the military cabinet, 
while the pro-independence faction faced the arrest and law suits from the new military regime, some 
of those also joined in the military government of General Ershad 
18The statistics in table 9.6.1 shows that the SID between the AL and the BNP was responsible in the 
failure to form the UMP, which is supported by 74.8% respondents (with 48.1% strongly agree). In 
the same way, 68% (with 27.2% strongly agree) supports the COL between Sheikh Hasina and 
Begum Zia, while 71.8% (with 35.4% strongly agree) blame the many appalling experiences in their 
past history (UPC) between the two parties. However, 50% (with 6.3%r strongly disagree) disagree 
with the fact that the AL independently was responsible in the failure to form an UMP in contrast to 
that of the BNP 56.8% (14.1% strongly disagree). It is interesting that the respondents identify other 
major factors responsible in this regard. It is that the major two parties were not sure who would be 
the next to the military leader in power and the ever-hostile two parties were not agreed to share 
power in the post-junta period. This is the prior cause supported by the 100% (83.3% strongly agree) 
respondents. The factional cleavages in the major opposition parties, by a minor group of respondents, 
were also found as responsible in the same cause. 
19 In fact, it was found that the opposition AL leader Sheikh Hasina became the target of attack by the 
military dictator after the dissolution of parliament following a mass upsurge of Dhaka Siege action 
in November 1987. Comparatively, there was no repression on the opposition BNP leaders and 
workers from the military administration. Killing, arrest and lawsuits became a daily events for the 
supporters and leaders of AL. On the other hand, it was believed that a pro-BNP faction of army 
officer was trying to plot a coup that would make it easier for Begum Zia to ride on the power. For 
Sheikh Hasina, she did never support a further military intervention that would create another new 
military leader. Hence, she was absent in such kind of unity gatherings that would have chances of 
further massacre which may broaden the possibility of promulgation of stiff military orders or a new 
military coup. 
20 The longstanding practice of the student bodies-independent soul of the students-lost their 
freedom of the thoughts and actions by the military order of General Zia that attached them as the 
student wing of the political parties. This law ceased the individual political role of the students 
leading them to follow the instruction of their parent political parties. However, the two major 
opposition parties-the AL and the BNP- were under conflicting atmosphere all through the 
movement against the military administration of General Ershad, which developed two different 
current of political forces in the opposition politics. The AL forged unity with leftist, socialist, 
communist and the parties with mixed economy while the BNP developed an opposite current with 
right wing capitalist, fundamentalist and religious forces of the society. Consequently, the student 
wings of these two parties, BCL and JCD respectively, had followed the same path and developed 
two different unity of students' forces as the CSAC and SAA, which had no alternative rather than to 
go after the their parent political parties. In this critical juncture, it was the toughest job ever to unite 
these two opposite and rivalry forces of the student community. 
21 Since the killing of their fellow student Najir Hussain Zehad including other three participants on 
10`h October 1990, they were observing continuous and spontaneous actions through out the country 
including hartal, gatherings, protest marches and demonstration, strike, seize of the residential area of 
the ministers, boycott, non-cooperation leading the civil disobedience at the end of the regime. 
These 
actions ceased many lives and casualties following the repressive measures taken 
by junta 
administration. At this stage, none of the student organisation had the moral courage to stay 
back 
from the unity of the APSU 
22 In fact, the BCL President Habibur Rahman Habib was under serious pressure to hold the 
conference of his student organisation and its parent organisation-the AL was planning to 
fix a date 
of the conference to elect new leadership. At this stage, the BCL-the strong rival of the 
JCD in all 
through student politics under military regime-has went to the unity of the APSU under the absolute 
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decision of Habib without prior concern of its other factions those who were expecting to be sworn in 
leadership in the forthcoming conference. Habib with this decision was able to survive his leadership 
crisis and was credited for the formation of the APSU-this was true, but widely criticised for his 
incapability to reserve the interest of his own party in leading the movement. 
23 Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed headed a temporary neutral caretaker government formulated 
under the constitutional provision and supported by the opposition political forces of the country. 
General Ershad and his many associates were arrested and jailed and sent for trial. The final stage 
movement that removed the junta started when mainstream opposition including 8-party, 7-party and 
5-party alliances observed the action of Secretariat seize on 10h October 1990 following 5 killings 
and many other injuries and arrests. Among the killings, the dead body of a fellow student of Ulla 
Para College, Pubna named Najeer Hussain Zehad was brought in to the Dhaka University campus by 
the fellow student protesters. The disintegrated student forces, in a sudden move, came together to the 
APARAJEYA BANGLA premises, where the crowd of students was mounting around the dead body 
of Zehad. All of a sudden, the student organisations, forgetting their all divisions, vowed in front of 
the dead body of their fellow student that they would never go back home until the removal of the 
military junta, and thereafter, in an hour move, the All Party Student Unity (APSU) was formed at the 
DUCSU office in the Dhaka University campus. All the main line political leaders including Sheikh 
Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia came to the campus and gave their support to the declaration of the 
student forces of the country. However, the military junta tried to divide the opposition forces, 
specially the student forces of the country. A major faction of the JCD, the student wing of the BNP, 
joined the junta side and moved forward against the APSU in the Dhaka University campus with the 
protection of the Army and police forces in November 1990. In the united resistance, the APSU with 
the support of thousands of neutral students won over the battle in the campus, in which the nasty 
design of the junta to divide the student forces had been foiled and the student s supporters of the 
junta ran away from the campus forever. The military administration promulgated a new Educational 
Institution Law and Order Ordinance that permitted the sudden closing of all educational institutions 
all over the country in November 1990, which made all the parents anxious for the annual 
examinations of their children. Curfew and security measures were imposed and the Armed Forces 
along with the Police and BDR were moving in the major cities including the capital city of Dhaka. 
Arrest and jail of the vital student and political leaders were being operated through out the country. 
But all of these measures turned ineffective to the united resistance of the opposition. However, the 
movement turned in to a violent and turmoil itinerary when the armed hooligans killed a veteran 
professional leader, Dr Shamsul Alam Khan Milon, Joint Secretary, BMA in the adjacent area of 
TSC in the Dhaka University campus on 27 November 1990. The professionals and intellectuals 
segment of the society came into the street for protest along with the students, trade unions and 
political forces of the country. In the face of millions of protesters, the junta declared state of 
emergency and called the armed forces to restore law and order situation. The army moved to the 
major cities including the capital of Dhaka. The armed forces understood that the situation of mass 
upsurge was now beyond the limit of their control and they did not agree to back the junta anymore. 
In the end, losing the support of the armed forces and peaceful exit guarantee led the junta to the 
announcement of the giving up power on 6`h December 1990. Millions of the people came to street 
with joys for the victory of democracy throughout the country in a couple of seconds at night with 
this announcement, which was relayed by the BBC evening service special news bulletin. However, 
this was a great political event of the country in the post independent period. 
24 According to the survey statistics in table 9.9.1, almost all of the respondents have recognised 
unanimously the central role of the APSU in making the final stage mass revolution. In fact, they 
were considered as the commanding force of this movement. Overall, 99% of respondents (in which 
83.5% approve 'a very good deal') have recognised their contribution as 'a good deal'. In the second 
stage, the respondents have recognised the role of political parties and alliances. In general, 'a good 
deal' contribution of the BNP-A (90%) is found slightly higher than that of the AL-A (84%). By 
contrast, in the highest scale-'a very good deal' is found slightly higher for AL-A (39.8%) than that 
of the BNP-A (35.9%). The leftist 5 party-A is also found with some contribution by 68% (in which 
13.1% approve 'a very good deal') even though a significant section of 24.8% have rejected their 
role as 'not very much' and 3.3% for 'none at all'. The role of the JIB and IPs in the uprising was 
insignificant. 24 In the third stage, the role of the TU played a fundamental role in the movement 
which is supported by 86.9% respondents (in which 30.1% for 'a very good deal'). In the fourth stage, 
the respondents considered the contribution of the intellectuals and professionals as supported by 
85.9% and 81.1% respectively (in which 18.4% and 16.5% respectively approve them 'a very good 
deal') while a small parts of 12.1% and 11.2% respectively disagree with their role as 'not very 
much. ' 
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25 The people of all classes and occupations were coming under a heroic struggle in the on-going 
mass movement for a single demand of the resignation of autocratic military dictator General Ershad, 
to re-establish the spirit and values of liberation war and to create a permanent democratic way of life in the country. In the different stages of this movement, the people embraced the arrests and jails, killings and injuries and false lawsuits to establish a real representative democratic government in the 
country. The aim of this struggle that took pools of bloods of thousands of countrymen was to resist the unconstitutional capture of power. The central aim of all of demands was to establish a sovereign 
parliament of the people representatives by a free and fair electoral practice. But, General Ershad who 
seized power was playing a continuous election fraud to sustain his illegal power. There were frequent and wide spread false votes, robbery of ballot boxes, capture of polling centres, media coup in announcing results and voter less elections were the main characteristics of every election held 
under his military regime. At this stage, the main opposition force felt that it was not possible to hold free and neutral elections under military administration. 26 For Details of the formula of the Caretaker Government, please see Mizanur Rahman Choudhury, 
in Begali, Rajnitir Tinkal (Three Generations of Politics), Hafez Mahmuda Foundation, Dhaka 2001, 
Appendix-27, pp. 394-395. The main points of this guidelines included 1. Setting free of the country from the autocratic General Ershad and the misrule of his government which was established by 
killings, coups, conspiracy and aggression, in the aim of re-establishing the spirit of independence 
and liberation war that would be able to establish a democratic rule in the country, (a) Under the 
regular provision of the constitution, President (General Ershad) would be forced to dissolve his 
cabinet and parliament under Article 58(5) and Article 72 (1) of the constitution. The present Vice- 
President (Barrister Moudud Ahmed) would resign under Article 51 (A)(1)and the junta President 
would be forced to appoint a new Vice-President (Chief Justice of the Country) who would be non- 
partisan, neutral and accepted to all anti-autocratic and anti-communal opposition democratic forces 
under Article 51(3) and thereafter the junta would resign from the office of the President and 
promptly transfer his power to the newly appointed Vice-President. (b) In this process, immediately 
after the resignation of the junta, the new Vice-President would take the charge of the office of the 
President as the Acting President under Article 51 (1) of the constitution. Thereafter, under the 
leadership of the Acting President, a non-partisan interim caretaker government would be formed 
including a council of advisors, where the Acting President would be regarded as Chief Advisor 
under Article 58. The principal task of this interim government is to ensure a free and fair election of 
the sovereign parliament within three months of the dissolution under Article 123 (3) of the 
constitution. 2. (a) The Chief Advisor of the Caretaker Government would be non-partisan and 
neutral, i. e. he would not be a follower of or would not have any relation with any political party of 
the country i. e. he would not be allowed to participate in the election for the post of President, Vice- 
President or Member of the Parliament; and any other advisor of the council would not be allowed to 
participate in the election; (b) This interim Government would reconstitute the Election Commission 
and re-evaluate and recast its powers and functions under Article 118 (1) ensuing a free and fair 
election of the sovereign parliament including the day to day basic duties of the regular 
administration.; (c) To restore the confidence of the voters and ensure the guarantee so that they 
could be able to cast their vote independently without any influence according to their wisdom and 
consideration; (d) To ensure the full neutrality in the public media, all state-run media including 
radio and TV would be transformed to full autonomous and independent bodies and all competitive 
political parties in the election should be provided equal chances for the advertisement of their 
agenda of the election; 3. The interim Caretaker Government is bound to transfer its power to the 
representatives of the elected sovereign parliament and would be accountable to the elected 
parliament. 4. The provision of the constitutional rule in the country would be absolute and would be 
continued on the basis of the appreciation of the sovereignty of the people and must be averted of any 
unconstitutional attempt to capture the power; (a) under no circumstances, a constitutional and 
elected government would be removed in any unconstitutional way without a due process of election; 
(b) The protection of the fundamental rights of the people, independence and neutrality of the 
judiciary and the rule of law would be guaranteed; (c) Any law inconsistent with fundamental rights 
of the people would be rescinded. 
27 Interview of the General Ershad with researcher during his fieldwork in Bangladesh in March 2003. 
He told that "I handed over power to my Vice-President. It was done by force. " 
28 See Moudud Ahmed, op. cit, p. 338 
29 The survey statistics in table 9.11.1 presents the level of sacrifice of different constituents of the 
participants in the movement. First, the survey has recognised the single highest sacrifice of the 
student constituents and 99.5% respondents have considered their effort as 'LOS' in which highest 
85.4% has supported their sufferings as 'quite a lot of sacrifice'(quite a LOS). Second, the statistics 
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considers the sacrifices of the constituents of the workers of major political parties in which S-1'; 
respondents speak out `LOS' for the `workers of the AL' supporting them again for t highest 47.6% 
for `quite a LOS' while 90.7%, 83% and 17% support the BNP, leftists and JI& IPs respecti%ely in 
the same scale for the same cause (in which 35.4%, 30.1% and 2.9% respectively have supported tor 
`quite a LOS'). However, it is distinctive that the highest 42.7% respondents have considered the JI 
&IPs for `ALS' (in a further down grading their role, 32.5% by `no sacrifice' rejects their an), kind of 
sacrifice in the movement). Third, 88.4% respondents stand out with 'LOS' for the huge sufferings 
(37.4% for `quite a LOS') for the TU constituents. Comparatively, the contribution of the 
professionals and intellectuals are found lower than that of the TU constituents. Only 62.7rß and 66% 
respondents have considered `LOS' for both of them respectively (with 8.3% and 6.8% for 'quite a 
LOS' respectively). However, a considerable section of the respondents, 36.4x% and 31.1% 
respectively have considered them for `ALS', and none, however, deny their contribution in the 
movement. Fourth, the socio-economic status i. e. class constituent also marks the sacrifice of its 
participants. The `LOS' for the middle class participants has received the highest response by 92.7% 
(including 59.2% for `quite a LOS') followed by the lower class by 80.6%7 (with 31.6% for quite a 
LOS') along with the higher class by the lowest 7.8% in the same scale. 29 Fifth, the survey reveals a 
significant characteristic that the movement was centred mainly in the urban area than that of the 
rural periphery of the country. 97.6% respondents (including 80.6% for 'quite a LOS') have 
considered of `LOS' for the urban constituent in comparison to that rural area by 24.2% only. It is 
significant that 74.8% also considers `ALS' for the rural supporters, which is almost none (1.5(/(, only) 
to urban constituent. The sacrifice of some demographic characteristics of the participants i. e. gender 
and age constituent have also been identified in the movement. There was no significant foundation 
of the gender issue in the movement. 29 The survey has revealed the fact that 98.5(( respondents 
support the `LOS' of the male participants in the movement (including 85.4% for 'quite a LOS') in 
comparison to female participants by 41.3% only, although 57.3% respondents consider the 
sufferings of the women as `ALS' in comparison to their male counterpart with almost none in the 
same scale. The findings of the survey present a general but significant length of the variations in the 
age group participants. 99% respondents (with 82% for `quite a LOS') have recognised the 'LOS' of 
the youth (15-35 age group) opposing by almost none while 88.8 % support the adult participation 
(35-55 age group) in the same scale ( with 17% for `quite a LOS'). In general, only 18.5 % supports 
the 55+ age group by `LOS' while a major part of respondents (78.1 %) marks their anguish by `ALS' 
other than the leaderships of the movement, in which a considerable part of 13.1%- deny their cause. 
Another important constituent of participants of the movement was the Toky (5-12 age groups)-the 
street urchins or floating children, who might be considered as a fatal socio-economic legacy for their 
rootless ness in the cities beyond their age group identity. In general, 53.7% respondents (21.5% for 
`quite a LOS') however, supports their contributions as 'LOS' who always participated in a number 
in all types of actions of the oppositions, and frequently embraced baton charges, shootings, tear gas 
and even precaution jail by the police 
30 In his interview with researcher, the military dictator argued that all foreign missions were aware 
about the military takeover. 
31 See Moudud Ahmed, op. cit, Footnote-1, p. 303 
32 The statistics in table 9.12.1 presents the level of involvement of different diplomatic missions and 
agencies in the democratic transition in Bangladesh. The survey findings reveal the view that USA 
played a central role as the directive of international forces at any change in the state power. The 
USA mission in Dhaka played such key role behind the scene for the safe transfer of power to the 
representatives of democratic forces of the country, which was supported by 31.1 % respondents (with 
13.1% for `most important role'). By contrast, 25.2% disagree with the fact while 43.7% remains 
silent. The presence of the role of the `geopolitical forces' is also revealed in the survey. In second 
position, 28.6% respondents believe the Indian government to have played necessary role in this 
regard in which 13.6% consider their 'most important role'. However, 24.8% do not believe in any 
such role played by them and 46.6% are unable to answer on such event. As a member of the 
Commonwealth, Bangladesh has been following the British customs in her politics, economy, 
judiciary, education and bureaucracy and in intelligentsias. Therefore, the survey also shows the 
British influence on the political affairs of the country. 28.1% respondents (with 6.3% 'most 
important role') consider the necessary role played by British High Commission in Dhaka, in the 
democratisation process differing by 26.2% with no such role while 45.6% remains unvoiced. The 
EEC, UN, Commonwealth and Japanese mission in Dhaka had also some significant role along with 
USA and British initiative in this process. Besides the diplomatic angle, there are some key foreign 
aid organisations such as World Bank, IMF and Foreign Aid Consortium and donor agencies, which 
had direct influence on the political economy of the country. The political role of the IMF and World 
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Bank in giving their financial assistance to Bangladesh military dictatorship as well as their pressure 
for establishing democracy in the country was nonetheless countable as supported by 27.217( 
respondents. In the same way, the Foreign Aid Consortium, xhich organised the meeting of the 
donors in Paris every year to support many development projects in Bangladesh, also favoured to 
establish democratic rule in the country, as supported by 25.8% respondents. 
33 Bangladesh is bordered by India from three sides; accept only in the south by Bay of Bengal and a 
smaller touch with Myanmar in the southeast. The business and commerce of the country especially 
the imports of every day commodities by roads are mainly dependent on India. As very influential 
geopolitical forces, India, therefore, had also a greater influence on the state affairs of the country. 
° The EEC mission is also considered by 21.3% and differed by 30.1% as well for their individual 
important role in the democratisation process. They might have the participation in the collective 
endeavour along with USA and British missions in Dhaka. Side by side, the UN mission in Dhaka 
had also similar role, which is supported by 20.5%r respondents while 27.3% rejects such kind of 
initiative by them. Among other diplomatic missions, the Commonwealth Secretariat in London 
(15.1%) and the Japanese Embassy in Dhaka (10.7%) are considered to have played some significant 
role in the democratisation process in the final stage of the movement in 1990. 
351t is widely believed that the international core countries including USA, Great Britain, and Japan 
etc have control on these organisations and can influence the aid flows to the affected country. 
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Chapter Eleven 
Conclusions 
The sociological understanding of the movement for the restoration of 
democracy in Bangladesh against the military dictatorship of General Ershad, as 
found in this research, demonstrates the power and strength of the people in making 
the revolution against the `satanic nest of the power greedy military intrigues'. The 
findings of the research have shown the military dictatorship was in every respect a 
betrayer and most vociferous opponent to the process of democratisation as well as 
for the institution of military itself in the 1980s Bangladesh. This also shows that the 
growth of uneven class composition in the social structure of pre and post 
independent Bangladesh leads to the rise of dictatorship and the movement for the 
social and political emancipation of the people. The latter became powerful due to 
the incapacity of the military dictatorship to adapt to the changing social 
formation-social differentiation, conflicts of new socio-economic groups and 
classes in the wake of reshaped modes of new economic life. Consequently, a slow 
but sturdy development of political and socio-cultural forces was able to start a 
revolution in building a capitalist democracy. The chronological order and effective 
events of the movement-actions, counter actions, violence, repressions, rebellions 
and vengeances, and the overthrow of the Ershad regime by the democratic people 
reflect the inability of the military in running the state. Even if there was a minimal 
unity in the diverse opposition political forces in the pre and post takeover periods of 
the junta, these dragons of military could not have the ability to seize the power and 
keep it for nearly a decade. The end of the cold war between the main powers in the 
global political order in the end of 1980s had also determined the fate of dictatorial 
regimes around the world and somewhat influenced the process of democratisation 
in Bangladesh 
The movement for restoration of democracy forced the military to abstain from 
the political process in Bangladesh. This could be regarded as a partial achievement 
of the democratic forces, which, however, might have posed threats to the 
continuation of the democratisation process. The success of the movement and the 
nature of the departure of the military dictatorship in Bangladesh are likely to have 
been exceptional compared to the patterns of exit of the authoritarian regimes 
around the world. Some observations in this whole process are crucial in this regard. 
The Bangladesh movement could have brought the criminal coup leaders to trial. 
Only the ring leader of the coup, General Ershad was placed under house arrest. 
Although some civilian associates of the dictator were put into the central jail in the 
capital, no other military officials were given any sentences for their misdeeds 
during the decade long military suppression of the people. This pattern of succession 
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of the democratic process did not have any effect on the movement participants and 
democratic people as it happened after the fall of many military dictators around the 
world. The divergent political leaderships of the movement had failed either to do so 
or did not take part in the prosecution of the coup leaders in order to keep the 
military in their favour in the ensuing power struggle. It is also relevant to argue that 
the coherence of military in their interest, status, power and privilege was also a 
crucial factor that might have influenced the leaderships of the movement to choose 
the Armed Forces as a whole without General Ershad. This happened in three ways. 
First, it would have reserved a possibility of the truce between central leaderships of 
the movements and the leaders of the Armed Forces that formulated an exit plan 
with guarantee of no loss for the latter and only after that assurance, the Army left 
power. Second, any one of the two major political alliances-widely believed to be 
the BNP-in the opposition democratic forces might have an understanding with the 
military leaders that they would not demand the trial of the army criminals of the 
regime so that this section of the army would favour them coming to power-for the 
victory in the upcoming JS elections. This process, if any, has also made weaker the 
demands of the movement to bring the coup leaders to justice. Under the darkness of 
the conflict of the race for power between the two major opposition forces, the 
demands of the people to hang the culprit military dictator was lost-a mistake was 
made to let off the Generals without punishment, which in fact, has left the chances 
for a return of the military to power in future greater. Third, the clever high ranking 
Generals of the military willingly left power before the movement had risen to a 
revolutionary stage that could wipe out the whole military institution, while there 
was an absence of active unity among the opposition forces in all stages of the 
movement. It is also argued with a sound academic expression by the scholars 
related to the military's vested interests that the beginning of the democratic process 
in the country was a peaceful transition of power by the military itself. But this does 
avoid the arguments if the sentences of the coup makers were inevitable for the safe 
development of the democratic process in the country, and in the ensuing struggle, it 
does not give any guarantee that the military institution would have lessened their 
control over the political process and would not be involved further in state power. 
How all of these arguments would be resolved and would be able to find a gateway 
for the resurrection of a democratic society, depends on how much the political 
institutions are able to train up a professional-rather than a political-military 
institution in the future political process of the country. 
However, the rudimentary passion of the movement, according to its leaders 
and participants, was to place the coup's army officers and their civilian 
collaborators under trial-that would strictly rule out any such ambition in future 
from the same vested quarter. The military personnel-officers and soldiers who 
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were drawn into the intervention following the torture of the civilians should be 
removed for the sake of democracy and to safeguard the discipline of the military 
itself. If necessary, the entire Armed Forces in service under Martial Law should be 
replaced by a completely new one. The collaborators among the high ranking 
personnel of the bureaucracy, police and BDR must be treated in the same manner 
for their misdeeds. 
There are the following options for the survival of the military institution as a 
supporting force for the development of full pledged democracy to practice in the 
country. First, if Bangladesh does not encounter any threats from neighbours or 
international forces to her sovereignty, she may consider the abolition of the military 
as a war necessity and to employ more effort to construct a more powerful domestic 
and border forces, so that the democracy would be free from the internal threat of 
the military fascism. Second, as a poor nation, Bangladesh has to spend a lot of 
revenue to maintain it's military. So Bangladesh may raise a small Army as a 
symbol that may be used to maintain ceremonies where it is so necessary. Third, 
although popular support is being aired in favour of building the huge military 
abilities that would be considered as a money earning force-as is being used 
now-in international peacekeeping mission. However, the question of who would 
maintain the expenditure to raise these extra forces when they return, as there will be 
an end to the necessity of peacekeeping missions and who would give the guarantee 
that they would not again be a threat to democracy needs to be resolved. Fourth, 
Bangladesh would have a military in collaboration with international superpowers so 
that its army and democracy would equally benefit, in which they can fight in favour 
of any international force and would be maintained by them. In this regard, the 
Bangladesh Army may be adjoined with the US military, NATO or even the Indian 
Army, if there was have been a guarantee of no threat to our sovereignty. Fifthly, 
Bangladesh could maintain a strong military that is guaranteed only in their 
institutional framework and would have legal restrictions to maintain a distance 
from the pure political institutions until they are retired from service. The careful 
implementation of any one or more of all these options may, however, be able to 
ensure Bangladesh is free from further military led destruction of democracy and the 
military institution itself. 
The social formation-primarily the necessary class developments-required 
for the movement was critical in the Bangladeshis case. First, a left 
linked pro- 
movement class formation, middle and lower class, originating mainly 
in the 
agricultural land, but having a link with urbanised and non-agricultural culture 
through their formative education, which had been configured under the phase of 
colonial rule of the British and Pakistan. This 
limited their objectives in the 
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nationalist and freedom movement from any kind of extreme or revolutionary 
change of society. These classes remained as the decisive and participatory forces in 
any kind of movement for social and political change in this region. Second, the 
infrastructural, administrative and industrial development under British rule had also 
contributed in building a non-agricultural reservoir of working and lower middle 
class who later had mostly developed to an independent non-agricultural middle 
class under Pakistan rule, and at a later stage into an affluent middle class in the 
wake of the introduction of a free economy and private entrepreneurship in the post 
independence Bangladesh. This already affluent class always maintained a clever 
balance between the ruling dictatorship and pro-movement forces-slightly leaned 
with latter assuming that any change may create further opportunity for the 
enhancement of their wealth with civilian regime. Third, as Bangladesh has a long 
experience of the chronic dominance of non-political military vested interest groups 
in state power in her pre and post independent history- for nearly thirty years, a 
pattern of an intolerant and coercive dominant class under the consolidation and 
patronage of military vested interest had been rooted in the society who were 
brought up all through the malpractices and illegal means in their socio-economic 
and political life. This class, in and outside power, had always played a subsequent 
role in the formation of class configuration in the power structure-center to 
periphery-of Bangladesh society. The success of the democratisation movement in 
Bangladesh against the military dictatorship of General Ershad wholly depended on 
how far the opposition democratic forces were able to curtail the influence of this 
third category class in the socio-economic and political atmosphere of the country. 
The movement for democracy in fact, originated in the development of the 
nationalist and independence struggle of the people of the Indian subcontinent in the 
end stage of the British period. This was mainly speeded up with the development of 
universities and colleges, the rail network, industrial development and huge 
expansion of administrative and judiciary infrastructure under British rule from the 
end of nineteenth century to the beginning of twentieth century. Through the start of 
the Indian National Congress (INC) in 1885 and the Muslim League (ML) in 1906, 
the struggle for political emancipation of the Indian nations began. The 
establishment of Dhaka University in 1921 in Dhaka became the center of the 
growth of an educated middle class in the capital of the then East Bengal, now 
Bangladesh. The birth of the Krishak Proja Party of Sher-e-Bangla in the 1930s was 
accepted popularly mainly in Bengal, which was centred on the landed middle and 
lower class. The growth of Bengali nationalist movement took place side by side 
with the INC and the ML. After the end of British rule, the birth of the East Pakistan 
Muslim Awami League (EPMAL) in 1949 took the leadership of this landed middle 
class along with the new educated salaried middle class in the capital to district 
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towns. The expansion of this class continued indefinitely under the new colonial 
Pakistan military regimes up to the birth of independent Bangladesh in 1971. The 
character of this middle class comprised of education based urban professionals and 
business men mainly who maintained a strong link with rural periphery through 
their ownership of land that was cultivated by sharecroppers or lease keepers. A 
major part of them were brought up in a left leaning revolutionary and nationalist 
spirit-carrying strong anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist beliefs, but still could not 
disconnect them from the magnetism of the growing westernised culture of the cities 
and towns. This nationalist and pro-socialist middle class mainly came to power 
with the liberation of Bangladesh. The upper layer of this middle class-the 
leadership of the nationalist forces was mainly educated salaried professionals and 
business men of the cities and towns, while the lower layer of this class-the pro 
socialist forces was trade union workers, students of rural background and working 
class of the non-agri cultural sectors. Immediately after independence, the first 
category of the middle class took the chance to establish democratic rule in the 
country-the parliamentary form government-a constitutional democracy took off. 
In the next three years, the pro-socialist middle class became consolidated under a 
section of nationalist forces, which led the government to turn down the path of the 
democracy-a socialist reform with one party government took place in the 
beginning of 1975. Before the full operation of this socialist movement in the power 
base of all levels in the society, the leader of this section-country's founding father 
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was killed in a triangular conspiracy of the 
anti-liberation forces, anti-socialist forces and the military institution of the country. 
The post-independence nationalist middle class that was just removed from 
power-pro democratic and pro-socialist-was pushed to the street in the movement 
for democracy from 1975 to 1981 under the military regimes of Khondoker 
Mostaque Ahmed, Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad Saem and General Ziaur Rahman. 
However, General Zia enacted the regulation for multi-party democracy under 
which he revived the opportunity for political activities in the name of religion that 
was banned in the original constitution of the country. Although he was a freedom 
fighter and a genuine field commander of the liberation war, he allowed many anti- 
liberation personnel in his military cabinet and in his umbrella party, the BNP-to 
face the movement of genuine democratic forces in opposition under the leadership 
of the AL. This was the beginning of the creation of a pro-religious new middle 
class by state patronage-which was only the career of plundering state wealth 
without having any modern education, culture, norms and values of democracy. As a 
result, soon after the death of General Zia, due to lack of democratic culture and 
values in his party-the BNP collapsed from power and was simply taken over by 
another traitor General Ershad. The new General employed his effort to dress up his 
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activities with a full fundamentalist cover-the expansion of an illiterate vv ealthy 
middle class as well as the destruction of democratic values of the nationalist and 
original educated middle class by the patronage of military institution, thus, 
reinforced until his oust from power in 1990. 
The collapse of the military dictatorship of General Ershad in the face of a 
mass uprising in Bangladesh has many resemblances and contrasts to the similar 
kind of events around the contemporary world. This was especially true in the 
aftermath of Second World War, when the popular military institutions of many 
countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, even some part of Europe used their 
war gained popularity to capture the state power, in most cases, in favour of western 
capitalism as a counter force to the rise of popular leftist movements of the time. 
The small but coherent unity of the military institutions became monopoly forces 
serving the interest purely of capitalism to destroy the chances of the civilian 
aspiration- whether for nationalist democracy or socialism or communism-to 
establish their own choice of rule in these societies. The birth of the Bangladesh 
military through the liberation war-although a repatriated faction inside the army, 
in addition, was functioning-had a resemblance of this type of popularity that was 
shrewdly used later for the intervention in state power for several times. There were 
also many resemblances of huge genuine movements of the democratic people in 
Bangladesh with these countries to expel the Generals from power. In all respects, 
the peoples' victory was inevitable and the Generals were compelled to step down. 
In this situation, the dictatorship was either fully uprooted and killed in the wake of 
a mass revolution, or fled the country for shelter, for example-General 
Chaucheshku in Rumania, Ferdinand Marcos in Philippines or Noriega in Panama 
and the like. In Bangladesh, the fall of the dictatorship of General Ershad clinches 
the difference in the similar contemporary events in that he was able to survive any 
kind of serious punishment according to the strongest demands of the pro- 
democratic revolution. Hence, they would remain as an indirect latent functional and 
elementary forces to the discourses of the process of democratisation-a permanent 
constraint on the democratic administration. The prospect of the advancement of a 
democratic society expressing the aspirations of the scarifies of thousands of the 
martyrs was completely dependent on how far the many divided democratic forces 
would be able to congregate under a broad based national reconciliation-a 
minimum consensus in all national issues and debates. Only this unity of political 
elites in all national causes could keep alive the possibility of the institutionalization 
of the democracy in Bangladesh society. 
The guarantee of the holding of a free and fair and trustworthy election 
seemed-from the experiences of the polls under military dictatorships-to have 
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been a necessary requirement to the smooth practice of democracy. Bangladesh, by 
virtue of its inherent desire of the movement, established a Caretaker Government- 
a non-partisan interim election supervising authority-to operate the election. The 
matter of the fact was that they used to deploy a corrupt and distracted army that had 
already lost its trust in the operation of many bogus and voter less elections to justify 
the reign of military dictatorships. The fair truth, if anybody listens during the 
election season, it would not be impossible to find many instances of the bundles of 
unseen money is being handed over secretly to the in-charge military officials- 
where there was no accountability, chain of command, morals, values of this army 
that had already been lost under the military regime and would never be regained. 
For the sake of democracy, the deployment of the army in any election is to be 
stopped, which is the fundamental precondition of the free and fair election. The 
trained police forces and the wisdom of the political institution is enough to ensure 
free and fair elections. Sometimes, the army was found to elect their favourable 
candidates in the elections. The experiences of deployment of the military in the 
elections in post-independent Bangladesh may support this truth in practice. Hence, 
the army must be separated from any kind of popular events for the safety and 
prospect of democracy. 
Through the aggression, interventions and the seizure of state power by the 
military institution, the sprit, ethics and culture of the middle class that were the 
vital supports to the rule of democracy were completely destroyed. In fact, the one 
and half decade military rule from August 1975 to December 1990-direct or 
indirect, in `uniform' or in civilian cover-was responsible for dividing this middle 
class or had even created a separate but new trend that was used to counter the 
existing middle class leaned to the rule of democracy. The existing middle class- 
developed mainly in the movement for autonomy and independence against the 
ruling military cliques of Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s and was born with the 
birth of independent Bangladesh-stood with the fundamental values of 
nationalism and democracy while the new middle class-grown during the phase of 
military rule-did not have such values, which was mainly produced as the outcome 
of the plundering the wealth of the people in association with military leaders to 
counter the forces of the pro-democratic middle class. This existing middle class- 
the fundamental base of any democratic society-is developed in a definite time in a 
society in accordance with the development of education, economy and culture that, 
in fact, is the practised tradition of the society. The military rulers were keen to 
develop a new middle class by distributing the illegal and plundered wealth of the 
state without proper education and culture. This class became affluent quickly by the 
direct patronage of the petrodollar from Middle East countries-mostly in the name 
of development of the religious institutions like mosques and madrasha (Islamic 
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schools): By the regular expansion of this plundering middle class under military 
rule, the original educated and cultured middle class that developed earlier became 
disconnected from the main current of the society. As a result, the basic, liberal and 
mild instinct of the modern society became distorted-all institutions became 
affected-mostly in the thoughts of the people where they became powerless to 
judge the difference between honest and dishonest, wrong and right, and good and 
bad in their ways of life. A large section of the population of Bangladesh became 
powerless in this way so that a General like Ershad was able to become forcibly 
their leader. In this trend, the military rule in Bangladesh was not only involved in 
plundering the economy but also had destroyed her social and political culture and 
was responsible for the rise of fundamentalism-the basic and foremost enemy of 
the rule of democracy. The military rule of General Zia was responsible for sowing 
the seeds of fundamentalism when he had revived and endorsed-by military order 
and later was accepted under Fifth Amendment of the constitution-the religious 
groups in politics, which was debarred in the original constitution of 1972. General 
Ershad fuelled these legacies and shrewdly used this approach of running 
fundamentalism in every sphere of social life-facilitating their wealthy roots that 
transferred them into a middle class prone to fundamentalism-a permanent setback 
to the establishment of the values of modern democracy in Bangladesh society. The 
task that military leader General Zia started with the distribution of incentives by 
plundering the wealth of the state among these groups to create his own support base 
against the ongoing democratic values of the society was taken further under 
General Ershad. This class-in military as well as in civilians of religious quarters 
under the patronage of the state became the main share of power of General Ershad 
under the umbrella of his JP as well as what was remained in the opposition force- 
that struggled to establish a democratic rule-as a significant faction in the BNP and 
anti-liberation forces JIB. In the post-Ershad period, these middle class 
fundamentalist factions of political forces in the country became the main counter 
forces to the middle class committed to the practice of modern democracy. 
The end of the military dictatorship of General Ershad-the restoration of 
constitutional rule-in fact, was the starting point of the aspiration for the 
institutionalization of the democracy in the country. The establishment of 
democracy in government as well as in all stages of the socio-political life of the 
people depends on how far the democratic forces-political parties and interest and 
pressure groups including students, intellectuals, professionals and trade unions and 
democratic vicinity, as well as the tools of democracy-elections, law and order, 
norms and values, and culture-could operate successfully in every sphere of the 
society. In necessary condition, the democratic forces must be reinstated in all public 
functions replacing the presence of any type of defence forces-specially the 
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military and para military BDR forces. In an emergency situation like flood, famine. 
drought and storms, there are many examples to deploy the military to public 
activities in the name of their assistance, which, definitely, is suicidal to the 
governments of new democracies-especially which have just experienced the 
military aggressions into the power. In stead, the democratic forces-all party 
students brigade, all party emergency committee, all party intellectuals and 
professional bodies or all party trade unions unity could operate such activities that 
would enhance further the chances to foster democracy among the general public. 
To bring up democracy in a society like Bangladesh-a backward, underdeveloped 
countryside with limited opportunities, the government for democracy must be 
sincere to the regular practise of democratic culture among the conscious quarters- 
the universities and colleges, the professional and intellectual institutions and trade 
union organisations, which are regarded as the breeding ground of democratic 
culture and leaderships-of the society. In Bangladesh, from the experiences of the 
many events in the nation's history, the student community who represent all 
classes-lower class illiterate farming labourers to middle class government officers 
and industrial and agricultural upper class-has been the regulatory force in any 
change-peaceful or revolutionary-in the society. Hence, the regular operation of 
the elections in the universities and colleges that would expand huge new 
leaderships for democracy, and a constructive and peaceful management of the 
student politics is able to broaden the taste of democracy from the urban cities and 
towns to the rural periphery. It was the examined instances in Bangladesh society 
that the regular elections in the universities and colleges and in the trade unions of 
intellectuals, professionals and working class labourers enhanced the base of the 
middle class support for democracy as well as diminished the chances of the rise of 
any unconstitutional forces allied to root the fundamentalism in society. It was 
observed in the post-Ershad period, the democratic governments of Begum Zia and 
Sheikh Hasina did not encourage any such activities prone to the extension of the 
democratic forces. There were many reasons behind their decisions-the pressure 
from military vested interests under their false intelligence reports or to earn cheap 
popularity raising the slogan of banning student and trade union politics or to secure 
their dynasty-as believed by many political critiques-in the competition of the 
future leadership of the country. The absence of the participation of the democratic 
forces everywhere in the administration, however, led to the instability of their 
democratic reigns and showed their empty abilities that made much dissatisfaction 
among the countrymen, which enhanced the problems for the future prospect of 
democracy in the country. In the failure of their dynasty, the chances of the 
unconstitutional forces for power would be increased-the land of freedom, liberty 
and equalities-the terms of democracy would be missing forever, and that would 
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even be more dangerous for the safety of their dynasty for which the people of 
Bangladesh is proud for-the heroic leaderships of the democracy. 
The chances of a further military takeover in Bangladesh power not are 
anymore possible in any kind-in any shape. Because, in the post independent 
years-through the struggle and movements against the authoritarian regimes-a 
sizable civil society and democratic forces necessary in the radius of the cities and 
towns has been developed that is enough to the forced removal of-if any-future 
unconstitutional forces from power. Hence, this kind of further attempt would bring 
events of great bloodshed and chronic instability in the political process of the 
country, and would increase the possibility of the complete destruction of military 
institution itself. After the collapse of the Ershad dictatorship, the channels in the 
military were able, for only once and that must be for the last, to manage the top 
level political leaders to release them from death-sentence, but the would-be success 
of the future movement-if this would have needed to do so against such a military 
dictatorship again-would be able to deracinate their last root from the hinterland of 
democratic society. However, a tolerant and civic as well as respectful to democratic 
rule and solely professional military institution is to be developed for the smooth 
continuation of the process of the democratisation. For that, the governments should 
strengthen their ties and friendships with other democracies around the world and so 
on, for the military of the country. For this objective, our military could work 
closely with the nations of leading democracies-USA, European Union and 
India-so that the military of this country would be enriched by the frequent training 
of democratic norms and values, and culture and in the same way, they must be 
detached from the connection of any sorts of authoritarian regimes around the world. 
The success of the movement for the restoration of democracy was partial and 
unfinished. It was nipped in the bud and was thwarted before it was ripe in the 
interest of the military itself. In the dazzling mass uprising, although it was true that 
the military leaders were compelled to disappear from the power race-a temporary 
supremacy of political and state elites was established over these power greedy 
militia service men-who are led only by the power of their guns rather than any 
other qualifications comparing to other leading professions under the republic, 
virtually the failure of the opposition democratic forces to ensure the cautionary and 
instanced retribution of the criminal coup leaders has put the fate of democracy at 
great risk. This failure of the opposition forces was long standing in their palpable 
disunity on which the military was able to sustain the power as well as escaped the 
charges for their crimes against humanity after the exit of the power. Although the 
divisions in the original civilian democratic secular nationalist pro liberation 
forces-between the AL and some other popular leftist forces-were already 
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functioning that led their unity of 15-party alliance an ultimate failure, however, the 
adding of the BNP-another civilian face of the military-as the opposition force 
and a latent and continuous patronage of the military for setting this party as an 
alternative power element in the wake of the imminent failure of Ershad dictatorship 
had weakened the pure non-military civilian secular opposition political forces 
under the AL and leftists force in the drama of raising the cheap slogan for the unity 
in the movement. This sharp disunity has been an ongoing situation and could not be 
resolved. Therefore, the aspiration for the development of strong democratic forces 
and institutions would be only in the expectation of the people rather than in reality 
until some measures-to stop patronizing any political party by military vested 
quarter-were taken in this regard for sensible solution. 
The popularity of the political parties is also a condition for the development 
of strong democratic forces-the lack of which decrease the power of general mass 
to protest against the brute forces in power like military. In Bangladesh, except the 
leftists and fundamentalist forces, the functioning of the leadership of the main 
power-contender civilian political parties-from center to periphery-were not clear 
and fair-did not reflect the opinions of the party workers that was to be a 
temporary solution, but was never a permanent policy for the development of a 
democratic society. This always created factionalism in the party institutions due to 
their limitation in a fair leadership selection process. This sometimes questioned the 
popularity of the leaders which ultimately detached the political parties from their 
mass base, and the military leaders used to collect their civilian associates from 
these dissatisfied leaders of the factions and used them to run through the general 
masses. For their own interest and security of democratic society, the functioning of 
leaderships in political parties should be fair and out of question. This was also one 
of the setbacks of the mainstream political parties that weakened the opposition 
movement many times and facilitated the monstrous military forces to sustain their 
power. 
The people of Bangladesh never wanted military rule nor did they want to 
fight against the independent military institution that respects the civilian rules. 
However, they had to fight against this military power in their long history of 
struggle for nation building that saw the military as a betrayer of the people's 
interests-to democracy. This military killed two Presidents of the country, and 
thousands of political workers in the movement for democracy as well as thousands 
of soldiers in the clutches of coups and counters coups in the very short period of 
post-independent Bangladesh. In the post-Ershad period, the military was still found 
to try to rehabilitate General Ershad in civilian politics, which posed a great threat to 
the continuation of the process of democracy. This has thrown the military in 
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opposition to the civilian political elites. In the same way, the uneven rift between 
the civilian political forces in the ensuing power struggle has been badly used by the 
military to keep their control on civilian politics. Consequently, since the military 
left power in 1990 they failed to achieve the trust of democratic forces of the 
country. The way out of this question of image of the military has to be conceived 
by military itself as well as by the careful interactions of the civilian political forces 
while they are in power. A national reconciliation between all civilian political 
forces and civil society has been an incessant feature of popular demand to uproot 
this `dragon seed' from the last edge of power politics. 
The history of destruction of civilisation and human beings beyond natural 
causes in nations around the world consequential in the huge cries of the human soul 
and mankind is the history of war and military. The characteristics of their invasion, 
intervention, seize and aggression may be different, but their faces of the despotic 
and cruel repression-genocide, killing, raping, plundering and arresting the 
freedom, liberty, impunity and equality of the mankind-are unchanged and 
indifferent. Oppositely, the honest and worthwhile impulse of democracy is to 
protect this domain of human civilisation-to uphold the voices of the mankind in 
every sphere of national to international brim of conflict resolution. In a word, 
democracy is the life to mankind. Let the movement of gleaming the light of this life 
of democracy be upheld forever in nations around the world until the end of the life 
of this human civilization. 
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APPENDIX-ONE 
Interview Questionnaire 
Dear Interviewee 
I am a PhD research student in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Leeds, UK. 
My research is: "The Movement for Restoration of Democracy in Bangladesh 1982-1990: A Study of Political 
Sociology". In my research, I am trying to analyse the social characteristics and actions of the mass 
movements against the military regime of General Ershad from 1982 to 1990. May I please request you to spend 
some time to answer the following questions, which will contribute to the research aiming at the objective 
analysis of the democracy movements in Bangladesh in 1980s? 
A. K. M. Jamal Uddin 
Four sections of the Questionnaire 
Section-1: Introduction of the Interviewee 
Q. 1.0: Name / code no ............................ 
Q. 1.1: 
Address: .................................................................................................. ........................ 
............................................................................................. 
Q. 1.2: Age in 1990... (a) Under 25 (b) 26-35 (c) 36-45 (d) 46-55 (e) 56-65 (f) Over 65 
[Coding: under 25 (1), 25-35 (2), 36-45 (3), 46-55(4), 56-65(5), over 65(5)] 
Q. 1.3: Gender: (a) Male .............................. (b)Female ............................................. 
[Coding, male-1, Female- 2] 
Q. 1.4: Educational qualifications: (a) under S. S. C (b) S. S. C (c) H. S. C (d) graduate (e) post-graduate 
[Coding, under S. S. C -1, S. S. C-2, H. S. C-3, graduate -4, and post-graduate-5] 
Q. 1.5: Occupation in 1980s/ 1990...? 
[Coding: Buisness-1, lawyers-2, Service-3, industrialist-4, landlord-5, student-6, politicians-7, physician-8, 
teacher-9, journalist-10, engineer-11, others-12] 
Q. 1.6: Designation in the organisation from 1982-1990: (a) President (b) Executive secretary (c) Presidium 
member... (d) Other (please specify) (in 1982-1990) 
[Coding: President-1, Executive Secretary-2, Presidium member-3, other-4] 
Q. 1.7: Religion: (a) Islam (b) Hindu (c) Buddhist (d) Christian (e) others (please specify) 
[Coding: Islam-1, Hindu-2, Bhuddhist-3, Christian-4, Others-5] 
Q. 1.8: Were you an active participant / member of any political party? Yes....... No... [Coding, Yes-1, No-2] 
If yes, which party? : (a) Bangladesh Awami League, (b) Bangladesh Nationalist Party, (c) Bangladesh 
Communist Party, (d)Bangladesh Workers Party, (e) Jamat-I-Islami Bangladesh, (f) others (please 
specify) ... [AL-1, BNP-2, 
CPB-3, BWP-4, JIB-5, others-6 .................. 
Q. 1.9: Are you a member of any interest groups/pressure group? Yes ........ No... [Coding, Yes-l, 
No-2] 
If yes, which of the following group you will be incorporated 
(a) Politician (b) student (c) intellectual (d) professional (e) member of trade union (Labourer/worker) 
(f) Non-participant pressure/interest group [Coding: politician-1, student-2, intellectual-3, professional-4, TU-5, 
NPG-6] 
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ý...... *Q. 1.10: Were you a supporter of the military regime of General Ershad in 1980s? Yes ... No 
[Coding, Yes-1, No-2] 
*Q. 1.11: In what ways did you participate in the movements against the military regime of Gen. Ershad? 
(a) As leader and organiser (b) active participant (c) supporter (d) neutral position (e) against the movement 
[Coding: As leader and organiser-1, active participant-2, supporter-3, neutral position-4, against the movement-5] 
Q. 1.12: How often you participated in the activities? (a) Participated regularly (b) participated irregularly (c) 
participated hardly ever (d) Never participated (e) no answer[Coding: participated regularly-1, participated 
irregularly-2, participated hardly ever-3, never participated-4, no answer-5] 
Section 2: Military Regime: The cause of Movement 
Q. 2.0: I would like to ask you to glance back to the democracy movements in the 1980s in Bangladesh. The 
Chief of Army staff Gen. Ershad captured the state power of Bangladesh on 1982 ousting the regular BNP 
government of Justice Abdus Satter . Tell me 
in which of the following way you agree or disagree to the 
military regime of General Ershad.. 
Agree....... Disagree ..... Don't 
know (DK)/ 
Refused 
Q. 2.1: Military intervention was expected by the people of 
Bangladesh society ...... """"......... ...... """ 
Q. 2.2: Military intervention was carried out by the Armed 
Forces of Bangladesh for their own interest ........ .. ". """"""". 
Q. 2.3: Justice Satter left the power to the Armed Forces ........... ............ ........... 
Q. 2.4: It was seen as a normal practice of the military 
aggression into the state power after the killing of 
Sheikh Mujib, the founding father of the state, in 1975 ............ ............. .......... 
Q. 2.5: Gen. Ershad captured the power to fulfil his 
personal ambition ...... """ "" ...... """...... """" 
Q. 2.6: Others, (if any, please specify) ........... ............ ........... 
[Coding: agree-1, disagree-2, don't know-31 
Q. 3.0: Social scientists have found out several causes of the military intervention in the state power in many 
countries around the world. Now I would like to draw to your attention to some of the following causes in regard 
to the military intervention of Gen. Ershad in Bangladesh. Please tell me which cause best describes your overall 
opinion of it.... (INSERT TERM... ROTATES... is strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, never 
agree, can n't rate) 
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly Never Can't 
Agree disagree agree rate 
Q. 3.1a: Corporate interest of the Armed forces 
was threatened by the Mujib regime creating JRB ....... ........ ......... .......... ....... ....... 
Q. 3.1b: A large scale killing of freedom fighters' 
soldiers and officers by Gen. Zia's regime ........ ...... ......... .......... .......... ....... 
Q. 3.2: Conflict between Freedom fighter factions 
and repatriated factions in the Armed Forces ......... ....... ......... ......... ......... ........ 
Q. 3.3: Ideological conflict between liberal 
faction and radical faction inside the Army .......... ...... .......... ......... ....... ........ 
Q. 3.4: International political order favoured 
the military regime to deter the rise of socialism 
in the state power. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 
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Q. 3.5: Absence of stable political culture and 
institution in the post-independent Bangladesh 
Q. 3.6: Bangladesh society was fit for an 
authoritarian regime as it was mainly an agrarian 
economy with high illiteracy, poverty and 
sharp inequality in her social life ......... 
Q. 3.7: Corruption, inefficiency and autocracy 
of civilian regime prevailed in society .......... 
Q. 3.8: Sharp and conflictual division among 
civilian political forces 
Q. 3.9: Others, (if any, please specify) ......... ........... ......... ........ ......... ...... [Coding, strongly agree-1, agree-2, disagree-3, strongly disagree-4, 
never agree-5 can't rate-6; recoding: agree-1+2 >2 and disagree- 3+4+5>3] 
Q. 4.0: Now I would like to draw your attention to the effects of military regime of General Ershad in 
Bangladesh. The major effects of the regime are cited in the following. See how closely the statements fit your 
opinion. (INSERT TERM... ROTATES... is very closely, fairly closely, not too closely, not at all closely; don't 
know) 
Very Fairly Not too Not at all DK 
closely closely closely closely 
Q. 4.1: Military regime destroyed the 
constitutional process of the change of 
government in the country. 
Q. 4.2: Military regime damaged the 
political institutions of the country 
Q. 4.3: Politicised the Armed Forces and 
destroyed the image of the Army as a 
professional institution ......... 
Q. 4.4: Spread and rooted corruption 
and the black economy in the country .......... 
Q. 4.5: It destroyed the election process 
Q. 4.6: Responsible for underdevelopment 
and acute poverty of the people 
Q. 4.7: It destroyed the rule of law resulting 
in killing, arrest, trial of thousands of 
political activists ......... 
Q. 4.8: Some steps of the regime could be 
appreciated (like Upazilla system, ) ... 
Q. 4.9: It made the country totally dependent 
on international political forces .... 
Q. 4.10: Others, (if any, please specify) ........ ........... ......... ......... 
[Coding: very closely-1, fairly closely-2, not too closely-3, not at all 
closely-4, DK-5; recoding: Closely- 1+2 >6 and not closely- 3+4 > 7] 
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Section 3: Social Background of the Movement 
Q. 5.0: Some social problems are cited below which could be considered to reflect the structure of Bangladesh 
society in the 1970s and the early 1980s. Could you please make your opinion on the following problem as a 
whole ......? (INSERT TERMS... ROTATES ... is completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, completer disagree, don't know. ) 
Completely Mostly Mostly Completely Don't know 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree 
Q. 5.1: Acute poverty ......... ......... .......... ............ ............. 
Q. 5.2: High illiteracy 
.......... ......... .......... .......... ............ 
Q. 5.3. Sharp inequality in social life 
For example, social class, caste, 
religion etc. ........ ......... ........... ........... .... . ....., 
Q. 5.4: Absence of communal harmony........... ......... ......... ........ 
Q. 5.5: High rate of population growth ....... .......... ......... .......... ............ 
Q. 5.6: Unemployment of educated youths ......... ....... ......... .......... ......... 
Q. 5.7: Corruption in all sectors ......... ....... ......... ........... ......... 
Q. 5.8: Absence of the right leadership in power ........ ........ ......... .......... 
Q. 5.9: Absence of democracy or 
presence of the authoritarian regime .......... .......... .......... .......... ........ 
Q. 5.10: Increased rate of the landless .......... ........ ......... .......... ....... 
Q. 5.11: Dependence on foreign aid .......... ............ ......... .......... .......... 
Q. 5.12: Informal money lending in 
rural society (Mahajoni protha) .......... ............ ........... .......... ........... 
Q. 5.13: Rise of fundamentalism .......... .......... .......... ........... ........... 
Q. 5.14: Others, (if any, please specify).......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 
[Coding: completely agree-1, mostly agree-2, mostly disagree-3, completely 
disagree-4, don't know-5; recoding: agree 1+2>6, disagree 3+4>7] 
Q. 6.0: We all agree to a basic point that the agriculture has led the Bangladesh economy from time immemorial. 
Some steps by different regimes in 1970s, however, changed the trend to increase industrialisation, which might 
be seen related to the democracy movement. Could you please make your opinion overall on the trends cited 
below, (INSERT TERM...... ROTATES... is yes, no, don't know) 
Yes No Don't know 
Q. 6.1: Bangladesh economy was led mostly by 
Agriculture in the 1970s and older industries were 
mainly agro-based. ........... ............ .......... 
Q. 6.2: Bangladesh economy was led by Agriculture 
but found increase of small batch industrial 
activity in early 1980s ............ ............. ........... 
Q. 6.3: Bangladesh economy was led by Agriculture 
but non-agricultural activities were found increased 
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mostly in urban areas in the mid-1980s ........... 
Q. 6.4: Bangladesh economy was led by agriculture 
but industrial activities were found proportionally 
major increase in early 1990s 
Q. 6.5: NGO operation in rural area was able to 
change the rural economy (agriculture and 
non-noricultural) nositivelv through out the 19Rnc ...,.. -a----------. r--------ý ------a-- --" -"- -_.. _ .............. ............ 
[Coding: agree-1, disagree-2 and DK-3J 
Q. 7.1: Social scientists normally find many inequalities and differentiations in society. Bangladesh, a third 
world poverty prone country, in the 1980s had also many inequalities in her social life. The major criteria are 
cited below. Could you please make your judgement by using (INSERTED TERM .... ROTATES... ) stron_LI\ 
agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, no answer. 
Strongly 
Agree 
Q. 7.1: Bangladesh society was mainly 
differentiated by income group i. e. social class 
(for example, lower, middle, higher class) ......... 
Q. 7.2: It was differentiated by religion ......... 
Q. 7.3: It was differentiated by caste system 
prevailed inside the specific religious 
community 
Agree Disagree Strongly No answer 
disagree 
Q. 7.4: It was differentiated by gender ........... .......... ......... .......... .......... 
Q. 7.5: It was differentiated by age group 
(high dependency ratio age group) .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 
Q. 7.6: Differentiated by giving more 
urban utilities rather than rural ones ....... ......... .......... ........... [Coding: strongly agree-I, agree-2, disagree-3, strongly disagree-4 
and no answer-5; recoding: agree 1+2>2 and disagree 3+4 >3] 
Q. 8.0: I, now, want to move your attention to the democracy movement against the military regime in the 
1980s. 
Different social groups like, as mentioned above, have different roles in the movement. How will you rate the 
participation of these groups in the movement from the following . statements...? 
(INSERTED 
TERM..... ROTATES... is highly accepted, accepted, rejected, highly rejected, no answer) 
Highly Accepted Rejected Highly No answer 
accepted rejected 
Q. 8.1: Bangladesh democracy movements 
mainly involved the rise of conflict between 
the social classes in her society ......... 
Q. 8.2: It involved the religious conflict of 
the society. ...... "" """ 
Q. 8.3: It involved gender discrimination ........... 
Q. 8.4: It involved the high participation 
of youth age group " 
Q. 8.5: It involved more urban participation 
than rural one " 
Q. 8.6: The movements involved different interest 
groups of society i. e. students, intellectuals, 
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professionals, labourers etc .......... 
Q. 8.7: The movement was organised and led 
By the political forces of society ........... 
[Coding: highly accepted-1, accepted-2, rejected-3, highly rejected-4 
and no answer-5, recoding: accepted 1+2 >2, rejected ', -4>3] 
Q. 9.0: This query draws your attention to the class participation of the movement. 'Major classes of Bangladesh 
society in the 1980s are given below. Could you please make your opinion, adjusted from the rating criteria cited 
in the right side by using ...? (INSERT TERM ..... ROTATES... is greatly participated, fairly participated, very little participated, not participated, don't know. ) 
Greatly Fairly Very little Not Don't know 
Participated participated participated participated 
Q. 9.1: Higher class: included landlord, 
industrialists, high position bureaucrat whose 
monthly income was supposed to be Tk. 25000. ......... ......... ........ ............ ............ 
Q. 9.2: Middle upper class: included big 
businessmen, university professors, bureaucrat, 
whose monthly income was supposed to be 
Tk. 15000-25000 ........... ... 
Q. 9.3: Middle class: included middle rank 
college teacher, government employee, 
businessmen whose monthly income was 
supposed to be Tk. 10000-15000 ......... ....... ........... ........ ....... 
Q. 9.4: Lower middle class: included small 
businessmen , school teachers, third and 
forth 
class government employees whose monthly 
income was supposed to be Tk. 5000 -10000 ........ ......... ........... .......... .......... 
Q. 9.5: Lower class: included small shop 
businessman, owner of small-size land, 
labourers of the industries whose monthly 
income was supposed to be Tk. 3000-5000 .......... ............ ........ .......... .......... 
Q. 9.6: Distressed class at the lowest stage of 
the society: included landless, day labourers, 
riksha puller, porter etc, whose monthly income 
was supposed to be under Tk. 3000. ............ .............. .............. ......... .......... 
Q. 9.7: others, (if any, please specify) ........... ............. ............. ......... ........ 
[Coding: Greatly participated-1, fairly participated-2, very little participated-3, not 
participated-4, and DK-5; recoding: fairly participated 1+2>2 and very little participated 3+4>31 
Q. 10.0: I have divided the participants and organising forces of the movement mainly into five interest group 
categories. They are politicians, students, intellectuals, professional, trade union workers and labourers. How 
important was their role in the success of the movement? Please follow the rating criteria in the right side of the 
following... (INSERTED TERM..... ROTATES... is great importance, fair importance, some importance, no 
importance, no answer) 
Great Fair Some No No answer 
Importance Importance Importance Importance 
Q. 10.1: Political parties and alliances ............ ........... ........... ........... ............. 
Q. 10.2: Students organisations (APSU) ............. ............ ........... ........... ............ 
Q. 10.3: Intellectuals of the society 
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(teachers, journalists, poets, cultural 
activists, artists, and the like) ............ 
Q. 10.4: Professional groups (doctors, 
engineers, bureaucrats and the like) ............ ............ ............ .......... ............ 
Q. 10.5: Trade union workers and 
labourers (labourers of industry, 
day labourers, landless, lower class 
employees of govt. non-govt., 
semi-govt. organisations) ............ ............. ............ ......... ........... [Coding, great importance-1, fair importance-2, some importance-3, no 
importance-4 and no answer-5; recoding: fair importance 1+2>2. some importance 3+4> 3] 
Q. 11.0: In this question, I have categorised different 'orders of the movement forces' according to their roles in 
the movement that ousted General Ershad. Different orders are given below. Could you please choose one order 
that is sufficient enough to identify their position in the movement by using... '? (INSERTED 
TERM...... ROTATES) yes, no, don't know 
Here, Students=S, Political party=PP, Trade Union= TU, intellectual, Professionals=P and Others= 0 
Yes No Don't know 
Q. 11.1: S--PP--TU--I--P--O ................. ................... ................... 
Q. 11: 2: PP--S--I--TU--P-O .................. ................... ................. 
Q. 11.3: S--PP-- P--I- TU--O ................... ................... ................. 
Q. 11.4: PP--S--TU--I--P--O ................... .................. ................ 
Q. 11.5: Others, (if any, please specify) ................ .................. .................. [Coding: yes-1, No-2, and DK-31 
Q. 12: 0: It was said that 'urban middle class' had the main role in organising the anti-autocracy movements. It 
was mainly concentrated in the urban areas: cities and towns. Could you please rate the party that had earned the 
support base of this urban middle class by giving your overall opinion (INSERT TERM... ROTATES... is Very 
high, High, Medium, Low, and No answer) 
Very high High Medium Low No answer 
Q. 12.1: Bangladesh Awami League (AL) ............ ........ ........... .......... ........... 
Q. 12.2: Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) ............. ......... ............ ........... .......... 
Q. 12.3: CPB and other Leftist parties ........... ""...... """...... """"""...... """"...... "" 
Q. 12.4: 5-Party alliance (radical leftist) ............ .......... ............. ............ ........ 
Q. 12.5: JIB and other Islamic parties ............ ........... ........... ......... ........... 
Q. 12.6: JP (Party of Military ruler) ............. ........... ............ ............ ........... [Coding: very high-1, high-2, medium-3, low-4, no answer-5; 
recoding: high 1+2>2, and low 4+5>4] 
Section-04: Actions of the Movement 
Q13.0: I want to request you to move your attention on the actions of the movements-- 
in fact, what happened in 
Bangladesh in the 1980s during the period of Martial Law regime. Opposition political forces had a number of 
actions against the regime to establish democracy in the country. Among other, hartal (general strike), 
Dhaka 
seize, protest march, public meeting, gherao ( block govt. office), long march, block traffic, 
hunger strike, 
human chain, signing petition, use of violence, etc. might be of some examples. Could you please rate these 
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actions by overall opinions by using (INSERT TERM....... ROTATES... ) mostly ettectiýe. cttecti%e, . little 
effective non-effective, no answer? 
Mostly Effective A little Non- No Participated 
Effective effective effective answer bý you 
Q. 13.1.0: Programmes mainly taken to increase 
the mass support for the movement 
Q. 13.1.1: Protest march ........... .......... ............. ......... ......... .. 
Q. 13.1.2: Public meeting .......... ............. ...... ....... ......... ........... 
Q. 13.1.3: Long march .......... .......... ....... 
Q. 13.1.4: Hunger strike ........... ........... ........ ....... ......... .......... .. 
Q. 13.1.5: Human Chain ........ ........ ........ ........ ..... 
Q. 13.1.6: Signing petition ......... ........... ......... .......... .......... ........ 
Q. 13.1.7: Torch light procession ........... ............ ........... ........... .......... ........ 
Q. 13.1.8: Press conference ........... ............ ........... ........... ........... ....... 
Q. 13.1.9: Press release ............ ............ ........... ............ .......... ...... 
Q. 13.2.0: Programmes mainly to create 
direct pressures on the regime to quit 
the power 
Q. 13.21: Block traffic .......... ........... ........... ........... ......... .......... 
Q. 13.2.2: Gherao (block govt. office) ....... .......... ......... ........... ......... ........ 
Q. 13.2.3:. Hartal ( General strike) ......... ........... ........ .......... ......... ....... 
Q. 13.2.4: Dhaka seize ............. ........... ........... ........... ......... ........ 
Q. 13.2.5: Non-cooperation .......... ......... ........... ........... ......... ........ 
Q. 13.2.6: Civil disobedience .......... ........... ........... ......... .......... ........ 
Q. 13.2.7: Burning the portrait of 
military ruler .......... .......... ............ ........... .......... .......... 
Q. 13.3.0: Programmes given to protest 
specific issues /decisions of the regime 
Q. 13.3.1 Demonstration ........... .......... ........... ........... .......... ......... 
Q. 13.3.2: Gherao ...... ........... ............ .......... ........... ........ 
Q. 13.3.3: Student strike ......... ........... ............ .......... .......... .......... 
Q. 13.4.0: Use of Violence 
Q. 13.4.1: Setting fire on effigies ......... ........... ............ ............ .......... .......... 
Q. 13.4.2: Setting fire and destroy 
public and private transport ........ ........... ........... ........... .......... .......... 
Q. 13.4.3: Charging crackers and bomb ...... .......... ........... ........... ......... ......... 
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Q. 13.4.4: Preventing govt. and 
Non-govt. employees to go to workplaces ....... ......... .......... ........... ......... ......... 
Q. 13.4.5: Guerrilla attack on the 
law and order forces of the military 
administration ..,,,,,, 
Q. 13.4.6: Gun fight with govt. forces ....... ........ ......... .......... ........ ..... 
Q. 13.4.7: Killing govt. supporter 
including military and political official .... ........... ..... .......... .......... ..... 
Q. 13.5.0: Programmes given by 
United cultural Jote (alliance) 
Q. 13.5.1: Patha Natak (street drama with .......... .......... ....... ...... ....... ........... ..... theme against military regime 
Q. 13.5.2: Singing songs to ............. ............ ............ ........ ......... .......... 
awaken the mass people against the regime 
Q. 13.5.3: Symbolic march by Arts and crafts institute 
against military exploitation ........... ........... ........... .......... ......... .......... Q. 13.5.4: Poems against military regime ........... ........... .......... ......... .......... ........ 
[Coding: mostly effective-1, effective-2, a little effective-3, non- 
effective-4 , no answer 
5; recoding: effective 1+2+3 >2, ] 
Q. 14.0: You possibly know that many repressive measures were taken by the military regime to denounce the 
opposition movements. How can you put your opinion by rating these measures overall by using .... (INSERT 
TERM..... ROTATES... ) mostly effective, effective, a little effective, non-effective, don't know 
Mostly Effective A little Non- DK Were you 
Effective effective effective affected 
Q. 14.1.0: Repressive measures taken during 
the normal course of the movement 
Q. 14.1.1: Lathi (baton) charge on the procession ...... ......... ......... ......... ........... ......... 
Q. 14.1.2 Block the protest march/ demonstration ...... ........ .......... ......... ........ ...... ...... 
Q. 14.1.3: Charging tear gas and rubber bullet 
on procession .......... ........... ......... ....... ......... ......... 
Q. 14.1.4: Guarded and cordoned the procession by 
Police Forces ........... ........... .......... .......... ......... 
Q. 14.1.5: Suiting false case against the 
participants of the movements .......... ........... .......... ........... ......... ........ 
Q. 14.2.0: Repressive measures to associative 
groups and individuals 
Q. 14.2.1: Restrictions on news media 
i. e. on Newspapers, radio, TV and the like .......... .......... ......... .......... ...... ....... 
Q. 14.2.2: Harasments in service i. e. transfer, 
sacking, demotion, etc. .......... ......... .......... ........... ........ ........ 
Q. 14.2.3: Making different type of threats 
individually to demoralise them. ......... ......... ......... .......... ........... ......... 
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Q. 14.2.4: Co-optation of the opposition 
leaders and organiser .......... 
Q. 14.3.0: Repressive measures taken during 
the peak of the movements. 
Q. 14.3.1: Mass arrest of the movements' 
participants ..... .......... .......... ...... ........... ............ .......... 
Q. 14.3.2: Ban on political activities.......... ........ ........... .......... ......... .......... 
Q. 14.3.3: Heavy lathi and tear gas charge, and fire 
on the protest march resulting in numerous casualties: 
killings, injuries. 
.......... 
Q. 14.3.4: House arrest of top level leaders ......... .......... .......... ............ .......... ........ 
Q. 14.3.5: Declaring curfew dawn to dusk to stop 
people moving outside the home .......... ....... .......... ............ .......... ........... . 
Q. 14.3.6: Closing the all higher level academic 
institutions like universities, colleges ........... ........... ............ ........... .......... .......... 
Q. 14.3.7: Filing false cases and issuing warrant against the 
organising leaders of the movement ........... ........ ....... ....... ........ ......... 
Q. 14.3.8: Others, (if any, please specify) 
[Coding: mostly effective-1, effective-2, a little effective-3, non- 
effective-4 and DK-5; recoding: effective 1+2+3>2] 
Q. 15.0: You know that Bangladesh democracy movements were led by the leadership of different political 
parties. Could you please give your opinion on different issues related to leadership so that main leaders of the 
movement could be judged? Please rate them by different criteria like personality, leadership, experience, stand 
on issues, taking popular decision, non-co-operation with the regime, Don't Know. You are requested to make a 
grade for each criteria as : like most=l, like=2, like least=3, and no answer=4 
Person- Leader- Exper- stand Non-co-operation popular DK 
ality ship ience on issues with regime decision 
Q. 15.1.0: Category one: 
Q. 15.1.1: Sheikh Hasina ........ ........ ....... ......... ............ ......... ....... 
Q. 15.1.2: Begum Zia ......... ........ ....... ......... ........... .......... ...... 
Q. 15.2.0: Category two: 
Q. 15.2.1: Comrade Forhad ......... ......... ........ ........ .......... ......... ...... 
Q. 15.2.2: Rashed Khan Menon ........ ......... ....... ....... .......... ......... ....... 
Q. 15.2.3: Hasanul Haque Inu ....... ......... ....... ....... ......... ......... ....... 
Q. 15.2.4: Abdur Razzak ....... .......... ........ ........ .......... ......... ....... 
Q. 15.2.5: Maulana Abbas Ali Khan..... ........ ........ ........ ......... ......... ....... 
Q. 15.3.0: Category Three 
Q. 15.3.1: Mr. Abdus Samad Azad ..... ...... ....... ......... .......... ...... ........ 
Q. 15.3.2: Mr Badruddoza Choudhury...... ........ ....... ......... ......... ....... 
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Q. 15.3.3 Mrs Syeda Sajeda Choudhury.... 
Q. 15.3.4: Barrister Abdus Salam Talukder 
Q. 15.3.5: Mr. Amir Hossain Amu 
..... 
Q. 15.3.6: Mr Saifur Rahman 
......... 
Q. 15.3.7: Mr. Tofael Ahmed 
Q. 15.3.8: Mr Nirmal Sen 
Q. 15.4.0: Leaders from non-political 
socio-cultural Organisations (please consider three popular leaders) 
Q. 15.4.1: 
Q. 15.4.2: 
Q. 15.4.3: 
[Coding: like most-1, like-2, like least-3 and no answer-41 
Q. 16.0 Different political parties and their alliances had different roles in the movement. Could you please rate 
their role by giving your opinion overall of ... (INSERTED TERM ... ROTATES) ... excellent, good, only fair, 
poor, and DK? 
Excellent Good Only fair poor Don't know 
Q. 16.1: Bangladesh Awami League (AL) 
with their alliance. ........... .... ... 
Q. 16.2: Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) .......... ......... ......... ........ ......... 
with their alliance 
Q. 16.3: Bangladesh Communist Party (CPB) ......... .......... ........ ........ ........ 
with their alliance 
Q. 16.4: Bangladesh Workers Party ........ .......... ......... ........ .......... 
with their alliance 
Q. 16.5: National Socialist Party ......... .......... ......... ........ ......... 
with their alliance 
Q. 16.6: Jamat-I- Bangladesh and other 
Islamic Parties .... . ..... ....... .""...... """...... ""...... """ 
Q. 16.7: Others, (if any, please specify) .......... ........... .......... ........ ......... 
[Coding: excellent-1, good-2, only fair-3, poor-4 and no 
answer-5; recoding: good 1+2>2 and only fair 3+4>31 
Q. 17.0: The movements' places or centres are very important to get a fair idea about the different events of the 
movements. Could you please tell me particular centres or places where frequency and effectiveness of the 
movement actions we brought about..... (INSERT TERM ..... 
ROTATES)... is high, medium, low, DK? 
Most High High Medium Low Very low DK 
Q. 17.1.0: Category one: 
Q. 17.1.1: Urban area (from the capital city to 
the thana headquarter and municipality) .......... ........ ........ ....... ....... ......... 
Q. 17.1.2: Rural area (rest of the urban area) ................... .......... ........ ......... ......... 
Q. 17.2.0: Category two: 
Q. 17.2.1: University and all other 
higher educational institutions ......... .......... .......... ......... ......... ......... 
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Q. 17.2.2: Premises of the offices of 
the different political parties .......... 
Q. 17.2.3: Press Club premises 
Q. 17.2.4: Area concentrated on the 
offices of professional bodies ........... ... ......... ........ ........... ......... ........ 
Q. 17.2.5: Area concentrated on the 
offices of the intellectual bodies ........... ............ ........... ............ . ......... ..... 
Q. 17.6: Bigger streets of the city 
Q. 17.6: Others, (if any, please specify) 
[Coding: most high-1, high-1, medium-3, low-4 and very low-5 no 
answer-6; recoding high 1+2+3 >3, low 4+5>41 
Q. 18.1.0: The issue of parliamentary election in 1986, in which AL and its 8-party alliance participated, and 
BNP and 7-party alliance did not, had created countless debates in the political arena. Could you please tell me 
which decision was to be right or wrong by giving your opinion overall of.... (INSERTED 
TERM.... ROTATES).... agree, disagree, and don't know ? 
agree disagree don't know 
Q. 18.1: The decision of AL and alliance to participate ......... .......... .......... 
Q. 18.2: The decision of BNP to boycott ......... ......... ......... 
Q. 18.3: The decision of AL made longer the military regime........ ......... ......... 
Q. 18.4: The decision of BNP made longer the military regime ......... .......... .......... [Coding: agree-1, disagree-2 and do n't know-3] 
Q. 19.0: You probably know that the general sentiment of the mass people of anti-martial law regime was found 
always in favour of a united movement from a single platform of all political forces, but it could not be in effect. 
Could you please give your opinion on the following causes behind the disintegration of opposition forces by 
using (INSERTED TERM.... ROTATES... ) strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, and don't know 
(DK)? 
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly DK 
agree disagree 
Q. 19.1: Sharp ideological distance 
between AL and BNP ............ ........... ........... .......... ......... 
Q. 19.2: Conflict of leadership might be 
seen between Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia ........... .......... ............. ........... ........ 
Q. 19.3: AL was not interested to 
forge united movements 
Q. 19.4: BNP was not interested to 
forge united movements ........... ............ 
Q. 19.5: Many contradictions existed 
between AL and BNP in their past history ............ ............ 
Q. 19.6: Others, (if any, please specify) 
[Coding: strongly agree-1, agree-2, disagree-3, strongly 
disagree-4 and DK-5; recoding: agree 1+2>2 and 3+4>3] 
Q. 20.0: In 1990 the movement was finally successful; opposition political forces were united at least by their 
joint programmes, and students' organisations forged unity. The movements reached the climax, and 
consequently, General Ershad was removed when a Caretaker Government took the power. After a peaceful 
general election under the Caretaker Government, a democratic government was established. For all these 
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successes, to whom do you give the creditability making your opinion overall 
TERM... ROTATES)... very great deal, good deal, not very much, none at all, don't know 
Very great Good not very none DK 
deal deal much at all 
Q. 20.1: All Party Students Union (APSU) 
......... ......... ......... .......... ........ 
Q. 20.2: AL and 8-party alliance .......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 
Q. 20.3. BNP and 7-party alliance .......... ........ ......... ........ ......... 
Q. 20.4: 5-party alliance ..., , ....... ......... ........ ......... ....... 
Q. 20.5: JI and Islamic Parties ......... ......... .. ....... ........ ......... 
Q. 20.6: Professional bodies 
......... ......... ......... ....... .... 
Q. 20.7: Intellectual groups .......... .......... .... ..... ........ ......... 
Q. 20.8: Labourers and workers of 
Trade. I ininn.. -. 
(INSERTED 
..... .......... .......... .......... ......... 
[Coding: very great deal-1, good deal-2, not very much-3, none at all- 
4 and DK-5; recoding: good deal 1+2>2 and not good deal 3+4>3J 
Q. 21.0: Thousands of participants, party workers and supporters of parties were killed, injured, arrested and 
faced with great deal of repressive measures through out the 1980s, the period of military dictator. How will you 
judge the sacrifice of following groups in the movement giving your overall opinion of (INSERT 
TERM.... ROTATES) quite a lot sacrifice, mostly sacrifice, a little sacrifice, no sacrifice, not known'? 
Quite a lot Mostly A little No Not know 
sacrifice sacrifice sacrifice sacrifice 
Q. 21.1.0: Category one 
Q. 21.1.1: Students community ........... ........... ........... .......... .......... 
Q. 21.1.2: Labourer and workers 
Q. 21.1.3: Professionals ............ ........... .......... ......... ......... 
Q. 21.1.4: Intellectuals ............ ........... ........... .......... .......... 
Q. 21.2.0: Category two 
Q. 21.2.1: Workers and supporters of AL ......... .......... .......... ........ ......... 
Q. 21.2.2: Workers and supporters of BNP ......... .......... .......... ........ ......... 
Q. 21.2.3: Workers and supporters of Leftist Parties ...... ...... ......... ............ .......... 
Q. 21.2.4: Workers and supporters of Islamic Parties...... ......... ......... ........... ....... 
Q. 21.3.0: Category three 
Q. 21.3.1: Participants of higher class ...... """"""" """"""" """""""" """""""" 
Q. 21.3.2: Participants of middle class ...... """"""""" """"""""""" """"""" """""". " 
...... """"" """""" """". """" """"""""" """" Q. 21.3.3: Participants of lower class 
Q. 21.4.0: Categoryfour 
Q. 21.4.1: Participants of Urban area """. """. . """"""" """"""" """"""""" """""""""" 
- _. .--. -` -----1 ---- (.: 1.4.2-: Yarticipanrs or rural arcs ..................... ......... ......... ........ 
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Q. 21.5.0: Category five 
Q. 21.5.1: Male participants 
Q. 21.5.2: Female participants 
Q. 21.6.0: Category six 
Q. 21.6.1: Youth (age 15 -35) 
Q. 21.6.2: Adult (Middle age group 
Age 36-55) 
Q. 21.6.3: Older 55+ 
Q. 21.7.0: Others 
Q. 21.7.1: Tokai (street boys: age 5-12) .......... .......... ............ ...... ......... [Coding: quite a lot of sacrifice-1, mostly sacrifice-2, a little sacrifice-3, no 
sacrifice-4 and DK-5; recoding: lot of sacrifice (LOS) 1+2>2, and a little sacrifice 3+4. >3] 
. 
22.0. It seemed that several diplomatic missions in Bangladesh had some catalystic roles in this movement. Do 
you think that the involvement of such outside forces had really an effective role to establish democracy in 
Bangladesh? Yes........... No 
............. [Coding: yes-I and No-21. If yes, how will you judge their role in establishing the democracy in the country? Choose the diplomatic 
mission and their role importance from the following 
Most Important 
Important role 
role 
Q. 22.1: American Embassy, Dhaka 
.............. .............. 
Q. 22.2: EEC diplomatic mission, Dhaka ............. ............. 
Q. 22.3: British High Commission, Dhaka 
............. ............. 
(122 4 Indian Nioh Cnmmiccinn T)haka 
No important don't know 
role 
ý. _ý. ......... »... . b. ................... .,......... .............. ............... .............. ............ 
Q. 22.5: Commonwealth Secretariat 
............. ............ ............. ........... 
Q. 22.6: Japanese Embassy, Dhaka .............. ............. .............. ............. 
Q. 22.7: United Nations Organisation ........... .......... ............. ............ 
Q. 22.8: World Bank and IMF ............ ............. ............. .............. 
Q. 22.9: Foreign Aid Consortium 
............ ............ ............ .............. 
Q. 22.10: Others, (if any, please specify) .......... ............ ............ ............. 
[Coding: most important role-1, important role-2, no important role-3 
and do n't know-4; recoding: important role 1+2 > 2] 
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APPENDIX-TWO 
Audio Interview of Key Leaders and Military Dictator 
List of Key Movement Leaders (1-5) and An Interview Guidelines used to Interview them 
1. Sheikh Hasina, President, Bangladesh Awami League 1981-to date 
2. Begum Khaleda Zia, Chairperson, Bangladesh Nationalist Party, 1984 to date 
3. Rashed Khan Menon, General Secretary, Bangladesher Workers Party 1990 
4. Hasanul Haque Inu, General Secretary, Bangladesh Socialist Party 1990 
5. Mujahidul Islam Salim, Bnagladesh Communist Party, 2003 
6. Professor Rangalal Sen, one of the key political sociologists of Bangladesh and 
7. General H. M. Ershad, the military dictator of the country 1982-1990 
Questionnaire for the in-depth interview with key leaders of the movement 
The movement for the restoration of democracy against military regime of General Ershad is very 
important event in the history of post-independent Bangladesh. The key leaders, mainly the chief of 
different political parties, were directly involved in planning of every action and certainly gathered 
much experience. In-depth interviews with these leaders on many issues, debates, failures, successes 
of the movement, might be able to provide some supportive evidences in favour of getting answers of 
my research questions. Incorporation of their experiences and opinions of different issues could be 
considered rich documents for the research. Every question, of course, will be extended with necessary 
follow-up questions. The questions to interview them may be extended on form and shape during my 
field research. A structure of questionnaire reflecting the central arguments of the research- 
`sociological analysis of a political event' regarding Bangladesh democracy movement- is given 
below. 
Structure of open questions 
1. I would like to seek your attention on the military intervention in Bangladesh, which is 
recognised as basis of the democracy movement. Could you please tell me, what are the causes of 
military take-over in the state apparatus in the post-independent Bangladesh? What causes you can 
explain behind the military take-over of General Ershad? 
Follow- up questions may be as follows: 
i) Whom do you make responsible for military regime? Military leaders? Civil bureaucracy? 
politicians? Others? 
ii) Why and how they are responsible? 
Iii) Do you find any difference between the military regimes in Bangladesh and those in other 
nations around the world? 
iv) Could you please explain how the armed forces of Bangladesh maintained a total unity in 
favour of the military rule in the country? And what happened regarding the military regime of 
Ershad? 
v) For the military intervention in Bangladesh, how will you explain the personal interest of the 
leaders of the coup, and the collective interest of the Armed Forces? 
2. The military regime of General Ershad sustained for almost a decade. What causes can you 
identify with this military rule to prolong in Bangladesh? 
Follow-up questions may be as follows: 
i) Strong unity inside the armed forces? How? 
ii) Failure of the opposition forces? How? 
iii) Bangladesh social structure was in favour for authoritarian regime? How? Please describe. 
iv) International auspices? How? Please explain. 
3. In Bangladesh, there were a great number of socio-economic problems in the post-independent 
period i. e. its poor economy, primordial loyalties, kinship, illiteracy, post-war conflicts and the 
like. Can you see any social causes for the rise of an authoritarian military regime in Bangladesh 
society, especially regarding the military regime of General Ershad? 
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Follow- up questions may be related to the issues as follows: 
i) Pattern of social change inside the social structure of Bangladesh? 
ii) Post war conflicts inside armed forces and in civilian politics? 
iii) Change in Economic policy- socialist economy to capitalist entrepreneurship? 
iv) Urbanisation and small batch industrialisation? 
4. There were many consequences of military rule in Bangladesh society. How will you 
explain them? What were the impacts of military regime of Gen. Ershad on the economy, 
polity and society of Bangladesh? 
Follow-up questions may be related to the issues as follows: 
(i) Destroying constitutional process? Political institutions? 
(ii) Corruption in different sectors? 
(iii)Major destructions in macro and micro economy? 
(iv) Poverty and illiteracy and foreign aid dependence? 
(v) Militarization of civilian administration? 
5. You are one of the main key leaders of the movement against the military regime of Gen. 
Ershad. How will you make a difference of this democracy movement against the autocratic 
military regime of Gen. Ershad with the fall of other military regimes around the world? What 
special factors can you identify to compare this movement with the other anti-autocracy 
movements around the world? 
Follow-up questions may be as follows: 
i) Is it an urban mass revolution led by urban middle class? If yes, please explain how? 
ii) Is it a proletariat revolution to change the society? If yes, please explain how? 
iii) Is it a political reform movement? If yes, please explain how? 
iv) Do you think any other different character of the movement? Please explain. 
6. I want to know about the participants of the movement. Could you please tell me who mainly 
were the participants, and organised the movement in different stages of the movement? 
Follow-up questions may be as follows: 
i) How was the economic condition of different level organisers-Union, ward, thana and district 
and divisional city level leaders of party/organisations? What was their position in society? 
ii) Which class were largely affected by the causalities of the movement? How was-their financial 
condition or education level or position in society? 
iii) What were the roles of students, labour unions, intellectuals, professionals, intellectuals in the 
movements. 
7. Could you please tell me the events you can recall, by which you were directly affected. Were 
you harassed by the repressive actions of the military ruler? 
Follow-up questions may be as follow: 
i) Please describe situation when you were arrested, attacked and repressed by the regime. 
ii) Please describe if you have any experience of brutality of the dictator as witness. 
iii) Please describe if you have any emotional experiences that you could never forget. 
8. I want to let your attention to the different alliances of opposition forces. 
Could you please 
describe the background of the alliances: 15-party alliance, 7-party alliance, 5-party alliance etc? 
Especially how they were formed? 
Follow-up questions may be as follows: 
i) Why and how was 15-party alliance formed? What was the 
basis (where applicable)? 
ii) Why and how was 7-party alliance formed (where applicable)? 
iii) How was 5-party alliance formed (where applicable)? 
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iv) Why it was not possible to make a united platform for the movement'? 
v) How did the formation of alliances help the movement? 
vi) How did three alliances maintain liaison among themselves? If any. please explain. 9. I want to draw your attention to an important debate on the parliamentary election of 1986 
under the military regime. How will you describe the participation or non-participation in the 
parliamentary election of 1986? 
Follow-up questions may be as follows: 
i) Participation in the election might help the military leaders to prolong in power. How? Please 
explain how they benefited or lost? 
ii) Non-participation in the election might help the military leaders to prolong in power. How? Please explain how they benefited or lost. 
10. Please, feel free to describe the effectiveness of different movement actions against 
military regime of General Ershad. 
Follow-up questions may be on each action as follow: 
i) Hartal? How it did it work as an effective movement action 
ii) Dhaka seize? 
iii) Non-cooperation? 
iv) Blocking communication network? 
v) Violence? 
vi) Protest march? 
vi) Public meeting? 
11. In the military regimes around the world, a common tendency was found that the military rulers 
tried to allure opposition leaders offering different port-folio in the cabinet. Either you or 
any other leaders of your party might have such offers? How did you face 
these kinds of problem in your party? 
Follow-up questions may be as follows: 
i) How you have personally faced this problem, if any? 
ii) How you have faced this problem inside your party, if any? 
iii) How these problems influenced the movements? 
12. It has been found in almost every event that there are influences of International centre countries 
on the change of political power in third world countries. Do you recognise any kind of influences of 
international forces in Bangladesh democracy movement? Who are those forces? World Bank? IMF? 
USA,? EEC? UK etc? 
Follow-up questions may be related with issues as follows: 
i) What are the patterns of influences or Assistance? 
ii) Wave of democratisation in 1970s and 1980s around the world? 
iii)Threaten the military regimes to quit power 
13 It has been found in different nations all over the world that when a military or authoritarian regime 
falls, the ring leaders of military rule were given brutal punishment. In Bangladesh, nothing was 
happen to those military leaders? How will you explain this fact? 
Follow-up questions may be as follows: 
i) Is there any exit guarantee to the military leaders? 
ii) Political leaders were failed to do it? 
iii) Is there any secret understanding between opposition political leaders and military leaders? 
N. B: This open questionnaire may include more issues and debates of the movement, if it is found 
important during the check of secondary sources, especially 9-years news papers. 
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APPENDIX--FOUR 
List of Survey Respondents 
l 
2 
3 
4 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
d5 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
Mr. Zillur Rahman (AL-PP) 27/6 Dhanmondhi, Dhaka 
Mr. Amir Hossain Amu (AL-PP) 42, Eskaton Road, Magbazar Dhaka 
Mrs Sajeda Choudhury (AL-PP) 12, Dhanmondhi (Office of AL) Mr. Mozaffor Hossain Paltu (AL-PP) 3/2 Chameli Bag, Dhaka 
Mr. Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan (BNP-PP) 25, Mintu Road, Dhaka 
Mr. Akbar Hossain (BNP-PP) H-63, R-79, Gulshan-2, Dhaka-1213 
Mr. Abdus Salam (BNP-PP) 29/2 Mohakhali, Dhaka 
Mr. Sadek Hussain Khoka(BNP-PP) Mayor, Dhaka City Corporation, Dhaka 
Mr. Pankaj Bhatyacharya (L-1=PP) B, kunja-l, R-5, S-c. Banasree, Rampura, D 
Mr. Muzahidul Islam Salim (L-1-PP) . 2/3 Naya Paltan Dhaka Mr. Pit Habibur Rahman (L-1-PP) Office of Ganatantri Party, Dhaka 
Alhaj Abdus Samad (L-1-PP) President, Gano Ajadi League 
Mr. Sharif Nurul Ambia (L-2-PP) JSD, 35-36, BB Avenue, Dhaka 
Mr. Haider Akbar Khan Rono(L-2-PP) Bangaladesh Workas Party, Dhaka 
Mr, AFM Mahbubul Haq (L-2-PP ) BSD Gono Ist. office Motijil, Dhaka 
Mr. Bimol Bishuash(L-2-PP) 31/F Topkhana Road, Dhaka 
Mr Nurul Islam Nahid (L-1-PP) 95/G, Azimpur Estate, Dhaka- 1205 
Mr Nirmol Sen (L-2-PP) 23/2 Topkhana Road, Dhaka 
Mr. Abdul Kader Mollah(JIB-IPs-PP) 493, Baramaghbazar, Dhaka 
Mr. Mowlana Keramat Ali (JIB-IPs-PP) H-4, R-3Tajmahal Road, Md-pur D. 
Mr. Azharul Islam (JIB-IPs-PP) Central JI B Office, Maghbazar, Dhaka 
Mr. Mowlana Mohiuddin Khan(J1B-IPs-PP) 337, DIT Road, Rampura, Dhaka 
Mr Aman Ullah Aman (VIP-NPG) VP, DUCSU (1990) 
Mr. Khairul Kabir Khokon (S) 93, Motijheel c/a Dhaka 
Mr. Ashim Kumer Ukil (S) 9/12 Dhanmondhi, Dhaka 
Mr Nazmul Haque Prodhan (S) R-5,128, Mohammodi Housing, Dhaka 
Mr Shafi Ahmed (S) 73, Green Road, Dhaka 
Mr. Nur Ahmed Bakul (S) HDRC, H-59, R-8/A, Dhanmondhi, Dhaka 
Mr. Mostafa Farook (S) 23/2 Topkhana Road, Dhaka 
Mr. Jahangir Satter Tinku (S) Sabbir Tower(3rd Floor), Dhaka 
Mr. Mohammad Yasin (S) H-20/A, R-32(old), Dhanmondhi, Dhaka 
Mr. SM Mosherof Hossain(S) 33/5 Khilgoan, Dhaka 
Mr. Akther Sobhan Mashrur(S) 2/13 Mohammadi Housing, M. pur, Dhaka 
Mr. Md Shajahan(advocate) (VIP-NPG) Excellent intern. Maghbazar, Dhaka 
Mr. Shamsur Rahaman(poet) (VIP-NPG)Shayamoli, Dhaka 
Professor Anisuzzaman (I) Deptt. of Bengali, DU 
Professor Sarder Fazlul Karim(I) Deppt of Political Science, DU 
Mr. Kahm Sharafi (art singer)(1) MD GInsurence, Motjjeel, Dhaka 
Prof, Rafikun Nabi(Painting) (1) Charukala Institute, DU 
Mr. Mamunur Rashld(Dramatist) (1) Aryannak, Baily Road, Dhaka 
Mr. Ali Zaker(TV artist) (1) Nimco International, Dhaka 
Professor Rangalal Sen (1) Deptt of Sociology, DU 
Professor Kabir Choudhury (1) National Professor 
Prof. M Moniruzzaman Mia (1) Ex. VC(1990), DU 
Prof, Sirajul Islam Choudhury (I) Deptt, of English, DU 
Ad. Gaziul Haque (I) X6/7 DIT Road, E. Hazipara, Dhaka 
Mr Ramendu Majumder (1) 20, Central Road, Dhaka 
Mrs Maleka Begum (1) F-5A, H-8, R-2/B, Lalmatia, Dhaka 
Mr Pqush Bondopaddya (1) 56, Siddasshari C Road, Dhaka 
Mr, Nasiruddin Yusuf Bachu (1) 11/1Kha, Purana Paltan L Dhaka 
Mr Bellal Choudhury (1) 41, Purana Paltan, Dhaka 
Prof. MA Mazed(DMCH) (P) Ex-President(1990), BMA 
Prof. Nurul Amin Bapary(DU) (P) Acting Sec. DUTA(1990) 
Prof. Anwar Hossain(BUET) (P) Ex-President, IEB(1990) 
Prof. M Akteruzzaman(DU) (P) President, BCUTA(1990) 
Mr. Amanullah Kabir (P) President, BUJ(1990) 
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57 Dr Mirja MA Jalil (P) President, BAGI (1990) 
58 Mrs Hena Das (P) President, BSSTA (1990) 59 Mr Kazi Golam Mahbub (P) H5, R 10, Dhanmondi R/A Dhaka 
60 A. K. M. Mustafa (P) 7/5 B-C, Lalmatia, Dhaka 
61 Dr Mostafa Jalal Mohiuddin (P) H20, R8A, Dhanmondi, Dhaka 
62 Dr Sarwar Ali (P) 273, New Iskaton Road, Dhaka 
63 Mr. Quazi Lutful Kabir (P) Excutive Secretary, DESSP(1990) 
64 Mr. Raisul Islam Asad (P) Group Theatre Federation(1990) 
65 Mr. Wasche Ansari (P) President, BFJA(1990) 
66 Mr. Fakir Alamgir (P) Hrishijo Shilpa Goshthi, Dhaka 
67 Mr. Muklesur Rahman (TU) President, BSSF(1990) 
68 Mr. Nurul Islam (TU) TUC, 23/2 Topkhana Road, Dhaka 
69 Mr. Nazrul Islam Khan (TU) H-2, R- 13, Dhanmondhi, Dhaka 
70 Mr. Md. Ahsan Ullah Master (TU) Noagaon, Tongi, Gajipur. Dhaka 
71 Mr. Shafiqur Rahman Majumder (TU)76/l/Q N atrabari B. Bagicha Demra Dh 
72 Mr. Dr Wazedul Islam Khan(TU) , , , 23/2 (2nd Floor)Topkhana Road, Dhaka 
73 Mr Rai Romesh (TU) Secretary, BTSU, Dhaka 
74 Mr. Bakir Hossain '(TU) 42/12 Sonali B Staff Q, Motijeel, Dhaka 
75 Mr. Shah Alam (TU) Staff Q, Paikpara, Mirpur, Dhaka 
76 Mrs Shirin Akther (TU) JSD Office, Paltan GPO, Dhaka 
77 Mr Shajahan Khan (TU) B 1, R9, MP Hostel, S. Nagar, Dhaka 
78 Mr Abdulla Sarker (TU) BSD Office, Topekhana Road, Dhaka 
79 Mr Waziuddin Khan (TU) Vangura, Faridpur, Pabna 
80 Mr Mezba Uddin (TU) 13/1 AG Lane, Ganderia, Dhaka 
81 Mr Rahmaa Ali (TU) 338, Shankor Dhanmondi, Dhaka 
82 Prof. LM Nath (RG-NPG ) 4/204 73, Green Road, Dhaka 
83 Mr. Shiril Sikder(Advocate) (RG-N PG)2119 Green Road, Dhaka 
84 Mr Bodhipal Mohathero (RG-NPG) Atisa Dipanker Sarak, Dhaka 
85 Mrs. Khushi Kabir (NGO-NPG) 3/3 Block-A, Lalmatia, Dhaka 
86 Mrs Salina Ali (N'GO-NPG) BNWLA Lalmatia Dhaka 
87 Mr. Mostak Ahmed (NGO-NPG) ASHA, Asad Gate, Dhaka 
88 Mr. Mujibur Rahman (NGO-NPG) AUPP, 83/23, New Circular Road, Dhaka 
89 Mr Latifur Rahman (B-NPG) Chairman, Transcom Group, Dhaka 
90 Aihaz Md Akram Hossain (B-NPG) Janata Travels, 128 B Maghbazer, Dhaka 
91 Mr Sharif Afsal Hossain (B-NPG) Simtex Fashion(BD)Ltd Motijeel, Dhaka 
92 Mr A. R. S Mabmood (B-NPG) Debon Air Complex, Crulshan, Dhaka 
93 Mr Abdul Malek (W-NPG) Shopkeeper, Press club, Dhaka 
94 Mr Arun Kumer De (W-NPG) Madhur Canteen, DU, Dhaka 
95 Mr. +Gopal Das (W-NPG) Photographer, DUCSU, Dhaka 
96 Mr. Gias Kamal Choudhury (VIP-NPG) Reporter, VOA, Dhaka 
97 Mr. Shafiq Rehman (VIP-NPG) 15, Eskaton Garden, Dhaka 
98 Mr Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir(P) H -60, R-25, Bonani, Dhaka 
99 Mr Wa'hidul Haque (W-NPG) 198/West Kafral, Rokeya S, Dhaka 
100 M. A Mannnan (AL-PP) 82, J. I Madrasa road, Dampara, Chtg 
101 A. B, M Mohiuddin Chou (AL-PP) Mayor, City Corporation Chtg. 
102 Md. Ekranul Karim (BNP-PP) 23/2 M. M Ali Road, Dampara, Chtg 
103 Mr. Shah Alam (L-1-PP) 44, Hajary Lane, Chittagong 
104 Mn Afser Uddin Chowdhury (JIB-IPs-PP) 19, Jamal Khan Chittagong 
105 Mr. Kazi Mohammad Yousuf (JIB4Ps-PP) 252, Parade Sqr. Chittagong 
106 Mr. Rafuqul Islam (Khokon) (S) KN Traders Raz Market, DT Road, Chtg 
107 Mr Sadek Hossian (S) 18, Harish D. Lane N Khanan Chittagong 
108 Mr Raxeku"aman ('S) Dost building 4th floor, Chittagong 
109 Mr Mausur Ahmed. (S) H-16, R-0I Blook-A, Chadga Chtg 
110 Mr, Md. Mamun (S) NDF Dus Building(3rd ftoor)Chtg 
III Prof Abdul Mnnan (l) Former VC CU, Chittagong 
112 Mr Mohammad Ibrahim Khan (1) 15 OR Nizam Road, PanchalishChtg 
113 Mr. Dipak Chowdhury (1) Room-75, Court Building, Chittagottg 
114 Dr. Muinul Islam (C) Dept. of Economics. CU, Chittagong 
115 Mr Muhammad Khaled (1) ICDA. C/ A, Momin Road, Chittagong 
116 Ad. lbrahim Hossain Choudury (P) 18 Horish D Lane. N. KanonChittagong 
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117 Mr Nazir Ahmed (P) 92A Katalgonj Panchalwish Chittagong 
118 Engt, Suttan Mahmood (P) 61 I. S Mirja lane Mahedibag Chittagong 
119 Mr Sunil Chakrabarthy (P) GS, BTA, 400 Andarkilla, Chittagong 
120 DR. A. Q. M. Serajul Islam (P) GS, BMA, Chittagong 
121 Mr Md. Nutul Islam (TU) 'WASA' Chittagong 
122 Mr Abdul Khalek (TU) City Corporation Chittagong 
123 Mr Sirajul Islam (TU) No- I MPB Gate Port Chittagong 
124 Mr Md. Abdur Rashid (TU) No-1Jetty Gate Bank Bldg Chittagong. 
125 Mr Azizur Rahman (TU) Bandar Tila, Sagarica, Chittagong 
126 Maolana M Jalal Uddin K(RG-NPG) Sunia Madrasa Sholo Shahar Chittagong 
127 Mr Sukesh Kumer Das (RG-NPG) 121, Andarkilla, Chittagong 
128 Mr Md. Arifur Rahman, (NGO-NPG) YPSA, H-2, Road-1, Block-B Chand 
129 Mr Kamal Sengupta (NGO-NPG) 'Codcc' H-62, R-3 Chandgaon R/A, Chtg 
130 Mr Abdul Mandal (W-NPG) Not Mentioned, Chtg (hired. participants 
131 Mr Rashidur Rahman (W-NPG) Station Road, Railway. Chittagong 
132 Mr Md. Nizam uddin (VIP-NPG) 29 ORNizam Road Panchlaish Chtg 
133 Mr. Shishir Datta (VIP-NPG) Bita, Mahedibag Chittagong 
134 Mr Mozaffr Hossian Advocate. (AL-PP) Kadirgang, P. S. Boalia, Rajshahi, 
135 Mr Mizanur Rahman Minu (BNP-PP) Vadrra, Rajshahi 
136 Mr Salehudin Baby (BNP-PP) B/102, Laxmipur Zautota, Rajshahi, 
137 Mr Mohammad Nassim (L-1-PP) Asso. Prof, Dptt. of Stat, RU. 
138 Mr Md. Safiqur Rahman. (L- I -PP) Principal, Rajshahi Court College. 
139 Mr Fazle Hossain Badsha. (L-2-PP) Haragram, PO Rajshahi court, Rajshahi 
140 Mr Md. Liakat Ali (Liku) (L-2-PP) F- 1245, Ghoramara, Rajshahi 
141 Mr Md. Abul Kalam Azad (JIB-IPs-PP) Hetem Khan, Rajshahi 
142 Mr Md. Ataur Rahman (JIB-IPs-PP)Terokhadia-Rajpara, Rajshahi 
143 Mr Md. Said Hasan (S) D-184, Pathan Para, Rajshahi, 6000 
144 Mr Robiul Alam Budu (S) Horrogrqm, Rajshahi, court, Raj 
145 Mr Salauddin Baby (S) Mohish-Batra, Rajshahi 
146 Mr Nafiqul Islam Settu (S) Ganak Para, Rajshahi. 
147 Mr Sariul islam Babu. (S) Kumur para. Rajshahi. 
148 Mr F. R Khan (1) Dpt. of Sociology. RU. 
149 Mr Tariq Saiful Islam (I) Professor, Dpt, of Economics, RU. 
150 Mr Sahidul Islam (1) Director, IER, RU 
151 Mr Hassan Azizul Haque (1) Prof., Dptt. of Philosophy, RU 
152 Mr Abdul Khaleque (I) Prof., Deptt. of Bengali. RU 
153 Mr Md. Tazul Islam (P) 31,46. New Market, Razshahi 
154 Mr Rezaul Karim Razu (P) President of City Press Club (88-89) 
155 Mr Ghulam Arif (P) 160/2 Housing State, Rajshahi 
156 DR. Md. Dayem Uddin (P) Xylia Medicare, Laximpur more. Rajsha 
157 Mr Bulbul Choudhury. (P) 3rd Lane, Serial colony, Rajshahi 
158 Mr Zulfiqur Ahmed (TU) Kumar para, P. O. Ghoramara, Rajshahi. 
159 Mr Md, Enamul Haque. (TU) Khargora, Ghoramara, Rajshahi. 
160 Mr Rattque Uddin. Ahmed (TU) Rajarhata, P/O /Dist. Rajshahi 
161 Mr Md. Abdus Sattar, (TU) Vill. Tolimaie, Boolia R: ajshahi 
162 Mr. Rafiqul Islam Dulal(TU), Hossanigong, Rajshahi. 
163 Mr Nur Mohammad (RG-NPG) Nur Homio Farmecy, Barakuti Road. Raj 
164 Mr M, K, B, (RG-NPG) Dpt. of Management, RU. 
165 Mr Mustafizur Rahman Khan (NGO-NPG) F-1237, Ghoramara, Rajshahi 
166 Mr AKM Mustafizur Rahman Suza (B-NPG)Razar Hata, Boalia, Rajshahi 
167 Mr Minhaj Uddin Mintu (W-NPG) Studio, New Market, Rajshahi 
168 Mr Mosarraf Hossain Akutjee(W- NPG) No-I Godi, Shahed Bazar., Raj 
169 Mr Azhar Uddin (VIP-NPG) Sagarpara Shiptala, Ghoramara, Raj 
170 Dr, M, Mizanuddin (VIP-NPG) Professor, Depart, sociology, Rajshah 
171 Mr Md. MoNurt Imam (AL-PP) 51, Samsur Rahman Road, Khulna 
172 Mr Sheikhs Harun Ar Rashid (AL-PP) 24/8, Rupsha Stand Rd. Khulna 
173 Mr M. Nutul Islam (BNP-PP) 20, Babu khan Road, Khulna. 
174 Mr Shahjalal Bablu. (BNP-PP) 6/1 Oraroga Para. Khulna. 
175 Mr SK. Moninlzzaman, (L- I -PP) Anjuman Road, Daulatpur, Khulna. 
176 Mr A. B. M, Nurul Islam (L-2-PP) 91 Mia Para, Main Road, Khulna. 
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177 Mr Hafizur Rahman (L-2-PP) Platinum Jublice Jute Mills Abasic ar 
178 Mr Answer uddin. (JIB-IPs-PP) Pabla, Doykxpur, Khulna. 
179 Mr S. A. Wahab (JIB-IPs-PP) 8, Gazi Ahsan Ali Lane, Hazi Mohsin RD 
180 Mr Md. Shahidul Haq (S) 1/6, Fire Brigate Road Khulna, -PH-725S 181 Mr Sarder Ruhin Hossain Prince(S) 45, hagi ismail link road-2 bonar khul 
182 Mr Ruhul Azim Rumi (S) 20/Munshpara, Khulna. 
183 Mr Diponkar Shah Dipu (S) 31F topkhyana road. shaka 
184 Mr Md Ilash Hossain (S) Boira, Khulna. 
185 Mr Mina Mizanur Rahman (I) 24, B. K west road khulna 
186 Mr A, K. Hiru (Sk Abut) (I). 177. B. K main road khula 
187 Mr H, M. Shahdat (Abdur Rauf) (1) Munshi Para, 2nd Lane Khulna 
188 Mr Tarak Chandra Kundu (1) 39, Mia Para Main Road Khu1na 
189 Dr. Md. Samsur Rahman (P) 17, Kh A Salsu8m road, Khulna 
190 Mr Mokbul Hossain Mintu (P) Tutpara central road, khulna. 
191 Mr E. M Maksudur Rahman ((P) Chotto Boyra, Khulna. 
192 Mr SM Moslem Uddin (P) Messer Monjil, 26 13 ,K 
East, Road, Khuln 
193 Mr B. M, Jafar (TU) Tut pars, Khulna. 
194 Mr Abdul Latif (TU) 37/A, Boira, Khulna. 
195 Mr Abdul Malek (TU) Khalispur, Khulna. 
196 Mowlana A. B. M Habuber Rahman (TU)K/4, Khalispur H, Estate, Khulna. 
197 Mr Md Mojibur Rahman (TU) Khalispur, Khulna. 
198 Mr Md Solaimen Ibne Faruk (RG-NPG) Boira, Khulna. 
199 Mr Rabindranath Taposhi (RG-NPG) Shibbari, Kalimondir. Palpara Road, Khu 
200 Mr Moheshor Raza (NGO-NPG) 13, F. Sir Iqbal Road, Khulna. 
201 Mr Abdul Goni (NGO-NPG) Wobax, Boira, Khulna. 
202 Mr Sharif K Jaman (B-NPG) Khalispur Housing Estate, Khulna 
203 Mr Abdur Rob (W-NPG) Mia Para Gamaya Mosqu, Khulna 
204 Mr Jotirmoy Mollik (W-NPG) 21 1, Khan jhan ali Road. Khulna. 
205 Mr Jakirul Islam (VIP-NPG) Officer, Islami Bank, (JS, BLC ) 
206 Mr Motiar Rahman (VIP-N'PG ) 133B, Tut Para, Khulna. (VP BLC) 
